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Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less travelled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
 
Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken 
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Thanks for being with me in travelling the less trodden path. 
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Abstract 
My thesis examines Indonesian filmmakers’ struggles in undermining the hegemonic 
ideal, bapakism. It focuses on the crucial years of 2000–2014. Profound socio-political 
and economic shifts had forced changes to Indonesia’s official patterning of gender 
relations during the period. Consequently, the changes provoked a requestioning of 
what constituted ideal masculinity, as well as femininity in Indonesia. So far, inadequate 
scholarly attention has been paid to the workings of power and class dimensions 
underlying the rejuvenated gender politics to secure hegemonic masculinity, especially 
in popular culture. Commercial cinema was, and still is, one of the most crucial arenas 
in popular culture, in which political agents—primarily urban, highly educated middle 
classes—sought to legitimise alternative ideals or to reinforce the existing hegemonic 
masculinity. My thesis is interested in exploring commercial filmmakers’ choices, 
negotiations and compromises in shaping what could be represented and idealised on 
Indonesian commercial cinema at this given time. Taking into account the flourishing of 
the 'new man' on-screen, I decided to use the filmmakers' struggles to legitimise this 
alternative ideal in commercial cinema as my analytic lens. The ‘new man’ challenges 
the hegemonic bapakism’s valorisation of breadwinning, authoritative patron leadership 
and heteronormativity. Combining textual analysis, field research and interface 
ethnography, I argue that commercial filmmakers struggled to innovate and experiment 
with alternative ideals which promoted equal and fluid gender relations on the big 
screen. Yet, the filmmakers’ struggles were overshadowed by middle-class biases and 
moral panic.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
My thesis examines filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the hegemony of the official 
cultural ideal of masculinity in Indonesia from 2000 to 2014. The period was marked by 
profound changes in the official structures of gender relations. It was against this 
background that intensive searches for alternative ideal masculinities, as well as 
femininities, were waged by various interest groups in various arenas. Cinema was, and 
still is, one of the most poignant arenas in popular culture, in which political agents 
have sought to legitimise alternative ideals or to reinforce the hegemony of bapakism,1 
the official most-exalted form of masculinity. In this thesis, I am interested in unpacking 
the workings of power that underpin Indonesian filmmakers’ struggles to legitimise 
forms of alternative ideal masculinities through commercial cinema during the period in 
question. Combining textual analysis, field research and interface ethnography, I argue 
that during the period, new hope blossomed in terms of representing alternative ideal 
masculinities in commercial cinema. Progressive filmmakers used intensive innovation 
and experimentation with alternative ideal masculinities to promote equal and fluid 
gender relations on the big screen. However, as the thesis unfolds, I also demonstrate 
that the filmmakers’ struggles were marred by middle-class biases and moral panic. 
During the period from 2000 to 2014, Indonesia was recovering from multiple 
crises. One of the major problems was the deep and protracted economic situation 
triggered by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The period saw the country struggling to 
bounce back to its pre-crisis economic condition. The struggle manifested in major 
restructuring at both macro and micro levels. Furthermore, the period also saw 
1 As suggested by Julia Suryakusuma, bapakism is basically a configuration of gender practices, 
personalities and culture which socially constructs its subjects, generally men, to become authoritative 
patron leaders in the family collectivity, ranging from a nuclear family to the nation; the idealisation of 
bapakism is supported by the idealisation of ibuism, which valorises women’s reproductive and domestic 
roles (2011: 5). 
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Indonesia struggling to re-establish itself as a democratic country in the wake of the 
demise of the New Order authoritarian regime (1966–1998). The democratisation of the 
public sphere led to the flourishing of civil society movements and an intensifying 
Islamisation. Among the civil society movements were feminist and LGBTIQ 
campaigns, which previously had been carefully controlled by the authoritarian regime. 
In addition, Islamisation became the most striking feature in the politics, economy and 
culture of the period. Interactions between these variants triggered major changes and 
debates within Indonesian gender politics and called into question the official 
patriarchal gender order as well as the legitimacy of hegemonic masculinity. 
This period also saw the flourishing of Indonesian cinema, with emerging 
filmmakers seeking to engage productively with various transformations that were 
taking place in the post-authoritarian socio-cultural landscape. After a long hiatus, 
Indonesian cinema was reinvigorated by the emergence of a new generation of 
filmmakers who were eager to take part in the country’s democratisation process 
through cinema. Consequently, Indonesian cinema became one of the most important 
arenas for gender politics, including the struggle to secure a new form of hegemonic 
masculinity in Indonesia at this given time. It was where certain political discourses 
concerning gender and gender relations were translated, or encoded, into film texts. 
Filmmakers who were critical of the patriarchal gender order and hegemonic 
masculinity experimented and innovated with alternative ideal masculinities to be 
visually depicted on the silver screen. They contributed to the shaping of what could 
and could not be represented, as well as which representations of masculinities could be 
idealised. 
My thesis is situated at the intersection of these phenomena. I examine gender 
politics in the arena of commercial cinema and the role of filmmakers in the broader 
struggles to steer the gender order in a certain direction through the re-creation and 
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representation of masculinity and gender relations. I seek to unpack certain filmmakers’ 
choices, negotiations and compromises in shaping what could and could not be 
represented, and what could and could not be idealised on the silver screen during this 
period in Indonesia. Recognising that the ‘new man’ emerged as one of the most 
prevalent alternative ideals seeking legitimacy on- and off-screen, I decided to use the 
filmmakers’ struggles to legitimise the ‘new man’ through commercial cinema as my 
investigative lens. The ‘new man’ challenges hegemonic bapakism’s valorisation of the 
breadwinning, authoritative patron of leadership and heteronormativity. Through a 
combination of close textual reading, field research and interface ethnography, my 
analysis reveals that while new hopes for more equal gender relations have indeed 
bloomed in Indonesian cinema, there are also strong middle-class preconceptions and 
anxieties that overshadow these cinematic alternative ideals of masculinity. Indeed, 
progressive Indonesian filmmakers working in commercial cinema took part in a 
broader struggle for hegemonic masculinity by promoting alternative ideals on screen, 
albeit marred by middle-class biases. As they did so, they had to deal with more 
rampant and random state and public censorship as well as moral panic.  
The first premise running through this thesis is that filmmakers are political 
agents who actively engage with contemporary gender politics—domestically and 
internationally. Their creative endeavour in cinema does not take place in a social and 
political vacuum. Even in commercial cinema, in which politics and commercial 
pressures are intricately interwoven, filmmakers cannot escape from factoring off-
screen political and social conditions in shaping the representations of social realities in 
their films. As suggested by Douglas Kellner, ‘film creators tap into the events, fears, 
fantasies and hopes of an era and give cinematic expression to social experiences and 
realities’ (2010: 4). Indonesian filmmakers definitely exploit contemporary gender 
politics to cinematically express their political views. At the same time, filmmakers, 
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especially those working in the commercial sphere, have to also factor off-screen 
politics into their filmmaking processes to ensure that their works do not attract 
unwanted controversy, which has the potential to harm film distribution and sales. 
Filmmakers have to carefully negotiate with off-screen political conditions in order to 
ensure that their works can reach their audience and potentially trigger changes in 
society. 
Furthermore, considering that filmmaking is mostly a collective endeavour and 
takes place in particular socio-political backgrounds, the filmmakers’ decisions, 
negotiations and compromises during the filmmaking process is a crux for politics. I 
acknowledge that the advance of technology has opened up opportunities for an auteur 
to undertake the process of filmmaking individually without the involvement of other 
people. Yet, such is a rare case, especially with films intended for commercial cinema. 
Generally, filmmakers must deal with other parties, as well as with each other, in the 
processes of production and the distribution of their works. The other parties include, 
but are not limited to producers, film consultants, the state censorship board, film 
distributors and exhibitors. These other parties may not share the filmmakers’ political 
perspectives regarding gender and they may have different interests in contemporary 
gender politics. Even the principal crew that is working on a particular film may not 
necessarily hold the same vision of filmmaking, let alone of politics. The negotiations 
and possible compromises engaged by filmmakers as they deal with these other parties 
and the associated off-screen politics are my main interest in this research. 
The proposition that filmmakers are political agents leads to my second premise. 
The representations of ideal masculinities offered on the silver screen are, thus, 
political. Taking into account the politics engaged by filmmakers in the production and 
distribution of films, we can no longer look at images of ideal masculinities on cinema 
screen as apolitical, detached from contemporary politics, including gender politics. 
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While the commercial pressure is real in every production of commercial film, we 
cannot sever cinematic representations from the (gender) politics underlying their 
production and distribution processes. In the case of my thesis, cinematic 
representations can indeed be political tools with which filmmakers stage their political 
ideals concerning masculinity. Consequently, cinematic representations of alternative 
ideal masculinities offered by filmmakers are part of a political endeavour aimed at 
replacing the hegemonic ideal and transforming the patriarchal gender order. 
My thesis contributes to the existing literature on Indonesian gender politics of 
the twenty-first century by offering a different vantage point: the struggle of 
filmmakers, who are representative of urban, highly educated, middle-class Indonesians, 
in challenging the existing hegemonic masculinity ideal through commercial cinema. As 
I will elaborate in a later section in this chapter, my thesis is situated in the study of 
Indonesian gender politics, in which discussion on men and masculinity is still scant 
and attention to popular culture is minimal. I join other scholars, including Tom 
Boellstorff (2004), Pam Nilan (2009), Rebecca Elmhirst (2007), Sonja van Wichelen 
(2009) and Kathryn Robinson (2015), in exploring the masculine dimension of twenty-
first-century Indonesian gender politics. Yet, I differ from these scholars in my method 
as I explore the pursuit for a new hegemonic masculinity in a non-formal political 
arena—popular culture, in which cinema is a significant part—instead of everyday 
politics or formal constitutional government. The battle for hegemonic masculinity is no 
less fierce but arguably more visible in cinema. During the period under study, the 
Indonesian public was witness to competing visual representations of ideal 
masculinities, some of which led to certain trends as well as political debates off-screen. 
My thesis offers insights into the workings of power and the struggles for resistance 
behind and around commercial cinema which eventually shapes what could and could 
not be represented, as well as what could and could not be idealised in terms of 
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masculinity in Indonesia between 2000 and 2014. This was a period marked by 
profound changes in gender order—the overall patterning of gender relations (R.W. 
Connell 2005: 84). 
My thesis also contributes to this gender scholarship by exploring the class 
dimension of such a political struggle. Political expressions arguably vary across class 
lines. Commercial filmmakers are a representation of urban-based and highly educated 
middle classes. Their political expressions may differ from that of the rural-based 
lower-class men, for example in Rebecca Elmhirst’s research (2007), who tend to resort 
to violence against the growing trend of women’s mobility for employment purposes, 
while they face dwindling employment opportunities. As I will explain in this thesis, the 
progressive commercial filmmakers criticise such political expressions and draw from 
alternative discourses, especially gender empowerment, to create representations of 
alternative ideas of masculinity on screen. My thesis thus provides insights into the 
nuances of political expressions which are strongly influenced by class. 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I explain 
the theory and framework central to my thesis. I elaborate on how I engage with R.W. 
Connell’s theorisation of masculinities and his three-structure framework. Next, I claim 
my research’s significance in the field of Indonesian gender politics. My thesis is the 
first in-depth research of gender politics which focuses on the intensified struggle for 
hegemonic masculinity pursued in Indonesian cinema. I detail my methods, involving 
approach, analytical lens and data collection methods. Finally, I explain briefly how the 
rest of this thesis is structured. 
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Masculinities and the gender order 
R.W. Connell’s theorisation of masculinity is central to my thesis.2 It shaped my 
understanding that masculinity is an historically specific social construction. 
Furthermore, it helped me understand that relations among masculinities, as well as 
between masculinities and femininities are neither neutral nor stable. In fact, the 
relations among gender categories in a specific gender order are hierarchical and 
historically dynamic. The plurality and inequality among masculinities are the crux for 
gender politics. Hegemonic status among masculinities is to be won by various interest 
groups. It is the political battle to secure this ultimate status through commercial cinema 
in Indonesia in the first 15 years of the twenty-first century which my thesis aims to 
unpack. The ability to secure hegemonic masculinity involves having the power to steer 
the official gender order in a particular direction—one that is set by the winning interest 
group.  
I depart from sex role theory in defining masculinities because of its inadequacy 
in explaining the multiplicity and the unequal relations among masculinities. In general, 
the sex role theory of gender, initially proposed by Margaret Mead (1950) and Talcott 
Parsons and Robert F. Bales (1955), emphasises stereotypical expectations for men’s 
and women’s behaviour. As R.W. Connell explained sex role theory ‘connects social 
structure with the formation of personality, via the idea of role learning or 
internalisation’ (1985: 262). The emphasis on social construction is appealing. Indeed, 
by adapting Simone de Beauvoir’s famous quote, we can say that one is not born 
masculine (1953: 273).3 Becoming a masculine man is not necessarily correlated with 
2 R.W. Connell, also known as Robert Connell or Raewyn Connell, is a prominent scholar in critical 
studies of men and masculinity, an offshoot of feminist and gender studies. R.W. Connell’s phenomenal 
work, Masculinities, first published in 1995 has become a canon source in the emerging field of study. 
Other works which emphasise the working of power in the social construction of gender have offered an 
alternative approach to studying gender and gender relations. 
3 In theorising about becoming a woman, de Beauvoir in her book, The Second Sex, states that ‘One is not 
born, but rather becomes, a woman (1953: 273). 
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being biologically male, although male individuals are indeed the most common 
subjects of masculinities. Masculinities are products of power/knowledge regimes, as in 
is the case of other gender identity categories (Butler 1999: 4–5). 
Yet, the social construction in sex role theory does not explain the fact that there 
must be more than one masculinity operating in a particular society at a particular time. 
According to Michael Messner (1998: 258), sex role theory has failed to explain the 
plurality of masculinity and the unequal relations between different masculinities, as 
well as between masculinities and femininities. Recognising the plurality of masculinity 
is about acknowledging that ‘ways of being a man and cultural representations of/about 
men vary, both historically and culturally, between societies and between different 
groupings of men within any one society’ (Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 82–83). The 
intersection between masculine identity and other identities creates a myriad of different 
masculinities which occupy different social locations within the gender order.  
Furthermore, sex role theory is inadequate in explaining the unequal relations 
among masculinities. A certain type of masculinity can become the most culturally 
exalted, while others are subordinated or even marginalised at a particular moment in 
history. Yet, culturally exalted masculinity does not remain at this apex position forever. 
Resistance against it is ever present and culturally exalted masculinity can lose its 
legitimacy and no longer retain its hegemonic position. Sex role theory is unable to 
explain resistance, change and history, which are central to this thesis (R.W. Connell 
1985; Messner 1998). I shall demonstrate that at one point in history, the battle for 
hegemonic masculinity becomes intensified, and the hegemonic basis of culturally 
exalted masculinity is substantially eroded. 
Thus, in this thesis I adopt R.W. Connell’s definition of masculinities. 
Masculinities are simultaneously two things. First, they are positions in a system of 
gender relations; second, they are certain configurations of gendered practices, 
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personality and culture, which are deemed manly, and which impact on practices in 
bodily performance (R.W. Connell 2005: 72). Adopting this bifurcated definition has 
helped me see masculinities as multiple categories. It has helped me understand the 
intricate relations among the multiple categories, as well as the relations between 
masculinities and femininities, which are historically dynamic (Hearn 2007: 392). 
Masculinities are socially organised within a system of gender relations, which 
also organises the relations between masculinities and femininities. As masculinity 
intersects with other identities, such as class and ethnicity, there are multiple forms of 
masculinity operating in a particular culture, at a particular time (Beynon 2002: 2; 
MacKinnon 2003: 11). The system of gender relations is termed by R.W. Connell as the 
‘gender order’, which is basically the overall collective patterning of relations between 
men and women and between masculinities and femininities at a particular moment in 
historical time (2002: 54). 
Allow me to give an anecdotal example to explain Indonesia’s official gender 
order. I grew up in Indonesia in the 1980 and 1990s. During secondary school years (in 
the 1990s), I felt very uncomfortable seeing one of my school mates, whom I had 
befriended at a much younger age, being verbally bullied because of his effeminate 
character; he was seen as less masculine than other boys. On TV, I watched how the 
verbal bullying of effeminate men or transwomen was often presented as comical. In a 
comedy film, for example the rerun of Betty Bencong Slebor (Betty the Reckless 
Transwoman, 1978, Benyamin Sueb), the transwoman character was subjected to 
countless derogatory remarks due to her non-normative gender performativity, and her 
masculinity was represented as a sham. This marginalisation of non-normative genders 
was not random and coincidental. They made a certain pattern of gender relations in the 
society to which I belonged at that particular time undesirable. In other words, the 
femininity and masculinity performatively displayed by the effeminate boy and the 
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transwoman were ‘not normal’. They were ‘unnatural’. Yet, there was no legal measure 
to criminalise transgenderism or homosexuality at that time. That particular patterning 
of relations between men and women at a collective level was part of the gender order 
in Indonesia at that time. It has slightly differed today. When I was conducting this 
research, between 2013 and 2016, there was strong support for individuals of non-
heteronormative genders and sexualities. At the same time, there was a strong pressure 
to criminalise them (Muthmainnah 2016). Such conflicting pressures were barely 
visible, or at least not publicly debated, in the 1980s and 1990s, although discrimination 
was undoubtedly widespread. 
Relations among masculinities within a gender order are hierarchical. R.W. 
Connell’s earlier work (1996) explains that a certain form of masculinity can become 
the most culturally exalted and achieve the hegemonic position, while others are 
subordinated or even marginalised at any particular moment in history. Culturally 
exalted masculinity can achieve hegemonic status and become the ‘most acceptable 
answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to 
guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’ (R.W. 
Connell 2005: 77). As a result, the configuration of gender practices constituting 
hegemonic masculinity become ‘taken for granted’ features of ideal masculinity. 
Hegemonic masculinity, in a Gramscian sense of the term, signifies a position of 
cultural authority and leadership, but not necessarily a total dominance. Thus, a 
hegemonic masculinity does not have to be the most common masculinity adopted by 
most men in a community at a particular moment in history, but it is certainly what most 
men and boys aspire towards. The majority of men, regardless of their ability to perform 
the gender practices that constitute hegemonic masculinity, are likely to support it as 
they receive what Connell terms the ‘patriarchal dividend’—the benefits allocated to 
men as a group for maintaining an unequal gender order (Raewyn Connell 2009: 142). 
10 
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Structurally, men are the interest group motivated to maintain unequal relations between 
genders as they reap the benefits in forms of honour, prestige and the right to command. 
Femininities are also defined against this so-called hegemonic masculinity—particularly 
by the extent to which they can support the establishment and maintain hegemonic 
masculinity and thus the patriarchal gender order. The femininity deemed the most 
compatible with hegemonic masculinity is more culturally exalted than other 
femininities. R.W. Connell terms it ‘emphasised femininity’ (1987: 187). 
In the case of Indonesia, the patriarchal gender order has facilitated the 
ascendancy of bapakism masculinity to the hegemonic position. Bapakism is basically a 
configuration of gender practices, personalities and culture which socially constructs its 
subjects, generally men, to become authoritative patron leaders in the family 
collectivity, ranging from a nuclear family to the nation (Suryakusuma 2011: 5). The 
hegemony of bapakism is sustained partly by the emphasis on ibuism femininity. 
According to Julia Suryakusuma, ibuism promotes women’s reproductive and domestic 
roles (2011: 2). Under the New Order regime, the policing of women’s roles as 
domestically bound wives and mothers was paramount to its gender politics. As shown 
by Suzanne Brenner (1999), for example, the authoritarian regime carefully controlled 
the representations of ideal women in the print media partly by censoring 
representations of women who were politically active and endorsing domestically 
bound wives and mothers. In such a way, the regime not only sustained the apolitical 
ibuism as the ultimate feminine ideal, but, in doing so, sustained the hegemony of 
bapakism by securing men’s roles in politics and in the public sphere more generally. 
R.W. Connell (1987, 2005) identifies three major structures in the system of 
gender relations which govern the relations among masculinities, as well as between 
masculinities and femininities. They include the structure of: the gender relations of 
production; the gender relations of power; and the gender relations of emotion. These 
11 
Evi Eliyanah 
three structures are substantially different, but they are not entirely separate. They, in 
fact, interweave and condition each other at all time. The three structures bear basic 
differences in the ordering of social relations among genders that operate in a system of 
gender relations at any particular time (R.W. Connell 1987: 97).4 
The structure of the gender relations of production basically deals with the 
gendered division of labour. In the simplest term, it is the allocation of certain types of 
work to a certain category of people (R.W. Connell 1987: 99). It incorporates, but is not 
limited to  
the organisation of housework and childcare, the division between paid and unpaid 
work, the segregation of production markets and the creation of ‘men’s jobs’ and 
‘women’s jobs’, discrimination in training and promotion, unequal wages and unequal 
change (ibid.: 96).  
These gender-based divisions of production are historically common and can be found 
across cultures. Yet, there is not exactly the same divisions in different cultures or at 
different moments of history (R.W. Connell 2002: 60). 
The second structure, the gender relations of power, involves both organised, 
institutional power and diffuse, discursive power (ibid.: 59). Organised and institutional 
power has to do with authority, control and coercion imposed by authoritative bodies, 
such as the state and companies; diffuse, discursive power, adopted from a Foucauldian 
concept of power, has to do with discourses underlying gender practices. The latter form 
of power is intimately present and does not necessarily involve institutionalised 
disciplines, such as in the earlier form of power (ibid.). 
4 In later work, Gender (2002) and Gender in World Perspective (2009), R.W. Connell adds another 
structure: symbolism, culture and discourse. This structure basically incorporates the ways in which 
society discursively constructs genders and sexualities through a system of representations, including 
symbolism, language, as well as visual representations (Raewyn Connell 2009: 83–85; R.W. Connell 
2002: 65–68). However, I tend to see this structure as constitutive in the previous three structures. The 
cinematic representations under my investigation are structured by the relations of power, production and 
intimacy. The taken-for-granted depiction of men as breadwinners, for instance, is shaped by a patriarchal 
gender relation of production, which requires men to provide a livelihood for their family. 
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The third structure relates to the gender relations of emotion, also known as 
cathexis. This structure has to do with the  
patterning of object-choice, desire and desirability; with the production of 
heterosexuality and homosexuality and the relationship between them; with the socially 
structured antagonism of gender (woman-hating, man-hating, self-hatred); with trust 
and distrust, jealousy and solidarity in marriages and other relationships; and with the 
emotional relationships involved in rearing children (R.W. Connell 1987: 97). 
Generally, the patterning of emotional attachment is most notable as a set of 
prohibitions, such as the incest taboo, law against rape, age of consent, and 
homosexuality; yet, at the same time, the patterning also involves injunctions to love 
and develop relationship with ‘the right person’, as well as to find certain forms of 
femininity or masculinity more desirable in such a relationship (ibid.: 112). 
I employed this three-structure model as my analytical framework to help me 
understand the complex processes of change to the gender order, which implicated 
masculinities in twenty-first-century Indonesia. The model allowed me to map the crisis 
tendencies of each structure, which reflect each structure’s internal tendencies towards 
change. It led me to trace the processes of change of gender relations in each structure, 
which may have developed and matured at different times. Internal contradictions 
within the structure of gender relations are key sites of gender politics. Indeed, as 
suggested by Raewyn Connell (2009: 138), the movements in gender politics follow the 
broad outlines of social divisions and interests defined in these structures of gender 
relations. 
The general premise of this framework is that each structure of gender relations 
develops within itself internal contradictions which can undermine the accepted pattern 
of relations, and eventually force a change within the structure itself (ibid.: 90–91). 
Ultimately,  
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Inequalities construct interests (whether or not the interests are articulated). Those 
benefiting from the inequalities have an interest in defending them. Those who bear the 
costs have an interest in ending them (ibid.: 141). 
At a particular moment in history, the crisis tendencies can no longer be offset 
and in turn, develop into an actual crisis of the gender order as a whole. It is at this 
moment of crisis that the legitimacy of hegemonic masculinity is substantially eroded. 
Such an event is likely to provoke attempts to restore the legitimacy of the previous 
hegemonic masculinity or to reconfigure it (R.W. Connell 2005: 84). Supporters of 
hegemonic masculinity have to struggle more fiercely to defend the hegemony of the 
culturally exalted masculinity as emerging alternatives are more intensively sought and 
legitimated on various fronts. This struggle for hegemonic position during a gender-
order crisis and in its wake is central to this thesis. I will explain in greater detail about 
the gender-order crisis in Indonesia which stimulated a more intensive search for an 
alternative ideal masculinity in Chapter 2. 
This section elaborates the theory and analytical framework deployed in the 
thesis. I underscore the centrality of Connell’s theorisation on masculinities in my 
pursuit of understanding the plurality and unequal social relations of masculinities, as 
well as between masculinities and femininities. In addition, I elaborate on the three-
structure model framework which I deployed in my research to identify the crisis 
tendencies of each structure of gender relations, around which my research participants 
waged their struggles to reconfigure hegemonic masculinity. Eventually, I would like to 
conclude this section by reasserting that the plurality of masculinities and unequal 
relations among them are a crux for gender politics. They provide reasons for 
proponents of hegemonic masculinity to fiercely defend the established cultural ideal of 
masculinity. At the same time, they provide reasons for the opposition to delegitimise 
the cultural ideal and offer alternatives. It is this reinvigorated struggle for hegemonic 
masculinity in twenty-first-century Indonesia which is the main concern of this thesis. 
14 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Reel masculinities in the study of Indonesian gender politics 
In this section, I situate my research in the burgeoning studies of Indonesian gender 
politics and elaborate my goals. Existing literature on Indonesian gender politics mostly 
focuses on women, femininities and marginalised groups of genders and sexualities, 
with only a few studies on men and masculinities. Among the scant studies focusing on 
masculinities, most concentrate on the conventional arena of gender politics, 
particularly state policies at regional or national levels. My thesis offers an in-depth 
investigation of the gender politics involved in securing hegemonic masculinity in 
twenty-first-century Indonesia and treats commercial cinema as a crucial arena of such 
public gender politics.  
Twenty-first-century Indonesian gender politics has been an important topic of 
discussion and debate among scholars. In fact, as stated by K. Robinson (2009: 164), 
gender politics has been an important arena of political struggle for securing state power 
since the turn of the new millennium. The major changes in the economy, politics and 
society that have taken place since the end of the second millennium arguably have 
motivated the burgeoning scholarship in Indonesian gender politics at this given time. 
Scholars such as Krishna Sen (2000), Boellstorff (2005a), Elizabeth Martyn (2005), 
Sharyn Davies (2005), Brenner (2006), Kate O’Shaughnessy (2009), Nelly van Doorn-
Harder (2002); Pieternella van Doorn-Harder (2006), Kaleen Love (2007) and Suvianita 
Khanis (2013) have been discussing in which directions gender politics is leading and 
who the strong political actors involved in Indonesian gender politics are. Other 
scholars, such as Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Saskia Wieringa (2003), Sharon 
Bessell (2004), Rachel Silvey (2004), Michele Ford and Lyn Parker (2008), Elizabeth 
Rhoads (2012), Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (2012), Ben Murtagh (2013), Stephen McNally, 
Jeffrey Grierson and Irwan Martua Hidayana (2015), and Ben Hilman (2017), discuss 
whose interests those political actors represent, and to whose advantage. The flourishing 
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Islamisation has also motivated scholars, such as Lily Munir (2005), Rachel Rinaldo 
(2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2014), K. Robinson (2009, 2015, 2016), Wieringa (2015), Mirjam 
Lücking and Evi Eliyanah (2017), to assess the extent to which the increasingly visible 
phenomenon has shaped the trajectory of gender politics at this given time. 
Yet, the focus on women, femininities and marginalised gender and sexualities 
is highly visible. Indeed, these studies have offered valuable insights. Evelyn 
Blackwood (2005) and Silvey (2006) have contributed to an understanding of the 
diversity and change in femininities as well as marginalised sexualities. Sen (2000), 
Boellstorff (2005), Khanis (2013), Rinaldo (2013) and Silvey (2014) have charted the 
multiple trajectories of personal and public gender politics of the patriarchal gender 
order’s cost-bearer groups. In addition, Murtagh (2013) and McNally Grierson and 
Hidayana (2015) discuss the various platforms on which these groups are engaged in 
expressing their identities and political views on gender. Finally, Elmhirst (2002), 
Boellstorff (2004a), Brenner (2006), Davies (2016), Human Rights Watch (2016) and 
K. Robinson (2016) have highlighted the continued and intensifying repression as well 
as discrimination experienced by these groups despite the range of positive 
developments during the twenty-first century in Indonesia.  
The focus on women and marginalised genders and sexualities is a logical 
consequence because they are arguably the immediate cost bearers of the patriarchal 
gender order. Men, on the contrary, are the recipients of ‘patriarchal dividend’ 
privileges that accrue to all men as a group by virtue of their masculine gender. The 
struggle of women and marginalised groups, mostly inspired by the feminist movement, 
has been vital in forcing changes towards an equal patterning of gender relations in 
Indonesia. The struggle has been more intensified since the turn of the millennium. 
Thus, it is a logical consequence of this development that scholarly engagement in 
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gender politics tends to be drawn into the struggle. In fact, like elsewhere, ‘gender 
politics’ is almost a code-word for these groups’ struggles for equality. 
Men and masculinities are not entirely absent from the above studies. In fact, it 
is impossible to talk about women and femininities in isolation without making 
reference to men and masculinities. However, there has been a limited attempt to shift 
the focus to men and masculinities. This is the gap which my thesis aims to bridge. 
Most of the abovementioned studies on gender politics tend to overlook men as a 
diverse group, and masculinities as irreducible to the culturally exalted form, which 
seems stubbornly unchanged. Nilan (2009a) and Elmhirst (2007), who are both pioneers 
in the studies of masculinities in Indonesia, agree that although the focus on women and 
femininities are by all means necessary, these studies have made men and masculinities 
remain unmarked categories or at best assumed to be one-dimensional. Doing so 
eventually will lead to a lack of understanding about the masculine segment of gender 
politics at this particular moment in Indonesian history. 
I argue that exploring ‘the masculine half’ of gender politics is imperative 
because men have different experiences in their relations to the gender ideals 
established in any particular society in a specific historical moment. Specifically, they 
establish complex social relations with the hegemonic masculinity. Michael Kaufman 
argues:  
Though men hold power and reap privileges that come with our sex [sic], that power is 
tainted … men’s social power is the source of individual power and privilege, but as we 
shall see, it is also the source of the individual experience of pain, fear and alienation 
(1999: 59). 
Men are subjected to a paradox of the patriarchal gender order. Thus, men can 
also be the cost-bearer group in this same patriarchal gender order, and masculinities are 
not only diverse but also historically dynamic. Consequently, as Pierre Bourdieu 
suggested, in order to understand the effects of the patriarchal gender order, it is 
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imperative to accompany the ongoing struggle to free women from masculine 
domination with an effort to expose how the same structure of domination also affects 
men (2001: 114). My thesis, thus, offers an alternative perspective of gender politics by 
exploring the struggle to replace the existing hegemonic masculinity in Indonesia in the 
period marked by a gender-order crisis. It provides an analysis around which aspects of 
the struggle were waged by certain political agents—in this case filmmakers—and how 
these political agents negotiated with the competing forces mobilised to counter their 
political moves in undermining hegemonic masculinity. 
Among the scant scholarship on Indonesian gender politics which focuses on 
masculinities, attention is barely directed to the struggle for hegemonic masculinity 
through popular culture. These studies approach the subject matter generally through an 
anthropological lens ( Boellstorff 2004a; K. Robinson 2015; van Wichelen 2009), a 
sociological perspective (Nilan 2009; Nilan and Demartoto 2012; Nilan, Demartoto and 
Broom 2013) research. These studies are insightful in revealing the strategies deployed 
by various interest groups in the struggle for hegemony. Boellstorff (2004a) and van 
Wichelen (2009) underscore how Islam has been used by different factions to legitimise 
their respective ideal version of masculinity and for that reason also to 
subordinate/marginalise other masculinities. K. Robinson (2015) also highlights the way 
that the heightened Islamisation has waged a series of masculinist backlashes against 
movements for gender equality in post-authoritarian Indonesia, so they can achieve their 
eventual goal—securing state power. At a personal level of gender politics, Nilan 
(2009) delineates that generally the hegemonic form of bapakism has lost its appeal 
among Indonesian youth in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Indonesian youth currently 
live under different sets of pressures compared to the previous generation of Indonesian 
men. Economic pressure, especially after the economic crisis, and the distribution of 
alternative images from the media, especially hypermasculinity, have made youths 
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critically negotiate the older hegemonic form of masculinity to better answer 
contemporary pressures. 
I dwell on a nonconventional yet poignant arena of gender politics where a 
fiercer and more visible struggle for hegemony is taking place—popular culture. 
Popular culture, of which cinema is part, must not be treated as simply as a by-product 
of commercial commodities. Instead, it should be seen as a more complex arena of 
meaning making and exchanging. In that sense, popular culture is ‘a site of struggle 
between the “resistance” of subordinate groups and the forces of “incorporation” 
operating in the interests of dominant groups (Storey 2009: 10). Specifically, I will 
demonstrate that commercial cinema is rife with gender politics, in this case to secure 
hegemonic masculinity. Ideological battles to contest or defend hegemonic masculinity 
take place behind, on and around the cinema screen. I examine the filmmakers’ 
strategies and compromises in challenging the hegemonic ideal and promoting an 
alternative ideal masculinity. 
I chose Indonesian commercial cinema as my field site in which to explore the 
struggle for hegemonic masculinity; first because it can be an unequal playing field for 
filmmakers intending to challenge hegemonic masculinity. Filmmakers as political 
agents do not hold absolute power in determining what can and cannot be represented 
on the silver screen. As I stated earlier, they have to deal with other factions who may 
have different interests but have more power over what they can do behind the scenes. 
The struggle to reconcile the different interests and navigate the unequal power relations 
behind and around the screen is the crux for the politics that I am interested in.  
Furthermore, the pressure for profit making in commercial cinema is immense, 
unlike in independent cinema. The production of commercial films generally relies on 
funding provided by profit-oriented film companies and investors. Film investment 
itself is categorised as a high-risk venture because the profit projection is often very 
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difficult to predict (Smith 2015). In addition, the distribution of commercial films relies 
on profit-driven cinema theatres and other commercial distribution outlets. 
Consequently, filmmakers working in this particular arena are burdened by the pressure 
to make their films sell well in commercial film markets and not stir unwanted 
controversy and censorship which potentially hamper the sales of films. Thus, 
filmmakers are generally compelled to make their works ‘political but safe’ (Putut 
Widjanarko, personal interview, 10 March 2014). Therefore, filmmakers, as political 
agents, should carefully negotiate between, on one hand, the profit-making pressure, 
which generally demands conformity with the dominant norms, including those of 
gender, and on the other hand the political intention of critiquing dominant social 
constructions of gender. My thesis dwells on this area of nonconventional gender 
politics, examining how filmmakers negotiate the tension in the nexus between political 
intentions and the profit-making mission in order to be able to stage their political 
struggle on screen. 
Second, when films are successful in penetrating the commercial markets, the 
distribution of images of gender through cinematic representations can reach a far wider 
audience, unbound by geographical boundaries. It can lead to the creation of a new 
popular trend. In some cases, these trends are then adapted into other forms of popular 
culture, including fashion, lifestyle, television, music and literature. The adaptation is 
less likely to take place in reverse. This is unlike the images of men and masculinities in 
the print media, as investigated by Suzie Handajani (2010, 2012), and literature, as 
examined by Marshall Clark (2010). For example, the popularity of Rangga in Ada Apa 
dengan Cinta? (What’s up with Cinta?, 2002, Rudy Soedjarwo) was more influential as 
an alternative ideal masculinity than male models gracing Indonesian men’s lifestyle 
magazines, which promoted configurations of masculine gender practices around the 
period of the film’s release. Furthermore, barely any magazine published and sold in 
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Indonesia, including men’s lifestyle magazines, has a readership of more than 700,000 
or published more than 300,000 copies of each edition (Kasali 2007). Ada Apa dengan 
Cinta? attracted more than 2.5 million moviegoers. Ada Apa dengan Cinta? was 
adapted into a television series in 2003, and an advertisement campaign for a social 
media platform in 2014. It led to a reprinting of Sjuman Djaya’s drama script Aku (I), 
first published in 1987, which was read by Rangga in the film (Anjani 2014). In short, 
the competing images of masculinities in cinema are likely to be more visible compared 
to other forms of popular culture. After all, as suggested by John Beynon, cinematic 
representations of masculinities are often visually more enticing, carefully packaged, 
and frequently idealised; they tend to have a more powerful impact than flesh-and-blood 
men (2002: 64). 
One scholar who is concerned with representations of masculinities in 
Indonesian cinema is Clark (2004, 2008, 2010). While not specifically locating his 
research in gender politics and rather sporadically focusing on only a few films, Clark’s 
analysis offers valuable insights on the intensifying challenges against the hegemonic 
construction of ideal masculinity in Indonesian cinema in the post-authoritarian era. 
While Clark focuses on the end product, I trace the ideological battle surrounding 
masculinities behind, on and around the cinema screen. In addition to examining the 
film texts, I explore the intricate and complex political struggles engaged in by 
filmmakers as they produce and attempt to legitimate certain alternative ideal 
masculinities. In other words, I am interested in the political processes which make a 
certain cinematic representation of an ideal masculinity possible to produce and 
distribute at a given time. 
I examine the ongoing struggle within Indonesian cinema to visually represent 
what it means to be a masculine man in contemporary Indonesia. During the period 
2000 to 2014, the legitimacy of bapakism masculinity as the hegemonic masculine ideal 
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was seriously undermined by a myriad of emerging alternatives in various fronts, 
including cinema. Not only did I find bapakism masculinity to be represented as less 
desirable in many commercial films, but a number of filmmakers also shared with me 
their criticism of it. Innovations and experimentations on cinematic representations of 
alternative ideal masculinities were intensified during the period in question. The 
struggle to legitimise the emerging alternatives was increasingly visible and some of 
them became strong contenders for the hegemonic position. This was a different 
environment from what Sen (1994) encountered in the 1970s and 1980s, in which 
commercial cinema was mostly occupied with representations of hegemonic 
masculinity and others complicit with it. Thus, an in-depth study into commercial 
cinema as a platform for the gender politics involved in securing hegemonic masculinity 
is timely and significant. 
Filmmakers and the voices of the Indonesian middle classes 
Indonesian commercial filmmakers’ struggles have become a significant area of study 
since they represent the diverse voices of the urban middle classes. Like any other 
countries, the middle classes are the lynchpin of political movements, including that of 
gender. My study offers a glimpse into the unconventional political moves carried out 
by factions within the Indonesian middle classes. Indeed, the discussion I offer cannot 
represent the whole gamut of Indonesia’s middle classes. However, it will enrich the 
existing studies of Indonesia’s gender politics at this particular moment in history by 
providing insights into the nuances of political expressions among middle-class 
Indonesians. This section defines my use of the term ‘middle class’ and scrutinises the 
significance of understanding Indonesia’s middle-class members’ unconventional 
politics through cinema. I argue that commercial filmmakers, representing factions of 
Indonesian middle classes, hold vital roles in shaping which forms of masculinity can 
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and cannot be idealised on- and off-screen at this given time. Yet, it is also worth 
questioning the potential middle-class bias in such cases. 
In this thesis, I define ‘middle class’ as a social category characterised not 
exclusively by financial capital. Indeed, financial capital is an important defining 
feature of middle-class identity, yet it does not explain the particular lifestyle adopted 
by its members. I adopt the definition offered by Ariel Heryanto which stresses that 
members of the middle class are generally characterised as being economically 
distinguishable from both the working classes and from the elites (1999: 28).5 They tend 
to reside in urban areas, have modern education qualifications and occupations; and 
certain cultural tastes, which manifest most clearly in consumer culture (ibid.). This 
definition is in line with Gerry van Klinken’s proposition that social class is not merely 
about financial income or consumption levels; instead, it is a political concept supposed 
to be able to explain different political behaviour between the rich and the poor over 
matters of common good (2014: 2). In this thesis, I expand the notion of political 
behaviour beyond electoral politics. I explore the use of political strategies in 
undermining the established hegemonic masculinity in twenty-first-century Indonesia. I 
use the plural form of the term to acknowledge the diversity within the category—
middle classes. 
Indonesian commercial filmmakers are part of the burgeoning middle classes. 
First, most of the filmmakers working in Indonesian cinema are urban based and have a 
relatively stable financial background. There is no exact figure of the number of 
commercial Indonesian filmmakers there are at this given time, yet, I can confirm that 
they are mostly based in Jakarta. It is hard, though not impossible, to find commercial 
5 The elite class generally profits from the existing social order by virtue of their wealth and bureaucratic 
power (Heryanto 1999: 28). 
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films emanating from other cities in Indonesia.6 Indeed, many of the filmmakers are not 
originally Jakartans, but their work with Jakarta-based film production houses often 
requires them to reside in the greater metropolitan area for the sake of efficiency. 
Moreover, it is highly likely that commercial filmmakers, like other filmmakers, come 
from middle-class or upper-class families. Of more than 30 filmmakers I met during my 
fieldwork, they generally came from families with stable financial backgrounds which 
facilitated their higher degree training, in film or other fields. The notable feminist 
filmmaker I mentioned earlier, Nia Dinata, was born in Jakarta and came from a 
wealthy family.7 Another example is Salman Aristo, a prolific script writer and director, 
who was born and raised in Jakarta. His parents were teachers (Personal interview, 11 
April 2014). These filmmakers are representative of the voices of the Indonesian middle 
classes who are actively engaged in politics, including gender politics. 
Second, commercial filmmakers tend to display lifestyle and cultural tastes 
which distinguish them from elite and lower-class people. A lifestyle that stands out and 
defines their middle-class identity among filmmakers is an awareness of socio-political 
and cultural issues regarding gender equality. Such lifestyles in turn shape their cultural 
tastes, including their film consumption and filmmaking. Filmmakers who have a 
background in gender activism—such as Nia Dinata, Shanty Harmayn and Lucky 
Kuswandi and their films—became important reference points among my research 
participants when we discussed representations of gender in Indonesian cinema. These 
activist filmmakers have set the benchmark for other Indonesian filmmakers in 
producing alternative visual representations of gender, both masculinity and femininity. 
6 Between 2000 and 2015, there were barely any films produced in provincial towns other than Jakarta 
which were able to penetrate major cinema theatre chains. In 2016, there was one which was finally able 
to penetrate the commercial film market: Uang Panai’ = Maha(l)r (Dowry), directed by Asril Sani and 
Halim G Safia. The comedy was very popular in its home city before finally securing distribution 
contracts with major exhibition companies. 
7 Dinata’s father, Dicky Iskandar Dinata, was a successful banker during the New Order. Her grandfather 
was an inaugurated independence hero, Otto Iskandar Dinata. 
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I was privileged to have the experience of interacting with and having intensive 
discussions with these filmmakers and watching the ways that their films were 
constructed—as the new ‘cool’ for other contemporary Indonesian filmmakers (see 
Chapter 3). 
Furthermore, most contemporary Indonesian filmmakers received higher 
education training, either domestically or overseas. It is usually during the period of 
pursuing higher education that these filmmakers learned about gender equality. Notable, 
feminist filmmaker, Nia Dinata, in an interview with me, claimed that she began to 
question gender equality and racist depictions in popular culture when she was pursuing 
her undergraduate degree in media in the United States. Dinata said:  
When I was taking a course called Minority Literature, I learned about unequal gender 
relations which took a toll on women and the LGBT community. The course has 
substantially shaped the way I see representations of gender in films and other forms of 
popular culture. Well, it has shaped the way I see things generally (Personal interview, 
28 May 2018). 
The generation that is active in Indonesian cinema in the twenty-first century 
mostly consists of young people who did not experience filmmaking under the New 
Order authoritarian regime. Thus, this latter generation is often referred as the ‘new 
generation’ of Indonesian filmmakers (Sasono 2012: 122). Having said that, these 
filmmakers may navigate the cinemascape differently, tailoring their gender politics into 
works from the older generation. In this way, they do not have to undergo multiple 
layers of censorship but may have to face more rampant and random public censorship. 
They may have more varied outlets for distribution but still face the same distribution 
monopoly. 
Who are these filmmakers speaking to us through their work in commercial 
cinema? In the context of Indonesian cinema of the twenty-first century, the 
demography of the immediate consumers of commercial films is dominated by young, 
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urban, middle-class consumers. This is mostly due to the urban-centred locations of 
cinema theatres and the relatively expensive price of a cinema ticket. The film-watching 
culture in twenty-first-century Indonesia has shifted since the arrival of Cineplex and 
the increasing significance of a single film exhibition chain, Cinema 21, in the late 
1980s. In 2007, the company managed 370 theatre screens across the nation, 
concentrated in big cities and more than half located in malls in greater Jakarta (Sasono 
2008: xi). The arrival of cineplex in Indonesia in the late 1980s, as suggested by 
Syahmardan Ardan (1992), gradually made the conventional cinema theatres that 
offered a large space but a single screen out of fashion and soon out of business. Hence, 
film watching has become part of an urban middle-class lifestyle. 
Furthermore, cinema going is becoming more of an exclusive urban middle-
class practice with the relatively expensive ticket price. Based on my fieldwork field 
note, to watch a film in a small Cineplex in Malang, East Java, cost around Rp. 35,000 
(US $2.6 on weekdays) and Rp. 50,000 (US $3.7 on weekends and public holidays) in 
2014. The minimum monthly wage in the region that particular year was around Rp. 1.6 
million (Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Malang, 2018). This figure means that the price of a 
ticket on a weekend is almost equal to the wage earned for a day job, which makes it a 
luxury for the lower classes. Certainly, the price in Jakarta and other big cities in 
Indonesia was higher than in Malang. Together with the urban-centred locations, we can 
discern that the immediate consumers of films are the middle classes, who can afford to 
buy cinema tickets and make their way to the fancy shopping centres where the film 
theatres are often located. 
Consequently, to be a successful bankroller, a film’s contents must be acceptable 
and attractive to this major segment of consumers. According to Garin Nugroho and 
Dyna Herlina, for an Indonesian audience to decide which film they want to watch, the 
story is the most important factor, in addition to the popularity of the film director(s) 
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and actors (2015: 308). Therefore, in order to increase the potential investment return 
and profit, filmmakers’ creative endeavours should aim at appealing to the above-
mentioned demography. Thus, it is common to find that the story is urban-centred, 
mostly in Jakarta and its greater regions, and presents characters who are young and 
professional, showcasing middle-class aspirations and lifestyle. The middle-class 
lifestyle generally includes but is not limited to urban residence, higher education, 
cosmopolitan outlooks, as well as possession of consumer products and cultural tastes 
which distinguish them from the lower class but at the same time represent a critique of 
the upper class. 
As in other political struggles in Indonesia and globally, the urban-based middle 
classes play significant roles in gender politics in the twenty-first century. This is often 
the case globally in any form of politics. As reinforced by Leela Fernandes and Patrick 
Heeler (2006: 496), in their research about the political behaviour of the Indian middle 
classes, in a country where the bourgeoisie has not achieved hegemonic status and the 
working-class formation has been weak and fragmented, the middle classes play 
significant roles in politics. Moreover, according to Michael Kimmel and Michael 
Kaufman, the middle classes are generally the groups that are feeling most besieged in 
the face of the widespread changes to the conventional gender order, and they have the 
resources to fight the siege (1994: 262–63). In the intensified gender politics in twenty-
first-century Indonesia, the urban-based, educated middle classes have been the main 
participants in almost any public controversies and debates regarding gender, such as 
those surrounding the legalisation of the Anti-Pornography Bill (see M. Budiman 2011; 
Rinaldo 2013), and the public debate on polygamy (Nurmila 2009; van Wichelen 2009). 
Thus, we can expect to encounter various forms of masculinities representing the 
concerns, anxieties, desires and frustrations of the Indonesian middle-classes to be 
competing for legitimacy in Indonesian commercial cinema. 
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Reflecting on the internal diversity within the categories of the middle-classes, I 
did not expect to encounter singular political views, including those on gender, among 
Indonesian filmmakers. Just like other members of the middle classes, they represent 
diverse political views. In fact, as argued by Manneke Budiman (2011), various 
elements of the Indonesian middle classes tend to react in different ways to social and 
cultural issues, gender included, which emerged in post–New Order Indonesia. Such 
divergent views reveal the category’s internal complexity and heterogeneity in terms of 
moral and political views. According to Heryanto (1999: 27) each segment of the 
Indonesian middle classes may provide a different political response at a particular 
moment in history in the complex and dynamic process of democratisation. 
Consequently, understanding the political responses of filmmakers working in 
commercial cinema has provided me with insights into their various responses towards 
the intensified struggle for hegemonic masculinity and gender politics in general. In 
writing this thesis, I focused my investigation on filmmakers who intended to 
undermine the hegemony of bapakism through their work in commercial cinema. 
By claiming that filmmaking is a middle-class practice, I do not wish to 
undermine the flourishing movement among marginalised segments, mostly the lower 
class, of Indonesian society to empower themselves politically. The movement, Cinema 
Lovers Community of Purbalingga spearheaded by Bowo Leksono, aims at civil society 
education through cinema. Eric Sasono (2017) terms this bottom-up political movement 
as ‘pedestrian cinema’. Katinka van Heeren (2012) has also warned film scholars not to 
overlook this flourishing movement. Yet, such a movement is still in its infancy and the 
hegemony of middle-class cinema culture remains strong. As also acknowledged by 
Sasono (2017), the emergence of a bottom-up political movement through pedestrian 
cinema has not changed the cinema culture in Indonesia entirely, although their 
presence and role in empowering marginalised groups can no longer be disregarded. 
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Thus, the middle-classness of Indonesian cinema, especially commercial cinema, 
remains a strong feature of Indonesian cinema culture in the twenty-first century. 
Eventually, this middle-classness of commercial cinema can be an entry point to 
understanding the diverse political expressions of Indonesian middle-classes towards 
changes in the gender order during the period from 2000 to 2014.  
Research methods 
I used a cultural studies approach to analyse the intensified struggle for hegemonic 
masculinity in Indonesia. Cultural studies acknowledge the importance of media and 
culture in the maintenance and reproduction of societies. Forms of media and culture, 
such as television, film, music, magazines, and advertising, offer role and gender 
models, fashion hints, lifestyle imageries and icons of personality reflecting proper and 
improper behaviour, moral messages and ideological conditioning, and often times 
sugar-coats social and political ideas (Kellner and Durham 2006: ix). This is the point at 
which I depart from many other scholars who previously examined Indonesian gender 
politics. Cultural studies have allowed me to explore commercial cinema as an arena of 
political struggle for hegemonic masculinity. It allowed me to examine cinematic 
representations as important political tools to contest the legitimacy of the existing 
cultural ideal masculinity. 
My main reason for deploying a cultural studies approach to the study of gender 
politics, particularly the struggle for hegemonic masculinity, is that it has allowed me to 
explore the politics pursued in popular culture. Cultural studies recognises that popular 
representations, including those in the cinema, are cultural products which are produced, 
circulated and consumed in the context of uneven power relations between agents, that 
are themselves partly shaped by the dominant social constructions of gender. Simon 
During asserts: 
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[C]ultural objects are simultaneously ‘texts’ (that is, they have meaning) and events and 
experiences, produced out of and thrown back into, a social force field constituted 
unevenly by power flows, status hierarchies and opportunities for many kinds of 
transportation, identification and pleasure (2005: 6). 
In other words, cultural studies allow researchers to view commercial cinema as 
more than a cultural product dedicated for mere pleasure. Instead, commercial cinema is 
also an arena of struggle through which to channel certain political view(s), including 
those of gender. It is an arena of struggle to contest or defend certain social 
constructions and beliefs. In the case of my research, commercial cinema is a field 
where the struggle to challenge and defend the hegemonic ideal and legitimise 
alternative ideals can also take place. In that sense, commercial cinema is a site of 
struggle where hegemonic masculinity is established and maintained by the dominant 
group, and also where subordinate masculinities are negotiated. Commercial cinema is 
not an arena which is won once and for all by the dominant group espousing hegemonic 
masculinity. In fact, in contemporary Indonesia, cinema is one of the key arenas of 
struggle for hegemonic masculinity. 
Certainly, it is not my intention to suggest that gender representations in films 
mirror social reality. Yet, cinematic representations and social reality display a 
dialectical relationship. Cinematic representations are not produced in a social vacuum. 
They are partly inspired by their contemporary social reality. As Heryanto suggested, 
intended or otherwise, commercially produced films constitute a collective statement 
about what is considered ‘normal’ (for that matter what is considered ‘not normal’: the 
odd, the humorous, the attractive, or scary) within a particular state-regulated social 
setting (2014: 51). Consequently, researching masculinity in commercial cinema will 
yield an equally rich analysis of gender politics. 
In order to glean the historical dynamics of the representations of ideal 
masculinities, I watched films produced during the New Order (1966–1998) and after its 
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demise. I watched around 20 films produced during this time. I also watched four films 
produced during the period of economic and political crises in 1997–1999. In addition, I 
watched around 60 Indonesian films produced between 2000 and 2015. I watched most 
of the films in 2013 prior to doing my fieldwork in order to equip me with information 
on the representations of gender as well as any controversies surrounding their 
production or distribution. By doing so, I could glean the historical dynamics of the 
cinematic representations of ideal masculinity.  
I use the Indonesian filmmakers’ struggle to legitimise a ‘new man’ masculinity 
as an alternative ideal as my magnifying lens to understand the broader gender politics 
of hegemonic masculinity staged in Indonesian cinema. The ‘new man’ is a hybrid 
configuration which incorporates gender practices which have been exclusively 
associated with femininity, in addition to other conventional masculine features. The 
‘new man’ is characterised by emotional sensitivity, a willingness to compromise 
breadwinning roles and to share day-to-day domestic and caring responsibilities, paying 
attention to fashion and physical performance, and fostering equal gender relations of 
power (Beynon 2002: 100). The ‘new man’ first became popular in the American and 
British media and popular culture of the 1980s. It was promoted as an alternative to the 
older Western hegemonic masculinity: machismo masculinity (Beynon 2002; Chapman 
1988; Gill 2003; MacDonald 2007).8 
Following the filmmakers’ journey to legitimise the ‘new man’ became an 
important method of investigation into Indonesia’s gender politics staged in Indonesian 
8 There are two strands of this ‘new man’ masculinity: the nurturer and the narcissist. The nurturer strand 
emphasises men’s emotional sensitivity and involvement in day-to-day domestic and caring duties, while 
the narcissist emphasises emotional sensitivity and fashionable looks (Beynon 2002: 100). While the 
narcissist strand was mostly inspired by the expansion of fashion to appeal to male customers, the 
emergence of the nurturer strand was arguably stimulated by men’s reaction to the social change and 
changing gender roles evoked by feminism (ibid.). The nurturer strand of the ‘new man’ has since been 
given weight by political leaders. One example would be Barack Obama’s personalisation campaign 
which shows him displaying a ‘“softer” form of masculinity, complete with “hands-on” fatherhood 
experiences’, which contrasts him with more macho political leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Boris 
Yeltsin (A. Smith 2016: 27). 
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cinema in the twenty-first century firstly because the ‘new man’s’ features contrast with 
the bapakism ideal in many ways. The gender practices, personalities and culture 
constituting this particular ‘new man’ ideal challenge the features of bapakism. 
Bapakism generally emphasises men’s ability to be family breadwinners and 
authoritative patron leaders of a family collectivity. Bapakism discourages men from 
being involved in day-to-day domestic and caring duties and emphasises them being 
more focused on their breadwinning role. Also, unlike the ‘new man’ ideal, bapakism 
does not condone equal power relations between men and women in the context of the 
household. In terms of the gender relations of emotion, ‘new man’ masculinity is open 
to homosexuality, while bapakism valorises heteronormativity. Thus, the struggle to 
legitimise ‘new man’ masculinity provides rich insights in to which masculinity features 
have become more acceptable and which ones are still largely rejected in screen 
representations during the period under investigation and why. After all, what can and 
cannot be visually screened in cinema is highly political and closely linked to off-screen 
politics. 
Moreover, the ‘new man’ stood out as a formidable challenge to the hegemonic 
ideal in films produced between 2000 and 2014. A proto ‘new man’ alternative 
masculinity promoted through Rangga, the male protagonist of Ada Apa dengan Cinta? 
became a legitimate alternative ideal as the film soared to popularity in 2002. Rangga’s 
masculinity featured emotional sensitivity, interest in literature, disavowal of masculine 
aggression and competitive sports, willingness to share domestic work, in addition to a 
steadfast belief in democracy. Yet, this masculinity was not able to totally depart from 
the authoritative male/patron/leader norm—a quality constantly challenged by his love 
interest, Cinta. Rangga’s emotional sensitivity, rejection of masculine aggression and 
willingness to share domestic work were then reproduced by other cinematic 
representations of ideal masculinities. Moreover, the gay ‘new man’ in the Arisan! 
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franchise who supported more fluid and equal gender relations of production and power, 
as well as embodying a subversive form of gender relations of emotion has been lauded 
by many scholars, such as Maimunah Munir (2011), Tilman Baumgärtel (2012), 
Fatimah Rony (2014) and Murtagh (2013) as the contemporary canon in representing 
gay men in more positive light, despite there being a few reservations (see Chapter 6). 
I assume as filmmakers promote alternative ideals which undermine the 
prominent gender practices that constitute the most culturally exalted forms of 
masculinity, they have to negotiate their different views of what constitutes an ideal 
masculinity with the long-held ‘common sense’ cultural ideal. It is their interest in 
projecting an alternative like the ‘new man’ and their negotiation with other parties 
involved in the production of such an alternative image of the masculine ideal which are 
my main research interests, in addition to how they actually cinematically depict the 
alternative ideal in relation to the hegemonic ideal on screen. Taking into account the 
‘new man’s’ popularity, I question further which direction the filmmakers aim to steer 
the gender debate amidst the gender-order crisis in Indonesia and why.  
I combined critical textual analysis of selected film texts, field research and 
interface ethnography to collect data for this research. Reading the texts allowed me to 
look at how relations between multiple forms of masculinity, as well as between 
masculinities and femininities were portrayed on screen. Furthermore, reading the film 
texts in context allowed me to analyse why certain representations of masculinity and 
gender relations were able to be produced at that particular moment in history. I 
specifically selected five films to be analysed in this thesis. These films clearly promote 
the ‘new man’ masculinity as an alternative ideal that renders bapakism obsolete. I 
again watched the selected films and other films which are arguably connected to the 
production of these five during my analysis stage. I conducted discourse analysis on the 
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film texts to elicit the narrative strategies, such as plot, framing of gender issues and 
characterisation that were deployed in promoting the ‘new man’. 
I conducted field research to explore filmmakers’ experiences during the 
production and circulation of images of alternative ideal masculinities. In 2014, I spent 
six months in Jakarta, where most commercial films are produced and where most 
filmmakers working for commercial cinema reside. I conducted semi-structured 
personal interviews with 27 filmmakers, mainly producers, directors and scriptwriters, 
whose works featured the ‘new man’ masculinity. I also interviewed two actors. I 
maintained correspondence with some of them to obtain further information on certain 
aspects. I conducted another personal interview with a producer in April 2016 via video 
call to follow up on some information I had gathered previously from other filmmakers. 
Examining the production and circulation of cinematic images of ideal masculinities, as 
narrated by the filmmakers in personal interviews and publicly available statements, 
afforded me rich data on the gender politics behind, on and around the screen. These 
insights were valuable in developing an understanding of personal and structural levels 
of engagement with particular forms of masculinity among filmmakers and how such 
forms could shape the production of certain representations of masculinity in films. 
I combined interviews with filmmakers with a more general interface 
ethnography method to unpack the political struggle that shaped the representations of 
masculinities in cinema. As experienced by John T. Caldwell (2008) and Sherry Ortner 
(2010, 2013) in their research among Hollywood film communities, I felt the need to 
experience live and relatively natural encounters with the selected filmmakers. Yet, due 
to their busy schedules and the difficulties associated with obtaining permits to be on a 
film set, such opportunities were impossible during my field research. Thus, following 
Ortner’s innovation (2010, 2013), I complemented my interviews with interface 
ethnography by attending events in which the target participants interface with the 
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public (Ortner 2013: 26). In my case, I participated in special screenings and film 
festivals. I did so in order to have more opportunities to interact with the filmmakers. 
After special film screenings, the principal filmmakers usually discussed their creative 
processes and the film’s distribution. In film festivals, not only did similar opportunities 
present themselves, but I also had the opportunity to explore further contemporary 
representations of ideal masculinity in films that had been selected to compete for 
prestigious awards. 
Additional material was acquired from interviews with activists in feminist 
women’s organisations and the men’s movement. Their insights enriched my analysis of 
the dynamics of masculinities off screen and possible representations on screen. During 
my fieldwork, I spent roughly two months travelling to Jakarta, Yogyakarta and 
Semarang to pursue this part of the research. I interviewed seven activists, three of 
whom were active in the Aliansi Laki-Laki Baru (New Men’s Alliance), a profeminist 
men’s movement established in 2009 to support the Indonesian feminist movement to 
promote gender equality and eliminate gender-based violence and discrimination. The 
female activists I interviewed were also involved in the establishment of Aliansi Laki-
Laki Baru. Five of the filmmakers were either directly or indirectly connected to Aliansi 
Laki-Laki Baru. It was from them that I could confirm my hypothesis that ‘new man’ 
masculinity was a significant alternative to bapakism not only on-screen but also off-
screen. 
Finally, I also gathered information from media publications and other related 
sources publicly available on the internet and social media. I collected material 
concerning the production and circulation of films from news reports. Prior to the 
release of a film, filmmakers and the film production companies involved usually 
released press statements, as part of the marketing campaign for the film. I also gathered 
news reports concerning the production and circulation of the selected films, including 
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any controversy surrounding the production process. Unlike press releases, these news 
reports capture incidents, controversies, as well as positive credits for the films. At 
times, they incorporate filmmakers’ and other stakeholders’ responses to films. In 
addition, I gathered information from interviews with filmmakers that had been 
conducted by the media. Publicly available film reviews and criticisms were also 
valuable data which provided me with insights into how certain films were received by 
this critical segment of the audience. 
These methods of data collection yielded abundant material on the gender 
politics engaged by filmmakers in their attempts to reconfigure hegemonic masculinity. 
My discourse analysis on film texts, interviews and other additional material helped me 
to explore the filmmakers’ strategies and compromises in challenging hegemonic 
masculinity and promoting an alternative ideal masculinity. 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. 
The following is a brief overview of each chapter, excluding the introduction. 
Moving on from the introductory segment of this thesis, in Chapter 2 I discuss 
the socio-economic and political background of the era. I only briefly discuss this off-
screen social, economic and political background in Chapter 1. Considering the 
complex situations underlying the search for alternative ideals of masculinity in 
Indonesia at that given time, I take the liberty of exploring it in more detail. In doing so 
I provide an understanding of the situatedness of the filmmakers’ political struggles 
against the hegemonic masculinity ideal. Employing R.W. Connell’s three-structure 
framework, I map the trajectory of the gender-order crisis in Indonesia at that time and 
explore its implications for hegemonic masculinity—bapakism. I argue, in the first 
instance, that the economic and political crises that emerged towards the end of the 
twentieth century sped up the maturation of the internal contradictions within the three 
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structures of gender relations in Indonesia’s gender order. I also argue that the gender-
order crisis eventually triggered, on one hand, more fervent oppositions to any 
overthrow of hegemonic masculinity. On the other hand, the gender-order crisis also 
motivated various interest groups to defend hegemonic masculinity. It is against this 
background that Indonesian filmmakers’ struggle to undermine the legitimacy of 
hegemonic bapakism should be situated. 
Theoretically, in Chapter 2, I depart from the common use of ‘masculinity in 
crisis’ or ‘crisis of masculinity’ that appears in the flourishing scholarship of Indonesian 
gender politics, especially among scholars working on the politics of masculinity. 
Adopting R.W. Connell’s concept of ‘gender order crisis’ (2005), I argue that locating a 
crisis of masculinity is likely to overlook the complexity of the process of change within 
the overall gender order. Crises which affect masculinities as well as femininities are 
not accidental. Instead, ‘crisis’ is a process which is caused by the inability of the 
system to accommodate its internal contradictions any longer. As such, the crisis not 
only affects the dominant cultural gender ideals, but also other masculinities and 
femininities subordinated to them. Consequently, locating a crisis in the gender order 
eventually allows researchers like myself to explore the reinvigorated struggle for 
hegemonic masculinity and the complex process of realignment within the gender order. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the broad implications of the gender-order crisis on 
Indonesian cinema. I offer a broad overview of how the gender-order crisis crept into 
the structure of Indonesian cinema and forced changes in cinematic representations of 
gender and sexualities. I question how new avenues for both political engagement and 
restraints opened up spaces for commercial filmmakers to innovate and experiment with 
alternative gender ideals on screen. I demonstrate that the gender-order crisis pervaded 
Indonesian cinema during the 2000–2014 period. I identify two major forces 
significantly shaping the directions of gender politics pursued in Indonesian cinema at 
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that time. They are Islamisation and women’s cinema. On one hand these pressure 
groups developed into strong forces of change within the structure of Indonesian cinema 
as well as on the cinematic representations of genders and sexualities. Yet, on the other, 
they deepened public anxiety and moral panic concerning gender and sexualities. In this 
chapter, I pre-empt the discussion in the following three chapters on the internal gender 
politics within Indonesian cinema which filmmakers had to deal with as they staged 
their political struggles on screen. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 discuss the filmmakers’ struggles in undermining hegemonic 
masculinity through the idealisation of an alternative masculinity, the ‘new man’, which 
subverts its most pertinent gender practices: breadwinning, authoritative leadership and 
heterosexuality. Using R.W. Connell’s three-structure framework to map the 
filmmakers’ resistance, the three chapters offer insights into the gender politics involved 
in replacing the existing hegemonic ideal with an alternative which has the possibility of 
better equipping Indonesian men navigate the changing landscape of gender relations at 
this particular moment of history. 
Chapter 4 explores the filmmakers’ struggles to reconfigure hegemonic 
masculinity around the gender relations of production. I argue that the filmmakers 
waged their political struggles around the male-breadwinner norm and men’s share of 
day-to-day domestic and caring duties; yet, this struggle was cast and in the interests of 
middle-class professionals. Through the filmmakers’ struggle to legitimise a ‘new man’ 
which emphasises more fluid gender relations of production, as an alternative ideal in 
7/24 (Seven Days/Twenty Four Hours, 2014, Fajar Nugros) and Hijab (Veil, 2015, 
Hanung Bramantyo), I demonstrate that filmmakers had to negotiate between two poles: 
the immense pressure to depict more fluid gender relations of production and the 
pressure of maintaining the breadwinning men/home-making ideal, which had given 
weight to the hegemony of bapakism. Yet, the struggle to legitimise the ‘new man’ also 
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shows that this political struggle for hegemonic masculinity was focused on the interests 
of middle-class professionals, rather than the lower classes. 
Chapter 5 examines the filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the hegemonic 
masculinity around the gender relations of power. In this chapter, as my analytical lens I 
used the filmmakers’ struggle to promote a non-authoritative Muslim ‘new man’ in 
Islamic-themed films, especially Perempuan Berkalung Sorban (Woman with a 
Keffiyeh on Her Neck, 2009, Hanung Bramantyo), one of the few Islamic-themed films 
which problematises men’s authoritative patron leadership in the public and domestic 
spheres. Islamisation has been the single most visible feature of Indonesian politics, 
economy and culture in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Coinciding with the decline of 
men’s authority in the public sphere, due to the surge of women into public-sphere 
roles, the heightened Islamisation that occurred from 2000 to 2014 triggered an 
intensive use of literal interpretations of Islamic texts to defend men’s authority and 
patron leadership especially in the domestic sphere. This chapter seeks to understand 
how filmmakers tapped into this Islamisation and gender politics as they staged their 
resistance to the existing hegemonic masculinity. First, I demonstrate that there is new 
hope in the cinematic representations of an ideal masculinity. The filmmakers attempted 
to offer cinematic representations of a religiously justifiable alternative ideal 
masculinity encouraging men to treat women as equal partners in both the public and 
domestic spheres. Unfortunately, as my second argument shows, the filmmakers’ 
struggle was biased in favour of the middle classes. The idealisation of an alternative 
masculinity heavily rested on a male Muslim protagonist who was urban-based and 
highly educated, while rural-based, less educated men who were graduates of 
traditionalist religious education institutions were ‘othered’. 
In Chapter 6, I examine the filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the hegemonic 
masculinity around the gender relations of emotion. The established structure of the 
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gender relations of emotion is heteronormative. Heterosexuality has thus been a 
significant gender practice defining ideal masculinity in Indonesia. From 2000 to 2014, 
civil society movements put immense pressure on the need for formal recognition of the 
rights of non-heteronormative individuals. Yet, counter arguments against such 
progressive movements were also prevalent on various fronts. In this chapter, I develop 
my analysis of the filmmakers’ struggles to promote the gay strand of the ‘new man’ as 
a legitimate alternative ideal masculinity through Arisan! (The Gathering, 2003, 2011, 
Nia Dinata), the first Indonesian film which celebrates and promotes a gay masculinity 
as a legitimate alternative ideal. I offer two arguments.  
First, I demonstrate that filmmakers must make aesthetics, narrative and 
distribution compromises in order to stage any subversion against men’s heterosexuality 
on the silver screen. On the one hand the compromises made by the filmmakers indicate 
that it was possible to portray resistance openly in the public sphere, such as through 
cinema, amidst the escalating moral panic against non-heteronormative subjects that 
emerged at that time. Yet, on the other, the compromises indicate a strengthening 
anxiety against the increased visibility and support of marginalised groups, which 
overshadowed the production and distribution of certain images of masculine ideals on 
screen at that time. Second, I argue that unfortunately, despite its progressive nature, the 
filmmakers’ struggles are clearly cast in the form of middle-class professional gay men. 
As shown in the struggles of filmmakers to legitimise the gay ‘new man’ as an 
alternative ideal in the Arisan! franchise, they tends to overlook the efforts of lower-
class gay men in expressing their gender and sexuality, especially amidst the heightened 
moral panic. The filmmakers did not extend their struggle to imagine that a legitimate 
gay alternative ideal of masculinity should be class inclusive. 
The last chapter of this thesis is the conclusion. I summarise my key points and 
establish linkages to the overarching argument of the thesis. I maintain that while new 
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hopes for more equal gender relations have indeed bloomed in Indonesian cinema, there 
are also strong middle-class biases and anxieties that overshadow these cinematic 
alternative masculinity ideals. In addition, reflecting on the negotiations and 
compromises made by filmmakers, as they tailor their political perspectives regarding 
masculinity on screen, I call into question the direction they took and the interests they 
served by doing so. The findings of my research eventually show that during the period 
marked by profound changes within the gender order, the political struggle for 
hegemonic masculinity found its momentum. Part of the broader struggle to establish 
gender equality, the struggle waged by progressive Indonesian filmmakers was directed 
at exploring alternative ideal masculinities which were expected to better equip 
Indonesian men in navigating the shifting landscape of gender relations at that given 
time. The filmmakers certainly had to face the reinvigorated defence of the status quo, 
waged by various interest groups supporting existing hegemonic masculinity and the 
official patriarchal gender order. Despite their middle-class biases, the filmmakers 
struggle represents the burgeoning of new hope for equal gender relations. By centring 
the struggle for hegemonic masculinity in a nonconventional yet poignant political 
arena—commercial cinema—my research offers a unique and important perspective in 
looking at Indonesian gender politics in the twenty-first century.  
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A Gender-Order Crisis 
In this chapter I discuss the social, economic and political backgrounds against which 
the intensifying innovation and experimentation for alternative ideal masculinities in 
Indonesian cinema took place. I claimed in Chapter 1 that the years 2000 to 2014 were 
marked by a gender-order crisis. It was a period when profound changes took place 
within the established structures of gender relations that supported Indonesia’s gender 
order. The internal contradictions within the structures of gender relations of 
production, power and emotion could no longer be counterbalanced. Consequently, a 
gender-order crisis was inevitable. This chapter maps the gender-order crisis in 
Indonesia at that given time and explores its implications for the hegemonic masculinity 
of bapakism. 
I propose two arguments in this chapter. The first argument is concerned with 
the stages leading up to the gender-order crisis. I argue that the economic and political 
crises towards the end of the twenty-first century sped up the maturation of the internal 
contradictions within the three structures of gender relations in Indonesia’s gender 
order. The second argument deals with the implications of the gender-order crisis on 
hegemonic masculinity. I argue that the gender-order crisis triggered more fervent 
opposition to hegemonic masculinity. However, the gender-order crisis also motivated 
various interest groups to defend the same hegemonic masculinity. It is against this 
background that Indonesian filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the legitimacy of 
hegemonic bapakism should be situated. 
This chapter aims at providing economic, social and political backgrounds to our 
understanding of why a certain segment of Indonesian filmmakers, represented by those 
promoting the ‘new man’ as an alternative ideal through their work in commercial 
cinema, were strongly motivated to destabilise the hegemony of bapakism at this 
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particular moment in history. I explained in Chapter 1 that filmmakers are political 
agents and their works in cinema, including representations of masculine ideals, are the 
political instruments they use to fight for certain political causes. In short, filmmakers 
do not work in a social, political and economic vacuum. Consequently, understanding 
the underlying social, political and economic pressures which provoke these political 
agents to mobilise their resources to accomplish their cause is imperative. This chapter 
then helps us situate the filmmakers’ struggles within broader gender politics in 
Indonesia at that time. 
This chapter departs from the popular concept of ‘masculinity in crisis’, also 
known as the ‘crisis of masculinity’ used by scholars working on Indonesian 
masculinity. Instead, it proposes to employ the ‘gender-order crisis’ concept devised by 
R.W. Connell (2005) to understand the changes in masculinities as the consequence of 
changes taking place within the gender order. In doing so, I differ from, among others, 
Rebecca Elmhirst (2007), Sonja van Wichelen (2009), Pam Nilan (2009a), Sharyn G. 
Davies (2016) and Alicia Izharuddin (2017) who have overlooked the long and complex 
trajectory of changes which have affected the construction of an Indonesian ideal 
masculinity and the relations between the official ideal and subordinated masculinities 
as well as with femininities. As I shall demonstrate in this chapter, the trajectory of 
changes which implicate masculinities can only be understood by mapping the 
structures of gender relations that support the gender order and the development of their 
respective internal contradictions. Indeed, changes in deeply rooted social constructions 
such as hegemonic ideal masculinity do not happen overnight due to accidental 
events—even events as substantial as the economic crisis. Changes in a system, such as 
a gender order, take place over time. Certain accidental events may speed up the 
development of already existing internal contradictions within each of the structures of 
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gender relations and may eventually erode the hegemonic bases of the official ideal 
masculinity, but they are not the core causes. 
I unpack my arguments in the following way. First, I offer a theoretical insight 
into what constitutes a gender-order crisis and outline the drawbacks associated with the 
‘masculinity in crisis’ concept. Then, I provide a broad explanation of Indonesia’s 
official gender order and its hegemonic masculinity. Such an explanation is important in 
order to understand how things were before the crisis. In the last three sections, I map 
the trajectory of the gender-order crisis and its implications for the hegemonic status of 
bapakism. I conclude this chapter by offering a reflection on how the off-screen gender-
order crisis might shape the ways in which masculinities are represented in commercial 
cinema. 
Who or what is in crisis? 
In this section, I examine the debate among scholars involved in men and masculinity 
studies about the concept of ‘crisis’ in relation to masculinity. This is despite the 
concept being one of the most commonly employed in the field. One of the on-going 
debates revolves around who or what is in crisis. There are two major factions in this 
debate. The first one locates the notion of crisis in masculinity itself. Even within this 
first faction, there is disagreement on the precise nature of the crisis in masculinity—
how it manifests itself and is actually experienced by the subjects of masculinities 
(Beynon 2002: 75). The scholars within this faction agree with R.W. Connell (2005) 
who theorises that masculinity is not a system, but a configuration of gender practices. 
Thus, we cannot speak of masculinity being in crisis; instead, we can speak of a crisis in 
the gender order and masculinity is implicated in the crisis process. This section 
assesses the drawbacks of the first concept and the perks of the latter.  
The concept of ‘masculinity in crisis’ generally refers to a condition where men 
are in a ‘predicament, confused about their place in the world and society’s expectations 
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of them’ (Manzoor 2016: n.p.). Western masculinities have been subjected to this strand 
of ‘crisis’ talk both in scholarly and media discussions since the late 1960s, especially in 
the wake of the civil rights movement and the shift to a post-industrial economy in 
many Western societies (S. Robinson 2000: 2). Roger Horrocks (1994), one of the 
prominent proponents of the concept, claims that masculinity in Western society is in a 
deep crisis—becoming precarious and damaging to men. Despite being the major 
benefactors of the patriarchal gender order, many men are, writes Horrocks, 
haunted by the feelings of emptiness, impotence and rage. They feel abused, 
unrecognised by modern society. While manhood offers compensations and prizes, it 
can also bring with it emotional autism, emptiness and despair (1994: 1). 
Asian masculinities have been subjected to the same scrutiny especially in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.1 The term is deployed by, for example, 
Laikwan Pang (2002) and Pattana Kitiarsa (2005, 2007) to discuss men’s 
hypermasculine responses towards economic pressures. In short, ‘masculinity in crisis’ 
signals the obsoleteness of a certain masculinity and the men’s insecurity in their 
masculine identity at a particular moment of history (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill 2003: 
4). Generally, the feeling of insecurity concerning masculine identity is discussed in 
relation to destructive hypermasculine acts committed by men against themselves or 
others.  
Such an understanding of a crisis in masculinity is also adopted by several 
scholars working on masculinities in Indonesia. Rebecca Elmhirst (2007), for example, 
discusses young men in a Sumatran region feeling ‘left behind’ as their female 
counterparts have more opportunities for mobility and employment. The dwindling 
work opportunities experienced by these young men in their hometowns and the 
1 Indonesia was one of several Asian countries worst hit by the financial crisis. Later in this chapter I will 
discuss how this financial crisis, which soon turned into a very bad economic crisis, has forced major 
changes in Indonesia’s gender order. It became one of the important catalysts of the gender-order crisis 
taking place in twenty-first-century Indonesia. 
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increase of women’s participation in the paid workforce in the domestic and foreign job 
markets have forced these men to rethink their roles and positions vis-à-vis women in 
family and society. Elmhirst (2007) suggests that often such insecurity and confusion 
among men regarding their gender identity leads to male violence. In similar vein, 
Izharuddin (2017), in her research on the representations of gender in contemporary 
Indonesian cinema, asserts that the economic pressure caused a crisis of masculinity 
among many Muslim men and made them turn to religion for a solution. Van Wichelen 
(2009) employs the concept to signal a crisis of hegemonic masculinity. Basically, these 
scholars employ the concept to indicate a rupture in the dominantly shared ideas of 
becoming masculine subjects in Indonesia in the wake of the economic crisis. 
Adopting R.W. Connell’s concept of ‘gender order crisis’ (2005) in 
understanding changes in masculinities and their social relations, I beg to differ from 
previous scholars. Connell adapts the Habermasian concept of a ‘legitimation crisis’—a 
decline in the confidence in certain structures of administrative functions, institutions or 
leadership (Habermas 1976), to explain changes within the system of gender relations, 
which eventually implicates masculinities. In this concept, the crisis takes place within a 
coherent system, instead of a configuration. In the Habermasian concept of crisis, at the 
time of crisis, a system can be destroyed or restored by the outcome of the crisis. As my 
argument goes so far, masculinity is not a system on its own. Instead, masculinity is a 
configuration of gender practices, personalities and cultures as well as their embodiment 
(R.W. Connell 2005: 71). We can thus only discuss the disruption or transformation of 
masculinity, instead of its crisis (R.W. Connell 2005: 84). Locating the ‘crisis’ within 
masculinity risks obscuring the complex processes of change, which affect the whole 
system of gender order. Missing in the discussion of ‘masculinity in crisis’ in Elmhirst 
(2007), Izharuddin (2016) and van Wichelen (2009), as well as Horrocks (1994) and 
47 
Evi Eliyanah 
Sarfraz Manzoor (2016), is the exploration of the extent to which changes implicate the 
whole structure of the gender order and provoke a reorganisation of gender relations. 
Furthermore, in the Habermasian concept, a crisis of a social system is a 
process, instead of something produced by accidental changes. Crisis results from the 
structure’s inherent contradictions which become increasingly incompatible and can no 
longer be accommodated (Habermas 1976: 2–3). R.W. Connell (2005) adopts this 
concept to recognise that the crisis in a gender order results from the inability of the 
system of gender relations to contain its own internal contradictions. Acknowledging 
change as a process and resulting from internal contradictions helps researchers to 
understand the system as imperfect and to explore the efforts put in place to 
counterbalance this imperfection over time. Indeed, certain circumstances may speed up 
the crisis of a system, such as the economic crisis, in cases presented by Elmhirst (2007) 
and Izharuddin (2016), or the demise of a long-reigning authoritarian regime, in the case 
presented by van Wichelen (2009). However, these circumstances cannot explain the 
growing incompatibilities within the system of gender relations and the painstaking 
strategies implemented by certain interest groups, including the state, to prevent a crisis 
in the overall system over a period of time.  
Each structure of gender relations supporting a particular gender order bears 
with it internal contradictions. As explained in Chapter 1, R.W. Connell (2005) 
identifies three structures of gender relations governing the social relations between 
masculinities and femininities, as well as between men and women. They are the 
structures of the gender relations of production, power and emotion. The internal 
contradictions are the sites which make the gender-order prone to crisis. In a gender 
order which valorises male authority, these crisis tendencies can be counterbalanced 
mostly by providing a patriarchal dividend (see Chapter 1) to men as a group for 
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maintaining an unequal gender order, and by managing challenges to prevent major 
changes within the gender order. 
At a particular moment in history, however, the crisis tendencies can mature and 
erupt into an actual gender-order crisis. Sudden and massive changes, such as economic 
or political crises, in the environment where the gender order operates can speed up the 
process of change. They can accelerate the maturation of crisis tendencies. Changes in 
the patterning of gender relations, especially on a large scale, are not trivial. While at a 
personal level, changes in the patterning of gender relations can upset personal images 
of one’s self, assumptions about personal relationships, social embodiment and 
everyday habits, at a macro level, they can upset and provoke the reorganisation of 
cultural and institutional arrangements (R.W. Connell 2002: 138). Consequently, when 
these changes are experienced by a large segment of a society, they can intensify gender 
politics (Raewyn Connell, 2009 137). It is in such situations that masculinities and 
femininities are inevitably affected. For one, the legitimacy of hegemonic masculinity 
can be substantially eroded; alternative ideals are more intensively sought and 
legitimated in various arenas. New exemplars are produced by various interest groups to 
secure the hegemonic position. In such gender politics, ‘masculinity is made a principal 
theme, not taken for granted as background’ (R.W. Connell 2005: 205). 
This section has defined my position on the notion of crisis, arguing that the 
notion of ‘crisis’ bears with it an assumption of a coherent system. Thus, in this thesis I 
define crisis as taking place within the gender order and implicating masculinities. In 
particular, I will show that the crisis of the official gender order, the legacy of the New 
Order, has required reorganisation and a reconfiguration of masculinities, including 
hegemonic masculinity. I will demonstrate that the gender-order crisis has resulted in a 
fierce struggle for hegemony as the gender-order crisis led to the erosion of the 
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hegemony of the most culturally exalted form of masculinity—bapakism—like never 
before. 
Indonesia’s official gender order and its hegemonic masculinity 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of Indonesia’s official gender order and its 
hegemonic masculinity. While acknowledging Indonesia’s diversity, I shall demonstrate 
that there is a macro level patterning of gender relations which is sanctioned by the state 
and major cultural institutions in Indonesia. Understanding the social construction of 
Indonesia’s gender order will help map the crisis tendencies born within each of the 
structures of gender relations. I argue that Indonesia’s gender order is discursively 
constructed in a familial model which guarantees the dominant position of men who 
espouse bapakism, the subordination of women and other men adopting subordinated 
masculinities. 
Indonesian studies scholars generally agree that ‘the family principle’ was vital 
in the consolidation and sustenance of the New Order. According to David Reeve 
(1985: 359), there was no theme more frequently articulated by the regime’s leader, 
Soeharto, than ‘the family principle’ in addition to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.2 
The family principle was an ideal used to create an organic unity of state and society 
which fostered harmony and consensus, rather than open debate and majority decision 
making (Reid 1998: 25). David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz (2003) use the term 
‘organicism’ to refer to this official New Order ideology. They argue that ‘Soeharto and 
many of his closest political allies promoted the idea that authority within the 
Indonesian state should reflect the patterns found within traditional families and orderly 
village societies’ (2003: 8). 
2 In Indonesia, the principle is known as azas kekeluargaan. 
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This family principle is inseparable from the idea of centralised power, as was 
prevalent in Javanese culture (Anderson 2007). It was partly reflected in the ‘steeply-
ascending pyramid’ political structure of the New Order, in which the apex was 
dominated by the presidency (Liddle 1985: 71). The presidency, the centre of the 
oligarchic network of state leadership, linked and oversaw all key institutions and state 
management, including policy making, resource mobilisations and security 
(Suryakusuma 2011: 5). The legitimised centrality of presidential power thus rejected 
the standard elements of liberal constitutionalism, including the separation of state 
power and individual rights, and eventually sustained the reign of the New Order for 
more than three decades. 
The intimate trope of family also provided the basis in the fashioning of the 
official gender order under the New Order. The principle is both hierarchical and 
gendered. Michael van Langenberg (1986) and Saya Shiraishi (1997) agree that this 
principle has naturalised the authority of the male leader of the family, in a unit as small 
as a nuclear family, to a larger one such as the nation. In fact, the principle is based on 
the paternalistic relationship in the kawala-gusti (Javanese for patron–client) model; a 
family state with the ‘wise father, the caring mother, and their children who know their 
places, duties and responsibilities’ (Shiraishi 1997: 84). The father figure, in this 
patterning of the family, becomes the natural leader of the family, under whose 
authority other members are subject. The regime shaped the gender order in such a way 
partly for the sake of legitimising its grip on state power (K. Robinson 1998: 67). The 
regime devised itself with state policies and programs which enshrined men’s authority 
and leadership status as well as women’s domestic roles. The policies include, for 
instance, the Marriage Law 1974, which is still valid. The law clearly stipulates that 
men are the leaders of the households and they are responsible for providing livelihood 
and protection for the members, while women are homemakers.  
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The valorisation of male authority within Indonesia’s official gender order 
produced bapakism as the hegemonic masculinity. Bapakism is a configuration of 
gender practices, personality and culture, which legitimises men as authoritative patron 
leaders of the family collectivity. The ideal fits perfectly with the patriarchal gender 
order. According to Julia Suryakusuma, bapak, or literally father and protector, 
connotes ‘the authoritarian, patron leader of the family collectivity’ (2011: 5). Bapakism 
combines paternalistic and authoritarian masculinities. The paternalistic masculine ideal 
of the Javanese aristocrats, which also resonates with the colonial Dutch’s idealisation 
of the nuclear family, particularly informs the paternalistic features, while the 
militaristic masculine ideal informs the authoritarian features of the configuration. The 
most common gender practices associated with this configuration include, but are not 
limited to, breadwinning, protecting, authoritative patron leadership and 
heteronormativity. These gender practices are translated in various personalities, 
institutionalised in various cultural institutions and inscribed on the subjects’ bodies in 
particular ways that are not necessarily uniform across Indonesia. As I will discuss in 
the next section, bapakism was at the heart of New Order’s bureaucratic structure. Male 
senior bureaucrats became patron leaders of official organisations of state employees, 
civilian and military. Bapakism became the culturally idealised configuration of 
masculinity which embodied the most accepted strategy in the defence of ‘the 
refashioned gender order’ (K. Robinson 1998: 67).  
The dialectic relations between the New Order and bapakism were also apparent. 
Theoretically, R.W. Connell argues that ‘hegemony is likely to be established only if 
there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective 
if not individual’ (2005: 77). The New Order’s state power was a resource used to raise 
bapakism to the status of hegemony, and bapakism hegemonic masculinity was a 
resource in the regime’s struggle to secure state power (K. Robinson 2015: 52). The 
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New Order state ensured men’s position in the family collectivity. I have already 
mentioned men’s position as heads of households, guaranteed by the Indonesian 
marriage law. The law, legalised under the New Order, sanctions men’s superior 
position in relation to women in the household. This gender arrangement was also 
reflected in the state’s bureaucracy, where heads of state departments and bureaucratic 
offices, as well as local governments, generally male, were patrons to the official 
organisation of wives in their respective institutions, Dharma Wanita (Women’s 
Duties). Members of Dharma Wanita were indoctrinated to become subordinate to their 
husbands; their main duty as bureaucrats’ wives was to support their husbands’ duties as 
state bureaucrats (Blackburn 2004: 152; Saroh and Hasan 2016; Suryakusuma 2011: 
18–22). There is no male counterpart of this organisation. The male-dominated 
bureaucracy and the official organisation of bureaucrats’ wives prove the New Order’s 
commitment in sustaining male supremacy, which eventually strengthened the 
hegemonic position of bapakism.  
Furthermore, in consolidating and sustaining its power, the New Order also 
benefited from the cultural exaltation of bapakism. For instance, hegemonic masculinity 
supports the conventional gendered division of labour which relegates men to the public 
sphere where they become the family’s breadwinners, while women are relegated to the 
domestic sphere where they take care of the unpaid domestic and caring duties. Among 
the implications of this officially sanctioned gender relations of labour was the murky 
gender politics of the late 1960s, in which a progressive left-wing women’s 
organisation, Gerwani, that was affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party, was 
purged following the transition of power from Soekarno to Soeharto’s New Order. The 
purge of Gerwani further resulted in the withdrawal of the mainstream Indonesian 
women’s movement from state politics to the conventional women’s domain—the 
home—leaving the politics to men (Katjasungkana and Wieringa 2003: 64). In the years 
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that followed, the New Order barely endorsed any women’s organisations which 
undermined its gender ideology. In short, the valorisation of bapakism and its 
accompanying ibuism was at the heart of the birth of the power consolidation of the 
New Order. 
Certainly, I do not propose a reified image of bapakism. As much as its impact is 
real and widespread across Indonesia, including in Papua (Munro 2017), bapakism is a 
social construction which could be embodied by only a minor proportion of Indonesian 
men. Not all Indonesian men are able to be the main breadwinners of their families; not 
all Indonesian men can be patron leaders of family collectivities; and there are men who 
do not conform to heteronormative ideals. Indeed, bapakism is an ideal to which many 
Indonesian men aspire. They are its ideal subjects and are complicit to its cultural 
exaltation. Many men have to negotiate the ideal with their living conditions. For 
instance, based on her ethnographic research in rural–poor areas in East Nusa Tenggara, 
Kathryn Robinson (2009: 16) underscores the reality of many poor men in the area. 
These men compromised their sense of masculinity by taking up domestic work, 
generally associated with women, in order to cope with their wives’ employment 
abroad. Yet, the men’s compromise does not necessarily mean fluidity in the structure 
of the gender relations of production between them and their wives. Although they were 
unable to perform the normative feature of hegemonic masculinity, these men were still 
legally and culturally considered to be the authoritative figures in the family 
collectivity. It is them, rather than women, who were legally listed as the heads of the 
families. In such a case, as argued by Madelon Djajadiningrat-Niuwenhuis (1992), men 
retain the ultimate power in the gender relations. Thus, the hegemony of bapakism is 
sustained. The women’s involvement in employment overseas was seen as part of their 
submission to their husbands and their defence of their husbands’ authority in the public 
sphere. 
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Reflecting on the official gender order and the hegemony of bapakism, it makes 
sense that the dominant representations of ideal masculinity in Indonesian cinema, as 
well as other popular-culture products during the New Order period, barely 
problematises men’s roles as family breadwinners and leaders of households. Krishna 
Sen (1994), based on her study of the representations of women in Indonesian cinema, 
confirms that the emphasis on women’s domestic and reproductive roles eventually 
supported the idealisation of bapakism on screen. The hegemony of bapakism is 
strongly depicted in state-sponsored propaganda films, such as Pengkhianatan 
G30S/PKI (The Treachery of G30S/PKI, 1984, Arifin C. Noer). As Intan Paramaditha 
has explained (2007), the father figures represented by the Indonesian revolution heroes 
are visual representations of superior authoritative patron leaders not only for their 
respective nuclear family but also for the nation. 
The maturing of crisis tendencies in the structure of the gender 
relations of production 
This section explains how the deep and protracted economic crisis of 1997–1998 sped 
up the maturation of crisis tendencies within the structure of the gender relations of 
production. To do so, I argue that the economic crisis exposed more clearly the internal 
contradictions in the structure of gender relations of production, which positioned men 
as family breadwinners and women as homemakers. As the economic crisis laid bare the 
unequal distribution of the patriarchal dividend supporting men’s masculine roles as 
family breadwinners, it triggered a gender-order crisis, which implicated the hegemony 
of bapakism. To unpack my argument, I will first explore the structure of the gender 
relations of production and the crisis tendencies within it. Then, I will present my 
assessment on the extent to which the economic crisis implicated the structure and the 
hegemony of bapakism. 
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The structure of the gender relations of production in Indonesia’s official gender 
order is premised in breadwinning men/homemaking women. Although the patterning is 
no longer taken for granted in the twenty-first century, it continues to dominate the 
ways in which most Indonesians imagine the ideal division of labour between men and 
women. Even in a contemporary urban context, where the male breadwinner ideal has 
been reworked to accommodate dual-income ideals, husbands still hold the 
responsibility as primary breadwinners, while wives become secondary income earners 
(Utomo 2012). The ability to provide for one’s family means authority for men. As in 
patriarchal societies elsewhere, men’s economic autonomy generally gives them a 
secure sense of masculinity (Kimmel and Kaufman 1994: 261). Men who are unable to 
be providers or are not so inclined are often seen by society as less desirable, as having 
subordinate masculinity. In fact, as argued by Elmhirst (2007) and Nilan (2009a), many 
Indonesian men are likely to be frustrated when they are unable to secure employment 
or when they feel that their breadwinning role is taken over by women.  
Prior to the nineteenth century, breadwinning was not a dominant feature of 
ideal masculinity in what is now Indonesia, and apparently this was the case throughout 
Southeast Asia. Anthony Reid, describes that the Dutch dealt with Aceh women in tin 
trades in the seventeenth century (1988: 635, see also Compostel 1636: fol. 1200). It 
was also the norm for women to trade, including export–import, in other areas of the 
Netherland East Indies, now Indonesia, such as the Moluccas and Java. In southern 
Vietnam, women performed many tasks generally reserved for men in the European or 
Indian context; the tasks included ploughing, harrowing, reaping, carrying heavy 
burdens, attending shops, brokering and money-changing (Reid 2014: 150). 
However, towards the late-nineteenth century, men’s economic dependence on 
women and women’s economic autonomy gradually became obsolete in Southeast Asia. 
In this period, Southeast Asians, especially the middle classes, became fascinated with 
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the Western model of modernity. Part of the then modern gendered moral vision was 
encouraging men to be breadwinners and women to be homemakers (Reid 2014). The 
increasing popularity of this reorganisation of the gender division of labour was partly 
due to the stronger grip of puritan Christian morality among the urban middle classes in 
Europe at that time (Locher-Scholten 2000; Reid 2014; Seccombe 1986).3 As depicted 
in advertisement pieces published in Pandji Poestaka magazines in first quarter of 1940, 
the middle-class segment of society was inspired to give up their traditional habits and 
adopt a modern lifestyle in order to be included as ‘cultural citizens of the colony’ 
partly by adopting the aforementioned gender division of labour (Nordholt 2011). The 
shifting gender relations of production were further cemented by the Islamic reform 
movement taking place at the same period. The movement justified that the virtue of 
Muslim women was primarily vested in their domestication and devotion to their 
husbands, while Muslim men’s virtue was premised mainly on their capacity to lead 
their family into Islam, provide a livelihood and protection for their family members 
(Florida 1996: 210–12). 
Under the New Order, breadwinning men/homemaking women became the 
official ideal gender relations of production. The state’s recognition of men as heads of 
families strengthened the prioritisation of men in accessing and owning resources. For 
instance, the New Order’s internal migration program enabled men, rather than women, 
to access land ownership and other resources because of their status as heads of 
households and their role as family providers (Dawson 1994). Furthermore, men’s role 
as breadwinners for the family culturally led men to get better access to education than 
women, especially in rural areas (Japan International Agency 1999). At school, young 
boys formally learned the notions of ideal masculinity (Blackwood 2005: 295); they 
3 In fact, this new conception of gender relations had become pervasive even among the working classes 
throughout the developed capitalist world by World War I (1914) although total influence was never a 
reality (Seccombe 1986: 54). 
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were oriented towards the workplace and pursuit of a career in the public sphere (Parker 
1993). In the workforce, men were likely to receive higher wages than women in similar 
positions (Seguino 2000; Siegmann 2007).4 In short, Indonesian men as a group 
received patriarchal dividends to facilitate them to become bapak. 
Such gender patterning bears several internal contradictions, making the 
structure of gender relations of production prone to crisis. First, not all men have access 
to good employment which enables them to be primary, let alone sole, family 
breadwinners. This crisis tendency was detected during the New Order period. A study 
conducted by Carol Hetler (1990) in Central Java in the 1980s shows that the double-
income household model was prevalent among the poor. In fact, the double income was 
an important strategy promoted to cope with the economic pressure at that time (Niehof 
2004). In female-headed households, which accounted for 14 per cent of the total 
households in Indonesia in 1990s (Buvinić and Gupta 1997: 261), women filled the role 
in the absence of male breadwinners. Many women in poor communities shared the 
responsibility of providing for the family, for instance by collecting food, fodder and 
fuel for the family’s subsistence; yet, these roles were barely recognised formally (Dutt 
2006: 216). Moreover, men in poor communities, whose wives worked overseas, had to 
do the domestic work in the latter’s absence (K. Robinson 2009: 106). In short, the 
unequal distribution of access to employment made many men unable to fulfil the role 
of primary or sole breadwinner for their families during the New Order period. 
Second, certain industries and professions which favour women more than men 
have made women’s involvement in formal economy inevitable. As the country’s 
economy shifted from oil and construction to the manufacturing of consumer goods, 
retail and services in the early 1980s, the entry of women into the formal economy was 
4 In 1986, women’s hourly wage was 58 per cent of their male counterparts. Although in 1997, this figure 
had increased to 65 per cent the gender pay gap was still stark (Feridhanusetyawan and Aswicahyono 
2001, quoted in Siegmann 2007: 118). 
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inescapable (K. Robinson 2009: 90). This trend continues into the twenty-first century. 
In 2001, more than 15 per cent of the female workforce was accommodated in 
manufacturing and 25 per cent in wholesale and retail trades (Siegmann 2007: 118). 
Even before the shift to industrialisation, certain professions, albeit those regarded as 
the extension of women’s domestic roles, also favoured women’s labour. Such included 
midwives, pre-school teachers, nurses and domestic assistants. Consequently, the New 
Order state also encouraged women to take part in the burgeoning industrialisation, 
despite this encouragement contradicting the dominant patterning of the gender relations 
of production. 
The wider opportunities for women to pursue higher education also became a 
significant crisis in the official structure of the gender relations of production. It is 
strongly evident in Indonesia, as in other developing countries, that spending more 
years in education has the tendency to delay marriage among young women 
(Buttenheim and Nobles 2009). The burgeoning new economy since the early 1970s 
opened up better access to higher education for women. In general, the pursuit of higher 
education also opens up opportunities for class mobility; in fact, as stated by Wendy 
Minza (2015) and Suzanne Naafs (2018), for a great many young Indonesians, diplomas 
of higher education have been tickets to a better future by allowing them to become 
urban professionals. As a result, the pursuit of higher education among women has led 
to an increase of women in formal paid work, especially in urban areas. Culturally, this 
phenomenon has contributed to shifting images of ideal femininity in Indonesia. Along 
with the development of the second wave of feminism globally, affluent working 
women have become key signifiers of Indonesian modernity since the 1980s. As 
demonstrated by Sen (1998), images of working women proliferated in Indonesian 
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advertisement pieces in printed magazines in the 1980s.5 However, we should not 
expect that the established ideal of femininity was entirely uprooted. In fact, as reflected 
by their representations in Indonesian cinema and print media, Indonesian women were 
still expected to prioritise their reproductive and domestic roles despite their 
increasingly significant involvement in the economy, politics and culture (Brenner 
1999; Sen 1994).  
Under the New Order, the above-mentioned internal contradictions were offset 
by state and non-state actors through various strategies. First and foremost, there was a 
constant campaign of the discourse of kodrat wanita (women’s nature) through policies 
and popular culture that was justified by the official religions. The discourse basically 
promoted women’s reproductive roles as mothers as the key defining feature of ideal 
femininity. These roles must be maintained at the expense of women’s career pursuits in 
the public sphere (Brenner 1999). In turn, kodrat wanita reinforced women’s 
stereotypical role as ‘the companion of their husbands’, which made women’s status as 
workers subordinated to their status as housewives (Ford and Parker 2008: 9) and their 
contribution to the family income was secondary to that of men (Utomo 2012). 
Moreover, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs successfully created a profile for working 
women as bearing ‘dual roles’, encompassing paid work and domestic responsibilities 
in the early 1980s (Blackburn 2004: 182). To cope with the dual responsibilities, 
economically affluent career women often reallocated their domestic caring 
responsibilities to female (usually older) relatives or female domestic servants (Elmhirst 
2005). These practices compensated for the necessity and increase of women’s 
involvement in the public sphere without necessarily transforming the gender order. 
5 According to Gabriel Griffin (2017) in the online version of the Oxford Dictionary of Gender Studies, 
second-wave feminism, which flourished from 1965–1985, is associated with identity politics and 
campaigns for gender equality at the workplace, women’s bodily autonomy, abortion on demand, 
economic recognition of domestic work, as well as the acknowledgment and prosecution of gender-based 
violence. The movement which began in the US and the UK soon spread globally.  
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Consequently, the hegemony of bapakism was sustained during most of the New Order 
period. 
Considerable shifts in the macro economy due to the 1997 Asian economic crisis 
forced major changes in Indonesia’s gender order. The macro-economic outlook at the 
onset of the crisis in 1997 and 1998 had strong gendered and class-segmented 
implications at the micro level.6 The decline of the currency value significantly affected 
economic institutions reliant on foreign-investment, which apparently employed a high 
proportion of the male production (Smith et al. 2002) and had been responsible for 
creating Indonesia’s emerging middle classes (Poppele, Sumarto and Pritchett 1999). 
Consequently, middle-class men, especially in urban areas, suffered the biggest income 
shock during the crisis (Smith et al. 2002: 173).7 This condition was complicated by the 
upward spiralling of the price of commodities in the first quarter of 1998 (Thomas and 
Frankenberg 2004: 518–19).8 
Eventually, the sudden economic reversal of fortune exposed more clearly the 
abovementioned crisis tendencies within the established gender relations of production. 
Many men (no longer only poor men), found it harder to be breadwinners at that time. 
Male government employees and export-commodity farmers, while exempted from 
wage cuts, were not excluded from the double impact of soaring prices and high 
inflation (Chen 2010: 301). Declining wages also made it more difficult to be able to 
afford the services of domestic assistants for middle-class families (Elmhirst 2005: 
6 At the macro level, Indonesia’s GDP shrunk by almost 14 per cent (Betcherman and Islam 2001: 5), and 
in 1999 there was an increase of only 1 per cent (Bank Indonesia 2000). For a country whose Gross 
National Product (GNP) had grown around 4.5 per cent per annum from the mid-1960s to1998, a 
contraction of this magnitude meant a substantial readjustment (James P. Smith et al. 2002: 164). 
Indonesia also experienced an 80 per cent currency depreciation, and a 50 per cent inflation rate (The 
World Bank 1998: 1). 
7 While the overall real wages declined by 41 per cent on average (Betcherman and Islam 2001: 14), and 
affected both men and women, for urban middle-class men: ‘the single year shift in the wage distribution 
virtually wiped out all wage gains made since 1986 … but … [women] have maintained some of the 
wage gains since 1986’ (J.P. Smith et al. 2002: 173). 
8 Food prices rose by about 20 per cent more than the general price index. 
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254).9 The reliance on women’s contributions to the family income was also clearer 
during the crisis. This led to impending changes in their relations with the men in their 
households (Hancock 2001). The notion of kodrat wanita and pendamping suami could 
no longer counterbalance the internal contradictions of the structure of the gender 
relations of production. Crisis of the gender order at the turn of the millennium was 
inevitable. 
The crisis within the gender order implicated masculinities and the social 
relations producing them. On one hand, it triggered frustration among men who lost 
their capacity to be breadwinners. As observed by many scholars, including Elmhirst 
(2007), Noorhaidi Hasan (2016), Stein Kristiansen (2003) and Pam Nilan, Argyo 
Demartoto and Alex Broom (2013), frustration and violence were common masculine 
responses to the changing economy which had taken away many men’s ability to earn 
enough income and thus undermined their masculinity. Between January and March 
1998, the economic disempowerment triggered men in at least 23 locations in Indonesia 
to sporadically loot shops and food warehouses: 266 shops and warehouses were 
reportedly looted, destroyed and burnt; 79 vehicles burnt; and five people died 
(Tadjoeddin 2002:16).10 Emasculation among men also manifest in widespread sexual 
violence in several cities in Indonesia in 1998 (Wandita 1998).11 This scale of violence 
motivated by economically driven emasculation indicates the erosion of the hegemony 
of bapakism, which was premised partly on male breadwinning practices. Violence was 
9 According to Elmhirst, the increasing involvement of women in formal work in the 1980–1990s was 
facilitated more significantly not by the state or men, but by paid domestic workers. Consequently, the 
shifting relations of labour were not accompanied by reconfigurations of domestic responsibilities 
between men and women. Middle-class Indonesians, the segment hit hardest during the economic crisis, 
continued to employ domestic assistants although they had to make financial adjustments in order to deal 
with their own aggravating economic insecurities (Elmhirst 2005: 254). 
10 This number is based on the incidents reported in media; 15 incidents took place in Java (Tadjoeddin 
2002: 16) 
11 The victims of raids, looting, and sexual violence that took place in 1998 were mostly Indonesian of 
Chinese descent. While acknowledging that the economic crisis exacerbated the existing social conflict, 
the ethnic dimension of the crisis and its aftermath is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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apparently one of the prominent ways for men to reclaim the hegemony of bapakism at 
the onset of the economic crisis. 
In addition, the gender-order crisis triggered by the sudden reversal of economic 
fortune, which was complicated by political chaos, led to stronger structural attempts to 
defend the hegemonic configuration of an ideal masculinity. In the post-authoritarian 
era, structural movements within Indonesia’s legal system and culture designed to limit 
women’s involvement in the economy became more visible. For instance, women had 
to face night curfews prescribed in newly enforced regional bylaws, enabled by the 
decentralisation policy that had been in place since 1999. Andi Yentriyani, head of the 
Public Participation Subcommission of the National Commission on Elimination of 
Violence against Women, explained in a press conference (14 September 2012) that 
until 2012, there were at least 38 regional bylaws which limited women’s participation 
in the public sphere through the implementation of night curfews and the requirement 
for women to be accompanied by male family members when going out at night. Such 
limitations reinforced the stereotypical image of women as the weaker gender, who 
must be protected while navigating certain spaces which are not normally part of their 
feminine domain. Furthermore, the limitation also implied time restrictions for women 
who were pursuing careers in the public sphere.  
Islamic rhetoric was deployed by various interest groups to highlight the Islamic 
nature of the male breadwinning norm that was strongly characterised in bapakism. In 
2003, a heated public debate on polygamy took place and involved various segments of 
Indonesian society. Devoted polygamy practitioner and wealthy businessman, Puspo 
Wardoyo, contextualised the necessity for rich Muslim men to take more than one wife. 
For Puspo Wardoyo, polygamy, among other reasons, ensured that more women could 
enjoy comfortable lives (Suryono 2003). Implicit in this statement of purpose behind his 
support for the pro-polygamy campaign is the reassertion of men’s role as family 
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breadwinners, and their normalised obligation to keep women bound to the domestic 
sphere. 
In the second decade of the third millennium, the public debate on gender roles 
became increasingly heated as new media platforms augmented its visibility. In 2013, a 
series of controversial tweets on how to be good Muslim women and perform ideal 
Muslim femininity were made by a prominent young Muslim preacher, Felix Siauw. In 
a tweet dated 28 May 2013 he lashed out at working women: ‘When a mother spends 3 
hours with her children and 8 hours at work, is she a mother or an employee?’ The 
tweets represented an attempt to restore a certain form of femininity—one that 
supported the construction of hegemonic masculinity. They also represent his support of 
the restoration of hegemonic bapakism. The tweet and his other tweets on women and 
gender immediately developed into a heated public debate, albeit mostly online (Hestya 
2013). 
The gender-order crisis also opened up opportunities for a fiercer struggle to 
emerge around attempts to reconfigure the hegemonic ideal masculinity. The complex 
process of democratisation in the post-authoritarian era significantly contributed to the 
flourishing of alternative forces attempting to uproot bapakism from its hegemonic 
position. These forces included feminist and women’s movements, as well as men’s 
movements for gender equality. The growing feminist and women’s movement 
supported women’s increased involvement in the public sphere, including in formal 
paid work and politics. Breadwinning was no longer a practice which was to be 
exclusively associated with masculinity at this given time. Moreover, the involvement 
of men in the feminist movement gave birth to a pro-feminist men’s movement such as 
the Aliansi Laki-laki Baru (LLB, the New Men’s Alliance), which campaigned, then 
and now, for a reconfiguration of masculinities to support gender equality. Their work 
also challenged the obsession over the breadwinning role (Hasyim 2009). Furthermore, 
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discussion on the decreasing significance of men’s breadwinning roles and the 
possibilities for compromise were prevalent in the print media at this given time 
(Yulindrasari and McGregor 2011). These forces in turn directed their energy to 
speeding up the decomposition of the gender order, inclusive of hegemonic bapakism. 
In addition to the above strongly opposing voices around the structure of the 
gender relations of production, there are myriads of in-betweeners. The most commonly 
encountered group comprises those who acknowledge that women’s contribution to the 
family income is an inevitable consequence of modernity, yet this group consistently 
reinforces that women’s financial contribution is secondary to that of the men (Utomo 
2012). They are the proponents of the New Order’s jargon on women’s dual roles 
(Blackburn 2004: 182). The 2006 World Values Survey for Indonesia shows that among 
Indonesians, 54 per cent generally held that men should have more rights to 
employment when jobs are scarce (Hosen, Faizah and Hosen 2006).12 The same 
population sampling provided strikingly discordant responses to other division-of-
labour-related questions, such as whether men make better business executives than 
women and whether becoming a housewife is a fulfilling career for women (Hosen, 
Faizah and Hosen 2006). This data implies that although it is becoming more acceptable 
for women to be involved in paid work, men are still socially constructed as the primary 
breadwinners for families. Thus, men should have better opportunities to access paid 
work in the event that employment is scarce. In other words, for certain segments of 
Indonesian society, a compromise is inevitable in navigating the changing landscape of 
gender relations in the twenty-first century, but there are limits. 
To conclude this section, I maintain that the economic crisis has exposed more 
clearly the crisis tendencies of the established structure of the gender relations of 
production, and it eventually led to the erosion of the legitimacy of bapakism as the 
12 The survey was administered using 100 random samples in 30 provinces in Indonesia. 
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hegemonic form of masculinity. It removed the conditions for many men to perform 
their breadwinning role—a normalised, if not naturalised, masculine gender practice. 
The violence committed by men partly out of economic frustration represents the 
dysfunction of the dominant patriarchal patterning of gender relations of production, as 
well as the eroded hegemony of bapakism. The ensuing public debate on gender 
relations of production showed the reinvigorated struggle in gender politics towards 
reconfiguring gender and gender relations.  
The maturing of crisis tendencies in the structure of the gender 
relations of power 
This section maps the crisis tendencies within the structure of the gender relations of 
power. In it, I describe the trajectory of the crisis tendencies within this structure of 
gender relations. Then, I examine how these crisis tendencies matured and eventually 
deepened the gender-order crisis in twenty-first-century Indonesia. I argue that the 
democratisation processes in the post-authoritarian era has facilitated the maturation of 
crisis tendencies within the structure of the gender relations of power. Democratisation 
has facilitated the flourishing of the progressive women’s movement and increased 
women’s participation in politics and economy. Women’s authority in these arenas 
threatens the legitimacy of the authoritative male-patron leadership norm—a legitimacy 
that underlies the structure and promotes hegemonic bapakism. Eventually, as the crisis 
tendencies matured, they deepened the gender-order crisis previously triggered by the 
economic crisis. 
Crucial to the patterning of the gender relations of power in Indonesia is the 
hierarchical and paternalistic nature of the relations between the male authoritative 
figure, or bapak, and his subjects, comprising women, minors and other men 
subordinate to his position. As a patron, a bapak was expected to be wise, provide 
guidance and maintain order (Suryakusuma 2011: 5–6). Bapakism thus became the most 
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socially acceptable masculinity configuration in defence of the patriarchal gender order. 
It subordinated or marginalised other masculinities which did not support men as 
paternal leaders of the family collectivity. It, for example, subordinated any masculinity 
that valued singlehood, or that tolerated men’s subordination to women, and it 
marginalised masculinity which accommodated homosexual relations. 
During the New Order, the arrangement of gender relations of power was central 
to the overall social ordering in Indonesia. I mentioned how the New Order stipulated 
the ideal power relationship between husband and wife in the 1974 Marriage Law. The 
male authoritative patron leadership was also reflected in the structure of the state’s 
bureaucracy. Throughout the New Order period, cabinet ministers were predominantly 
male.13 Soeharto was the father figure, whose guidance and instructions were to be 
sought and followed by his ministers and other subordinate bureaucrats, regardless of 
whatever ideas and opinions the latter had (Shiraishi 1997: 81). As argued by Ken Ward 
and David Bourchier, the New Order state was clearly preoccupied with order, 
obedience, patronage as well as a father-knows-best type of leadership (Ward 1974: 
187–88; David Bourchier 2015: 161). Also, state policies and regulations concerning 
families clearly hailed men as patron leaders of their nuclear families.14 Such patterning 
of the gender relations of power in turn created gendered legal subjectivities intended to 
(re)shape the broader social order (O’Shaughnessy 2009: 32), in this case particularly 
reconfiguring the gender order. 
The patterning is sanctioned by the major religions operating in Indonesia, 
especially Islam. The dominant teaching of Islam endorses a husband’s authority over 
and patronage towards his wife and other female and junior family members. In fact, 
13 Under Soekarno’s administration (1945–1966), there were five women holding ministerial posts. Yet, 
under Soeharto’s administration (1966–1998), women entered cabinet ministry only later in 1978, when 
the state established the Junior Ministry of Women’s Affairs. 
14 See the previous section for a brief explanation on the internal migration program as an example of the 
wide range of policies. 
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since the Islamic revival period in the late-nineteenth century, as discussed above, 
men’s authoritative patron leadership over women has been one of the issues 
emphasised in the gendered teaching of Islam in Indonesia. Growing up a Muslim 
during the New Order, I frequently attended Muslim weddings, in which religious 
preachers were likely to give advice to the newlyweds and the attending audience that a 
wife’s ticket to heaven is her submission to her husband. While alternative 
interpretations of Islamic teachings regarding gender relations of power have been 
emerging since the early 2000s, men’s authoritative patron-leadership norm continues to 
be reinforced in the dominant teaching of Islam in Indonesia. At my own wedding 
reception in 2004, the religious preacher invited by my family to provide a sermon also 
reminded me, as a wife, that I had to obey my husband’s orders, in addition to taking 
care of the domestic work and caring duties. 
The internal contradictions of this patterning partly stem from women’s 
involvement in paid work. Not all men can be leaders at work. In many cases, many 
men had to negotiate their sense of masculinity to accommodate becoming the 
subordinates of women at work. In fact, since the surge of women into paid work post 
the oil boom in the early 1980s (Dhahani, Islam and Chowdhury 2009: 8), career-
pursuing women who could juggle domestic and public-sphere roles had become 
established images of alternative ideal femininity by the 1990s (Sen 1998). Moreover, 
with more opportunities opening up for women to pursue higher education, as discussed 
in the previous section, affluent and educated women were more likely to be involved in 
paid work in the public sphere. The direct implication of women’s higher position in in 
the workplace is that men’s normative patronage leadership in the public sphere was 
brought into question. At the household level, as women’s contribution to the family’s 
income increased, generally they gained elevated positions in decision making (Elmhirst 
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2007; Hancock 2001; K. Robinson 2009). In such cases, reorganisation of the gender 
relations of power was more-than-likely required.  
During the New Order period, these internal contradictions were 
counterbalanced primarily by emphasising that women’s primary role was motherhood. 
While women were encouraged to play dual roles, the state and Indonesian society 
reminded them that their place was behind their husbands. The wives of male 
bureaucrats, military and police were organised under state-endorsed women’s 
organisations and constantly reminded that they were first and foremost loyal 
companions to their husbands (Suryakusuma 2011: 16).15 The organisation itself was 
under the patronage of senior male bureaucrats and the organisational structure mirrored 
that of the male-dominated bureaucracy.16 
The New Order also cautiously implemented policies and strategies, which 
contradicted the established patterning of the gender relations of power. For example, it 
established a ministry to deal with women’s empowerment in 1978. Due to domestic 
and international pressures to deal with gender inequalities, the regime created the 
Junior Ministry of Women’s Affairs, an event that also marked women’s first entry into 
cabinet, albeit with minor co-ordinating roles and budgetary authorities (Blackburn 
2004: 26; Martyn 2005: 153). Furthermore, it signed the Convention on the Elimination 
15 Dharma Wanita has been the vehicle that advocates the five duties of women. The duties are inscribed 
in the organisation’s visions: 1. women as loyal companions of husbands; 2. women as procreators for the 
nation; 3. women as educators and guides of children; 4. women as regulators of the households; 5. 
women as useful members of society (Suryakusuma 2011: 16). 
16 The leadership of Dharma Wanita and other women’s organisations of the same sort, such as Persit 
Kartika Candra Kirana, which accommodates wives of military officers, as well as the grassroot’s 
Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK), which organises wives in general, is not democratically 
appointed nor based on meritocracy. For example, the wife of the male bureaucrat leading a particular 
government office is the leader of the Dharma Wanita at that office. The wife of a village head will 
automatically be the head of PKK in the village. 
These organisations share a similar rhetoric regarding what constitutes ideal femininity—women 
as managers of households and companions to their husbands (Wieringa 1992). These organisations 
generally received more support from the state compared to the progressive women’s movement that 
struggles for gender equality (Parawansa 2002). Discursively, the spectre of sexual politics which led to 
the elimination of the progressive women’s movement, Gerwani, during the transition to the New Order 
still works to marginalise the progressive women’s movement under the New Order (see Katjasungkana 
and Wieringa 2003; Wieringa 2003). 
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of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on 29 July 1980 and ratified 
it on 24 July 1984 with Act No 7/1984 (Indonesian Committee of the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, 1997). Consequently, the state must ensure the 
securing of women’s human rights and fundamental freedoms in political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil and any other field, as well as the elimination of any form of 
gender-based discrimination against women (Milasari and Tangka 2013). 
The New Order policies to encourage women’s participation in politics also 
developed crisis tendencies. The participation of women in Indonesian politics was 
especially low during the time of the New Order regime. The highest participation rate 
of women in state politics under the New Order was reached in 1987 with women 
occupying 13 per cent of the total 500 seats in parliament (Parawansa 2002). And the 
presence of women in the cabinet ministry was maintained, even if they were limited to 
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. This meagre participation is arguably due to the 
state’s gender politics which discouraged women from becoming progressively political 
by sexually slandering members of the progressive women’s movement (Katjasungkana 
and Wieringa 2003) and the intensive campaign and policing of women’s motherly 
duties (Brenner 1999). Overtime, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs became a ‘Trojan 
Horse’ within the New Order bureaucracy, as some of its staff brought in new ideas on 
gender equality, often conflicting with the state’s gender ideology (K. Robinson 1997). 
Moreover, the women’s movements, outside the state-established organisations, became 
a fertile ground for movements for gender equality (Women’s Research Institute 2013). 
They built up pressure to influence the New Order’s state policies and programs to 
advance women’s rights (Sjarifudin 2009). They were not always successful.  
The New Order administration detected these crisis tendencies which threatened 
its own legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the male-patron leadership patterning of 
the gender relations of power. Thus, mechanisms were deployed to counterbalance the 
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crisis tendencies. The women appointed as ministers and elected to the parliament were 
likely to have close relationships with male party elites (Parawansa 2002). Soeharto 
carefully appointed his ministers over the years to ensure that his authority was not 
contested (Robertson-Snape 1999). Thus, to avoid conflicts of interest, the ministers of 
Women’s Affairs and other women legislators were never from the progressive 
women’s movement and mostly had close ties with high-ranking male bureaucrats or 
politicians. The third minister for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Mien Sugandhi, for 
instance, was a wife of an army general, founder of a wing organisation of the state’s 
party, Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (MKGR). Both Mien Sugandhi and 
her husband were close to Soeharto. 
The euphoria following the transition to democracy engendered high hopes for 
establishing gender equality. The newly democratised public sphere enabled a bolder 
public struggle of gender politics to advance women’s status and rights. In 1998, after a 
long and gruelling political struggle by various women’s organisations, the new 
government established the National Commission on Eradication of Violence Against 
Women (KOMNAS Perempuan) (Anggraeni 2014). The establishment of this 
commission was overdue in dealing with discrimination and violence against women. In 
2004, Megawati Soekarnoputri’s administration passed the law on the elimination of 
violence against women after a long struggle led by progressive feminist movements. 
The law criminalised acts of violence, generally perpetrated by men against women or 
other subordinate members of the family, which were previously tolerated and 
normalised. It challenged men’s absolute authority in the household as certain measures 
of control, in this case violence, were no longer tolerated by law. 
Furthermore, it was within this period that the women’s involvement in state 
politics remarkably increased. Megawati was sworn in as the fourth president, the 
ultimate symbol of state power in 2001. The former vice-president rose to the 
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presidency after President Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached by Indonesia’s Upper 
House in June 2001.17 Megawati’s rise to top-level state leadership was accompanied by 
a fierce public debate about whether a woman could be a president (N. van Doorn-
Harder 2002).18 In the following years, the number of women who held ministerial 
offices and other high bureaucratic posts also increased. Under President Joko Widodo, 
there are nine women out of a total of 34 ministers in his cabinet—the highest number 
since Indonesian independence (B.P. Siregar 2016). In addition, the affirmative 
regulation for a political party to allocate at least 30 per cent of its nomination to female 
legislative candidates has elevated the involvement of women to 11.3 per cent in 
parliament and 27 per cent in the senate in the 2004–2009 period (Parawansa 2002; 
Wardani 2009). The affirmative action exposed more clearly the marginalisation of 
women in Indonesian politics and the immediate need to address it. 
During the heightened Islamisation in the post-authoritarian moment, the 
pressure to legitimise alternative interpretations of religious texts, which accommodate 
women’s perspectives, also emerged. Since the early 2000s, Musdah Mulia, a former 
expert counsel to the Minister of Religious Affairs, led a revolutionary counter legal 
draft movement to contest the Islamic Law Compilation, partly due to its gender biases. 
According to Mulia: 
The compilation is very conservative … For instance Article 79 specified that a 
husband is the leader of the family and a wife is a homemaker … This article 
normalises women’s domestic roles … and men’s public roles. Men are naturalised as 
leaders and women are subjected to their authority (in Abdala 2003: n.p.). 
17 Megawati was the first female president of the Republic of Indonesia and the sixth female to lead a 
Muslim-majority nation in the world (for more details on female state leaders in Islamic majority 
countries, see Bennett 2010). 
18 Nelly Van Doorn-Harder provides a thorough account of the debate, in which Islam played a major 
role. 
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Although the movement has not been able to convince the government, 
parliament and Muslim religious leaders, it has created a lasting controversy. The 
opposition of this movement generally argues that the movement is being overly 
progressive. The then Head of Fatwa commission of Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(Indonesian Ulema Council, hence abbreviated as MUI) said, ‘I am up for a progressive 
movement; I don’t like jumud. But everything has to go by the rule’ (cited in Karni 
2004). Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, also a strong opponent of the Gender Equality Bill, 
views the movement to contest Islamic Law compilation as anti-Islam (Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia 2010).19 Implied in the opposition view is anxiety over the decreasing 
authority of men and the increasing power of women; the increasing participation of 
women in the public sphere and thus the potential domestication of men. 
In concluding this section, I point out that the increasing participation of women 
in politics, culture and economy undermined the established gender relations of power. 
The rise of women to key decision-making posts in the state bureaucracy, parliament 
and private sectors, as well as the bolder movements for gender equality obviously 
exposed more clearly the crisis tendencies of the established patterning of the gender 
relations of power. The increased participation of women in the abovementioned sectors 
also exposed more clearly that the state had been implementing policies contradictory to 
the gender patterning which previously sustained its patriarchal legitimacy. Such 
policies have provided inconsistencies which movements have used to overturn the 
established gender order. Eventually, the maturation of the crisis tendencies in the 
structure of the gender relations of power not only deepened the existing crisis of the 
gender order but also implicated bapakism. 
19 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is the Indonesian branch of the international pan-Islamist political 
organisation, which promotes the re-establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. In Indonesia, the organisation 
mostly operated underground; it developed its base in universities through Lembaga Dakwah Kampus 
(Campus Proselytisation Organisation) from the early 1980s, before it was disbanded in 2017 (Ahnaf 
2017). 
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The maturing of crisis tendencies in the structure of the gender 
relations of emotion 
In this section I explore the crisis tendencies undermining the established structure of 
the gender relations of emotion and its trajectory to crisis. I examine the development of 
these crisis tendencies. I then scrutinise the implications of the maturation of the crisis 
tendencies on bapakism during the period under study. I argue that the bolder political 
movements in support of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer 
(LGBTIQ) in the first 15 years of the twenty-first century has deepened the gender-
order crisis. It has considerably undermined the heteronormative structure of the gender 
relations of emotion. On one hand, the struggle has exposed more clearly the 
marginalisation of non-heteronormative individuals and their expressions of gender and 
sexual identities. On the other hand, the intensifying struggle has also triggered 
backlash, mostly led by conservative religious groups. Indirectly, the backlash against 
the growing support for LGBTIQ reinforces heteronormativity and the idealisation of 
heteronormative gender ideals, including the bapakism hegemonic masculinity. 
The dominant patterning of relations of emotion in Indonesia is heteronormative. 
It emphasises an assumed coherence between sex, gender and sexuality. An individual 
born male is culturally expected to assume a masculine gender identity and to desire a 
heteronormative sexual relation with a heterosexual feminine woman. Since the colonial 
period, the state has formally recognised only heterosexual unions and families. 
Compulsory heterosexuality increasingly became ‘the norm’ of the gender relations of 
emotion since the intervention of colonialism. Deviation from heteronormativity outside 
the culturally recognised niches, such as rituals, entertainment and the informal 
economy, have generally resulted in discrimination and/or marginalisation (Blackwood 
2005). Heteronormativity is significant to the hegemony of bapakism. A man can be an 
ideal authoritative patron leader only in the social units organised within the 
heterosexual family order. Consequently, masculinities not supporting 
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heteronormativity are subordinated or in many cases marginalised. To date in Indonesia, 
there has not been any openly gay man who is publicly idealised as a representation of 
ideal masculinity. 
Under the authoritarian regime (1966–1998), the heteronormative patterning of 
sexual relations became increasingly dominant as the state formally supported a 
patriarchal gender order. Although the New Order state did not criminalise homosexual 
unions, it did not take a clear stance to support them either. Given that the state’s 
Marriage Law of 1974 recognises only heterosexual marital unions, the New Order state 
barely took any legal precautions to criminalise non-heterosexual unions. Yet, the New 
Order’s policies and programs, especially concerning families, were clearly designed 
with heteronormative assumptions. This is despite the long history and cultural 
significance of non-heteronormative individuals in many Indonesian societies since the 
pre-colonial era (see Blackwood 2005; Davies 2010), and despite the prevalent presence 
of transgender individuals, including those in popular culture (see Murtagh 2017) and 
the informal economy (Boellstorff 2004b) at that time. It might indeed sound 
contradictory that the then President Soeharto invited a transwoman entertainer, Dorce 
Gamalama, to several events at his presidential palace.20 
This internal contradiction between officially recognised heteronormativity and 
the reality of everyday LGBTIQ identities overtime developed into a crisis tendency 
within the structure of the gender relations of emotion. Indeed, theoretically the 
impending legitimacy of homosexuality is a fundamental crisis tendency within any 
heteronormative structure of the gender relations of emotion. According to Sara Ahmed 
(2014: 144), non-heteronormative arrangements of gender relations of emotion threaten 
20 Dorce Gamalama completed her transition to becoming a woman in 1980s and has since been 
reportedly engaged in romantic relationships with men (Noviandi 2013). Dorce, in her biography, claims 
that she had performed live in front of five presidents of the Republic of Indonesia (Gamalama and 
Gunawan, 2005: 80–86). She had performed for Soeharto, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono by the time her biography was released in 2005. 
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the only legitimate way of reproducing life—in the form of future generations—as well 
as reproducing culture as they destabilise the specific arrangements for living, in this 
case ‘family’ (ibid.). Since the 1980s, activism for the support of non-heteronormative 
relations of emotion has been visible. The establishment of Lambda Indonesia in 1982 
marks the increasing prominence of activism in support of this marginalised group. 
After being disbanded in 1986, Lambda Indonesia metamorphosed into GAYa 
Nusantara in 1986, whose operations focused mostly on publication and advocacy 
against AIDS (Oetomo in Ikawati 2015: n.p.). 
The crisis tendency imposed by the increasing visibility of non-heteronormative 
individuals and communities was discursively counterbalanced by the state. In addition 
to naturalising heteronormativity through the Marriage Law and other regulations and 
policies, the New Order state discursively constructed homosexuals and transgender 
people as belonging to the primary risk groups for developing HIV/AIDS (Oetomo 
2000). In doing so, the state discursively constructed homosexuality as bearing 
substantial health risks, as opposed to the legally sanctioned heteronormative gender 
relations of emotion. In addition, the consistent naturalisation of gender roles through 
promotion of heteronormative nuclear families and ideal femininity contributed 
significantly in controlling gender and sexuality (Blackwood 2005). The state regulation 
on child adoption favoured heterosexual couples; in fact, since colonial times, as 
prescribed in Staatsblad (129/1917), adoption has been the sole privilege of 
heteronormative couples. In short, the New Order state was aware of the growing crisis 
tendency lurking beneath the heteronormative structure of the gender relations of 
emotion, yet it did not take direct legal precautions to outlaw this gender practice. 
The post-authoritarian moment in Indonesia engendered high hopes for changes 
to the overall patterning of gender relations, including that of emotion. The euphoria 
regarding possible changes also triggered bolder political movements in support of non-
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heteronormative groups. Activism for transgender rights, which started around 1960, 
and gay and lesbian activism, beginning in the early 1980s, became more noticeable 
publicly and gained more substantial traction post-1998. One of the major milestones 
was the daring move to host the International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transexual and 
Intersex Association (ILGA) in Surabaya in 2010. Yet, the event was eventually 
cancelled on the day of the conference due to a violent protest led by conservative 
Islamists. According to Hartoyo, the founder of Suara Kita (Our Voice), a not-for-profit 
organisation focusing on advocating LGBTIQ rights: 
In post-1998, LGBT organisations began to show their identities more publicly. 
Discussions on discourses of sexualities and genders started to be more seriously 
fostered by several social organisations. Even LGBT groups started to build intensive 
dialogues and communication with religious groups (2015: 81). 
The movements for LGBTIQ rights also attracted support from public figures. In 
fact, some religious figures and organisations openly declared their support for 
LGBTIQ rights. Among them were Ulil Absar Abdala, the founder of Jaringan Islam 
Liberal (JIL, Liberal Muslim Network) (Hadiansyah 2016) and Musdah Mulia, a 
notable Muslim feminist activist. Although their controversial views subjected them to 
harsh criticism and multiple threats of violence, they continued to provide support for 
the recognition of non-heteronormative individuals and communities.  
In addition, the post-authoritarian moment opened up new political avenues for 
the struggle for LGBTIQ rights. Dede Oetomo, an openly gay man and the founder of 
GAYa Nusantara, was nominated by a minor leftist political party, Partai Rakyat 
Demokratik (PRD, People’s Democratic Party), as a legislator in the 1999 General 
Election (Oetomo 2006).21 In 2012, Oetomo passed the first selection process in an 
effort to become a commissioner of the Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM), 
21 The party itself while standing in the 1999 general election, only won 0.07 per cent of the vote. It has 
not stood in any subsequent elections. 
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although he eventually failed in the ‘fit and proper’ test conducted by the legislative 
members. This information was reported in ‘Inilah tujuan aktivis gay ingin jadi 
komisioner komnas HAM’ (This is the goal of a gay activist’s bid for a seat at the 
National Commission for Human Rights) in Liputan 6(11 October 2012).22 Although he 
did not make it to the parliament or to KOMNAS HAM, his nomination proves the 
increasingly visible activism supporting the rights of non-heteronormative individuals 
and communities. The involvement of openly gay men in state politics was unthinkable 
in the previous era.  
In a much later development, responding to the heightened public debate on 
LGBTIQ and the intensified global pressure to legalise same-sex unions since 2014, the 
views of cabinet ministries were no longer in unison towards marginalised groups and 
individuals. Although none of them asserted their support for the legalisation of non-
heteronormative union, the ministers’ views ranged from the need for the state to ensure 
their safety and rights, all the way through to the need to raise awareness of the apparent 
dangers of LGBTIQ and the need to criminalise LGBTIQ individuals (Ikawati 2015). 
The abovementioned daring movements exposed more clearly the internal 
contradictions in the established structure of the gender relations of emotion. They 
revealed more clearly the social and cultural marginalisation and discrimination, which 
so far had been largely tolerated. In addition, they exposed more plainly the ambivalent 
position, as well as absence, of the state in terms of legal recognition and protection, 
discrimination, threats of violence towards these marginalised groups and individuals 
(Khanis 2013). They also highlighted the involvement of the state and its apparatus in 
the ensuing criminalisation of LGBTIQ individuals since 2004. For instance, the 
persecution of Hartoyo in Aceh in 2007 (as a result of the enforcement of the anti-
22 A part of the selection process is commonly called the ‘fit and proper’ test, in which the candidate has 
to face a panel of legislators. The candidate has to answer the questions given by the legislators. The 
legislators will then determine whether the candidate is suitable for the position. 
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LGBTIQ bylaw) spread virally through global social media networks. It spurred 
controversy and gained attention from international human rights organisations 
(Hartoyo 2015).  
The movements in support of LGBTIQ rights and the changes they inspired 
further implicated the relations of masculinities in the gender order. They exposed more 
clearly that the hegemony of bapakism was at the expense of the marginalisation of 
masculinities and of non-heteronormative men and women. The movements revealed 
that the cultural exaltation of bapakism had inspired the tolerance of bullying and 
prevalent discrimination against other masculinities which were considered unfit in the 
patriarchal gender order. The idealisation of culturally exalted heteronormative 
masculinity was no longer taken for granted. Its hegemony was further eroded. 
As the movements in support of LGBTIQ rights further eroded the legitimacy of 
the dominant patterning of the gender relation of emotion, as well as the deeply 
entrenched culturally exalted masculinity, they eventually triggered a backlash. 
Islamisation provided a platform for the struggle to restore the hegemony of 
heteronormativity and bapakism masculinity. Tom Boellstorff (2005a: 575) asserts that 
many Muslim public figures, mostly men, continued to discriminate against 
homosexuality in their public sermons. Some of them increased their vitriol. A series of 
violent protests, led and populated by mostly men, had taken place against LGBTIQ 
individuals (Boellstorff 2004a; Liang 2010), and against the activism and social media 
campaigns of the LGBTIQ rights movements since 1999 (Lestari 2015). In 2010, the 
Indonesian Islamic Clerics Council (MUI), the official fatwa-issuing organisation in 
Indonesia, and the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) protested against the Q!Film Festival 
because homosexuality was considered against the religion and social norms (Gus/Ken 
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2010).23 In January 2015, MUI formally issued a fatwa condemning especially gays, 
lesbians and transgenders and suggesting the state rehabilitate individuals contacting the 
‘disease’ and capitally punish those caught performing homosexual activities (Hidayana 
2015). 
The force to restore the heteronormative gender patterning of emotion, as well as 
its heteronormative masculinity ideal—bapakism—eventually culminated in the 
criminalisation of homosexuality since 2004, albeit in a few regions. While the national 
law continued to be silent in regard to the legal status and citizenship rights of LGBTIQ 
people, the decentralisation policy provided opportunities for local governments in 
several sharia-compliant regions, such as Aceh, Padang Panjang and Tasikmalaya, to 
criminalise homosexuality (Arivia and Gina 2016; Ichwan 2013). In Aceh, the 
punishment for committing homosexuality is 100 lashes (Arivia and Gina 2016: 8). 
Other legal mechanisms, which discriminate against homosexuality, include, among 
others, Law No. 44/2008 on Pornography,24 and Government Regulation No 4/2007 on 
adoption25 (Muthmainnah 2016).  
The increasing visibility of movements in support of LGBTIQ rights and the 
mounting pressure to formally criminalise non-heteronormative relations were strong 
indicators of a deepening crisis in the patriarchal gender order. The support for LGBTIQ 
rights indicated an increasing distrust of the established patterning of the gender 
relations of emotions. However, the mounting pressure to restore ‘order’ was a very 
strong indicator of the growing awareness of the eroded legitimacy of the 
heteronormative patterning of the gender relations of emotion and more specifically of 
23 Greg Fealy (2004) categorises the FPI as part of the burgeoning Islamist movement seeking to 
dramatically change Indonesian society and politics through the implementation of a comprehensive 
sharia law. FPI is best known as a vigilante group for its violent approach to enforcing Islamic law. 
24 Article 4 criminalises the production, procurement, distribution of pornographic materials, including 
those on ‘deviant sexual intercourse’, which further partly specifies as lesbian and homosexual sex (see 
Muthmainnah 2016). 
25 Article 13 clearly states that homosexual couples cannot adopt children. 
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hegemonic masculinity. What was considered as something that it was not necessary to 
regulate in formal legal terms began increasingly to be seen as a threat requiring special 
attention from, not only religious and community leaders, but also lawmakers. The 
struggle for hegemony was thus more intensified at this moment in history.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explained the socio-economic and political background that 
triggered the renewed struggle for hegemonic masculinity in Indonesia in the first 15 
years of twenty-first century. I have demonstrated that the period was marked by a deep 
gender-order crisis, initially triggered by the sudden reversal of economic fortunes in 
1997–1998. It was then complicated by the transition to democracy and a series of 
social and political changes that included an intensifying Islamisation in the wake of the 
authoritarian regime’s demise. The gender-order crisis eventually implicated 
masculinities. On one hand, it triggered strong attempts to defend the hegemonic ideal 
masculinity of bapakism. On the other, it inspired bolder movements to undermine it. 
In this chapter I have set the scene for a deeper discussion on Indonesian 
commercial filmmakers’ struggles to reconfigure what constitutes a cultural ideal 
masculinity in the ensuing chapters. Commercial cinema is an arena where the 
hegemonic position of masculinity is to be won or lost. It was during the gender-order 
crisis that the struggle for hegemonic masculinity in Indonesian cinema became 
increasingly visible, compared to the period when the crisis tendencies had not yet 
erupted into a full-blown crisis. As my chapters unfold, I shall demonstrate that 
hegemonic bapakism was deeply entrenched in Indonesian cinema especially during the 
New Order period. It was reflected in the structure of Indonesian cinema—filmmaking 
was very much a male-dominated arena. Thus, as also suggested by Sen (1994), it was 
not surprising that the gender representations in Indonesian cinema at that time reflected 
the patriarchal patterning of gender relations. The hegemonic position of bapakism was 
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barely contested. Yet, the major shifts that occurred in social, political and economic 
arenas off-screen at the turn of the millennium have forced changes within the structures 
of gender relations and the ways in which gender ideals are depicted in Indonesian 
cinema. Partly, filmmakers were involved in an intensified political battle for 
hegemonic masculinity. They tapped into the events, fears, fantasies and hopes of the 
period in their innovations and experimentations of alternative ideals. Yet, their struggle 
was not always successful and it could not avoid inevitable biases. 
In this chapter, I have also defended my position regarding the concept of 
‘crisis’ in the studies of men and masculinities. I have elaborated my opposition to the 
concepts of ‘masculinity in crisis’ or ‘crisis of masculinity’ as deployed by many 
scholars working on masculinities, including in the context of Indonesia. I have 
demonstrated that the concept has failed to capture the complexity of the process of 
change within the gender order. I propose to use ‘gender order crisis’ (R.W. Connell 
2005), instead throughout the thesis, to better map the trajectory of crisis and shifting 
relations among masculinities. I have demonstrated that the crisis within the gender 
order developed over time, instead of accidentally. Accidental events, in this case the 
economic crisis, political crisis and social change did, however, contribute to speed up 
the maturation of the respective crisis tendencies of the structures. In the case of 
Indonesia, these accidental occurrences exposed more visibly the crisis tendencies of the 
gender relations of production, power and emotion. Eventually, the accidental events 
sped up the maturation of those crisis tendencies and led them into a deep gender-order 
crisis in the twenty-first century. 
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The Gender-Order Crisis on the Silver Screen 
In this chapter I discuss the broad implications of the gender-order crisis for Indonesian 
cinema. In the previous chapter, I mapped the trajectory of the crisis within the three 
structures of the gender relations that support Indonesia’s official gender order. In this 
chapter, I provide a broad overview of how the gender-order crisis crept into the 
structure of Indonesian cinema and forced changes in the cinematic representations of 
gender and sexualities. How did, on one hand, the crisis open up new avenues for 
filmmakers to engage in innovation and experimentations with alternative gender ideals 
on screen; and on the other, it restrain the filmmakers’ political endeavours to offer such 
alternatives on screen? I essentially argue that the gender-order crisis permeated 
Indonesian cinema during the period from 2000 to 2014. In fact, Indonesian cinema 
became a contested territory in which various interest groups took part in a political 
endeavour either in support of or in challenge of official gender ideals. I identify two 
major forces significantly shaping the directions of gender politics pursued in 
Indonesian cinema amidst the weakening of official gender ideals. They are Islamisation 
and women’s cinema. I shall demonstrate that while they developed into strong forces 
of change within the structure of Indonesian cinema as well as the cinematic 
representations of genders and sexualities, they also deepened public anxiety and moral 
panic concerning gender and sexualities. 
Islamisation in Indonesian cinema is an extension of its off-screen phenomenon 
in the country at any given time. Islamisation is a series of processes involving certain 
measures and campaigns, regardless of the identity of the advocates and their motives, 
which call for the establishment of what are considered to be Islamic doctrines in legal, 
political and social systems (Salim 2008: 45). This phenomenon has been the most 
visible feature of Indonesian politics, economy and culture. Islamisation in 
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contemporary Indonesia, indeed, is a complex set of processes. As argued by Ariel 
Heryanto, it involves a set of multiple processes with multiple directions, in which 
various Muslim-affiliated groups, which do not necessarily hold shared views, are 
involved, and none of the groups holds control over the trajectory of the process. 
Islamisation is even more complex with the involvement of non-religiously affiliated 
groups and individuals as well as other factors, including post-authoritarian politics, the 
expansion of global capitalism, and the development of information and media 
technology. In popular culture, the phenomenon manifests partly in the explosion and 
celebration of products which are deemed by the Indonesian community as reflecting 
Islamic values (Heryanto 2014: 26). 
I shall demonstrate that during the period under study, Islamisation in 
Indonesian cinema manifested partly in the explosion of films promoting Islamic 
values—popularly known as film Islami. Films under this category provide a rich site of 
innovation and experimentation with alternative gender ideals, femininity and 
masculinity, which foreground Islamic piety. I will also show that Islamisation has been 
significant in shaping film censorship in Indonesia, both official and unofficial censors. 
Muslim protests against films, while not new to twenty-first-century Indonesia, have 
been much more visible when compared to the period under the authoritarian regime. 
Cinematic representations of alternative gender ideals have mostly been produced, 
censored and circulated in ways that anticipated or prevented unwanted protests which 
could have led to the withdrawal of films from distribution or even to their banning. 
The second major force shaping the trajectory of gender politics in the first 15 
years of twenty-first-century in Indonesia is women’s cinema. I define women’s cinema 
as an institution and a set of practices in which women filmmakers and women’s issues 
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are central to film production, representations and distribution.1 Indonesian women’s 
cinema is an extension of the flourishing feminist women’s movement off-screen. 
Women’s cinema is an avenue for women filmmakers to voice their concerns and 
protests against unequal gender relations that sustain the gender order in Indonesian 
cinema and beyond. As argued by Fatimah T. Rony (2012), films made by filmmakers 
who are critical of gender issues can be seen as political interventions aimed at raising 
viewers’ awareness of gender issues in their society at a particular time. I shall 
demonstrate that during the 2000 to 2014 period, a vibrant women’s cinema in 
Indonesia not only challenged the taken-for-granted male dominated cinema, but also 
triggered an intensive search for alternative gender ideals—femininities and 
masculinities. Yet, at the same time, these ‘vulgar’ cinematic challenges often annoyed 
various interest groups who supported official gender ideals. Thus, women’s cinema 
also deepened public anxiety around the possibility of impending moral decay. 
While not specifically addressing the feminist women’s movement and 
Islamisation in the previous chapter, I did mention that they played major roles in 
shaping the trajectory of gender politics off-screen. I suggested that both have 
contributed to the maturation of crisis tendencies in each of the structures of gender 
relations. For instance, I emphasised the role of the feminist women’s movement in 
forcing changes to the Indonesian legal system to criminalise acts of domestic violence. 
I also underscored their role in advocating for changes to the Compilation of Islamic 
Law to address gender biases. In addition, I also highlighted the role of radical Islamists 
in mobilising forces to curb non-heteronormative expressions of gender and sexuality. 
1 Indeed, there are films made by men which reflect feminist ideologies very well, yet I consciously limit 
the definition to exclude such films. For instance, I will include Lucky Kuswandi’s Selamat Pagi, Malam 
(Good morning, Night, 2014), although Kuswandi is a man. The film is produced by a renowned feminist 
producer, Sammaria Simanjuntak and problematises the life choices of lesbians in Indonesia. The 
feminine perspective offered in this film questions the normalised practice of marriages of convenience 
among Indonesian lesbians. Yet, I will exclude Hanung Bramantyo’s Kartini (2017) as part of women’s 
cinema because it is his auteur work despite problematising women’s issues, such as rights to education. 
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This chapter paves the way for deeper scrutiny of filmmakers’ struggles in 
undermining the hegemony of bapakism through screen representations. Its exploration 
of the rejuvenated struggle of gender politics behind and around the silver screen will 
help us to understand the opportunities as well as the limitations that filmmakers 
encountered in staging their public gender politics through commercial cinema. Not all 
innovations of alternative gender ideals are able to be represented, let alone idealised, 
on the screen in a particular cultural and historical setting. While some alternative ideals 
successfully appeal to the viewing public, others are banned, censored, protested about 
or withdrawn from circulation. This chapter explores the forces which on one hand 
fostered intensive search for new alternative gender ideals, and on the other limited such 
innovations within Indonesian cinema. Understanding these forces will help us 
comprehend why filmmakers were driven to promote certain forms of masculinities, 
while supressing or even avoiding taking sides on others in their films. 
We have witnessed certain depictions of gender ideals in commercial films that 
have been publicly protested about or badly censored. For instance, the idealisation of 
Muslim men and women who promote religious pluralism in Hanung Bramantyo’s ? 
(2011) was heavily criticised by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Indonesian 
Muslim Clerics Council (MUI); the protests caused the film to be temporarily 
suspended from circulation for re-editing (Afrisia 2015b). Brokeback Mountain (2005, 
Ang Lee) was not exempted from state censorship before its release in Indonesia in 
2006. Assuming that the film promoted same-sex relations, the state censorship board 
cut many scenes in the film, to the point that it disturbed the flow of the story (Detik 
Hot 2006). Consequently, staging political protests against established gender ideals 
through commercial cinema requires careful assessment of the intersection between 
politics and the economy. The political dimension apparently extends from off-screen 
(see Chapter 2) to within the structure of cinema itself. Such assessment is important in 
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order to create representations which are not only relevant but also potentially 
marketable. Eventually, political and economic considerations, independently or 
together, leave traceable consequences in the range of cinematic representations of 
gender ideals on the silver screen. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the 
Islamisation of Indonesian cinema. It examines how this most telling phenomenon 
shaped the trajectory of the political battle for official gender ideals in Indonesian 
cinema. I begin by describing the emerging film category which foregrounds Islamic 
piety—a category that became a rich ground for innovation and experimentation with 
alternative ideals of masculinities and femininities. While Islamisation inspired an 
intensive search for new gender ideals, it also posed limitations in the process through 
its intervention in film censorship—both official and otherwise. Islamisation 
contributed significantly to determining what could and could not be represented, let 
alone idealised, on screen at that time. 
The second section of this chapter is dedicated to exploring another major force 
shaping the trajectory of gender politics pursued in Indonesian cinema—women’s 
cinema. A newly emerging genre with barely any precedence, women’s cinema has 
been a powerful force of change in Indonesian cinema. This section begins with an 
explanation of the exponential increase in women filmmakers in Indonesian cinema. I 
will underscore the implications of such an increase for the structure of Indonesian 
cinema as well as the production of cinematic representations of gender ideals on the 
silver screen. Then, the discussion shifts to the moral panic and anxiety triggered by the 
flourishing of women’s cinema. Due to supposedly ‘vulgar’ and confronting depictions 
of gender and sexualities, women’s cinema was often linked to pornography. This 
chapter concludes with a reflection on the political–economic dimension of commercial 
cinema and how the production of cinematic representations of gender ideals is shaped. 
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Considering the intricate relations between politics and the economy in commercial 
cinema, we can expect that filmmakers must carefully negotiate their personal political 
views with off- and on-screen gender politics as well as the pressure to make a profit. 
Islamisation: New alternative gender ideals and the evolution of 
censorship 
In this section, I shall demonstrate that during the period under study, 2000–2014, 
Islamisation significantly shaped the trajectory of gender politics pursued in Indonesian 
cinema. On one hand it triggered an intensive search for alternative gender ideals: 
masculine and feminine. Through the flourishing of film Islami, Islamisation inspired 
the emergence of alternative gender ideals which foreground Islamic piety. On the other 
hand, as Islamisation emerged as a powerful force in the heated debate about public 
morality, it shaped the trajectory of state and public censorships onto a more 
conservative track. Consequently, Islamisation left telling marks in determining which 
representations of gender ideals could and could not be shown, let alone idealised in 
Indonesian cinema at that given time. 
The seed to the burgeoning Islamisation in twenty-first-century Indonesia can be 
traced back to the 1990s. Under the authoritarian regime, while being allowed to 
flourish, Islam was mostly distanced from state politics and reduced to its spiritual 
aspects and as a means of controlling public morality (Hefner 2000: 58–59). Yet, 
towards the end of the 1980s, the regime began to wane as the friction within Soeharto’s 
immediate circle and power base had reached a breaking point and threatened to 
overturn his three-decade dictatorship (Heryanto 2014: 29). During 1990s, there were 
several noteworthy historical milestones that reflected the regime’s inclination towards 
Islam in order to strengthen its power base. They included the establishment of Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars) in 
1990 by the state, President Soeharto and his family’s nationally televised Hajj 
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pilgrimage in 1991, and a more relaxed attitude towards wearing religious symbols, 
particularly the headscarf for Muslim women (Heryanto 2008b).2 As a result, Islam has 
been growing into a powerful force in Indonesian politics, economy and culture.  
Although none of the Islamic-based political parties has ever secured enough 
votes to win the majority seats in the parliament and pass the presidential threshold, 
Islam has been a strong force in Indonesian politics in the wake of the New Order’s 
demise. Islam has been intensively used by politicians—Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike—to garner votes.3 Political Islam has also permeated secular political parties 
(Baswedan 2004; Tanuwidjaja 2010).4 Candidates for the position of Indonesian 
President in the past three direct presidential elections must show their support to the 
religion of the majority of the Indonesian population.5 Non-Muslim candidates have 
also been using Islam to garner votes.6 Moreover, Islamic symbols, such as the 
headscarf for Muslim women, have been deployed by politicians to bolster their 
2 Under the reign of the New Order, the adoption of religious symbolism was largely confined to religious 
occasions. Until 1991, the government prohibited veiling in public offices and state schools (Smith-
Hefner 2007: 397). 
3 To date, there have been five general elections held in Indonesia, and in the last four, Indonesian voters 
were also asked to elect a President, in addition to electing representatives to the upper and lower houses 
of the parliament. The elections were held in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. In all these elections, none of 
the political parties which declare Islam as their basis has ever won the majority of votes. Moreover, since 
the substantial increase of the presidential threshold in Law Number 42/2008 (Republic of Indonesia 
2008), none of the Islam-based political parties has ever been able to achieve the lowest number of votes 
to nominate a president without joining a coalition. The law prescribes that nomination of a presidential 
candidate can only be done by a party or a coalition of political parties which can secure at least 20 per 
cent of the total number of parliament’s seats or by winning 25 per cent of votes in the general election 
prior to the presidential election (Article 9). 
4 In this thesis, political Islam refers to movements using Islam to attain political power. 
5 For example, part of the strategy to win the votes for his presidential bid in 2014, Joko Widodo with his 
family went to Mecca to perform Umrah close to election day (Primandari 2014). Considering the 
massive campaign undermining his religiosity (ibid.), his pilgrimage was a bold political strategy 
strengthening his image as a pious Muslim. 
6 For instance, the former governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Christian, tried to maintain his 
political standing by allocating funding for the welfare of mosque caretakers (Rikang 2014). In his second 
bid for Jakarta’s governorship in 2017, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama pledged before Nahdlatul Ulama leaders 
that he would allocate funding for 3,000 mosque caretakers to go to Saudi Arabia to perform the umrah 
pilgrimage (Sasongko 2017). 
89 
                                                 
Evi Eliyanah 
careers.7 Last, but not least, Islamisation in contemporary Indonesia has facilitated the 
emergence of organised vigilante groups, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and 
the Forum of Islamic Society (FUI), which do not shy away from using violence in 
disciplining public morality (Bamualim 2011; Munabari 2018). 
In gender politics, Islam has also emerged as a powerful contender. Despite its 
internal diversity and contradictions, Islam has been a strong alternative force amidst 
the weakening hegemony of New Order gender ideals. First and foremost, the 
decentralisation policy has also paved the way for many local governments to establish 
sharia by-laws, many of which are gender biased and target women (see Bush 2008; 
Noerdin 2002; Wieringa 2006).8 Second, Islam has also played a major role in almost 
all public debates on gender issues, including those surrounding the female presidency, 
polygamy, pornography, public morality and gender equality debates (see Chapter 2). 
Indonesian Muslims do not necessarily hold the same views regarding those gender 
issues. In many cases, Muslims’ opinions have been sharply divided, for instance on the 
polygamy and public morality debates (Brenner 2006; Nurmila 2009). Indeed, 
organised vigilante groups, such as FPI and FUI were behind many public protests and 
raids aimed at disciplining public displays of gendered morality. For instance, these 
organisations mobilised a massive protest against the Lady Gaga concert in May 2012. 
They considered Lady Gaga, renowned not only for her songs but also for the 
controversies surrounding her appearance and live acts, as a threat to the nation’s 
morality and to Islam (Saputra 2012). Although the concert tickets had already been 
7 I have shown elsewhere that Joko Widodo’s wife adorned the headscarf during her husband’s campaign 
for presidency, but she took it off once he won the election (Eliyanah 2016). 
8 In the absence of official figures Robin Bush (2008: 174) provided a statistical illustration on regional 
regulations based on sharia—there are 78 regional regulations enforced in 52 districts/municipalities of 
the total 470 districts/municipalities in Indonesia. Fourteen of these regulations indirectly target women 
by regulating the way they dress. For example, in Bulukumba, South Sulawesi, based on Bylaw No. 
5/2003 (Regional Government of Bulukumba 2003), all women accessing public services are required to 
veil. In Aceh, veiling is also an imperative gender practice justified by the province’s Bylaw No. 11/2002 
(Provincial Government of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 2002) Violation of this regulation can result in 
punishment, which is decided by the Islamic court (Article 23). 
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sold (Hari 2012) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs did not object to it (Liauw 2012), 
the Indonesian Police cancelled the permit due to enormous pressure from Muslim 
groups (A. Setiawan 2012). In short, Islam, despite its internal diversity and 
contradictions, has been a strong powerhouse in shaping the trajectory of gender politics 
in Indonesia in the twenty-first century. 
The pervasiveness of Islam in cinema triggered the emergence of a new 
category: film Islami (Islamic films), or film bernafaskan Islam (films which breathe 
Islam).9 The same trend in mainstreaming Islam in popular culture products can also be 
seen in literature, music and television programs.10 Films in the film Islami genre tend to 
foreground religiosity in their title and content, in some cases involve clerics preaching 
about Islam as the solution to the life problems faced by the characters (Imanda 2012: 
92–93). James Hoesterey and Marshall Clark (2012: 208) argue that films under this 
category are part of a wider artistic movement which attempts to articulate forms of 
aspirational piety that resonates with the contemporary anxieties, desires and 
frustrations of Indonesian Muslims, albeit mostly from the middle class. Indeed, films 
which promote Islamic values are not new in Indonesian cinema, yet they have never 
been as pervasive as they are in the twenty-first century. In fact, many films under this 
category are in the top ten best-selling films and have become part of the contemporary 
film canon in Indonesia. Ayat-ayat Cinta (Verses of Love, 2008, Hanung Bramantyo) 
which raked up more than three million viewers and the Ketika Cinta Bertasbih (When 
Love Glorifies God, 2009, Chaerul Umam) duology which attracted almost five million 
viewers collectively (Film Indonesia 2013). Watching Ayat-ayat Cinta, the then 
9 I am using film Islami in this thesis as it is the most commonly used terms among scholars working on 
Indonesian cinema. 
10 In literature, fiction promoting Islamic piety has emerged as an alternative literary genre. In music, 
Islamisation has led to the emergence of a genre of musik bernafaskan Islam (music that breathes Islam) 
(see Capwell 2011). In television, it has led to the popularity of sinetron religi, or religious soap operas 
(see Subijanto 2011). 
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President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono shed tears and encouraged the production of 
more such films which show the softer side of Indonesian Muslims (Hasits 2008; 
Wijoseno 2008). 
Islamisation in Indonesian cinema has also been brushing up against 
contemporary gender politics. The phenomenon has opened up avenues for the search 
for new alternative gender ideals which foreground Islamic piety. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Eliyanah 2016), film Islami is a rich site for innovation and experimentation 
with Muslim versions of alternative ideal femininities and masculinities. Films such as 
Kun Fayakun (Be and so it is, 2008, Guntur Novaris), Ayat-ayat Cinta, Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban (Woman with Keffiyeh, 2009, Hanung Bramantyo), Ketika Cinta 
Bertasbih and many others of a similar kind offer ‘visual guides’ to becoming ideal 
Muslim masculine men and feminine women (Eliyanah 2016; Hoesterey and Clark 
2012; Izharuddin 2017; Lücking and Eliyanah 2017).11 In terms of masculinity, film 
Islami first and foremost defies the secular version of the hegemonic cultural ideal, 
bapakism. Although bapakism was sanctioned by the dominant interpretation of Islam 
in Indonesia, Islamic piety was not promoted explicitly as part of the gender practices 
configuring the cultural ideal. Instead, it was subtly implied. As Islamisation intensified, 
Islamic piety has become explicitly foregrounded in the depiction of ideal masculinity, 
especially in film Islami. I will discuss more about these Muslim versions of an 
alternative ideal masculinity in Chapter 5. 
Just as there is a plurality of Islam off-screen, films under this category do not 
offer a singular form of gender ideal. The visual interpretation of what it takes to be 
ideal Muslim masculine men and Muslim feminine women are far from monolithic in 
Indonesian cinema. In terms of masculinity, I agree with Alicia Izharuddin (2017) that 
11 Indeed, films under the category of film Islami operate within a heteronormative world view. Globally, 
heteronormativity governs Muslim societies in gender and sexuality. The latter three films: Ayat-ayat 
Cinta, the Ketika Cinta Bertasbih duology and Perempuan Berkalung Sorban are adaptations of popular 
novels of the same titles. 
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most cinematic depictions of ideal masculinity represent the characters as aspiring to be 
rich and pious. Yet, they also bear many differences. For example, in the film Kun 
Fayakun, the character representing the ideal Muslim man promotes being the sole 
breadwinner for the family as the conventional masculine role. To do so, the male 
protagonist shoulders the economic responsibility on his own; he even prevents his wife 
from working for financial gain during the family’s hardest time. This representation of 
ideal masculinity is challenged by the film versions of Ayat-ayat Cinta, Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban, and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih which, to varying degrees, encourage 
women to pursue public-sphere careers and men to share the breadwinning 
responsibilities with women. 
We can also trace the influences of a burgeoning women’s cinema and the off-
screen movement for gender equality in the production of some alternative gender ideals 
in film Islami. Some filmmakers behind film Islami are idealist Muslim women 
filmmakers. For instance, Nan T. Achnas, the director of Pasir Berbisik (Whispering 
Sand, 2001), has collaborated with her director husband, Nurman Hakim to produce a 
number of films that critique radical Islamists and stereotypical Islamic gender 
practices. In Khalifah (2011, Nurman Hakim), for example, the husband-and-wife team 
problematises, not only the controversial face-veiling practice among Muslim women, 
but also the absolute authority of a husband over his wife, which extends to regulating 
her appearance in the public sphere.12 In the film, the female protagonist, who has not 
adopted veiling prior to her marriage, takes up veiling on the instruction of her husband. 
The husband, the representation of a member of a radical Islamist group, believes that 
face veiling is required of Muslim women to preserve their chastity. Although the 
female protagonist eventually finds liberty in adopting face veiling, the film 
problematises the extent to which a Muslim man holds authority over his wife’s body.  
12 In this film, Khalifa is the name of the protagonist. 
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Film Islami has also been an important platform from which to respond to 
contemporary public debates concerning gender issues. Film Islami has also been a rich 
site of political contestations that focus on the depiction of particular political stances in 
certain debates on gender issues. Control of cinematic representations of gender issues 
comes with the power to shape the trajectory of gender politics. This political 
contestation was highly visible on screen during the period under study. For instance, 
the filmmakers behind the adaptation of the Ayat-ayat Cinta novel took dramatic licence 
and extended the narrative’s polygamy scene. Instead of toning down the polygamy 
scene as in the novel, the filmmakers provided a much longer scene to show the 
complexity of a polygamous household. As Hanung Bramantyo explained to me: 
The (novel’s) logic is too simplistic: when she is in comma, Fahri’s voice or touch will 
awaken her. To get that touch, Maria and Fahri should be married … But where are the 
women’s rights? … The (novel) writer was so cruel to Maria. We could only provide a 
little happiness which is righteous for Maria. The polygamy scene was specifically 
Gina’s request because she pitied Maria (Personal interview with Bramantyo, 21 April 
2014).13 
As expected, the scene became one of the most discussed parts of the film. It 
revived the public debate on polygamy (Yumiyanti 2008), which had never entirely died 
down since the early 2000s. It has arguably been one of the most important arenas for 
13 Gina refers to Gina S. Noer, one of the scriptwriters of the film. The novel does not problematise the 
polygamous household led by the male protagonist. As for the film, the polygamous scene is extended to 
show how difficult it is for a man to treat his multiple wives equally and the jealousy between the co-
wives as a humane reaction towards unequal treatment. In the film, the male protagonist, Fahri, takes a 
second wife, Maria based on his first wife’s request in order to save him from the death penalty. 
Previously, Fahri is convicted of rape. He cannot prove his innocence unless he can make Maria testify 
for him. Maria, who is gravely ill with a heart condition and depression due to her unrequited love for 
Fahri, is in coma. Doctors advise the family that it is only Fahri’s voice and touch that can ease Maria’s 
depression, and in turn help her recover. The only way that Fahri can touch Maria is for them to marry 
because a Muslim man cannot touch a woman who is not in his immediate family. Fahri needs Maria to 
testify for him; Maria needs Fahri to recover from her illness; and the pregnant first wife, Aisha, needs 
Fahri free and alive to be with her to raise their child. Polygamy is the only option. Fahri weds Maria on 
the hospital bed. After he kisses her, Maria gradually regains consciousness. Finally, Maria can testify in 
Fahri’s trial and he is free. The happiness however is short lived. Upon returning home, Fahri, Maria and 
Aisha live under the same roof. This is when the polygamous household becomes complicated. Aisha is 
jealous of Fahri’s treatment of Maria. Fahri is confused and finds it difficult to be fair towards his two 
wives. The conflicts culminate with Aisha running away from home to seek consolation from her family. 
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legitimising an alternative ideal masculinity—a masculinity which encourages men to 
take more than one wife. For men, the polygamous practice is considered to be a heroic 
act towards protecting women. After 2006, when disappointment towards A’a Gym (a 
famous Muslim televangelist) escalated due to his decision to take a second wife, the 
debate seemed to go under the radar. Yet, the release of the movie Ayat-ayat Cinta 
revived the debate with Muslims again being widely divided. 
In addition to opening up new avenues in which to reconfigure new gender 
ideals, Islamisation has also shaped the trajectory of censorship in Indonesia during the 
period under study. Earlier, I mentioned the significant role of Islam in the ongoing 
debate about public morality. Part of the control of public morality is contingent upon 
securing control over which forms of gender ideals can and cannot be represented and 
idealised on cinema screen. In the following discussion, I shall demonstrate that 
Islamisation has contributed to shaping the direction of state and public censorship. 
Islamisation has contributed to the strengthening of conservatism in state censorship; it 
has also emerged as a strong force of public censorship in its own right. During the 
period under study, we saw many films being censored, withdrawn from circulation, or 
even banned due to protests from various Muslim pressure groups because of alleged 
‘inappropriate’ representations of gender and sexualities as well as blasphemy. In many 
cases, public protests altered the decisions made by the state censorship board. 
Although many layers of state censorship regulations under the New Order have 
been scraped, the Film Censorship Board (LSF) still holds a prominent role in 
determining what can and cannot be screened in Indonesian commercial cinemas. The 
LSF, a state-funded body, is the legacy of film regulation under the colonial 
government. It is responsible for censoring and classifying films. The most recent Law 
on Film, Law No. 33/2009 (Republic of Indonesia, 2009) stipulates that every film and 
film trailer produced domestically and internationally, intended to be distributed 
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through the commercial market in Indonesia must pass censorship (Article 57). The 
censorship board is a powerful state-funded body which assesses each film’s 
‘appropriateness’ for legal distribution in Indonesian cinema theatres or in the 
DVD/VCD formats (van Heeren 2012: 178). 
During the 2000 to 2014 period, it was clear that many decisions the board made 
regarding film censorship were shaped by Islamisation. The supposedly independent 
body seemed, on many occasions, to be intimidated by public protests that were staged 
by various Muslim pressure groups. In 2004, it controversially cancelled its approval for 
Buruan Cium Gue! (Kiss Me Quick! 2004, Findo Purwono) after massive and highly 
publicised protests led by A’a Gym.14 The film which had already obtained approval 
from the LSF was criticised by A’a Gym for containing pornographic content and 
advocating pre-marital sex among youths, thus endangering the nation’s morality. 
Basing his judgement only on the film’s title, A’a Gym made the accusation during his 
live television sermon on 8 August 2004, three days after the film was released (Detik 
News 2004).15 Quickly gathering support, including from the Indonesian Ulema 
Council (MUI), A’a Gym led an entourage to visit the LSF to have a dialogue about 
films and the nation’s morality (Fransambudi and Wahyudi 2004). After the meeting, 
the LSF claimed that it might have made a mistake by passing the film. Thus, the LSF 
cancelled its approval and demanded that the film be withdrawn from theatres. The 
producer finally withdrew the film from distribution and ordered a re-editing to abide 
with the protestors’ demands (ibid.). This incident relating to the censorship board’s 
reversed decision on Buruan Cium Gue! demonstrates the immense pressure caused by 
14 The televangelist’s name is Abdullah Gymnastiar. But he is more popularly known as A’a Gym 
(Brother Gym). 
15 The narrative of Buruan Cium Gue revolves around two high school students who have been dating for 
two years. They are each other’s first love. The girl, Desi, somehow expects that her boyfriend, Ardi, will 
kiss her on her lips. She has never had the experience before, while her female friends have. However, the 
guy tends to wait until the right moment to do so. Calling in to a live radio program, Desi lies about 
having been kissed by her boyfriend. Listening to the confession, Ardi wonders who kissed Desi before 
him. After all of the misunderstandings are cleared up, they eventually kiss. 
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the intensifying Islamisation on the structure of Indonesian cinema and especially on the 
censorship board. 
The recall of censorship approval for Buruan Cium Gue! should be understood 
in the context of the gender-order crisis. The gender-order crisis occurred during a 
period of profound changes, in which the hegemonic bases of official gender ideals 
were substantially eroded. It was during this period of crisis that Islam emerged as a 
powerful alternative force in the contest for gender hegemony. The public protests 
against the film followed by the recall of approval and the withdrawal of the film from 
theatres were political strategies staged by Muslim pressure groups to secure gender 
hegemony. They struggled to control what could and could not be screened in 
Indonesian cinema at that given time because they were fearful of the perceived 
negative excesses of films. The provocative title and the alternative gender ideals 
offered by the film in question did not sit well with the pious ideals promoted by these 
groups. In other words, the public persecution of Buruan Cium Gue! was a reaction 
towards the film’s challenges of an ideal passive feminine sexuality and the new 
aspiration of becoming pious Muslim subjects. Although kissing scenes were not new in 
Indonesian commercial films, this film happened to catch the attention of a high-profile 
Muslim cleric (A’a Gym) who garnered substantial power by inspiring the Muslim 
public at that time.16 By gathering support from various Muslim pressure groups, the 
cause against Buruan Cium Gue! was finally able to influence the official body that held 
the legitimate power to censor films. 
16 Prior to Buruan Cium Gue!, another teenage romance Ada Apa dengan Cinta? (What’s Up with Cinta? 
2002, Rudy Soedjarwo) also featured a kissing scene between the two teenage protagonists at an airport. 
This earlier film did not attract a similar reaction from the Muslim pressure groups. Thus, according to 
van Heeren (2012: 168) Muslim protests against films have at best been random in contemporary 
Indonesia. Yet, in my opinion, among this randomness, there is a loose pattern emerging in relation to 
Muslim protests against films. Protests tend to target films which allegedly contain sexually explicit 
scenes, LGBTIQ, blasphemy and communism. The definition of each of these content topics can be very 
broad and highly subjective. 
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Prior to the incident involving Buruan Cium Gue!, in 2003 a heated debate on 
pornography and morality was triggered by a popular female dangdut singer—Inul 
Daratista. Her trademark dance move, the goyang ngebor (drill dance) became 
controversial as she began to be featured on national television.17 Many senior dangdut 
musicians, led by the notable Rhoma Irama, also an icon of devout Muslims, criticised 
her and accused her of smearing dangdut with immoral dance moves. It was during his 
row against Inul that Rhoma Irama coined the term ‘porno-aksi’ (porno-action). The 
gyrating hip movement of the dance was considered by Rhoma Irama and his 
proponents to threaten the nation’s morality, and thus it should be banned from being 
shown in public. Certainly, such row between a junior and a senior artist, a devout 
Muslim and a Muslim who was considered immoral, soon received a lot of media 
attention, which led to a public debate on public morality. In the debate, Inul garnered 
support from other Muslim leaders, especially Nahdlatul Ulama and former President 
Abdurrahman Wahid. The debate set in motion a stale discussion in parliament about 
regulating pornography and porno-action in the Indonesian public sphere. Reading the 
case of Buruan Cium Gue! against this precedence alerts us to the increasingly 
significant role of Islam, regardless of its internal frictions, in regulating public 
gendered morality during the period of a deep gender-order crisis. It aspired to regulate 
what could and could not be shown in the Indonesian public sphere. 
Among the filmmakers I met during my fieldwork in 2014, LSF was notoriously 
described as becoming more conservative due to the intensified Islamisation. As 
described by Nia Dinata, ‘Previously, the censorship board worked for an authoritarian 
regime. But now, it works to please organised groups bearing the name of religion’ 
(Personal interview, 28 May 2014). The case of Buruan Cium Gue! has clearly proven 
17 Prior to her popularity on national television, she was a popular off-air artist. She had popularised her 
dance move before securing television popularity (Heryanto 2008a). 
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this allegation. The actual content of the film does not contain any graphic sexual scenes 
or pre-marital sex. Yet, the censorship board succumbed to the pressure of Muslim 
pressure groups and cancelled its initial censorship decision. Consequently, it is 
necessary for filmmakers to negotiate their political struggles around state censorship as 
well as potential public protests, especially those mounted by certain Muslim pressure 
groups. For example, in an article that appeared in Kapan Lagi, ‘Nia Dinata siapkan 
banyak bonus dalam DVD “ARISAN 2”’ (Nia Dinata has prepared a lot of bonuses for 
‘ARISAN 2’ DVD), Nia Dinata said that one of their biggest concerns in her 
collaboration with director Lucky Kuswandi in Madame X (2010, Lucky Kuswandi), a 
transgender superhero comedy, was censorship: 
I can’t deny that we are worried (that the film might not pass censorship). But we are 
used to making films which are out of the box. As long as we have positive messages to 
offer and we believe in what we are doing, I believe all of the worries will be gone (14 
June 2012). 
Madame X experiments with a superhero genre by offering a trans woman as the 
heroine. The film is a critique of the social bullying of non-heteronormative individuals, 
polygamy and corrupt public officials. Making a non-heteronormative individual into a 
hero could easily be translated as the glorification of LGBTIQ, which was a risky 
subject matter at the height of the gender-order crisis (see Chapter 2).18 
Indeed, the censorship board was generally known for being conservative and its 
decisions were at best arbitrary (van Heeren 2012: 179). There has never been any clear 
definition of what constitutes ‘inappropriate’ screen content. Both the 1992 and the 
2009 film acts broadly mention that films must not contain content that: 
1. inspires viewers to commit violence, or partake in drug or substance abuse, 
2. promotes pornography, 
18 In Chapter 2, I showed that the development of movement in support of LGBTIQ sped up the 
maturation of the internal crisis tendencies within the structure of gender relations of emotion. It 
threatened the heteronormative patterning of emotional relations which have become hegemonic. 
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3. provokes conflict between ethnicities, religions, races or other groups, 
4. is blasphemous or offends religious values, 
5. inspires law violation, 
6. degrades human dignity (Art 6, Law No. 33/2009, Republic of Indonesia). 
As a result, these categories are open to subjective interpretation by members of the 
censorship board. 
The more conservative censorship institution is inseparable from the 
increasingly prevalent public protests against films staged by various Muslim pressure 
groups. Indeed, incidents of Muslims protesting against films are not new in Indonesia. 
Both during the authoritarian period and after its demise, Muslim protests have led to 
the banning, withdrawal from distribution, reversal of censorship decisions or even 
cancellation of production.19 In both periods, Muslim protests against films have been 
able to influence the decisions made by the LSF. However, I agree with Katinka van 
Heeren that protests against films launched by various Muslim groups were never as 
loud, or as violent as during the post-authoritarian period; neither did they garner as 
much media attention (2012: 157). At that time, there was an increasing significance of 
Islam in politics, including gender politics, and a greater exposure of Islam in the media. 
Amidst a heightened Islamisation, it was easy for public protests against films or other 
products of popular culture staged in the name of Islam to get substantial media 
attention (ibid.). Wide media coverage about events, and voluntary individual posts on 
various social media platforms, eventually multiply the echoes of such protests, which 
in the previous era might not have generated the same level of media attention. 
In addition to public protests against Buruan Cium Gue!, two other infamous 
cases involved public protests and controversies. These were Perempuan Berkalung 
Sorban and ?. Both were directed by Hanung Bramantyo, who also directed Ayat-ayat 
19 Van Heeren (2012: 169) has listed a number of protests against films conducted by various Muslim 
pressure groups during the New Order period. They include the protest against Bagi-bagi Dong (Share, 
please, 1994, Tjut Djalil) due to the alleged pornographic content. The protests were likely to have been 
instigated by allegations that the films contained pornographic material. 
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Cinta. Perempuan berkalung Sorban, which revolves around the life of a progressive 
Muslim woman who challenges patriarchal gender relations in a Muslim setting, was 
heavily criticised by many Muslim pressure groups, including MUI and Islamic-based 
political parties, such as the Justice Welfare Party (PKS) for offending Muslims by 
depicting Muslim clerics and traditional Islamic boarding schools in negative lights 
(Dewi 2009). While gaining support from Muslim feminists, such as Musdah Mulia, the 
film was unable to escape the controversy and the pressure to withdraw it from theatres 
(Yunita 2009). I will discuss the alternative ideal masculinity promoted in Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban in Chapter 5. The same fate also befell ? in 2011. This film explores 
religious pluralism in Indonesia. Through its protagonists, the film promotes tolerance 
among different religious believers. MUI and FPI were among the most vocal Muslim 
pressure groups in the public protests against the film. In their view, the film offended 
Islam by glorifying religious pluralism.20 In both cases, although the censorship board 
did not alter their censorship decision, the controversy certainly hampered the film 
distribution and sales. While another film Islami released around the same time as 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban earned more than a million viewers during its theatrical 
release, this film was able to attract only around 600,000 moviegoers (Film Indonesia 
2013). According to an article in the Jakarta Post entitled, ‘FPI pulls scalpel on Hanung 
Bramantyo’s plurist film “?”,’ the television station cancelled the screening due to 
protests by the FPI in front of SCTV which planned to screen ? on the eve of Idul Fitri 
in 2011 (29 August 2011).21 
The increasing visibility of public protests staged by Muslim pressure groups 
also led to major distribution chains becoming more selective in screening films. 
Cinema theatres are the immediate distribution channels for commercial films. 
20 In their view, Muslims must believe that Islam is the only one true religion. 
21 Idul Fitri is the Islamic festivity marking the end of Ramadhan. In Indonesia, this festivity is the biggest 
Islamic event celebrated every year on the first day of the tenth month of Islamic lunar calendar. 
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Consequently, they hold substantial power in determining which films they can screen 
and which ones they reject. Even when they agree to screen a particular film, they have 
the power to determine how many screens are allocated and in which theatres the 
screening can be done. Amidst rampant public protests by Muslim pressure groups 
between 2000 and 2014, cinema theatres were likely to avoid screening films which 
potentially triggered protests and controversies. In turn, this attitude towards a particular 
film could limit the varieties of representations of gender ideals in commercial cinema. 
Not only do such attitudes limit what can be accessed by viewers, but they can also limit 
the extent of innovation and experimentation of gender ideals that can be done by 
filmmakers should they want their films to be screened in major theatres. Nia Dinata’s 
Arisan! (The Gathering, 2003) was almost rejected by a major cinema theatre franchise 
due to its representation of gay masculinities (Dinata cited in Baumgärtel 2012: 206). 
After a tough negotiation, the film exhibition company finally agreed to screen it in a 
limited number of theatres in Java. The case faced by Dinata proves the important role 
of distribution channels in determining what kind of film and also what kind of gender 
representations could be made available to Indonesian film audiences. In addition, the 
film distribution companies also determine the size audience and the reach of film 
distribution.  
In conclusion, during the period under study, Islamisation played a major role in 
shaping the gender politics pursued in Indonesian cinema. Not only did it motivate and 
open up avenues for filmmakers to innovate and experiment with alternative gender 
ideals which foreground Islamic piety, but it also contributed to the conservative turn of 
state and public censorship. I have shown in this section that Islamisation facilitated the 
flourishing of film Islami, which became a rich ground for such innovation and 
experimentation. Several films under the category of film Islami, such as Ayat-ayat 
Cinta and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih have successfully facilitated the legitimacy of non-
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hegemonic masculinities and femininities as alternative ideals. However, the heightened 
Islamisation in Indonesia, made public protests against films in the name of Islam more 
visible. In many cases, such public protests were able to influence the decisions made 
by the film censorship board and the distribution channels. Islamisation and public 
protests against films indirectly also limited the extent of innovation and 
experimentation with gender ideals in cinema. 
Women’s cinema: Exposing gender inequalities, undermining 
bapakism 
In this section, I examine the roles of the women’s cinema in shaping the trajectory of 
gender politics pursued in Indonesian cinema from 2000 to 2014. Twenty-first-century 
Indonesia has witnessed the flourishing of women’s cinema. It has become a rich site 
for critical responses towards the patriarchal patterning of gender relations in Indonesia. 
I shall demonstrate that on one hand, women’s cinema became an inevitable force of 
change in challenging male dominance of the industry and in promoting feminine 
perspectives in cinematic representations of gender and sexualities; on the other, it 
deepened public anxiety and moral panic.  
The flourishing of women’s cinema in twenty-first-century Indonesia has been 
facilitated partly by the gender-order crisis. The hegemony of the New Order’s gender 
ideals has weakened, and gender politics have been rejuvenated due to the gender-order 
crisis (see Chapter 2). Gender issues have been openly discussed and debated in 
Indonesia’s public sphere. They have become an increasingly important arena of power 
contestation in the post–New Order period (K. Robinson 2015: 52). In fact, symbolic 
control over what constitutes ideal femininity and masculinity does come with power 
(Brenner 2011). For example, as I mentioned in the previous section, the interest 
group(s) able to secure control over how people should dress in public comes with the 
power to regulate the public sphere, such as through the implementation of sharia 
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bylaws. As a result, older gender ideals, such as bapakism and ibuism, have been 
strongly contested, and new alternative ideals have been intensively sought. 
Women’s cinema has been an important platform for women filmmakers to take 
part in such heightened gender politics. Progressive women filmmakers tailor their 
perspectives on gender equality on their films, both for commercial and independent 
cinema markets. According to Nan Triveni Achnas, a senior filmmaker in Indonesia, 
women’s cinema is a statement of challenge against ‘the politics and culture which 
impose restrictions on women established by the state’ (cited in Syahrul 2002). 
Moreover, with the flourishing feminist movements, some of the new generation of 
Indonesian women filmmakers, such as Nia Dinata, have been working closely with 
feminist activists to advocate for gender equality on- and off-screen.22 Consequently, 
the roles of women’s cinema in shaping gender politics in Indonesian cinema cannot be 
disregarded. 
Many films made by progressive women filmmakers, such as Pasir Berbisik 
(Whispering Sand, 2001, Nan. T. Achnas) and Berbagi Suami (Love for Share, 2006, 
Nia Dinata) have become new canons in contemporary Indonesian cinema. They 
promote diverse feminine perspectives of certain social and gender issues, and offer 
alternative gender ideals. The representations of plural feminine perspectives over the 
hotly debated topic of polygamy are visible in Berbagi Suami. The film, which was 
produced amidst the rejuvenated public debate on polygamy in the early 2000s (see 
Chapter 2), offers different perspectives of women living in polygamous households. 
The film is not simply a black-and-white verdict of whether polygamy is a justifiable 
22 Nia Dinata is a good example of filmmakers who are also activists. She has been working closely with 
Kalyana Mitra and Jurnal Perempuan, non-government organisations for women’s empowerment, to 
establish Project Change. Project Change is a filmmaking master class run biannually to mainstream 
women’s perspective in filmmaking. Dinata also worked with the two organisations to organise the V 
Film Festival—an international film festival to showcase films made by women about women’s issues 
and employing women’s perspectives 
22 In short, women’s cinema has been playing a pivotal role in challenging the official patterning of 
gender relations in Indonesia. 
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masculine gender practice. Some of the women portrayed are tricked into polygamous 
marriage, but some enter it with consent. Some of them choose to stay in the 
relationship, but others choose to leave for various reasons. This kind of exploration of 
plural perspectives of women towards gender issues is scarcely ever found outside 
women’s cinema. 
The backbone of women’s cinema is certainly the women filmmakers who are 
aware of gender issues and feminist struggles for gender equality. They are agents in the 
political battle to undermine the dominant patriarchal gender order in cinema. As 
suggested by Flavia Laviosa, women filmmakers whose works are provocative are 
advocates for women’s problems and their films are expressions of ‘cultural challenges, 
political advocacy and artistic commitment’ (2010: xvii) for women’s collective 
experiences of struggle. Indonesia has seen a surge of women filmmakers into decision-
making positions in Indonesian cinema. Novi Kurnia estimates that there were at least 
25 women directors23 of a total of 184 directors working in commercial cinema between 
1998 and 2010 in Indonesia (2014: 8, 61, 237–38).24 Women in other roles such as 
producers, scriptwriters, editors, designers, and other film-production activities have 
also increased significantly (Kurnia 2013: 33). Quantitatively, this is unprecedented 
compared to women’s involvement prior to the twenty-first-century in Indonesia. 
Between 1926 and 1999, there were only four women directors who worked under the 
supervision of their superior male counterparts (Michalik 2013: 17–18; Sen 1994: 
135).25 Although this numerical data does not convey the whole gamut of the 
23 Kurnia mentions that of the 25 women directors during the period, 22 of them started their film 
directing career in post-authoritarian Indonesia (2014: 8). 
24 These women directed 51 commercially distributed feature films. This number constitutes around 12.5 
per cent of around 400 feature films that were released during that period (Aartsen 2011; Kurnia 2013: 
35). 
25 According to Krishna Sen (1994) and Yvonne Michalik (2013), generally these women filmmakers 
worked under the supervision of their male counterparts, some of whom happened to be their spouses or 
close kin. This family-connection pattern was likely to make women filmmakers unable to liberate 
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development of Indonesian women’s cinema prior to the twenty-first century, it at least 
points to the sheer number and significance of women and women’s perspectives in 
Indonesian cinema during the previous eight decades. 
While acknowledging the role of the gender-order crisis in facilitating the 
development of women’s cinema in Indonesia, the global trend of women’s cinema in 
the twenty-first century is also an important factor to be taken into account. In 
Hollywood, Martha Lauzen (2014) documented that women made up 17–19 per cent of 
total filmmakers involved in the 250 top grossing films between 1998 and 2014. In 
South Korea, according to Anchalee Chaiworapon (2007), the increased involvement of 
women in filmmaking began to be recognisable in the late 1990s; the rise of South 
Korean Women’s cinema was part of the national struggle for democratisation in the 
post-authoritarian era, just as in Indonesia.26 In India, the increased involvement of 
feminist filmmakers since the 1990s, particularly in documentary films, has made 
national women’s issues more visible; these filmmakers used films as political tools to 
voice their concerns and appeal to their fellow citizens (Sinha 2010). The rising 
involvement of women filmmakers in Indonesian cinema is inseparable from this global 
trend and also from the increased awareness of gender inequalities. In fact, according to 
Achnas: 
Globalisation and information flow have triggered changes within our society. The 
women’s movements which originated from outside Indonesia have raised our 
awareness of women’s roles and rights. And along with this development, women who 
used to work as copy writers, creative directors in various advertising agencies and 
production houses, have tried to break into cinema (cited in Syahrul 2002). 
themselves from men’s perspective in filmmaking, in order to survive and obtain recognition in the male-
dominated creative condition (Sen 1994: 135). 
26 Under the New Order, independent cinema was relatively absent. 
106 
                                                                                                                                               
Chapter 3. The Gender-Order Crisis around the Silver Screen 
The emergence of Indonesian women’s cinema occurred simultaneously with 
growing interests among Indonesian youth in exploring themes of genders and 
sexualities in other forms of popular culture. In Indonesian literature, for example, 
scholars have widely discussed the emergence of young women writers whose works no 
longer shy away from challenging the established patriarchal patterning of gender 
relations. Many of their works, categorised under Sastra Wangi (Fragrant Literature), 
rose to prominence and received high recognition in national and international literary 
circuits (see Downes 2016; Hatley 1999, 2002, 2007; Marching 2007). In theatre 
performances, Barbara Hatley (2008) underscores the increasing prominence of gender 
issues and women’s participation since the early years of the twenty-first century, that 
are reflective of the narrative changes in Indonesian society and performance since the 
1970s. In cinema, Aristo indicates: 
In fact, the most powerful producers in Indonesian commercial cinema now are women. 
Many of them are unique and maintain their independence. Name them! Shanty 
Harmayn, Mira Lesmana, Nia Dinata, Lala Timothy … Joko Anwar made Modus 
Anomali and Pintu Terlarang with Lala Timothy. Shanty Harmayn and Mira Lesmana 
have produced films with unique themes (related to gender). Nia Dinata was the first 
filmmaker who could speak about polygamy in her film in such a relaxed way. While 
the male producers tend to be on the industry side of cinema (Personal interview, 11 
April 2014).27 
Aristo’s statement highlights the formidable role of Indonesian women filmmakers, 
especially producers in forcing changes in Indonesian cinema. This growing interest in 
gender reflects increasingly active gender politics in popular culture during the gender-
order crisis. 
27 These arthouse thrillers, Modus Anomali (Ritual, 2012) and Pintu Terlarang (The Forbidden Door, 
2009), directed by Joko Anwar received rave reviews nationally and internationally. Pintu Terlarang 
received the Best of Puchon award at the 2009 Puchon International Fantastic Film Festival. Modus 
Anomali enjoyed its World Premiere at the 2012 SXSW (Martin 2012). 
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However, having more women involved in cinematic production does not 
necessarily translate into recognition of women’s perspectives in cinema. Krishna Sen 
(2005) also doubts that the involvement of women filmmakers directly leads to 
recognition of women’s perspectives, especially in the context of commercial cinema. 
However, as suggested by Barbara Quart (1988) and E. Ann Kaplan (2003), the 
involvement of women filmmakers can at least open up women’s world on the screen; 
women can now define themselves instead of being defined by men, and women can 
also contribute to shaping the representations of other genders, sexualities and gender 
relations. Based on a study conducted by Lyle Friedman, Matt Daniels and Ilia 
Blinderman (n.d.) on over 200 Hollywood films produced from 1995 to 2015, a film 
production team that has gender diversity in the crew (writer, director and producer), 
tend to provide less sexist representations of women. In Indonesia, women’s cinema has 
increased the visibility of feminine dimensions of ideas, images, values and wishes 
(Michalik 2013). Women filmmakers have contributed to the blurring of gendered 
moral ideals and gender boundaries (Sen 2006) as well as creating strong and 
independent female characters (Imanjaya and Citra 2013; Monteiro 2013). In short, the 
burgeoning of women’s cinema has provided high hopes for change in the prevalent 
male perspectives in representations of gender and sexualities. 
In fact, Indonesian women’s cinema provides a rich critique of cultural ideals of 
masculinity. As films in this category undermine the established cultural ideal of 
femininity, they also problematise the hegemonic masculinity ideal of bapakism. They 
do this by depicting bapakism as making men violent, victimising women, and 
pressuring other men who are unable to attain the ideal. Berbagi Suami, a film that I 
mentioned earlier, also problematises unequal power relations within marriage. It 
questions the men’s authority as heads of their families. The men tend to blindside their 
first wives when they decide to take more wives into the marriage. Such decisions tend 
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to lead the family into conflict and misery. In such instances the family is not 
necessarily broken up. Another example is Pasir Berbisik. The film also problematises 
the social construction of bapak as the legitimate provider and authoritative patron 
leader of a family.28 It problematises the significance of bapakism in making a man into 
a good father. The film suggests that the inability to perform the gender practices 
associated with the bapak ideal tends to place a psychological burden on men, which 
potentially leads to frustration and violence. In such a damaging situation, women and 
children have a tendency to become the victims of men’s violence. In short, as films 
under women’s cinema mainstream women’s perspectives on the silver screen, they also 
scrutinise the hegemonic masculinity ideal. 
The critical acclaim received by Indonesian women’s cinema at national and 
international film circuits, makes their challenges even more formidable. As Marijke De 
Valck and Mimi Soeteman (2010) argue, festivals act simultaneously as indicators of 
changing norms, and forces that can drive, shape and legitimise change. The recognition 
of women’s cinema in international film festival circuits partly indicates that the films’ 
subjects matter: feminism and gender issues are relevant and deserve cinematic 
exploration at this particular moment in history in Indonesia and globally. The issues 
brought up in women’s cinema certainly are not limited to women and femininities. 
Women’s cinema also critically tackles issues concerning men and masculinities, as I 
illustrated in the case of Pasir Berbisik. Nationally, Pasir Berbisik was nominated for 
multiple awards at the Asia Pacific Film Festival in 2001, including Best Film and Best 
Emerging Film Director. Domestically, the film also received multiple nominations at 
the 2004 Festival Film Indonesia (FFI), including Best Actress in the Leading Role, 
Best Cinematography and Best Actress in a Supporting Role (Film Indonesia 2010). 
28 Pasir Berbisik is a film in one of the new canons in contemporary Indonesian cinema. It is ‘the first 
work directed and produced by women with a conscious feminist agenda’ (Paramaditha 2013: 75). The 
film is about a mother protecting her daughter from the abuses committed by her own father, other men 
and the masculinist regime. 
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The international recognition that Pasir Berbisik received legitimised the issues it 
explored as national and global concerns: women’s empowerment, violence against 
women, trafficking, state violence and masculinities. This recognition of issues on men 
and masculinities explored in women’s cinema thus highlights their significance and 
relevance and subsequently allows them to be cinematically explored by other 
filmmakers beyond women’s cinema. 
Women filmmakers, who consistently tailor their progressive gender 
perspectives into their works, have inspired many of their colleagues to be more aware 
of gender issues—within and outside their own networks. Most of the filmmakers I met 
referred to women filmmakers and/or their films as being inspiring and providing role 
models, especially when it comes to representations of gender. Lucky Kuswandi, a 
prominent young director, called Dinata his ‘mentor’ and has been working closely with 
her on various projects for commercial and independent cinema (Personal interview, 28 
May 2014). Kuswandi worked with Dinata on Madame X (2010)—a satirical comedy 
about a transgender superhero who deals with homophobia, human trafficking and 
corrupt politics. Kuswandi directed and Dinata produced the film. A prolific 
scriptwriter, Aristo, named Shanty Harmayn as his ‘most critical writing counterpart 
and producer’ especially when it came to creating gender representations (Personal 
interview, 11 April 2014).29 A prominent director Riri Riza also claimed that his interest 
in exploring gender issues was inspired by his colleague Mira Lesmana. In an interview 
with Hera Diani, of the Jakarta Post, Riza stated that: 
If you notice, the main characters in most of my films are women … It just happened. 
My mother has played a huge role in my life. I also work with Mira Lesmana. I may 
make several other films about mother-child relationships because, for me, it’s very 
29 Aristo worked with Harmayn on a number of films, including the blockbuster Sang Penari (The 
Dancer, 2011, Ifa Isfansyah). 
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personal. And in this male-dominated and predominantly Muslim society, those issues 
will not be seen critically (12 May 2002).30 
In short, progressive women filmmakers in Indonesian cinema have contributed 
significantly to the ways that their colleagues think about and represent gender and 
gender relations. 
Riri Riza’s experience working with Mira Lesmana and Prima Rusdi in his first 
feature film, Eliana Eliana (2001) is a good example of the role of progressive women 
filmmakers in shaping the representation of masculinities. The road movie explores 
mother–daughter relationships against a backdrop of grim and gloomy areas of urban 
Jakarta during the economic crisis in 1998.31 While focusing on the difficult 
relationships between a mother and a daughter, the film also carries a strong critique of 
hegemonic masculinity. None of the male characters, be they physically present or 
implied from stories told by the female characters, represents an ideal bapak, the 
authoritative patron leader of a family collectivity who provides a livelihood and 
protection for his family members. In the film the men’s inability to adopt the gender 
practices of hegemonic masculinity eventually leads to their destruction and they 
became a burden to the women in their families.  
Aside from providing optimism regarding gender transformation, the flourishing 
of women’s cinema has also triggered public anxiety and moral panic. Many films in 
30 Among 11 feature films that Riza directed between 2000 and 2017, 10 feature strong and independent 
female protagonists. 
31 Riri Riza became Mira Lesmana’s business partner at Miles Films in 1998. They have been working at 
the company ever since. Riri Riza had previously been a producer in Ada Apa dengan Cinta? (What’s up 
with Cinta? 2002, Rudy Soedjarwo). Prima Rusdi wrote the script for Gie (2005) and the sequel of Ada 
Apa dengan Cinta 2 (2016, Riri Riza). 
Riza and Lesmana made the film as part of their film activism in the ISinema (independent 
cinema) movement, in which young filmmakers in the early twenty-first century challenged the 
established filmmaking practices and the institution, which in their opinion allowed no room for 
innovation (Barker 2011: 96). Eliana Eliana follows a journey towards reconciliation between the titular 
character and her mother. Eliana escaped an arranged marriage and went to Jakarta; her mother visited her 
after five years. The film presents a non-judgemental perspective of the seedier side of the metropole and 
its inhabitants; moreover, it offers a strong depiction of a woman—who may have fallen in with a morally 
ambiguous crowd, but she herself retains her own values, to the credit of her strong-willed mother 
(Sharpe 2002). 
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this category have been well received, such as Pasir Berbisik and Berbagi Suami. 
However, many others have been caught up in a heightened public debate on morality 
and Islamisation due to their confronting visual depictions that challenge the official 
patterning of gender relations. Films made by idealist women filmmakers who chose to 
be bold in challenging taboos related to gender and sexualities were often targets of 
public and state censorship, especially when they received substantial media coverage. 
Such films were considered by their opponents, including members of the censorship 
board, to harm the nation’s morality or to be blasphemous. During the period from 2000 
to 2014 many of the films made by progressive women filmmakers that explored issues 
of gender and sexualities were badly censored by the state censorship board. They were 
also heavily protested about by various pressure groups and not circulated in any film 
markets (including commercial ones) in Indonesia. 
One of the notorious cases of state censorship against women’s cinema was that 
of Perempuan Punya Cerita (Chants of Lotus, 2008, Nia Dinata, Fatimah T. Rony, Upi 
Avianto and Lasjah Fauziah). The film was an omnibus of four short films: Cerita 
Pulau (Story from an Island, Fatimah T. Rony), Cerita Yogyakarta (Story from 
Yogyakarta, Upi Avianto), Cerita Cibinong (Story from Cibinong, Nia Dinata), and 
Cerita Jakarta (Story from Jakarta, Lasjah Fauziah). These stories generally explored 
the experience of Indonesian women victims of gender-based violence, trafficking in 
women, and gendered social stigma. The films included scenes of sex, abortion and 
violence. In defending her cinematic representations of rampant sexual relations among 
teenagers in Cerita Yogyakarta, Upi Avianto stated that those scenes illustrated that 
most Indonesian teenagers were not well equipped with sex education. Thus, they tend 
to make uncalculated decisions regarding their sexuality (cited in Erlin 2008). While 
well contextualised and important to the narrative, the scenes irked the increasingly 
conservative censorship board. The board eventually cut about 90 metres from the 
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film’s reel to remove the scenes they deemed inappropriate. The cuts included a veiled 
female teenager smoking a cigarette. A group sex scene was also cut to make it appear 
as if the girl had sex with only one boy, while the film actually wanted to show that the 
girl had been doped before having sex with multiple boys (Rony 2012: 162). 
The censorship of the film was embroiled in a heated debate about public 
morality and there developed a growing pressure to abolish film censorship at that time. 
The debate surrounding the film and public morality was triggered by the massive 
protest and censorship reaction towards Buruan Cium Gue! (see previous section). The 
debate was deepened in late 2007 by the highly publicised proposal for a judicial review 
of the Indonesian Film Act of 1992. The proposed judicial review was the culmination 
of many years of political struggle led by film workers organised under the Indonesian 
Film Society to reform Indonesian cinema. One of the review points being proposed 
was the abolishment of the state censorship board because it had been limiting the 
freedom of expression of artists (Shanty, Riza, Dewi, Amriradhiani and Saroenggallo 
2007).32 
In an newspaper article, ‘Anggota FPI Hadiri Uji UU Perfilman’ printed in 
Kompas, it was reported that the censorship board and its proponents, including right-
wing politicians and the hardliner-organised vigilante groups bearing the name of Islam, 
such as the Islamic Defenders Front, refuted the proposal because of threats to the 
nation’s morality (30 April 2008). The film Perempuan Punya Cerita was at the centre 
of the debate when it reached the Constitution Court in December 2007 and January 
2008. At a hearing for the judicial review, Anwar Fuady singled out Perempuan Punya 
Cerita to show that some films contain inappropriate scenes—rampant premarital sex 
among teenagers—and portray a supposedly pious Muslim girl, wearing hijab, in a 
32 In the fifth point of the appeal, the Indonesian Film Society argued that film censorship was against 
Indonesia’s constitution and also against the human rights to freedom of expression. 
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negative light (Perempuan Kisah Dalam Guntingan, Women and Censorship, 2008, 
Ucu Agustin, 00.41.00–00.42.40). Supporting Fuady’s remark in a press conference 
after the court hearing, the then chief of the censorship board, Titie Said, defended the 
removal of ‘inappropriate’ scenes from the film. 
You asked about Perempuan Punya Cerita. Indeed, we significantly censored it by 
cutting many scenes. The scenes which we cut were those potentially triggering public 
unrest, as well as pornographic ones. What is pornographic? Showing sexual activities 
is categorised as pornographic. If you want to make a sex education film, you can make 
such a special film for students at the medical department, not for the general public 
(ibid. 00.42.40–00.43.30). 
The pro-censorship arguments eventually prevailed. Perempuan Punya Cerita 
was unable to show its whole message when it was released in selected theatres in Java 
in January 2008. Moreover, in April 2008, the judicial review proposal was rejected by 
the Constitution Court. Several members of FPI were reportedly present at the final 
court judgement for the judicial review; they exclaimed ‘God is Great!’ upon the 
declaration that the censorship board should maintain its function and protect 
Indonesian society from (morally) harmful audio-visual entertainment forms (Bambang 
2008). Thus, censorship, including censorship in the name of Islam, remains rampant to 
the time of writing. 
During the period from 2000 to 2014, some women filmmakers decided not to 
screen their films in Indonesian theatres for fear of triggering negative reactions. 
Nevertheless, as with the Sastra Wangi category in literature, some films in Indonesian 
cinema have not shied away from exploring female sexualities and sexual trauma. 
Women’s films which were not shown in Indonesian cinemas but screened overseas 
included Djenar Maesa Ayu’s SAIA (2009). Djenar Maesa Ayu, a writer and film 
director, is no stranger to visual explorations of female sexuality. Her co-writer for 
Mereka Bilang Saya Monyet (They Say I’m a Monkey, 2008), Indra Herlambang, 
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describes Ayu as ‘a household name for films about sex and violence’ (cited in Detik 
Hot 2009). Being aware that SAIA would not pass censorship and would only create an 
uproar in Indonesia at that time, Ayu did not release the film in Indonesia but screened 
it at several international film festivals abroad (L. Siregar 2016). 
Despite its powerful depictions of sexual violence and trauma which resonate 
with gender-based violence in domestic settings in Indonesia, the director was fully 
aware that the sexually explicit scenes could have easily been taken out of context by 
the censorship board and conservative viewers. The film narrative revolves around a 
female protagonist’s trauma when witnessing, on a daily basis, acts of sexual violence 
committed by her neighbour on his female partner. The horrid scenes of sexual violence 
are repeated daily without any intervention from anyone, including the onlooker. 
According to Ayu, the 80-minute experimental drama is a critique of the rampant 
domestic sexual violence in Indonesia, to which many people seem to be oblivious and 
consume without guilt (cited in L. Siregar 2016). Yet, given the heightened Islamisation 
and rampant censorship, such a strong critique with explicit sex scenes would most 
definitely not make it into Indonesian theatres. The prevalent controversies and protests 
against films which challenge the official patterning of gender relations led Ayu to self-
censorship her film. SAIA, instilled an awareness that graphic challenges to normalised 
domestic sexual violence in Indonesia must not be screened. On a broader scale, as I 
have discussed in the previous section, filmmakers were discouraged from producing 
subversive challenges to official gender ideals. 
In conclusion, this section has shown that during the 2000 to 2014 period, the 
burgeoning women’s cinema became a strong force for many contemporary Indonesian 
filmmakers through which to challenge established patterns of gender relations. Not 
only did women’s cinema challenge male domination in Indonesian cinema, but its 
feminine perspectives on social issues contested the hegemonic masculine perspective 
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which had previously been taken for granted. Especially in terms of representations of 
ideals of masculinity, women’s cinema problematised hegemonic bapakism. Thus, 
women’s cinema put pressure on the need to reconfigure a new cultural ideal of 
masculinity. Furthermore, women’s cinema not only exerted its influence within its own 
genre, but it also inspired changes in commercial cinema. The burgeoning of women’s 
cinema within Indonesian cinema has increased the awareness of filmmakers—men and 
women—of the importance of creating equal representations of gender and sexualities 
on screen. However, in this section I have also demonstrated that, in many cases, the 
confronting challenges promoted in films under the rubric of women’s cinema did not 
sit well with the political atmosphere at that given time. The increasingly conservative 
and rampant public censorship, especially during the heightened Islamisation process, 
posed a threat to artists’ freedom of expression. To a great extent, censorship and 
conservative public opinion limited the extent to which critiques of dominant gender 
relations could be visually depicted on screen. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how the gender-order crisis crept into Indonesian cinema. I 
have demonstrated that intensified gender politics took place behind and around the 
silver screen during 2000–2014, a period marked by a deep gender-order crisis. In 
Chapter 2, I explained that the gender-order crisis triggered fierce struggles in defence 
or in challenge of official gender ideals—hegemonic masculinity and emphasised 
femininity. This fierce struggle was also pursued in cinema. In fact, the control over 
which representations of gender could be shown and idealised on cinema screens 
afforded power to steer the trajectory of gender politics off-screen. Thus, the struggle 
around gender supports my premise that cinematic representations, even in commercial 
cinema, are highly political. The examples that I have provided in this chapter clearly 
demonstrate a link between on- and off-screen gender politics. 
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In this chapter, I identified two major forces which were significant in steering 
Indonesian gender politics through cinema in 2000–2014: Islamisation and women’s 
cinema. I showed that these forces provoked an intensive search for new alternative 
gender ideals. Islamisation, which facilitated the burgeoning of film Islami, led to 
intensive innovation and experimentation of femininities and masculinities which 
foreground Islamic piety. Certainly, considering the plurality and internal contradictions 
within Islam in Indonesia, we could expect to see complex and plural Muslim 
alternative versions of gender ideals. Furthermore, the burgeoning feminist women’s 
movement off-screen contributed to the flourishing of women’s cinema, which became 
a rich site of critique of the official gender ideals, but also of the overall patterning of 
gender relations. 
Nevertheless, Islamisation and women’s cinema posed limitations on the extent 
of innovation and experimentation of gender ideals that could be achieved in cinema. 
Islamisation contributed significantly to conservative state and public censorship. I 
demonstrated that public protests against films that were staged by various Muslim 
pressure groups were rampant and more visible in the newly democratised public sphere 
in Indonesia. In many cases, such protests led to films being withdrawn from 
circulation, re-censored or re-edited, or even not being produced at all. They also 
discouraged many filmmakers from subversively experimenting with gender ideals. As 
to women’s cinema, their confronting challenges of official gender ideals, and the 
gender order more broadly, provided the benchmark of what constitutes gender 
subversion. In the case of Perempuan Punya Cerita, the censorship board singled it out 
as promoting premarital sex and pornography. The internalisation of such a benchmark 
also led filmmakers to self-limit which direction they wanted to steer through their 
cinematic representations of gender. 
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I would like to end this discussion with a reflection on the political dimension of 
commercial cinema. Unlike films which are not intended to compete in commercial film 
markets, the production, circulation and consumption of commercial films are 
significantly shaped by the intersection of politics and the economy. Filmmakers can 
enjoy relatively more liberty when making independent films which are solely intended 
for festivals or private art-house cinema theatres. In such instances these filmmakers do 
not need to worry that some scenes are missing due to censorship or certain interest 
groups are protesting about some of the film’s content. These same filmmakers do not 
have similar privileges when working in commercial cinema.  
In this chapter I showed that while politically filmmakers were required to 
produce representations of gender ideals relevant to the era, they were also compelled to 
factor state and public censorship into their creative endeavours. In addition, 
commercial cinema is also significantly driven by a profit-making logic. To Janet 
Wasko, profit-making is the primary driving force and the guiding principle for 
commercial cinema as an industry (2003: 3). Commercial film investors, unlike non-
commercial film funders, are willing to finance a film’s production with a certain 
expectation of profit. Thus, filmmakers must work towards this goal, while responding 
to politics. 
Yet, as I claimed in Chapter 1, the intense pressure of profit making does not 
necessarily discount filmmakers’ agency in channelling their progressive perspectives 
on gender, which might well defy the official gender ideals and undermine the overall 
patterning of gender relations. In fact, this intricate intersection of the economy and 
politics is at the crux of negotiations. Filmmakers must negotiate their political views 
regarding gender at almost every step of the way in order to ensure that the 
representations of gender ideals portrayed in their films reach the wider audience.  
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In the following chapters, I will scrutinise how filmmakers negotiate the 
pressure to innovate on relevant, relatable gender ideals while, at the same time, 
creating marketable films. Indeed, compromise is inevitable. As I mentioned in the 
discussion on Islamisation in Indonesian cinema, it would be suicidal to make films 
portraying Muslims in strongly negative lights. Doing so would be like a direct call for 
confrontation against not only the censorship board, but also Muslim pressure groups, 
such as the FPI. In Chapter 7, for instance, I will discuss in more detail on how 
filmmakers compromised in promoting a form of gay masculinity as an alternative 
masculinity ideal in Arisan!. 
As will become clear in subsequent chapters, Chapter 3 has provided invaluable 
background for understanding the internal gender politics pursued in Indonesian cinema 
and the conditions faced by filmmakers intent on undermining the hegemony of 
bapakism through commercial cinema. It has furnished the rough ideas of not only what 
major forces shape the direction of gender politics, but also the forms of gender 
representations which were able to be produced, distributed and consumed during 
2000–2014, a period marked by a deep gender-order crisis. 
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Chapter 4 
Filmmakers’ Reel ‘New Man’  
and the Gender Relations of Production 
This chapter examines Indonesian filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the hegemony of 
bapakism in terms of the gender relations of production in commercial cinema between 
2000 and 2014. I unpack the negotiations and potential compromises employed by 
commercial filmmakers in staging their gender politics designed to replace bapakism 
with an alternative masculinity ideal, namely the ‘new man’. The ‘new man’, unlike 
bapakism, does not emphasise the breadwinning role. As I explained in Chapter 2, the 
deep and protracted economic crisis towards the end of the twentieth century sped up 
the maturation of crisis tendencies within the structure of the gender relations of 
production. Rapid and profound changes within the structure rendered the breadwinning 
men/homemaking women arrangement obsolete. Consequently, the cultural exaltation 
of bapakism is no longer taken for granted. By exploring the filmmakers’ struggles in 
promoting the ‘new man’, in this chapter I extrapolate how the filmmakers attempted to 
redefine the official gender order and to what extent their endeavours succeeded. 
This chapter is guided by the following questions. How did progressive 
commercial filmmakers engage with contemporary gender politics as they intentionally 
attempted to undermine the hegemony of bapakism and the gender relations of 
production in their films? How did they deal with the political–economic pressures of 
commercial cinema in doing so? What can the filmmakers’ struggles inform us about 
transformations in Indonesia’s gender order at this time? To this end, I focus my 
investigation on the texts and the production politics of two films: 7/24 and Hijab. I 
select these films mainly because they emphasise the renegotiation of the gender 
relations of production at the household level in their narratives and character 
development. Both explore how husbands and wives must adapt to the changing 
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dynamics of the gender relations of production as the wives’ careers in the public sphere 
flourish and they bring more income into the family. Yet, unlike many other 
contemporary films and others before them, these films do not resort to reproducing the 
officially sanctioned gender relations of production. They do not force the wife to return 
to the confines of the domestic home and reinstate the husband’s role as the sole and 
rightful breadwinner of the family. Instead, these films make the husbands adopt an 
alternative masculinity which helps them navigate with their wives the changing 
landscape of the gender relations of production. 
I argue that the filmmakers’ struggles to promote the ‘new man’ as an alternative 
ideal indicates that there is new hope for the presentation of an alternative ideal 
masculinity—a hope that has fostered more fluid and equal gender relations of 
production. Yet, such a fight for change pursued on screen was riddled with middle-
class biases. In the filmmakers’ struggles to legitimise the ‘new man’ as an alternative 
ideal masculinity through 7/24 and Hijab, they attempted to break away from 
bapakism’s rigid and unequal gender relations of production. The filmmakers did so by 
defying men’s normalised role as the families’ sole or primary breadwinner—a notion 
that is central to the definition of bapakism. Instead, they favoured portraying men’s 
involvement in day-to-day domestic and caring duties, while not encouraging men to 
entirely give up their paid work. However, we cannot help but notice that the 
filmmakers’ struggle was largely focused on the interests of Indonesian middle-class 
professionals, rather than lower-class men. By doing so, the filmmakers ignored the 
constant struggles of lower-class men in negotiating their masculinities with the official 
and popular ideals. The filmmakers were also biased towards middle-class men’s 
interests in maintaining paid work, albeit negotiated, as a marker of gender and class. 
Apparently, the filmmakers were not yet open to idealising full-time stay-at-home 
fathers/husbands as representations of the ideal ‘new man’. 
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Why do representations of the gender relations of production at the household 
level matter in the struggle for hegemonic masculinity? As suggested by Micaela di 
Leonardo (1987: 441) and Carla Jones (2004: 511–12) the household is a locus of the 
private political struggle to negotiate conditions of gender and class inequalities, that 
have resulted from the official prescription of the gender relations of production. This 
private struggle matters significantly because it is often at this private level—in 
household spaces—that men and women constantly negotiate such inequalities. 
Undoubtedly, the official arrangement of the gender relations of production has much 
wider implications beyond the household level. It shapes what type of jobs and how 
much time is considered fit and proper for work and for which groups of men and 
women. Furthermore, it shapes the meanings associated with women’s and men’s work 
for the family as well as for the nation. It also affects who should be prioritised to 
benefit from certain government programs, or who should have access to certain public 
facilities. Yet, while women may be able to break through the glass ceiling and achieve 
the highest career position available in the public sphere, they must continue to 
negotiate with gender and class inequalities that take place in the private sphere. In 
Jones’s research (2004) on middle-class households in Yogyakarta, for example, 
middle-class wives who pursued careers in the public sphere continued to shoulder the 
emotional burden of domestic and caring responsibilities. While these women tended to 
delegate the day-time caring and domestic duties to live-in domestic assistants, they still 
had to manage and oversee the assistants’ work. Their husbands were liberated from 
this responsibility because of their role as breadwinners. Indeed, Indonesian men and 
women constantly have to negotiate these inequalities of gender and class in their 
private, household spaces. Cinematic representations open up avenues for such private 
struggles to be visible in the public sphere. The cinematic representations of gender and 
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gender relations at the household level are popular imaginings of how such negotiations 
are engaged with in real life. 
This chapter unfolds with the following structure. The section immediately 
following this introduction situates the filmmakers’ struggles in promoting the ‘new 
man’ as an alternative ideal in 7/24 and Hijab, to the long-running tradition of 
representations of ideal masculinity in Indonesian cinema. Drawing from textual 
analysis, I contend that aesthetically the filmmakers try to break away from the 
hegemonic idealisation of bapakism. They do so by subverting the cultural significance 
of male breadwinning practices and instead promote men’s active involvement in day-
to-day domestic and caretaking duties—duties generally associated with femininity and 
women. Supporting the argument laid out in the textual analysis, the second section 
discusses the filmmakers’ motives and their negotiation with the political–economic 
dimensions of commercial cinema as they seek to undermine hegemonic masculinity 
around the gender relations of production. Drawing from interviews with filmmakers 
and media releases, I argue that the promotion of the ‘new man’ in 7/24 and Hijab is a 
political intervention engaged by politically conscious filmmakers who are intent on 
addressing the unequal gender relations of production that have been sustained by 
bapakism. However, as I indicated earlier, this political intervention is situated in the 
crucible of middle-class bias. The third section demonstrates that the commercial 
filmmakers’ alternative ideal, as seen in 7/24 and Hijab, is in the interest of middle-
class professionals. The chapter concludes with a summary and a reflection on the 
political dimension of various screen representations of ideal masculinity. 
Reel ‘new man’ of 7/24 and Hijab: Overturning the cinematic tradition 
of bapakism 
This subsection analyses the narratives of the two films I have chosen and situates their 
representations of an alternative masculine ideal, the ‘new man’, within the tradition of 
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ideal masculinity as it has been represented in Indonesian cinema. I demonstrate that the 
innovation waged by the filmmakers behind 7/24 and Hijab departs from the hegemonic 
idealisation of bapakism on Indonesia’s silver screen. By punishing breadwinning-
obsessed professionals and idealising men who are actively involved in day-to-day 
domestic and caring duties, the alternative ideal promoted by the filmmakers in both 
films indicates a possibility of more equal gender relations of production. 
7/24 is a romantic comedy which revolves around the life of a Jakarta-based 
young married couple in their thirties, who struggle to find a balance between career 
and family. The couple, Tyo and Tania, have been married for five years and have a 
daughter. They are successful in their respective careers. Tyo is an award-winning film 
director and Tania is a successful banker. Unlike the common practice among middle-
class couples who are both working full time in the public sphere, Tyo and Tania do not 
employ domestic assistants to help them with the household chores.1 Instead, they 
benefit from the on-demand assistance provided by their female family members—such 
as Tania’s mother and a female cousin—in managing the day-to-day domestic and 
caring duties. Tension builds up as their careers take off, and the reorganisation of the 
gender relations of production at home becomes inevitable as they strive to cope with 
the increasing demands. With his directorial career on the rise, Tyo can barely spend 
any quality time with his family, let alone help with domestic and caring duties. The 
couple struggles to find a new balance between work and family.  
The story reaches the climax when Tyo falls ill and has to be hospitalised. Tania, 
who is eyeing a career promotion, has to juggle the domestic and caring work at home, 
caring for her husband at the hospital and her own increasing work demands. Unable to 
physically cope with these demands, Tania eventually falls ill too. At the hospital, she 
1 Employing a domestic assistant is common practice among middle-class families not only as a marker 
of class but also as a way to cope with women’s involvement in formal paid work (see Elmhirst 2005; 
Jones 2004). 
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shares a suite with her husband. The conflicts sharpen as they begin blaming each other 
for their misery. Tania blames Tyo for not having time to do his share of the domestic 
and caring duties. Tyo blames Tania for being a workaholic and obsessed with her 
career’s progression. They are on the brink of separation because Tania feels that Tyo 
cannot be an equal partner at home. The conflict is finally resolved by Tyo apologising 
to Tania and negotiating his work demands so that he can share the day-to-day domestic 
and caring responsibilities with Tania at home.  
I now turn my attention to the second film I have chosen. Also a comedy, Hijab 
follows four young urban-educated Muslim middle-class couples as they struggle to 
renegotiate gender relations—especially power and labour—when the women’s careers 
take off. The three married couples are Sari and Gamal, Bia and Matnur, and Tata and 
Ujul. Gamal, of Arab descent, is a public servant at a Jakarta tax office. Matnur is a 
famous actor who spends most of his days on a film set. Ujul is a successful 
photographer who also spends most of his days outside the home. The single woman, 
Anin, acts as an observer and a reminder to the others of women’s premarital 
independent selves. Her boyfriend, Chucky, is an award-winning progressive 
independent filmmaker. He is the critical voice which questions the normative 
arrangement of the gender relations of production adopted by the three married couples. 
It eventuates that the women secretly establish a business venture to prove to 
themselves (and presumably their husbands) that they can be economically independent. 
Conflict builds up when the women’s collective fashion business develops 
exponentially. The women find it more and more difficult to juggle their domestic and 
caring responsibilities with their growing business. As expected, the conflict affects the 
married couples more than the dating couple. As I mentioned, Chucky has a progressive 
view of gender and has no reservations about his girlfriend being economically 
independent. Neither is he worried about a husband and wife sharing the daily domestic 
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and caregiving duties. However, the married couples arrange their gender relations of 
production based on the official structure. As the husbands’ careers dwindle or stagnate 
and their wives’ business flourishes, the men feel emasculated. Their roles as family 
breadwinners are threatened by the financial success of their wives. They accuse their 
wives of abandoning the family. Except for Sari and Gamal, the domestic conflict is 
finally resolved by a renegotiation of the gender relations of production. The husbands 
recognise the significant financial contribution of their wives and become willing to 
share the day-to-day domestic and caring duties. Gamal, however, the representation of 
a conservative Muslim, is persistent and makes his wife withdraw from the business 
venture. He believes that it is his religious obligation to provide for her. His wife agrees 
to pull out to respect her husband. 
Both films, instead of pressuring women to return to their normalised gender 
division of labour, place the onus on men to change their attitudes to the gender 
relations of production. The men in both films, who are open to change, must 
reconfigure their masculinities in order to accommodate the changes in the gender 
relations of production in their households. These men must abandon their complicity 
with the hegemonic ideal, bapakism. Drawing from discourses of gender equality, these 
men reinvent their masculinities to establish more fluid gender relations of production 
within their households. They do so by negotiating their breadwinning roles and by 
being involved in the day-to-day domestic and caring duties. It is, however, left unclear 
in the films what they have to do to fulfil the new role. Nevertheless, the change in 
attitude allows them to take pride in not being the primary or sole breadwinners for their 
families, instead of feeling pressured, subordinated and frustrated. Furthermore, it 
makes them more desirable and worthier in the eyes of their wives and family. In short, 
these two films render breadwinning as less important practices in defining ideal 
masculinity.  
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The idealisation of the ‘new man’ in 7/24 and Hijab was offered to Indonesian 
men to help them better navigate the changing landscape of gender relations of 
production through a reconfiguration of masculinities portrayed in popular culture. In 
fact, like the cinematic ‘new man’, most of the alternatives offered in magazines and 
tabloids introduce more fluid gender relations of production at the household level. 
Men’s lifestyle magazines published in Indonesia during this period, such as Emporium, 
FHM Indonesia and Playboy Indonesia all highlighted alternative ideals which 
encouraged men to accommodate women’s involvement in the public sphere (Handajani 
2010). Parenting tabloids, such as Ayah Bunda, promoted a ‘New Father’ masculinity 
which encouraged men to be more involved with caring responsibilities (Yulindrasari 
and McGregor 2011). Women’s lifestyle magazines, such as Femina, also took part in 
the debate about an ideal masculinity in contemporary Indonesia. Towards the end of 
2014, the premium year-end edition of the women’s lifestyle magazine, Femina, 
explored contemporary ideal masculinity in Indonesia. While not offering definitive 
features of a contemporary ideal masculinity, the discussion in many of the articles in 
the edition highlighted the friction between Indonesian men and women—especially the 
middle classes—about what constituted an ideal masculinity in contemporary Indonesia. 
In short, with the proliferating alternative ideals that were promoted in various popular 
culture media, the emphasis on breadwinning in defining an ideal masculinity was no 
longer taken for granted. 
The involvement of men in caretaking duties, especially caring for their own 
children, has recently attracted the attention of the state-funded body which deals with 
family planning, the National Population and Family Planning Board (BKKBN). 
Through parenting seminars, the board has been encouraging men to renegotiate their 
sense of masculinity in order to accommodate their roles as active child caretakers 
(Anwar 2016). Elly Risman, a frequent consultant to BKKBN and renowned 
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psychologist, emphasised in one of the BKKBN-sponsored parenting seminars, Menjadi 
orangtua hebat dalam mengasuh anak (Becoming great parents in raising children), that 
was reported by Anwar in Detik Health: 
One of the solutions to preventing juvenile delinquency is returning fathers to ‘the 
home’. A father’s role is not merely breadwinning because when he dies, God will ask 
him not only about his good deeds, but also about his responsibility to his wife and 
children. The best father is the one who care most about his family (14 September 
2016). 
Drawing on an alternative interpretation of Islamic texts, Risman highlights the 
shifting discourse surrounding the ideal father in contemporary Indonesia. Represented 
by Risman, the BKKBN has acknowledged the unequal burden of parenting on women 
as prescribed in the official gender relations of production. Under the New Order, the 
BKKBN was the primary campaigner of the regime’s family planning programme, 
which heavily rested on women’s reproductive roles. The campaigns held by the 
institution tended to target women, rather than men. In this way, the family planning 
program reinforced the construction of women’s citizenship based on their difference as 
mothers (K. Robinson 2009: 79). Presented in the context of a state-funded event held 
by a state-funded institution used to support women’s citizenship based on their 
reproductive role, Risman’s statement encouraging the transformation of an ideal 
masculinity indicates a deeper tension between the official and the popular discourses of 
ideal masculinity. 
Indeed, we can trace the emergence of alternative ideal masculinities (which 
justify men compromising their breadwinning role and involvement in the day-to-day 
caring and domestic duties in Indonesian cinema) back to the early 2000s. Rangga, the 
protagonist of Ada Apa dengan Cinta? is a proto ‘new man’. Unlike his rival, Rangga is 
more emotionally sensitive and emotionally expressive; he is keen on cooking. In fact, 
as suggested by Ariel Heryanto (2006), Rangga’s cooking skills, in addition to his 
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poetry writing, appeal to the contemporary film audience. Furthermore, the 
controversial film adaptation of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban offers a pious and gentle 
Muslim man, who negotiates his masculine gender identity in his relations with his 
economically independent and educated wife. Intended partly as a challenge to the 
conservative perspective on gender relations of production among Indonesian Muslim 
communities, the protagonist of this latter film is very hands-on in undertaking domestic 
and caring responsibilities. However, it is in 7/24 and Hijab that the renegotiation of the 
gender relations of production become the central driver to the narrative and also to 
character development. The negotiation which takes place in the household is the site of 
tension between the official discourse of the ideal gender relations of production and the 
everyday reality faced by the characters in both films. The characters develop as they 
negotiate their gender identities with the changing roles in their families. 
Situating 7/24 and Hijab amongst their predecessors in Indonesian cinema, 
especially those made and circulated prior to 2000, it is clear that the two films 
challenge the normalised idealisation of bapakism on the silver screen. As I constantly 
reiterate, representations of gender in cinema cannot be separated from gender politics 
off-screen. The hegemonic bapakism—officially sanctioned by the New Order—
features strongly in films produced during the period from 1966 to 1998. Ideal 
masculine men were unquestionably depicted as having the capacity to provide for the 
family. Even when they were incapable of accomplishing this role, they were generally 
depicted as complicit with this social construction of ideal masculinity. Krishna Sen 
(1994) detects this valorisation of economically productive men in Indonesian 
commercial films produced and circulated during the 1970s and 1980s. According to 
Sen, breadwinning is represented as men’s natural and culturally proper role in the 
Indonesian films of this generation (1994: 138). In fact, according to Sen, at least until 
1991, none of the films winning the most coveted categories in the FFI deviated from 
130 
Chapter 4. Reel New Man and the Gender Relations of Production 
the established gender relations of production prescribing men’s ultimate role as the 
family breadwinner and protector, and women’s roles as the procreator and homemaker 
(1994: 148).  
The breadwinning men/homemaking women arrangement of the gender 
relations of production is prevalent not only among state-sponsored films, but also in 
other commercial films. State-sponsored propaganda films, such as Pengkhianatan G-
30S/PKI clearly exemplify this official structure of the gender relations of production 
and glorify bapakism. The military male heroes are the heroic father figures who protect 
the nation from the communists in both public and domestic spheres (see Paramaditha 
2007). In terms of the gender relations of production at the household level, these 
military heroes are depicted as their family’s sole breadwinners and their wives are full-
time housewives. Furthermore, at least until the late 1980s, the most common resolution 
to the conflict stemming from the gender relations of production offered by films is the 
restoration of the breadwinning man/homemaking wife sustaining bapakism. The 
award-winning Di Balik Kelambu (Behind the Curtain, 1982, Teguh Karya) explores the 
psychological burden on a man due to his inability to financially provide for his family.2 
The frustrated man tries extremely hard to prove that he is a worthy husband, father and 
son-in-law by working at multiple jobs; he even forbids his wife from being involved in 
paid work. In the 1990s, there was a slight shift in the way conflict over the gender 
relations of production was resolved in films. Responding to the increasing number of 
women in formal paid work, Sesal (Regret, 1994, Sophiaan) explores the relations of 
labour between a diplomat wife and her writer husband. The film depicts the man as 
being emasculated and, as a result, becoming verbally violent towards his wife. 
Although the film does not reinstate the woman as the ideal full-time housewife ideal, it 
2 Di Balik Kelambu received multiple awards in the 1983 Festival Film Indonesia, including the Best 
Film, the most coveted award category, which implies recognition of the cultural acceptance of the 
narrative. 
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emphasises men’s position as the primary breadwinner, and women’s as the secondary 
breadwinner. It also idealises the wife who bears the multiple burdens of working in 
both the domestic and public spheres, and it maintains the man’s status as head and 
bearer of power in his household. Consequently, by comparing the representations of 
masculine ideals in 7/24 and Hijab with Di Balik Kelambu and Sesal it can be seen that 
the former provide breakthrough examples. They do not resort to restoring the official 
structure of the gender relations of production to resolve the conflict; thus, they defy the 
significance of breadwinning as a defining gender practice of ideal masculinity. 
Let us now shift to contemporary films. Around the time of the release of 7/24 
and Hijab, few other films whose narratives were driven by men’s helplessness and 
frustration at economic hardships were made and released to the commercial markets. 
However, other films in this genre were likely to reproduce the breadwinning 
men/homemaking women gender relations and valorise bapakism masculinity. Of the 
notable examples are Mengejar Matahari (Chasing the Sun, 2004, Soedjarwo) and 
Sembilan Naga (Nine Dragons, 2006, Soedjarwo). According to Marshall Clark (2008, 
2010), these films highlight widespread violence among Indonesian men in the post-
1997–1998 economic crisis. Indeed, male violence is their masculinist response to the 
emasculation and frustration that occurs in the wake of economic and political crises.  
Furthermore, the flourishing of Islamisation in Indonesian consumer culture in 
the twenty-first century provided religious overtones to the cinematic representation of 
men’s responses to their emasculation in the wake of the 1997–1998 economic crisis. 
Alicia Izharuddin (2017) asserts that stoicism and spiritual devotion are central to 
providing a solution to Muslim men’s economic problems in the commercially 
successful Kun Fayakuun (When God Wills It, So Be it, 2008, Guntur Novaris) and 
Emak Ingin Naik Haji (Mother Desires to Go on a Hajj Pilgrimage, 2009, Aditya 
Gumay). However, as I indicated earlier, the solutions offered by these films barely 
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challenge the established gender relations of production and the cultural exaltation of 
bapakism masculinity. The economically disempowered men in the films restore their 
masculinities by reinstating their roles as the families’ breadwinners. 
Unlike the previously mentioned films, 7/24 and Hijab offer an alternative 
solution for their male protagonists who are socially pressured when they are unable to 
be their family breadwinners. The films 7/24 and Hijab promote ‘new man’ masculinity 
as a solution to the disempowerment of men and the increasing economic independence 
of women in contemporary Indonesia. The ‘new man’ masculinity, which does not 
place primacy on male breadwinning, liberates men from feeling helpless about their 
inability to provide for their families, and in many cases also justifies their financial 
reliance on their wives or other female family members. By allowing men to be 
absolved from the role of sole or primary breadwinners, and by encouraging men to be 
more involved in domestic and caring duties, the cinematic ‘new man’ in these films 
challenges the hegemonic bapakism masculinity. Male frustration, let alone violence, is 
considered an undesirable masculinist response to both the economic downturn and the 
increasing significance of women’s contribution to the family’s finance. 
Through a critical reading of film texts which promote the ‘new man’ as an 
alternative masculine ideal, we can discern that the hegemony of bapakism in 
Indonesian cinema has been under serious threat. As seen in the narratives of 7/24 and 
Hijab, the obsession over ‘breadwinning’ in defining a cultural ideal masculinity has 
been undermined by the emergence of the ‘new man’ as an alternative. The idealisation 
of the ‘new man’, as seen in the narrative and character development of the two films, 
shifts the onus of coping with changes to the established gender relations of production 
from women to men. Men have to negotiate their masculinity in order to better cope 
with the shifting gender relations of production. From my discussion in this section, it 
can be inferred that the ‘new man’ is a political intervention to transform the long-
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running tradition of idealising bapakism on- and off-screen amidst the profound changes 
occurring within the structure of the gender relations of production.  
Behind the scenes of 7/24 and Hijab 
This section reinforces the previous section’s argument by providing a discussion on the 
behind-the-scenes politics engaged by the filmmakers of 7/24 and Hijab. It scrutinises 
the filmmakers’ negotiations with the political–economic dimension of commercial 
cinema in staging their critiques through the cinematic ‘new man’. I argue that the 
filmmakers’ innovations surrounding the ‘new man’ are political interventions designed 
to steer the official gender order towards accommodating the changing roles of men in 
the domestic sphere and redefining ideal masculinity. 
Innovation in the cinematic ‘new man’ was about shifting the onus from women 
to men to cope with the profound changes occurring in the gender relations of 
production. The films suggest that men have to rethink whether the official masculinity 
ideal is relevant given the increasingly significant roles played by women in the 
economy and their contributions to the family income. As I explained in the previous 
section, the narratives of 7/24 and Hijab refrain from portraying women as those who 
are at fault and promote instead that men refashion their masculinities to cope with the 
conflicts emerging from the shifting gender relations of production. The films do not 
attempt to draw women back into the domestic sphere or idealise a super woman who 
can perfectly juggle between domestic and public-sphere roles. Instead, the films make 
their male protagonists reflect on and negotiate their sense of masculinity to 
accommodate their spouses’ careers and do their own share of the domestic and caring 
workload on a day-to-day basis. 
Why was such a cinematic representation of an alternative ideal like the ‘new 
man’ significant in a period marked by profound changes in the structure of the gender 
relations of production? I argue that it was to redress the situation, in which women had 
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been bearing a disproportionate moral burden in the shifting structures of the gender 
relations of production in Indonesia. Various groups interested in restoring the 
established breadwinning men/homemaking women to the gender relation of labour, 
and thus the hegemony of bapakism masculinity, waged struggles to reinstate women’s 
reproductive and domestic roles. These interest groups sought to limit women’s 
involvement in the public sphere, including in the economy and politics. In Chapter 2, I 
discussed several paths that were taken by proponents of the official structure of gender 
relations of production in an attempt to restore ibuism. The struggle to restore ibuism 
necessarily implies the restoration of the hegemony of bapakism, which facilitated 
men’s authority in the public sphere. Thus, the production of images of alternative 
ideals in 7/24 and Hijab was part of the filmmakers’ struggle to redress this problem by 
making men reflect on the social construction of an ideal masculinity. 
Behind the production of 7/24 is a noteworthy filmmaker, Lukman Sardi, who 
has been involved in off-screen gender activism by promoting an alternative ideal 
masculinity. Lukman Sardi, the creative producer of 7/24 has been actively engaged in 
the global fatherhood campaign MenCare+, also known as Laki-Laki Peduli in 
Indonesia. He has been the celebrity champion of the campaign since 2013.3 At the 
heart of the campaign is an effort to engage men in establishing gender equality and 
preventing domestic violence. Getting men to actively participate in everyday domestic 
and caring duties is one of the most important campaign strategies of MenCare+ 
3 MenCare+ is a global fatherhood campaign funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands and managed by two multi-national not-for-profit organisations: Promundo and Rutgers. The 
campaign is run in four countries: Brazil, Indonesia, Rwanda and South Africa, whose rates of domestic 
violence against women are relatively high. We can trace the influence of White Ribbon in this global 
fatherhood campaign. Initially established in Canada in 1991, currently White Ribbon is the world’s 
largest effort of men and boys working towards eliminating violence against women and girls. In 2011, 
White Ribbon operated in 60 countries across the globe and had been working with the United Nations to 
engage men in addressing issues of gender inequalities and gender-based violence (White Ribbon Canada 
2017: 2). The cofounder of White Ribbon, Michael Kaufman, also served as a fellow providing advice to 
the administering of the campaigns (Promundo Global 2014). White Ribbon believes that transforming 
ideal masculinities can be a primary prevention strategy—to prevent the reproduction of violent men 
(White Ribbon 2017). 
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globally. The campaign expects to inspire more harmonious and equal gender relations 
between men and women, thus preventing toxic and violent relationships (Rutgers WPF 
Indonesia 2015: 22). Apparently, the campaign resonated with Sardi’s personal concern 
that men must not merely position themselves as breadwinners; instead, men should be 
more caring and share the domestic work and childrearing roles equally (Antara 
Lampung 2014). Sardi, in a talkshow ‘Ayah Masa Kini: Membangun Kedekatan 
Emosional dengan Anak’ (Modern Dad: Building Emotional Bonding with Children), 
implies that men who are involved in the day-to-day domestic and caring duties are 
progressive. 
Men should not be embarrassed for doing domestic work, which is stereotypically 
feminine. In the previous era, these men might have been categorised as cemen (less 
masculine) by other men, but these days men no longer care with such gender labels … 
Men have to be more caring, more than just breadwinning (in S. Setiawan 2014: n.p.).4 
In so saying, Sardi acknowledges the changing landscape of the gender relations of 
production in contemporary Indonesia which requires men to redefine the dominant 
norm of masculinity. A more caring and emotionally engaged masculinity, in place of a 
masculinity that is obsessed with breadwinning, has been the most prevalent alternative.  
As a creative producer at MNC Films, the film company that produced 7/24, 
Sardi was responsible for exploring new film ideas for the company. As soon as he was 
appointed to MNC Films, Sardi was interested in following up idea for a film about 
husband-and-wife gender relations—previously this had been a stale project at MNC 
Films. Sardi took the male protagonist role in the film. According to his colleague, 
4 Cemen is a colloquial adjective commonly used by Indonesian youth to describe someone who lacks 
courage or an action which does not require much courage to carry out. The term is an abbreviation for 
cetek mental which literally means shallow mentality. When used to describe a person, cemen means 
timid and weak. When used as a rhetoric of gender, especially in relation to masculinity, in my opinion, 
cemen means less masculine, or unmanly. In this context, it is a strong culturally derogatory term which 
indicates a man’s inability to exhibit bravery, generally expected of his gender. 
136 
                                                 
Chapter 4. Reel New Man and the Gender Relations of Production 
Affandi Abdul Rahman, the executive producer of the film, in an exclusive interview 
with Kania Kismadi in Jakarta in 2014: 
(Lukman Sardi and I) would like to tell a story of relationships … of husband–wife, 
parents–children, son-in-law–mother-in-law, collegial relationships ... We’d also like to 
explore gender issues. Primarily it is because most of us (Indonesians) still think that 
women should not be this or that way, and men should not be this or that way … It [the 
film] is inspired by my boss’s experience. We (at the MNC Pictures) did talk about the 
possibility of filming it but it had never gone further than a mere discussion. Until 
Lukman (Sardi) came, we brought up this theme again and we decided to produce it. 
Sardi and Rachman developed the film’s synopsis, narrative and 
characterisation. The director, Fajar Nugros, in an interview with Reino Ezra of Muvila, 
mentioned that he was hired when pre-production was in its final stage and ready for 
filming (cited in Ezra 2014). In this sense, the producers’ vision of the narrative 
becomes more poignant in determining the narrative and character development of the 
film. With this gender activism background, in 7/24 Sardi revived the previously stale 
discussion on a gender-relations themed film project, and simultaneously produced 3 
Dara (3 Ladies, 2015, Ardi Octaviand), about three hyper-masculine men experiencing 
a temporary gender dysphoria.5 
The MenCare+ campaign is quite visible in 7/24. The male protagonist of 7/24, 
played by Sardi, certainly strives to become the MenCare+ masculinity ideal. He regrets 
his obsession with becoming a family breadwinner and placing too much of the burden 
of domestic and caretaking duties on his wife. The film does not force the female 
protagonist to preserve the marriage by returning to her domestic confines. Instead, the 
film places the onus on the male protagonist and his sense of masculinity. The male 
protagonist, instead of being career obsessed, has to resume the roles of father and a 
5 In this film, the three hypermasculine and sexist men have to experience becoming women who are 
often assaulted and discriminated against due to their gender. 
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husband who is caring and actively engaged in day-to-day domestic and caregiving 
duties. By doing so, the protagonist recognises his wife’s contribution to the family and 
supports her career endeavours. 
Moving on to Hijab, there are two prominent filmmakers who played crucial 
roles in shaping the narrative as well as the representations of gender in the film. They 
are Hanung Bramantyo (director) and Zaskia Adya Mecca (producer, costume designer, 
casting director and the actress playing Sari). They are husband and wife. Prior to 
directing Hijab, Bramantyo had provoked controversy around representations of gender 
in several of his films. I previously discussed his controversial decision to extend the 
polygamy scene in his adaptation of Ayat-ayat Cinta in order to problematise the much-
debated masculine practice. Bramantyo was also behind the controversial Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban which challenges male dominance as well as the status and treatment 
of women in conservative Islamic communities in Indonesia (see Chapter 6). As to 
Mecca, besides being a famous actress, she has been an important player in the growing 
Muslim fashion economy. By the time Hijab was produced in the second quarter of 
2014, her business had grown exponentially—from hiring only three employees, using a 
focused-only sales method and producing about ten pieces a day in 2013 (Nurdiansyah 
2017)—to a fashion empire that produced around a thousand pieces a day and which 
had expanded to direct sales with four boutiques in July 2014. The changing gender 
relations between husband and wife inspired the production of Hijab. 
Like 7/24, Hijab is a response to the increasing involvement of women in paid 
work. Yet, it specifically zooms in on the increasing roles of women in the creative 
economy of Muslim retail fashion. Wearing a headscarf (more popularly termed jilbab 
or hijab) took on a whole different level during the intensified Islamisation that 
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occurred in twenty-first-century Indonesia.6 The increasing popularity of wearing a 
headscarf facilitated a burgeoning market for Muslim fashion like never before 
(Amrullah 2008; Jones 2007). According to the Ministry of Industry of Indonesia (Viva 
Life 2012), the market for the Muslim fashion business increases at least 7 per cent 
every year—one of the biggest in the wake of the economic crisis of 1997–1998. 
Women apparently are the major players in this business segment. Moreover, the 
advancement of communication and information technology which has revolutionised 
retail business globally has opened up opportunities for women to be engaged in 
creative economies without necessarily being physically away from home (Beta 2014). 
Many women, including Zaskia Mecca herself, have found incredible success in 
the burgeoning market of Muslim fashion in contemporary Indonesia. In fact, like 
Mecca, many women eventually earn more than their husbands with their successful 
Muslim fashion businesses. While not specifically mentioning a number, Bramantyo 
confirms that he earns way less than his wife and consequently they have had to 
renegotiate their gender relations of production (Personal interview, 21 April 2014). In a 
patriarchal society, which valorises the male breadwinner norm, a high-income wife can 
pose a serious challenge to her husband’s sense of masculinity. In such a patriarchal 
society, being a good provider is central to a man’s, rather than a woman’s gender 
identity (Brennan, Barnett and Gareis 2001: 171). Indeed, breadwinning is central to a 
man’s definition of self and his self-worth. Thus, in such a cultural context, when men 
earn less than their wives, there is a likelihood that the men will feel incapable and 
insecure. In Indonesia particularly, a wife’s higher income is often cited as a reason for 
an unhappy marriage (Rachmayani and Kumala 2016) and divorce (Edo/ASP 2016).  
6 As I indicated in Chapter 3, the seed to increasing the popularity of headscarf-wearing among Muslim 
women in contemporary Indonesia can be traced back to the early 1990s. This was when the then 
authoritarian regime began to have a more relaxed attitude toward the personal public display of religious 
symbols, especially the headscarf. 
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Hijab addresses the changing dynamics in the gender relations of production at 
the household level when a wife earns more income than her husband. When questioned 
by a journalist for his motive in making Hijab, Bramantyo implied that he was 
concerned by masculinist responses towards the spousal income gap: ‘I think it is only 
in Indonesia that a wife’s higher income is seen as a problem’ (Subkhan 2015a: n.p.). 
Despite his hyperbole, Bramantyo’s view of the spousal income gap has substantially 
shaped the film’s call for men not to problematise the husband-wife wage gap and 
instead positively respond to it by supporting their wives’ careers and sharing the 
domestic and caring duties. The male characters in the film who problematise women’s 
higher income, are frustrated because of it, or make it into a reason for curbing women’s 
economic activities in the public sphere, are strongly criticised and made undesirable. 
Ultimately, the film makes the hegemonic bapakism irrelevant and unsuitable in 
navigating the changes, both within the household and the larger structures of the 
gender relations of production. In short, like 7/24, Hijab was intentionally made to shift 
the onus onto men to cope with the changes occurring within the gender relations of 
production. 
A politically loaded film, Hijab is also a critique of the conservative Islamist 
approach to women’s increased participation in paid work. In the previous chapter, I 
mentioned the persistent attempts to reinforce women’s reproductive and domestic roles 
that were led by certain Islamist groups and individuals. The attempts included the 
curbing of women’s mobility in the public domain through regional bylaws (Wieringa 
2006), public protests against deliberation of the Gender Equality and Equity Bill 
(Fadjar 2012; Kafil 2012), as well as social media campaigns that criticised working 
women as irresponsible mothers (Hestya 2013). By reinforcing women’s reproductive 
and domestic roles, this conservative Islamist approach liberated men from taking part 
in negotiating potential changes. Through Gamal, a stereotypical conservative Muslim 
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man, who is persistent about making his wife a full-time homemaker due to his religious 
belief, the film demonstrates that barring women from pursuing a career is old 
fashioned. According to Bramantyo,  
Through this film, I would like to challenge the conservative Muslims’ perspectives on 
gender but in a funny way. I would like to specifically poke fun at their viewpoint 
which prohibits women from getting involved in paid work (cited in Subkhan 2015b). 
Contrary to this conservative approach, Bramantyo and the team of filmmakers behind 
Hijab shift the onus for change onto men. 
Although allowing room for difference, Hijab promotes the transformation of 
masculinities as a strategy to navigate the changing landscape of the gender relations of 
labour. The film supports those men who do not claim authority by being breadwinners. 
They do not feel intimidated by the changes in the gender relation of labour, and make 
necessary adjustments to their lives, including to their breadwinning practices. Chucky, 
the model of the ‘new man’ form of masculinity, convinces Ujul and Matnur to embrace 
the ‘new man’ and not be obsessed by breadwinning. The male characters who 
refashion their masculinity are rewarded with the reunification of their families. These 
men prove to be worthy husbands to progressive women. Gamal, the conservative 
Muslim, remains part of the group but obviously his masculinity is not idealised, and it 
is subordinated to the other men’s ‘new man’ masculinity. Although Gamal continues to 
be a vocal advocate of his conservative masculinity, his conventional Islamist views on 
gender and gender relations are rendered irrelevant by the other men. The other three 
characters, who are also Muslim, do not share his views and are not convinced by his 
religious justification.  
Both 7/24 and Hijab did not have any difficulty in passing state censorship. 
Mainly, this was because they included no sexually explicit scenes or other scenes 
which are legally prohibited under the new Film Act of 2009. There are hardly any 
scenes involving passionate personal displays of affection, violence between characters 
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or same-sex romance—the most common targets of state censorship (see Chapter 3). In 
terms of film casts, none of the actors and actresses was considered particularly 
controversial. They were not porn stars.7 Moreover, prior to their releases, the 
marketing strategies of both films were focused on selling the films as romantic 
comedies about young married couples. The promotional synopsis shared by Dapur 
Films, the film company producing Hijab, for example, highlights the spousal income 
gap between the couples in the film (Ichsan 2014). Thus, 7/24 and Hijab easily passed 
the state censorship board and secured distribution deals with major cinema theatre 
chains in Indonesia. 7/24 was released on 27 November 2014 and Hijab was released on 
15 January 2015. 
The only concern held by the films’ team was the possible reaction from 
conservative Islamists who may disagree with the representations of Muslim men and 
women in Hijab, By the time of the release of Hijab in Indonesian theatres, Hanung 
Bramantyo was known as a controversial filmmaker famous for challenging the 
dominant construction of ideal Muslim men and women, through his cinematic works. 
Earlier in this section I mentioned some of his controversial films. His previous film 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban (2009) was vigorously protested against by leading 
Muslim figures and organisations. They were concerned that Bramantyo’s depictions of 
Islam were overly conservative in terms of gender (see Chapter 5). Based on this 
precedence, Bramantyo was aware that the stereotypical representation of a 
conservative Muslim man in Hijab, albeit presented as a comical character, could 
7 Around the same period, several Indonesian films cast porn stars—such as the famous Japanese adult 
film stars Maria Ozawa a.k.a. Miyabi (in Menculik Miyabi, Kidnapping Miyabi, 2010, Findo Purwono 
HW) and Sora Aoi (in Suster Keramas 2, Evil Nurse, 2011, Findo Purwono HW). The production and 
distribution of films featuring foreign porn stars soon received substantial media attention and a negative 
reaction from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and other Muslim Pressure groups, such as the 
Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) (Solo Pos 2009; Taufiq 2010). The films, while passing state censorships, 
were heavily protested against by a number of Muslim pressure groups, including FPI and Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) in several cities in Indonesia (Hidayatullah 2010; Nu2/HKM 2011). Maria Ozawa and Sora 
Aoi are both porn stars from Japan. 
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potentially offend Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, the representations of Muslim 
women and their commitment to wearing and selling hijab were not typically based on 
religious piety. None of the women wore a headscarf due to her commitment to Islam. 
Aware of the potential controversy, Bramantyo and his team intensively 
promoted the film as a comedy, instead of a film religi, or film Islami, although the title 
refers to an iconic Muslim fashion item. As I have argued elsewhere, in twenty-first-
century Indonesia, the headscarf has become an important marker of religious piety and 
ideal femininity for Indonesian Muslim women (Eliyanah 2016). According to 
Bramantyo in a press conference to announce his new film project: 
Hijab is based on Zaskia’s experience in establishing a hijab fashion business. It is not 
easy for a woman to be an entrepreneur, especially in this business segment. There are a 
lot of funny moments. The film might sound religious, but it is actually about our 
everyday lives (cited in Triyanisya 2014). 
As argued by James Hoesterey and Marshall Clark (2012), film Islami is often 
expected to provide visual guidance on how to become pious Muslim men and women. 
Consequently, by not categorising Hijab as an Islamic-themed film, we can infer that 
the filmmakers tried to influence the expectations of the potential audience. While 
criticising conservative Muslims’ attitudes towards women’s participation in paid work 
and contribution to the family income, the film does not offer Islamic texts to justify 
certain solutions. 
Unfortunately, by reflecting on the reception of 7/24 and Hijab, I conclude that 
the films were not powerful enough to steer the gender order to accommodate more 
fluid and equal gender relations of production at this given time. The cinematic 
representations of the ‘new man’ as an alternative ideal of masculinity did not gain 
adequate media or audience attention so as to create any public debate, such as in the 
case of Ayat-ayat Cinta or even Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. Instead, 7/24 received 
more appreciation because of the return of Dian Sastrowardoyo, a famous actress who 
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previously had been on leave after her marriage and the birth of her children, and the 
ability of the director to sustain the film’s drama in such a small setting, the hospital 
suite. Hijab, furthermore, was embroiled in controversy over its representation of 
Muslim women after a notable female writer, who also happens to be the daughter of a 
famous Muslim politician, wrote a negative response to the film on her social media 
page. 
However, like many other cases of political engagement, not all struggle can 
lead to immediate change. The fact that such representations were able to be produced 
and circulated without attracting excessive negative reactions also means that change in 
that particular direction is possible. Men not being family breadwinners, as promoted in 
7/24 and Hijab, was not as socially confronting as it would have been in the 1970s and 
1980s. The off-screen struggle to promote the same type of alternative masculinity 
ideals through magazines, tabloids, as well as the men’s movement have not generated 
any substantial direct opposition. From this we can discern that film is not the only 
platform where the transformation of ideal representations of masculinity for the sake of 
equal gender relations of production are presented. These political struggles continue to 
compete with attempts to restore bapakism and its supporting femininity ideal, ibuism. 
For example, in late 2014, the newly elected vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, suggested that 
the Ministry of Manpower should reduce women civil servants’ working hours by two 
hours every day so that women could perform their domestic and reproductive duties 
(Wibisono 2014). Due to strong protests from various feminist activists, the suggestion 
was never followed up (Gabrillin 2014). In addition, the debate on what it takes to be 
ideal men and women continues to be forged by Indonesians in social media around 
husband–wife gender relations of production. With their television reruns and 
reproductions of DVDs, not to mention internet pirated copies, 7/24 and Hijab remain 
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potent challenges to the hegemonic bapakism and the official structure of the gender 
relations of production. 
Middle-class biases underly the glittering scenes of the ‘new man’ in 
7/24 and Hijab 
Unfortunately, the filmmakers’ struggle to promote an alternative ideal masculinity 
through films such as 7/24 and Hijab is not free from class bias. This section 
demonstrates that the struggle is cast on and in the interests of middle-class 
professionals, rather than lower-class men. The cinematic ‘new man’, promoted in 7/24 
and Hijab, have characters that represent middle-class Indonesians with relatively wider 
options in negotiating their sense of masculine identity, despite economic hardship and 
a spousal income gap. The cinematic ideal, regardless of the filmmakers’ intention, 
excludes the on-going struggle of lower-class Indonesian men in negotiating their 
everyday reality within the official and popular construction of ideal masculinities. Last 
but not least, the cinematic ideal is cast in the interests of middle-class men in 
maintaining their professional jobs as markers of both gender and class. 
Clearly, both 7/24 and Hijab cast their masculine ideal figures as middle-class 
professional men. All of these men, and their families, lead a middle-class lifestyle. 
What I mean by middle-class lifestyle is that they live in formal settlement complexes 
in an urban neighbourhood in Jakarta, instead of in a kampung.8 The protagonist couple 
of 7/24 had just moved into a gated neighbourhood as their careers take off and their 
financial situation improves. In fact, the film implies that moving into the gated 
community is a symbol of upward class mobility. Unlike an informal settlement such as 
a kampung, a gated neighbourhood in an urban area symbolically offers upper middle-
class prestige and lifestyle, in addition to security (Leisch 2002). Likewise, the aspiring 
8 In Indonesia, kampung refers to urban neighbourhoods, as opposed to desa which refers to rural 
neighbourhoods (Yeoh 2010). Robbie Peters (2010) and Evawani Ellisa (2016) characterise kampungs in 
mega cities such as Jakarta and Surabaya as urban low-income areas.  
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‘new man’ characters and their families in Hijab also live in relatively large private 
homes in Jakarta. One household is depicted as hiring a domestic assistant, a practice 
common to middle- and upper-class Indonesian households (Elmhirst 2005; Sen 1998). 
Moreover, all of these men and their families in both films use private cars as their main 
mode of transportation, instead of public transport. In addition, they are highly educated 
and work in formal occupations: as a film director, a mid-ranking bureaucrat, a 
photographer and an actor. For example, before their careers dwindled, the men in Hijab 
could afford to pay their spouses’ monthly arisan contributions which amount to Rp. 
500,000 (approximately AUD 50), in addition to their other expenses.9 The amount 
equals about 20 per cent of Jakarta’s minimum wage in 2014 (Kuwado 2013). And the 
male protagonist of 7/24 can afford first-class private health insurance; a privilege 
which no lower-class men can provide for their families. Even in their financial 
hardship, none of these families lives below the poverty line although at some point 
they have to readjust their lifestyles. 
The struggle of lower-class men in negotiating their masculinity around the 
changing gender relations of production is entirely absent in 7/24 but present, albeit 
sidelined, in Hijab. In Hijab, the struggle for the male protagonists to depict alternative 
ideal masculinity figures is juxtaposed with that of a lower-class man, in this case a 
parking ranger, who is negotiating his masculinity against the culturally most exalted 
form.10 The lower-class man is a representation of a complicit and stoic man who 
struggles to attain the cultural ideal of masculinity despite his economic disadvantage. 
His complicity represents the stoicism, if not naïvete, of lower-class uneducated men. 
9 Arisan is a form of rotating saving. Usually, the members of an arisan group meet a regular basis to 
draw a lottery determining which member wins the saving for that period. An arisan group is commonly 
formed by women. Men become members of arisan groups generally when the group consists of families, 
rather than individual members. I will explain more about this gendered cultural practice in Chapter 6. 
10 A parking ranger in Indonesia is a profession which is not formally structured, unlike in Australia or 
other developed countries. In Indonesia, a parking ranger generally does not earn regular wages. They are 
not formally employed by companies or government institutions. 
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Beside this, the choices of the middle-class men, to be more actively involved in the 
domestic and caring duties, are depicted as a sign of modernity. The parking ranger 
strives towards the cultural ideal because of his lack of knowledge and exposure to 
alternatives. 
Casting masculinity ideals in middle-class professionals is not only unique to the 
abovementioned films, other films with the same mission also share the tendency to 
depict ideal masculinity in middle-class professionals, rather than lower-class men. As I 
will demonstrate in Chapter 6, for example, the idealisation of the gay ‘new man’ in 
Arisan! and its sequel, Arisan! 2, is also cast in affluent middle-class gay men. They 
have secure employment which allows them to live comfortably and provides them with 
relatively more options through which to express their gender and sexual identities. 
They can afford to live in formal settlement complexes which provide security and 
relative liberty as they express their non-heteronormative sexual and gender identities 
with lower risk of public persecution. The gay ‘new man’ protagonists of the Arisan! 
franchise are unlike their lower-class counterparts who work in the informal sector, such 
as beauty salons or the streets. The lower-class men tend to live in a kampung or urban 
slum, neither of which provide adequate security measures to protect them from 
potential violent public protests against LGBTIQ individuals and groups.  
Like the protagonists of the Arisan! franchise, the comfortable life led by the 
middle-class male protagonist representatives of the alternative ideal masculinity in 
7/24 and Hijab provides them with more options as they negotiate their sense of 
masculinity around the gender relations of production. With their wives’ high income 
and their ethical decision to share the domestic and caring responsibilities with their 
wives, they do not have to entirely give up their own careers, albeit rearrangement is 
inevitable. Even then, with negotiated working hours, they can still comfortably 
maintain their middle-class lifestyle with the double income they earn together. On the 
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contrary, many lower-class men do not have this double-income option in order to make 
ends meet.  
One prominent case which is barely present in discussions of fatherhood and 
masculinity is that of Indonesian male migrant workers. In 2013, the total number of 
Indonesian migrant workers overseas was around 6.5 million (WIJ/DRU 2013). 
Reflecting on the average number of migrant workers sent every year since 2011 as 
around 45 per cent male/55 per cent female (BNP2TKI 2015), it is safe to assume that 
almost three million Indonesian migrant workers are men.11 Although numerical data on 
their individual marital status is unavailable, Rutgers WPF Indonesia suggests we can 
assume that a significant number leave their wives and children behind (2015: 19).12 
Unlike the cinematic representations of ‘new man’ fathers in the films, fathers who 
migrate for work overseas barely have any choice but to leave their children behind and 
thus they are unable to participate in conventional day-to-day caregiving duties. For 
these lower-class men, just as with their Philippine counterparts, breadwinning is often 
the only gender practice which defines their role as a father (McKay 2015). Certainly, 
reducing the lower-class men’s negotiation of masculine identities to complicity with 
bapakism, such as reflected in Hijab, obscures the structural alienation experienced by 
these men. They do not have access to high-paying jobs in the country which provide 
them with wider options in negotiating their roles as husbands and fathers, especially 
around the gender relations of production.  
Furthermore, the idealisation is biased towards justifying the changing roles of 
men in dual-income, middle-class households. The involvement of men in domestic and 
11 BNP2TKI recorded that in 2011, Indonesia sent 586,802 workers abroad and men constituted 36 per 
cent of the number; in 2012, 43 per cent of the total 494,609 workers sent abroad were men; in 2013, men 
constituted 46 per cent of the 512,168 workers placed abroad; and in 2014, men made up 43 per cent of 
the total 429,872 workers sent abroad. 
12 These men, as well as women who seek low-skilled employment abroad, tend to be from poor rural 
areas in Indonesia, especially Java and the eastern part of Indonesia, where paid employment is scarce for 
landless, low-educated and low-skilled villagers (Rutgers WPF Indonesia 2015: 18). 
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caregiving duties is not a new phenomenon but making it a defining feature of ideal 
masculinity is. Before the global campaigns pioneered by White Ribbon in the early 
1990s and more recently by MenCare+ and specifically by Aliansi Laki-Laki Baru in 
twenty-first-century Indonesia, many Indonesian men shared domestic and caregiving 
duties, albeit not discursively constructed by the state and gender activists as 
progressive and ideal. For example, in households where mothers migrate for work 
overseas, lower-class men barely have any choice but to take care of the domestic and 
caring duties themselves. Based on the same data set as that of the male migrant 
workers discussed above, by 2014 more than three and a half million women had 
migrated overseas for work. Although data on the marital status of female migrant 
workers is unavailable, Rutgers WPF Indonesia (2015) suggests that it is safe to assume 
that most of them were married, and they left their husbands and children behind. Many 
studies, such as those by Nurul Inayah (2012), Theodora Lam and Brenda Yeoh (2018), 
and Tyas Wulan et al. (2018), agree that while in some cases, some households receive 
assistance from female relatives, left-behind men tend to become the primary carers for 
their children and primary caretakers of the domestic chores. Although this reality has 
been prevalent in many migrant worker-sending areas in Indonesia, the idealisation of 
men who are involved in domestic and caring duties barely became popular until the 
twenty-first century when such images began to grace popular magazines, tabloids, 
films and other popular culture products. 
How have left-behind fathers of lower-class households been able to justify their 
shifting gender roles in the absence of their wives? Instead of taking pride in becoming 
family caregivers, it is common to find left-behind men feeling emasculated as they are 
confronted with the loss of their conventional masculine role as family breadwinners 
and the added burden of taking care of domestic and caregiving responsibilities (Lam 
and Yeoh 2018: 109). Young unmarried men who live in areas where women get more 
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opportunities to migrate internally or internationally for work also tend to be frustrated 
by their economic disability (Elmhirst 2007). Unlike the educated and enlightened male 
protagonists of the films who draw from discourses of feminism and profeminist men’s 
movements, these poor left-behind men tend to justify their changing roles as a rational 
decision to ease their feelings of masculine inadequacy. Rather than being discursively 
constructed as progressive, their involvement in caregiving and household chores is a 
marker of class—they are unable to afford the service of live-in domestic servants, a 
common practice among middle-class dual-income households. Alternatively, they do 
not have the power to reorganise their careers in order to accommodate their spouses’ 
endeavours in the public sphere. 
Hani Yulindrasari and Katherine McGregor (2011) and Suzie Handajani (2010) 
also detect the same middle-class-centred representations of alternative ideal 
masculinity in parenting tabloids and men’s lifestyle magazines respectively. 
Yulindrasari and McGregor (2011) in particular argue that in catering to the need for 
information on parenting among the Indonesia middle class, parenting tabloids like 
Ayah Bunda promote the expansion of gender roles for fathers from breadwinners to 
also include complementary caretakers, cognitive enhancers, children’s entertainers as 
well as bravery trainers. These new images of the ideal father are arguably a response to 
and recognition of women’s roles outside the home (Yulindrasari and McGregor 2011). 
The popular representations of an alternative ideal masculinity in contemporary men’s 
lifestyle magazines are not much different from the tabloids. As shown by Handajani 
(2010), representations of alternative ideals, apparently also including the ‘new man’, 
recognise the increased participation of women in the public sphere. Men and women 
are depicted as sharing public-sphere roles, albeit to a certain limit.  
Why were middle-class Indonesians pressured into reconfiguring ideal 
masculinity especially around the structure of gender relations at that given time? 
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Indonesian middle-classes were faced with a pressing urgency to do so partly because of 
the massive economic shock that befell them at the turn of the millennium. As I argued 
in Chapter 2, many middle-class Indonesians were among those hit hardest by the 
decline of real wages, inflation and soaring prices at the onset of the 1997–1998 crisis. 
Indeed, the economic downturn did not uniformly affect each and every Indonesian, 
including the plural middle classes. As shown by Lizzy van Leeuwen (2011: 122), some 
upper-middle-class Jakartans even profited from the soaring value of the US dollar 
because they had substantial dollar savings or were involved in export businesses. Yet, 
for many middle-class men who did not work as businesspeople, the economic crisis 
brought a very big income shock. Jessica Poppele, Sudarno Sumarto and Lant Pritchett 
(1999) and James P. Smith, Duncan Thomas, Elizabeth Frankenberg, Kathleen Beegle 
and Graciela Teruel (2002) argue that the declining currency value significantly affected 
institutions that were reliant on foreign investment. These institutions apparently 
employed a high proportion of male labour and had been responsible for creating 
Indonesia’s emerging middle classes. In particular, the declining value of the rupiah 
caused mayhem in the financial sector where foreign-currency denominated loans 
soared in rupiah terms. These included the construction sector, especially in Jakarta, 
where businesses put construction work on hold, and the formal manufacturing sector, 
which was heavily reliant on imported materials (Cameron 2002: 145). The 41 per cent 
decline in real wages in 1997 virtually eliminated the entire wage gain that had been 
made by Indonesian middle-class men since 1986. A slightly different reality was 
experienced by middle-class women who generally maintained some of their wage 
gains during the same period (J.P. Smith et al. 2002: 173). Consequently, middle-class 
men felt under the utmost pressure to perform their conventional masculine role as 
family breadwinners amidst the decline of income. The alternative ideal masculinity 
which downplays the pressure for men to become family breadwinners and appreciates 
151 
Evi Eliyanah 
men’s involvement in domestic and caring duties, such as the ‘new man’, thus provided 
solace for middle-class men who were forced to renegotiate their masculinities amidst 
economic hardships. 
The roles of flourishing women’s and men’s movements advocating gender 
equality in post-authoritarian Indonesian should not be underestimated in motivating 
Indonesian middle classes, including commercial filmmakers, to reconfigure ideal 
masculinity on various fronts. In Chapter 2, I mentioned the flourishing feminist and 
women’s movements whose struggles for gender equality eventually established a 
pathway for Indonesia’s own Aliansi Laki-laki Baru (LLB, New Men’s Alliance). I also 
mentioned the men’s movement campaign earlier and how the partnership with Lukman 
Sardi had inspired the production of 7/24. These forces encouraged the middle classes 
to reconfigure ideal representations of masculinity around the gender relations of 
production (Hasyim 2009). In fact, as stated by Nia Dinata (who partnered with 
MenCare+ to produce a short film, Surga Kecil di Bondowoso (A Little Heaven in 
Bondowoso, 2013), the involvement of men in domestic and caring duties on an 
everyday basis is the zeitgeist of new millennium: 
Among my generation who got married and had kids after 2000, the fathers never shy 
away from caring for their children. They hold the babies, bathe them and even change 
their diapers. These acts are expressions of respect and affection to their wives who had 
gone through labour. Most men I know do that. Why don’t we portray this kind of man 
which has become more common these days on screen? Why do we have to hide them? 
(Personal interview, 28 May 2014).13 
13 The MenCare+ campaign also worked with a feminist filmmaker, Nia Dinata, and her film company 
Kalyana Shira Film to produce a short documentary Surga Kecil di Bondowoso (A Little Piece of Heaven 
in Bondowoso, 2013, Dinata) as part of its media campaign. The film documents a model Muslim man 
who adopts the ‘new man’ masculinity. It highlights the role reversal between the couple and explains 
how such changes can be religiously justified. The husband provides the primary care for the children and 
the unpaid domestic labour. The wife works full time as a school principal. The Indonesian MenCare+ 
Program itself, according to one of the program’s founders, Sri Kusyuniati, was a form of feminist 
intervention in redefining the dominant norm of masculinity in order to support gender equality and the 
elimination of violence against women in Indonesia (Personal interview, 11 October 2014). Sardi is one 
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The men referred to by Dinata in her statement obviously do not refer to lower-
class men, some of whom have no choice but to undertake household and caring roles, 
as I discussed earlier. The men that Dinata, as a filmmaker, perceives as progressive and 
representative of the spirit of the third millennium are those who do their share in 
domestic and caring duties for ethical reasons. Choosing to do so has become a new 
cool thing for men amidst the flourishing movements for gender equality. These 
movements have provided a new meaning for men doing daily unpaid household chores 
and caregiving duties. 
Interestingly, the idealisation of the ‘new man’ in various parts of the world has 
paved the way for the idealisation of full-time stay-at-home fathers/husbands as 
representations of an ideal masculinity. However, 7/24 and Hijab and almost all 
contemporary Indonesian commercial films do not extend the challenge of making a 
full-time stay-at-home father into an ideal figure of masculinity. All the male 
protagonists in the films continued to maintain their employment, although they had to 
renegotiate their working arrangements, especially around timing and workload in order 
to accommodate their roles in day-to-day caring and domestic duties. The resolution to 
the conflicts proposed in 7/24 is a clear example that men are not encouraged to give up 
their careers entirely and be domestic-bound fathers/husbands. The MenCare+ 
campaign film Surga Kecil di Bondowoso also deploys a similar strategy of 
representation as the abovementioned films. The main subject of the short documentary, 
a male Muslim preacher who is married to a school principal, does not give up his role 
as family breadwinner entirely although he accepts the idea that women can pursue their 
careers in the public sphere and earn more than their husbands, and that men can be the 
primary caregivers for their children. 
of the program’s appointed celebrity champions who help promote the program and disseminate the idea 
of transforming masculinity. 
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Since the late 1990s and into the third millennium, the idealisation of ‘new man’ 
masculinity has opened up an avenue for the emergence of full-time stay-at-home ‘new 
man’ fathers/husbands in many other countries. Full-time stay-at-home fathers have 
become an established alternative norm of masculinity in the US and in European 
countries. The celebrity ‘new man’, David Beckham, has become a contemporary icon 
for the ‘new man’ father. Upon his retirement from football, he became a full-time stay-
at-home father to four children, while his wife continued to pursue her career in the 
entertainment and fashion industries. Beckham as a ‘new man’ father is positively 
profiled in various media and new media outlets. Emily Sheridan in an article that 
features in the UK’s Daily Mail, ‘Retired David Beckham settles into his new life as 
full-time dad and husband as he accompanies wife Victoria on shopping trip’, portrays 
Beckham as supportive of his wife’s career and enjoying his new role as full-time stay-
at-home father (13 June 2013). In fact, Sarah Gee (2014) states that the masculinity 
adopted by Beckham reflects a more fluid (re)construction of masculinity which serves 
to negotiate and extend the boundaries of gender, bend the codes of masculinity, and 
diversify the available options of masculinity, albeit within the particular context of a 
global consumerist society. Certainly, we have to acknowledge Beckham’s economic 
and social status which allows him to maintain his choice of becoming a full-time stay-
at-home father. The idealisation of Beckham as a ‘new man’ icon should not obscure 
the fact that he and his family are financially secure. His financial security and social 
standing provide him with wider options in navigating his masculinity around the 
changing gender relations of production in his own household and eventually he is able 
to become an icon of an alternative ideal masculinity. 
Since the 2000s, full-time stay-at-home fathers have become an established 
alternative norm of masculinity in many Asian countries. In Seoul, for example, the 
number has increased. In 2011, Asia Pulse featured an article entitled, ‘Number of 
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Seoul’s stay-at-home fathers surges 125 per cent since 2005’. It stated that in Seoul the 
number of stay-at-home fathers ‘totalled 36,000 men, which is a 125 per cent increase 
from that figure in 2005 (25 July 2011). In Singapore, a small but growing number of 
men are choosing to be stay-at-home fathers to care for their offspring. According to 
Theresa Tan (2015), reporting for the Straits Times, stated that there were more than 
10,000 men in Singapore who chose to not be involved in paid work in 2014, which is 
triple the number in 2006. Ralph Jennings (2017) reported that in Asia, as in Western 
societies, men who give up their jobs and become stay-home fathers/husbands are 
generally middle-class and highly educated; they have chosen to offer to care for their 
children, rather than being economically forced to do so. 
The absence of full-time stay-at-home fathers/husbands as figures representing 
an alternative ideal masculinity in Indonesian popular culture, including cinema, should 
be understood within the context of country-specific gender politics, which are rife with 
a middle-class bias. I did mention in Chapter 2 that we can historicise breadwinning as a 
defining feature of ideal representations of masculinity in Indonesia. It was not until the 
late-nineteenth century that this particular construction of gender emerged as a 
significant masculine practice and gradually became constitutive of hegemonic 
masculinity. The emerging middle-classes of the Netherland’s East Indies were 
prominent actors in the transformation of an ideal masculinity and a refashioning of the 
gender order amidst modernisation and an Islamic revival at this given time (see 
Chapter 2). Ideal middle-class households were culturally constructed in popular culture 
texts, such as magazines, as consisting of a breadwinning father who held a formal 
office job, and a homemaking mother who was central to the family’s maintenance of a 
good marriage through hygiene and cleanliness (Nordholt 2011: 441). The magazine 
advertisements reflected the desire of the indigenous middle classes, inhabiting the 
centre of the late-colonial state but denied political power (ibid.: 440), to be involved 
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with ‘progress’, partly by abandoning traditional gender roles. Breadwinning was thus 
not only a marker of gender but also a marker of class. 
Although the increasing significance of breadwinning in defining ideal 
masculinity never fully transformed Indonesian society at every level, it is clear that the 
reliance on male breadwinners and the idealisation of domestic-bound femininity 
became hegemonic during the New Order period. The New Order government solidified 
the idealisation of a masculinity that featured breadwinning in its gender politics. In 
part, this was through the discourse of kodrat wanita (women’s biologically pre-
ordained roles). The discourse naturalised the reproductive roles and domesticity of 
women. Ideal women discursively were constructed as those fulfilling their reproductive 
and domestic roles. Consequently, women were not naturally obligated to earn a living. 
Ideally, they would rely on their husbands for income. When women did earn an 
income, their financial contribution tended to be discursively constructed as secondary 
to that of their husbands (Utomo 2012). This arrangement of the gender relations of 
production is deeply rooted in Indonesian society. 
The ideal discourse of femininity reinforced by the New Order eventually 
strengthened the idealisation of bapakism, which prescribed its subjects as family 
(primary) breadwinners. Such idealisation implies the subordination and/or 
marginalisation of other masculinities which do not comply. Consequently, jobless men, 
who are unable to provide for their family, are often seen as somehow less masculine, or 
even a failure. As represented in the commercial film Zaman Edan (Crazy Time, 1978, 
Nawi Ismail), a jobless man who took up domestic and caring duties and a woman who 
became the family’s breadwinner, were a curse, not only to the family, but also to the 
future generations and society at large. Social stigma dogged men who were unable to 
perform the stereotypical masculine role. Thus, among double-income middle-class 
families, the absence of women as primary caretakers is often solved by hiring female 
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domestic assistants (Sen 1998; Jones 2004; Elmhirst 2005). This takes the pressure off 
men having to negotiate their masculinity and career to embrace domestic and 
caregiving roles. Even amidst the rampant layoffs and bankruptcy experienced during 
the deep economic crisis in 1997–1998, middle-class men who lost their livelihood were 
ashamed of their incapacity to perform their conventional masculine role. In one of her 
ethnographic vignettes, Leeuwen (2011: 144) highlights that an affluent middle-class 
man, who lost his job due to the crumbling construction business he was employed in, 
would arrive at his friends’ offices every morning at around nine o’clock and hang 
around until five o’clock in the afternoon. Going out of the house during working hours 
was his way of coping with his loss of livelihood. Consequently, the on- and off-screen 
idealisation of men who can both keep their career and be actively involved in daily 
domestic and caring duties is biased towards justifying middle-class men’s interests in 
keeping formal employment—a practice which simultaneously defines their gender and 
class identities. 
This section has shown that the transformation of ideal masculinity around 
gender relations of production is potent with middle-class biases. Drawing from 
discourses of gender equality, the screen idealisation of a hybrid masculinity provides 
an alternative pathway for middle-class men to retain the ideal masculinity amidst the 
profound changes occurring within the structure of the gender relations of production. 
However, we cannot help but notice that the filmmakers’ struggle in Indonesian cinema 
is focused on middle-class professional men and excludes lower-class men. The 
idealisation is biased towards providing justification for middle-class men’s limited 
involvement in domestic and caring duties. It is also biased towards middle-class men’s 
interests in maintaining professional work as a marker of gender and class. Indeed, an 
ideal masculine man is not pressured to be the sole or primary family breadwinner. Yet, 
as reflected in the absence of cinematic representation of full-time husbands/fathers, an 
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ideal masculine man must not abandon his professional job altogether in order to 
embrace his changing roles in the domestic sphere. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the struggles of commercial in undermining the hegemony 
of bapakism through their work in Indonesian cinema. It is through their struggle to 
promote the ‘new man’ as an alternative ideal that we know that more equal and fluid 
gender relations of production have unfolded, albeit with biases towards Indonesian 
middle-class men. In this concluding section, I will present a summary as well as a 
reflection on the political dimension of cinematic representations of (ideal) masculinity. 
The new hope is reflected in the filmmakers’ rendering of breadwinning, a 
defining gender practice of bapakism, as obsolete. As seen in the selected films (7/24 
and Hijab), the masculine obsession with breadwinning practices was depicted by the 
filmmakers as incompatible with the changing landscape of the gender relations of 
production. The obsession’s limitations on men highlighted the increasing significance 
of women’s roles in the public sphere and women’s increased contribution to the family 
economy. The culturally most-exalted masculinity was depicted as putting immense 
psychological pressure on men who were unable to attain the ideal. This form of 
masculinity also constrained women in pursuit of their careers. The filmmakers’ 
proposed alternative ideal ‘new man’ allowed men to take pride in their roles in the 
domestic and public sphere, instead of emasculating them. From my discussion of the 
film texts and behind-the-scene politics, we can infer that the politically conscious 
filmmakers aimed at steering Indonesia’s gender order into accommodating not only 
women’s increased participation in the public sphere, including in paid work, but also 
the transformation of the cultural ideal of masculinity. 
Yet, we cannot help but notice that the filmmakers’ struggle through commercial 
films is constructed through the cultural lens of the Indonesian middle classes. As seen 
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in the selected films, the struggle is focused on middle-class professional men. The 
characters depicting the ‘new man’ ideal are also representations of middle-class 
educated urban young men. These men’s financial security and social standing offer 
them wider options in negotiating their masculine identity amidst the profound changes 
in the gender relations of production at the household level. Unlike their lower-class 
counterparts, they have the power to negotiate their career for ethical reasons; in order 
to accommodate their changing role in the domestic sphere and support their spouses’ 
careers in the public sphere. The old solution of hiring domestic assistants to fill in the 
absence of women in middle-class households is heavily challenged by the ethical 
decision made by these educated middle-class men. 
Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the struggle is biased towards justifying 
middle-class men’s interests in maintaining paid work as a marker of gender and class. 
Indeed, while commercial filmmakers strongly challenge the ultimate necessity of men 
being the sole breadwinner in their films, the ideal middle-class masculine men do not 
abandon their paid jobs in order to embrace domestic and caring roles. Reflecting on the 
significance of paid work as a marker of class, encouraging middle-class men to give it 
up in order to support their spouse’s career and fully participate in domestic and caring 
duties is still unimaginable. 
The discussion in this chapter reinforces my thesis arguments that politically 
conscious commercial filmmakers have made attempts to include their perspectives on 
masculinity and the gender relations of production in their films. Films such as 7/24 and 
Hijab are political vehicles through which the filmmakers expressed their engagement 
with contemporary gender politics and attempted to steer the gender order in a specific 
direction. Through the narrative and character development of the films, the filmmakers 
carefully instilled their critique of the hegemonic ideal (especially around the gender 
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relations of production) and promoted an alternative ideal masculinity, albeit still biased 
towards a certain segment of Indonesian society. 
To successfully stage their gender politics in commercial cinema, these 
filmmakers negotiated their intentions to inspire the transformation of a new hegemonic 
masculine ideal within the complex political–economic dimensions of commercial 
cinema. They may have benefited from working within a network of likeminded people. 
Furthermore, their own financial security that allowed them to partly finance the film, or 
their position within a film company, permitted the production of an alternative 
representation of an ideal masculinity possible. Yet, these privileges in production were 
not necessarily followed by privileges in circulation. The filmmakers still had to 
negotiate with the state and public censorship in order for their films to find an 
audience. As I mentioned, due to the absence of controversial elements in scenes and 
the acting department, the films passed state censorship. Indeed, their takes on 
masculinity did not lead to substantial public debate or immediate social change. 
However, the absence of negative sentiments towards the alternative masculine ideal 
that they proposed in these films implies that such challenging representations were able 
to be produced and circulated during a time marked by profound changes in the 
structure of the gender relations of production in Indonesia. 
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Filmmakers’ Reel Muslim ‘New Man’  
and the Gender Relations of Power 
This chapter examines Indonesian commercial filmmakers’ struggles to undermine 
bapakism around the gender relations of power. The period of 2000–2014 saw major 
changes in the established structure of the gender relations of power. The changes 
included a surge of women into key public-sphere roles, especially in politics and the 
economy, as well as increasingly vocal movements that promoted women’s 
empowerment and gender equality. New policies supporting women’s economic and 
political participation and laws criminalising domestic violence were also legalised 
during this period. Ultimately, these changes problematised the normalised authoritative 
patron leadership of men in the public and domestic spheres. The changes triggered a 
more intensive search for alternative gender ideals, including masculinity. They also, 
however, provoked stronger attempts to restore the hegemonic masculinity of bapakism 
and to emphasise femininity—ibuism. The period also saw the flourishing of 
Islamisation, which in fact was then, and still is today, the most visible feature in 
Indonesian politics and consumer culture (see Chapter 3).  
How did the filmmakers deal with contemporary gender politics in their pursuit 
of an alternative ideal Muslim masculinity which fostered equal gender relations of 
power? In this chapter I unpack the filmmakers’ aesthetic strategies, intentions and 
negotiations, as well as public controversies surrounding the production and distribution 
of cinematic representations which undermine men’s authoritative patron leadership in 
public and domestic spheres. As this chapter unfolds, I demonstrate that the filmmakers 
did successfully offer an alternative ideal Muslim masculinity, the Muslim ‘new man’, 
which challenged the normalised unequal gender relations of power underlying 
hegemonic masculinity and more broadly the patriarchal gender order. However, I also 
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show that their struggle was distorted by middle-class biases. The idealisation of an 
alternative masculinity relied heavily on men’s higher education and training in 
reformist education institutions as well as their reformist (secular) networks of Muslims. 
By relying on these ‘privileges’, the filmmakers ‘other’ lower-class, less educated men.  
To this end, analysis in this chapter is focused on the political struggle waged by 
several Indonesian filmmakers, mostly Muslim, in offering an alternative ideal 
masculinity, the Muslim ‘new man’, through the film adaptation of Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban (Women with Keffiyeh, 2009, Hanung Bramantyo). This film is one 
of the key works in the burgeoning film Islami genre (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, the 
principal filmmakers behind this film, including Hanung Bramantyo (director), Gina S. 
Noer (scriptwriter) and Faozan Rizal (director of photography), were involved in the 
production of the movie Ayat-ayat Cinta.1 In this chapter, I will show that these 
filmmakers attempted to ‘correct’ Ayat-ayat Cinta’s representation of the ideal Muslim 
man and masculinity through their politically loaded Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. In 
this latter film, the filmmakers aimed to challenge gender-biased interpretations of 
Islamic texts which tend to privilege Muslim men and discriminate against Muslim 
women. Upon its release, the film stirred a major controversy because of the 
representation of Islam, (male) Islamic clerics, and the traditional Islamic education 
institution, pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) (Afrisia 2015a). Considering the film’s 
significance, I focus my investigation on the filmmakers’ struggle to reconfigure 
hegemonic masculinity around the structure of gender relations in this film. 
There are two arguments I propose in this chapter. First, I would like to 
demonstrate that, as seen in the filmmakers’ struggle to promote the Muslim ‘new man’ 
as a legitimate ideal through Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, there were attempts by 
1 Ayat-ayat Cinta is a film adaptation of a novel of the same title, written by Habiburrahman Elshirazy. 
The novel was released in 2004, and the filming took place in 2007. The film version was produced by 
Manoj Punjabi and Dhamoo Punjabi for MD Pictures. 
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Indonesian commercial filmmakers to promote an alternative ideal masculinity which 
fosters equal gender relations of power both in public and domestic spheres. The 
filmmakers offered screen representations of a religiously justifiable alternative ideal 
masculinity that encouraged men to treat women as equal partners in both public and 
domestic spheres. Unfortunately, as my second argument shows, the filmmakers’ 
struggle was biased towards middle-class Muslim men. The idealisation of the 
alternative masculinity heavily relied on a male Muslim protagonist who was urban-
based, and highly educated in a modernist Islamic education in Indonesia and abroad, 
while othering rural-based, less-educated men graduates of traditionalist religious 
educational institutions. 
This chapter will unfold as follows. Initially I offer a textual analysis of the 
representation of the Muslim ‘new man’ offered in the film adaptation of Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban. This is followed by a discussion of the situatedness of the narrative, 
in which I unpack its significance amidst arguments associated with contemporary 
gender politics. These two sections generally show the blossoming hope of being able to 
represent an alternative ideal masculinity on the silver screen. However, as I shall 
demonstrate in the penultimate section of this chapter, middle-class biases are apparent 
in the filmmakers’ political take on hegemonic masculinity. Finally, I will conclude this 
chapter by summarising my points and establishing linkages to the grand argument of 
the thesis. 
Muslim ‘new man’ of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban 
In this section, I offer textual analysis of the film, Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. I then 
situate the film among its contemporaries and also films produced during the New 
Order period. This section unpacks the filmmakers’ aesthetic strategies in undermining 
bapakism and promoting an alternative ideal in a commercial film. I discuss the film’s 
point of view, characterisation and plot to understand how the filmmakers depicted the 
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Muslim strand of the ‘new man’ as a critique against the hegemonic ideal, bapakism. I 
also discuss how the film departs from the long-running tradition of representing men as 
authoritative patron leaders in Indonesian cinema. I argue that, as shown in Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban’s narrative elements, progressive Indonesian commercial filmmakers 
attempted to offer a religiously justified alternative masculinity to simultaneously 
challenge the deeply rooted hegemonic bapakism, and the intensive invocation of a 
literal interpretation of Islamic texts in its defence.  
The film Perempuan Berkalung Sorban is an adaptation of a novel of the same 
title. The novel was written by a progressive female Muslim writer, Abidah El 
Khalieqy. Like other works written by El Khalieqy, the novel was known for its strong 
critique of the patriarchal patterning of gender relations in Indonesia, especially among 
the Muslim community.2 According to Tineke Hellwig, the novel Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban criticises: 
the patriarchal attitudes and traditional gender roles that treat women as sexual objects 
and inferior beings, at the same time [it] endorses women’s activism and solidarity to 
advocate gender equity and social justice based on modern interpretations of Islamic 
texts (2011: 28). 
The novel Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, along with many other works written by 
progressive Muslim women writers, has been known as a ‘canon counter-discourse’ in 
depicting a multitude of Muslim women’s identities and Muslim women’s struggles to 
either maintain or challenge their prescribed gender roles (Arimbi 2009: 85).  
The film, as indeed the novel, revolves around the trials and tribulations of its 
female protagonist, Annisa, the daughter of a pesantren leader and a notable Muslim 
cleric in East Java. The story is set between the 1980s to the late-1990s and follows the 
2 El Khalieqy’s other works include Geni Jora (Jora’s Flame, 2003), which won the Novel Writing 
Competition held by the Jakarta Art Council in 2003. According to Wiyatmi (2010), this earlier novel of 
El Khalieqy’s problematises the rights and position of women in conservative Muslim communities. 
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development of Annisa’s character, from childhood to adulthood. The key driver of the 
narrative is Annisa’s struggle to challenge the gender-biased interpretation of Islamic 
texts which privileges men and discriminates against women. Annisa challenges the 
gender-biased interpretation of religious texts which strengthens her father’s 
authoritarian leadership over other family members, especially women. She also 
challenges the conservative Islamic institutions which are responsible for teaching a 
younger generation of Muslims the gender-biased interpretations of Islamic texts. Such 
teaching ultimately relegates women as subordinate to men and tied to the domestic 
sphere—a situation which hides domestic violence from the outside world. The cost of 
her struggle is a damaged relationship with her father and brothers, as well as her 
eviction from her parents’ home. Annisa finds support in Khudori, her love interest who 
later becomes her second husband. Khudori is the representation of the ideal Muslim 
man, a modernist adopting an alternative ideal masculinity, which I call the Muslim 
‘new man’. Unlike Annisa’s father and first husband, Khudori supports Annisa’s pursuit 
of higher education and a public-sphere career. He is hands on with day-to-day domestic 
and caring responsibilities, and respects Annisa as an autonomous and agentic 
individual. 
Through the film adaptation of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, the filmmakers 
offered a different point of view of gender and gender relations within Muslim 
communities in Indonesian cinema. The filmmakers use the feminine perspective. In 
this case, the filmmakers make the viewers see the gender issues: discrimination and 
violence against women, from a Muslim woman’s experience of living in a conservative 
Islamic community. This is unlike most film Islami during this period, including its 
contemporaries: the Ayat-ayat Cinta and the Ketika Cinta Bertasbih duology (2009, 
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Chaerul Umam), which are anchored in the male perspective.3 Set in Java in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the film, Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, chronicles Annisa’s rebellion 
against the gender biases in the dominant interpretations of the Islamic texts. The 
gender biases, in Annisa’s view, have afforded men more power at the expense of 
women. In her pursuit, she has to face her own father, a notable Islamic cleric, her 
teachers at the pesantren, and more widely her conservative Muslim community, in 
which patriarchal arrangements of gender relations are normalised. Annisa 
problematises women’s subordinate status and rights, men’s privileges, as well as the 
rampant discrimination against women by virtue of their gender. 
The woman-centred narrative of Perempuan thus becomes important in the 
filmmakers’ attempt to legitimise an alternative ideal masculinity which supports 
women as autonomous agents. Khudori, as the cinematic representation of the Muslim 
‘new man’, emerges—but not as a superior figure in his gender relations of power to 
other characters, especially to Annisa. Khudori is promoted by the filmmakers as a 
counter image to other Muslim men who righteously position themselves as superior in 
their power relations with women. In the film, the superior Muslim men are represented 
in the figures of Annisa’s father, brothers, male teachers and first husband. Decentring 
Khudori in the film’s narrative thus highlights Annisa’s agency and autonomy. Not 
being overshadowed by Khudori’s exemplary personal qualities, Annisa’s character 
arises as a solid representation of a strong, agentic and autonomous Muslim woman 
who challenges the male patron leadership norm. Khudori is not a hero who saves 
Annisa from her abusive husband. Annisa is her own saviour. Thus, Khudori is unlike 
3 Both Ayat-ayat Cinta and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih are also film adaptations from novels of the same 
titles, written by a prolific male Muslim writer, Habiburrahman Elshirazy. The plots of these films 
generally revolve around the male protagonist’s search for an ideal wife. Both protagonists are Indonesian 
students at Al-Azhar, Cairo. It is through their quest for the love of their life that their version of ideal 
Muslim masculinity is represented as a legitimate alternative ideal. 
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Fahri of Ayat-ayat Cinta, who is a patron saviour to all women around him.4 Khudori is 
unlike Azzam of Ketika Cinta Bertasbih who is the didactic voice and patron for 
women around him.5 
The filmmakers’ struggle waged through the idealisation of the Muslim ‘new 
man’ in this film matters because the alternative ideal challenges the hegemonic 
bapakism mainly by fostering equal power relations with women. Mainly, it encourages 
men to recognise women’s autonomy and agency. This alternative ideal is represented 
as more compatible with the emerging alternative ideal Muslim femininity, represented 
by Annisa. Annisa exhibits strong self-determination and responsibility for her own life 
choices. Annisa rejects her subordinate position in her power relation with her abusive 
first husband as well as her authoritative father and teachers. Annisa criticises the 
conservative interpretations of religion which maintain gender discrimination and 
inequality. While Annisa’s alternative ideal femininity is considered threatening by the 
conservative pious men around her, it gains support from the progressive alternative 
masculine protagonist, Khudori. Adopting a ‘new man’ masculinity, Khudori validates 
Annisa’s right to pursue higher education and establish a career in the public sphere, 
equal to men. He also validates her autonomy of her own body and sexuality. Unlike 
Annisa’s first husband, Khudori is never shown demanding her submission. In short, the 
‘new man’ represented in Khudori overturns the male authoritative patron-leadership 
norm, strongly featured in bapakism, by supporting women as autonomous agents.  
The strength of the filmmakers’ critique against bapakism also lies in the 
invocation of Islamic teaching to justify the alternative ideal masculinity promoted 
4 Fahri saves the American women from the verbally abusive Arab Muslim man during the train scene. 
Fahri also saves Noura from his abusive father. Most of all, Fahri saves the sinking image of Islam post-
9/11 and in post-authoritarian Indonesia by becoming an ideal Muslim masculine figure who is a counter 
image to violent radical Islamists. 
5 Azzam is a representation of an ideal Muslim man who becomes the reference for everyone in his 
surroundings—men and women—on Islamic teaching. Moreover, he is the patron leader and breadwinner 
for his family in wake of his father’s death. 
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through Khudori. Around the production of the film, including Ayat-ayat Cinta, 
invocation of a textual interpretation of Islamic texts was prevalent in almost all public 
debates about gender relations (K. Robinson 2009: 7). Literal interpretations of Islamic 
texts was likely be used by proponents of the patriarchal gender order to maintain the 
male patron leadership norm. To counter this gender-biased interpretation of religion, 
the filmmakers, through Khudori, also used alternative interpretations of Islamic texts to 
justify alternative ideal masculinities and femininities.  
For instance, in the scene describing the intersection of sexual and power 
relations between Khudori and Annisa, it is clearly shown that an ideal Muslim man, 
represented by Khudori, should respect women’s rights and autonomy in relation to 
their own bodies. Annisa is still trying to cope with the trauma of marital rape 
committed by her first husband. When Annisa rejects his sexual advances, Khudori, 
citing a verse from Surah An-Nisa in the Qur’an, reinforces that he is willing to wait 
until she is ready. 
Annisa: (sobbing) I am sorry I cannot be a perfect wife for you. 
Khudori: It is not your fault. Istighfar (ask forgiveness from God), Nisa. Istighfar. 
Mu’asyarah bil ma’ruuf. A husband-and-wife relation must be grounded on kindness. 
In this relationship, you also have rights. And we don’t have to do it if you are not 
ready. Right, honey? (Perempuan Berkalung Sorban 1:14:40–1:15:45).6 
The reference to the primary source of Islamic teaching and laws not only shows 
Khudori as a religious authority who is aware of gender equality in marital 
relationships, but also confirms that Islam recognises an equal power relation between a 
6 Literally this Arabic verse (Mu’asyarah bil ma’ruuf) means the relationship between a husband and wife 
must be grounded on kindness. This verse is taken from Surah Annisa 19. An Indonesian progressive 
Muslim thinker, Hamka, in his interpretation of the verse states that the verse as a whole is to challenge 
the tribal traditions of treating women as possessions which can be inherited and includes physical as well 
as psychological violence against women (1970: 1136). Specifically, the sentence cited by Khudori in this 
scene, is interpreted by Hamka, citing a Hadith, as ‘(men should) offer them (women) good friendship, 
provide them with appropriate clothing and food’ (1970: 1136–137). In other words, Muslim men must 
treat their wives with kindness, instead of violence. 
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husband and wife. Annisa’s former husband forces her sexually. The conservative 
Muslim teacher in the pesantren taught that it is a wife’s obligation to serve her husband 
sexually anytime because it is his right. However, Khudori acknowledges a woman’s 
rights in deciding whether and when to have a sexual encounter with her husband.7 The 
deployment of Islamic injunctions in the negotiation of power in the context of the 
domestic sphere, thus, emboldens the legitimacy of both the alternative ideals of 
masculinity and femininity which may not agree with the dominant prescription of the 
gender relation of power. 
The film’s stance against bapakism and the intensive use of literal interpretations 
of Islamic holy texts to defend the male patron leadership norm is eventually 
strengthened by introducing an alternative representation of ideal masculinity—in the 
figure of Khudori, a modernist authority in Islamic knowledge and law. Like most of its 
contemporary cinematic representations of alternative ideal Muslim masculinities which 
emphasise piety, a cosmopolitan world view and intellectuality, Khudori is a highly-
educated and pious Muslim man. He received training in Islamic studies from Islamic 
boarding schools in Java and at Al-Azhar, Cairo, the world’s oldest university that 
focuses on Islamic studies. In terms of knowledge of Islam, Khudori is  equal, if not 
superior to other religious leaders depicted in the film. Khudori’s academic background 
represents his licence of authority in Islamic studies. Upon his return to Indonesia, it is 
apparent that his foreign education does more than enhance his piety but also provides 
him with knowledge of Islam and gender equality. Thus, his adoption of ‘new man’ 
masculinity can be seen as part of his expression of piety and an alternative 
interpretation of Islamic texts, which is not gender biased. 
7 Kecia Ali argues that the dominant view in various Islamic texts and jurisprudence does see sex as 
inherently men’s right and women’s duty; however, she also notes that this view tends to overlook other 
hadiths and other scholars’ views which promote a wife’s sexual rights and husband’s obligation to fulfill 
them (2006: 13). 
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Now I would like to situate the idealisation of the Muslim ‘new man’ in 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban and within the long-running tradition of cinematic 
representations of masculinity in Indonesian cinema, both during the New Order period 
and into the twenty-first century. I demonstrate that the alternative ideal presented in 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban competed against persistent representations of 
masculinities which emphasise men’s authoritative patron leadership in both the 
domestic and public spheres. 
Placing Perempuan Berkalung Sorban’s idealisation of a Muslim ‘new man’ 
against the cinematic tradition of representing bapakism in Indonesian cinema during 
the New Order, the Muslim ‘new man’ overturns the taken-for-granted norm that men 
are, by virtue of their gender, more superior to women and thus deserve to be the latter’s 
patrons. In her analysis of Indonesian cinema under the New Order, Krishna Sen argues 
that ideal masculinity was generally represented by assertiveness, dominance, activity in 
the public sphere, and certainly economic productivity (1994: 137–38). When film 
Islami began to flourish in the 1990s along with the shifting direction of Indonesian 
politics, this form of masculine representation was sustained. A notable film, Nada dan 
Dakwah (Melodies and Islamic Preaching, 1991, Chaerul Umam) promotes men’s 
authoritative patron leadership over women and other men of subordinate social 
positions. Rhoma, the character played by Rhoma Irama, is the patron to the female 
protagonist and lower-class villagers who fight against a tycoon intending to take over 
their land. The cleric, Zainuddin MZ, is the religious authority that Muslims in the film 
consult on their life problems—including those involving the tycoon. Unlike the 
autonomous and strong character of Annisa, the female protagonist of Nada dan 
Dakwah eventually turns to these male figures of authority to help her deal with the 
tycoon. 
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In other areas of popular culture during the New Order period, the idealisation of 
bapakism and other masculinities complicit with it were dominant. On television, male 
characters representing the ideal masculinity were likely to dominate the narration of 
events, represent the voices of wisdom and rationality, as well as embody the perfect 
personality that hardly ever made mistakes (Aripurnami 1996: 254). In Javanese 
theatrical performances, according to Barbara Hatley (1990), the male patron leadership 
norm was persistently preserved through male protagonists who represented wisdom, 
ascetic spirituality and authority. Moreover, in all these variants of popular culture 
products, male heroes were the ones who provided solutions. They also disciplined 
politically and sexually assertive women in an attempt to make them embrace the 
feminine ideal: passivity, submission, and total devotion to their husbands (Aripurnami 
1996: 254; Hatley 1990: 198–99; Sen 1994: 144). Consequently, the valorisation of a 
strand of a masculinity which encouraged men not only to be more religious but also to 
abandon authoritative patron leadership qualities, such as those presented in Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban, undermines the deeply-rooted popular tradition of representing 
masculinity ideals.  
The male patron leadership norm was still a strong underlying pattern in the 
representations of gender relations of power, especially in the domestic setting, in 
Indonesian screen culture into the twenty-first century. The shifting representations of 
ideal femininities which accommodated women’s increasing involvement in the public 
sphere were not necessarily followed by the legitimacy of more fluid gender relations of 
production (see Chapter 4) and more equal gender relations of power, especially in the 
domestic sphere. Indeed, female characters that held high-level corporate positions, and 
in some cases were financially more affluent than their male partners or love interests, 
were prevalent in Indonesian films produced between 2000 and 2014. The new icon of 
the feminine ideal: Cinta of Ada Apa dengan Cinta? (What’s up with Cinta? 2002, Rudy 
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Soedjarwo) is a high-achieving teenager of an urban middle-class family who manages 
the student publication at school. Yet, in terms of her gender power relations with her 
male love interest, I agree with Hapsari Sulistyani (2006) that Cinta is still dominated 
by Rangga. Indeed, Rangga is not a stereotypical representation of a young man of his 
generation. He is emotionally sensitive, poetic and at ease with domestic work. His 
masculinity is hailed as an alternative ideal. Yet, in terms of the gender relations of 
power, it is Rangga who holds higher authority in determining the course of his 
relationship with Cinta. 
Representations of husbands who are subjected to the authority of their wives 
continued to be subjects of comedy during the period under study. The sitcom Suami-
Suami Takut Istri (Wife-fearing Husbands), produced by Multivision Plus was aired on 
week nights between 15 October 2007 and 29 January 2010 on Trans TV. As can be 
gleaned from the title, the central theme is men’s submission to their dictator wives—
culturally it is expected to be the other way around. In the previous era, such comedy 
also flourished in Indonesian cinema. In Perempuan Kedua (The Second Woman, 1990, 
Ida Farida), the joke of submissive men and authoritative wives was represented as a 
part of the daily conversations among men to prove their ideal masculinity. The 
television success of the sitcom Suami-Suami Takut Istri was followed by the success of 
its silver-screen adaptation in 2008 (Ajo 2008). The film version attracted around 
400,000 moviegoers (Anton 2008). The success of the television show and the silver 
screen adaptation implies the persistent strong appeal of the male patron leadership 
norm. It also suggests that men’s inability to display authority in their gender relations 
of power with women in the domestic sphere is considered as a defeat of masculinity, 
which, in many cases, is what makes it comical. 
Yet, the persistent representation of bapakism and the male patron leadership 
norm which underlines it in Indonesian screen culture was strongly challenged by the 
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representations of independent women in domestic and international women’s cinema. 
Feminist filmmakers were likely to offer representation of women as agents who hold 
full responsibility for their action and determine their own life course, rather than 
depending on men to make these choices for them. Here are some examples. In the 
award-winning thriller Fiksi (Fiction, 2008, Mouly Surya) the female lead character, a 
former victim of sexual abuse turned serial killer, is an autonomous agent who is able to 
decide her own life course. The narrative of the award-winning comedy Demi Ucok (For 
Ucok, 2012, Sammaria Simanjuntak) is driven by an independent woman in her thirties 
who has the agency to decide to be single despite pressure from her mother and society. 
Furthermore, the central figure in the documentary Di Balik Frequency (Behind the 
Frequency, 2013, Ucu Agustin), Luviana, is a female journalist unfairly dismissed by 
her employer (a major television network). She is depicted as an equal partner in her 
gender relationship of labour and power with her husband. In the early 2000s, 
Hollywood films with strong women characters, such as Erin Brokovich (2000, Steven 
Soderbergh), written by Susannah Grant, also captivated Indonesian audiences. 
Amidst the intensifying Islamisation, an ideal masculinity was also intensively 
sought and experimented with on screen to highlight religious piety as an important 
feature of an emerging ideal masculinity. In terms of depictions of the gender relations 
of power, the analogy of a ‘cinematic battle’ proposed by Ariel Heryanto (2014) can be 
useful in illustrating the competing representations of gender ideals.8 While these films 
agree that religiosity, compassion, as well as emotional sensitivity and expressiveness 
are vital gender practices in defining a Muslim man’s ideal masculinity, they stake 
different claims in portraying an ideal patterning of the gender relations of power, 
especially in the domestic setting. Ayat-ayat Cinta is ambivalent in its depiction of the 
8 Heryanto illustrates that the competing representations of Islam and Muslims in Perempuan Berkalung 
Sorban and Ketika Cinta Bertasbih, were intended as corrections of the former film, Ayat-ayat Cinta 
(2014: 60–61). 
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gender relations of power between its ideal masculine and feminine figures.9 Fahri is a 
dominant figure in his relation to Muslim women characters in the film. Fahri’s power 
relationship with his wife is ambivalent. While the novel version offers clear positioning 
of women as subordinate to their husbands, the film tends to obscure the gender 
relations of power by providing fleeting scenes and an absence of solution.10 Ketika 
Cinta Bertasbih, while supporting women’s pursuit of higher education and careers in 
the public sphere (Hakim 2013), continues to sustain the dominant interpretation of 
Islamic texts on the gender relations of power at the household level—that women have 
to submit to the authority of their husbands. Such positioning is very clear from the 
beginning of the film. 
It is against the consistent valorisation of bapakism masculinity and the 
emergence of various alternative ideals, especially anchored in Islamic piety yet 
preserving the male patron leadership norm, that the Muslim ‘new man’ in Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban was promoted by the filmmakers as an alternative ideal. The Muslim 
‘new man’ is offered by filmmakers as a solution for men to navigate the changing 
landscape of gender relations of power in twenty-first-century Indonesia. Eventually, 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban’s daring representation of gender discrimination and a 
normalised male patron leadership norm in religious society, especially Islam, at this 
time became a loud wake-up call for the majority of the Indonesian population to pay 
more attention to the use and abuse of religious texts in the maintenance of unequal 
gender relations of power. 
9 I have argued elsewhere (Lücking and Eliyanah 2017) that Fahri, the male protagonist of the film, 
represents not only the face of a more compassionate Islam but also an ideal Muslim masculinity. 
10 For instance, Fahri actually opposes living in Aisha’s grand mansion because he cannot afford to pay 
their living expenses. To such a statement, Aisha responds that Fahri’s responsibility transcends economic 
responsibility, but she also reluctantly says that if he insists on moving out, she cannot do anything but 
submit to his decision as head of the household. No decision is reached in the argument. 
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Tapping into the politics of the gender relations of power 
This section discusses the politics behind and around the production of images of the 
Muslim ‘new man’ in Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. It unpacks the filmmakers’ 
intentions and negotiations as they tapped into contemporary gender politics to secure a 
new hegemonic masculinity, especially around the gender relations of power. As seen in 
the production of cinematic representations of the Muslim ‘new man’ in Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban, the filmmakers were forced to negotiate their political manoeuvre 
not only with the normalised unequal gender relations of power but also with the 
intensive invocation of Islamic religious texts in its defence on- and off-screen. 
Especially in the case of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, the filmmakers had to 
challenge the representations of ideal masculinity they themselves had contributed to 
producing in Ayat-ayat Cinta. 
The production of the film adaptation of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban was both 
political and commercial. Released in January 2009, the film was part of the burgeoning 
trend of film Islami in twenty-first-century Indonesia. Undoubtedly, the producer and 
filmmakers behind the movie capitalised on the heightened Islamisation that was 
prevalent at that time and the growing popularity of film Islami, especially after the 
stellar success of Ayat-ayat Cinta.11 Yet, the production of Perempuan Berkalung 
Sorban cannot be reduced to merely making commercial opportunities out of the 
political situation. It was politically and economically motivated, to intervene in the 
popular representations of gender ideals, including masculinity. 
Around the period of the production of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, it would 
have been easier to appeal to Indonesian commercial film markets by reproducing the 
11 Ayat-ayat Cinta broke the ticket sales record at that time with around 3.5 million tickets being sold 
during its theatrical release (Film Indonesia 2013). Previously impressed by the movie Ayat-ayat, Din 
Syamsuddin, chairperson of Muhammadiyah, one of the major Muslim organisations in Indonesia, 
strongly encouraged more productions of film Islami (Irwansyah 2012). 
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Islamic romance formula exemplified in Ayat-ayat Cinta. At that time, the publication 
of Islamic romance novels was burgeoning. They offered a fresh narrative approach to 
the generally secular romantic stories (Rani 2012; Widodo 2008). The novel’s formula 
was successfully translated in the adaptation of Ayat-ayat Cinta into a film which 
earned stellar commercial success with more than 3.5 million tickets sold during its 
theatrical release. The film eventually generated a generic formula for box-office 
success—film Islami—a melodramatic narrative combined with practical guides for 
living the Islamic way. Indeed, many later films under the category of film Islami which 
adopted this formula also gained relatively good sales. Such was evident in the release 
of the duology Ketika Cinta Bertasbih the year following Ayat-ayat Cinta. The duology 
collectively attracted more than 3.5 million moviegoers (Film Indonesia 2013). An 
Indonesian film critic, Ekky Imanjaya, observes that copying the previously successful 
generic formula has long been a common strategy in Indonesian cinema to ensure the 
commercial success of a film (2006: 35–38). When a film is successful, more films of 
the same theme and genre will be produced. 
Yet, Perempuan Berkalung Sorban did not take such easy route. Instead of 
choosing a romantic drama, the producer and the principal filmmakers agreed to adapt a 
highly political novel. As I mentioned earlier, the novel itself had earned rave reviews 
before the film adaptation was even conceived of in 2008. Like the novel, the adaptation 
of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban has become known as one of the few most powerful 
films that criticise the deeply rooted patriarchal traditions in Islamic communities in 
Indonesia. Indeed, adapting Perempuan Berkalung Sorban into a movie at that time was 
a daring political move in Indonesian commercial cinema. As indicated by Faozan 
Rizal, the director of photography of Ayat-ayat Cinta and Perempuan Berkalung 
Sorban: 
We at that time agreed to fight through Perempuan Berkalung Sorban because it was 
like all of a sudden after Ayat-ayat Cinta, an offer to make such a challenging film came 
176 
Chapter 5. Reel Muslim New Man and the Gender Relations of Power 
from a producer who dared to do it for commercial cinema (Personal interview, 22 May 
2014). 
Moreover, offering an alternative interpretation of Islamic texts to justify 
alternative gender ideals of femininity and masculinity, amidst the intensifying 
Islamisation could have risked triggering controversy. It has never been easy to promote 
alternative interpretations of religious texts to support gender equality. A movement led 
by progressive Muslim feminist, Musdah Mulia, to revisit and amend the compilation of 
Islamic-based law in Indonesia partly to ensure gender equality has been constantly 
challenged by conservative Muslims. Alternative exegeses have been accused of being 
against Islam (Abdala 2003). Several legislative struggles to formally institutionalise 
gender equality have been suspended because of protests led by conservative groups, 
despite progress in other areas. 
The gender politics that the filmmakers of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban wished 
to present provided visual representations of the abuses of religion in the maintenance 
of unequal gender relations, including those of power. Such efforts also risked protests 
from conservative Islamists. During the theatrical release of Ayat-ayat Cinta, 
Bramantyo hinted that he was excited about the prospect of making more film Islami, 
especially those that contained a critical element. 
I am excited by the idea of making more Islamic movies. I plan to release two more this 
year … Perempuan Berkalung Sorban is based on a novel by Abidah El Khaliqey, who 
according to reviews of the book, explores the concept of Islamic feminism … It will be 
different from Ayat-ayat Cinta, which is clean and without controversy. Perempuan is 
more advanced; it will be more critical (Bramantyo in an interview with Evi Mariani 
2008). 
In other words, the filmmakers were aware of the potential controversies the film 
adaptation would stir up, but they continued to take their chance amidst the intensifying 
Islamisation of Indonesia. Certainly, controversy is not always bad for marketing. 
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Manoj Punjabi, producer of Ayat-ayat Cinta, categorises controversy as negative and 
positive; referring to productive and counterproductive controversies respectively 
(Personal interview, 2 May 2014). Yet, relying on controversy to boost sales is at best a 
gamble. Based on my interviews with several producers, they are indeed not totally 
against controversy. Yet, they would rather choose not to stir up sensitive issues such as 
these that challenge Islam in the period of a heightened Islamisation of Indonesia. 
Picking controversy that sits at the intersection of gender and religion is always risky. A 
purely commercially driven film would be much less likely to take such an approach. 
The filmmakers’ experience motivated them to embark on producing a counter 
representation of ideal masculinity which is not superior to women in the gender 
relations of power and which recognises women’s autonomy and agency. As I 
mentioned earlier, the principal filmmakers behind Perempuan Berkalung Sorban were 
almost the same people behind the production of Ayat-ayat Cinta. Most of the 
filmmakers, including Hanung Bramantyo (director), Gina S. Noer (script writer) and 
Faozan Rizal (director of photography) held the same roles in the Ayat-ayat Cinta 
production.12 Through Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, they intended to offer an 
alternative ideal masculinity, the Muslim ‘new man’, in which the man is not as 
‘superior’ as the version they offered in Ayat-ayat Cinta, especially in terms of his 
power relations with his wife and other women around him. In separate interviews with 
me, the director and the scriptwriters indicated that they were not enamoured by 
depictions of gender ideals and gender relations in the novel Ayat-ayat Cinta despite 
their own involvement in the film’s production.  
Salman Aristo, Gina S. Noer, and I did not have much room to rework the narrative 
about women in the film (Ayat-ayat Cinta). Now look at the novel. The character of 
12 They were hired by MD Entertainment, led by Manoj Punjabi, for the movie Ayat-ayat. They worked 
with a competitor film company Kharisma Starvision, led by an Indonesian Muslim producer of Pakistani 
descent, Chand Parwez Servia for Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. 
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Maria is wedded to Fahri when she is in coma, and then soon Maria is dead. To me, that 
is a cruel treatment of a character … where are women’s rights? (Personal interview 
with Bramantyo, 21 April 2014).13 
Bramantyo’s statement implies his dissatisfaction in working on Ayat-ayat Cinta 
as he had only a very narrow space in which to innovate and present alternative 
representations of women and men. The ideal Muslim man, Fahri, in Ayat-ayat Cinta is 
represented as having patriarchal privileges by virtue of his masculine gender, including 
a licence to wed a woman who is badly ill and unable to voice her consent. It is against 
this representation of the superior Muslim man that the Muslim ‘new man’ of 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban is produced as a counter representation that recognises 
and respects women’s agency and autonomy in the gender relations of power. The 
Muslim ‘new man’ ideal character of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban not only supports 
women in their pursuit of career and education in the public sphere, but also respects 
women’s agency and autonomy in the domestic sphere (see previous section).  
The controversy accompanying Ayat-ayat Cinta bolstered the filmmakers’ 
motivation to embark on a project that produced a counter narrative about Islam and 
gender ideals. Although the controversy revolved around Ayat-ayat Cinta’s depiction of 
polygamy, it can be gleaned that opposition to the film was concerned with the portrayal 
of the gender relations of power. Those who opposed the film questioned the rights and 
position of women in (polygamous) marriages (Hatley 2009; Yumiyanti 2008). 
Responding to such criticism, Bramantyo has constantly reiterated that the making of 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban was a healing experience after his involvement in Ayat-
ayat Cinta. 
13 In Ayat-ayat Cinta, both the film and the novel, the male protagonist weds the second wife when she is 
in a coma. Although the woman is previously shown to have had an interest in him, her consent to a 
polygamous marriage with him is completely circumvented. 
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Making Perempuan Berkalung Sorban is about paying my dues to women for making 
Ayat-ayat Cinta … I practically could do nothing in Ayat-ayat Cinta … I could not give 
women a voice … Thus, the film Perempuan Berkalung Sorban is a healing for me. 
Frankly, the success of Ayat-ayat Cinta did bother me—seeing people queuing for 
tickets and they, including my own mother, cried over the film (Personal interview, 21 
April 2014). 
Apparently, Bramantyo and his colleagues found the commercial success of the 
movie Ayat-ayat Cinta and its evolution into a visual lifestyle guide for the creation of 
good Muslim men and women disconcerting. Bramantyo and his filmmaker colleagues 
themselves were not fully convinced by the idealised masculinity and femininity in the 
film and novel versions of Ayat-ayat Cinta. 
In addition, the pre-production process of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban 
strengthened the filmmakers’ intentions to stage their political views regarding gender 
and religion in the film. They were concerned that their views regarding unequal gender 
relations between men and women were hardly ever explored on cinema screens. 
Indeed, unequal gender relations were often justified by using literal interpretations of 
Islamic texts. Gina S. Noer in an interview with me implied that she was very keen to 
take part in Perempuan Berkalung Sorban because of the many unheard voices of 
Muslim women who are confined by cultural traditions under the guise of religious 
texts. 
During my research prior to writing the script for this film, I met and talked with the 
novelist, and she told me about her source of inspiration in structuring the novel’s 
narrative. But as an intellectual, I could not simply believe in her. Then, in one of the 
discussion forums where I served as a speaker, I met a Muslim woman who confided in 
me about her personal life in pesantren, which I think is comparable to that of Annisa 
[the female protagonist of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban]… there are indeed many 
Muslim women who are deprived of freedom by cultural traditions, not religion 
(Personal interview with Noer, 11 April 2014). 
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The filmmakers were even more motivated to offer a counter narrative and counter 
representations of gender ideals when they encountered more stories in which Islam was 
used to justify discrimination and oppression of women. In fact, Perempuan Berkalung 
Sorban was the first film Islami to critically explore this issue in Indonesian cinema.. 
Why was challenging the gender relations of power a crucial battle for 
Indonesian progressive filmmakers during 2000–2014? The answer lies in the 
situatedness of the struggle in the broader gender politics associated with the securing of 
hegemonic masculinity. During 2000–2014, Indonesians were witnesses to significant 
changes in the gender relations of power. During this period, women secured key posts 
in governments and politics, especially in positions unthinkable during the New Order. 
They rose to positions of power as the President, cabinet ministers heading departments 
other than those specially crafted for women, leaders in parliament and of political 
parties. Gender equality was also strongly advocated for in the state’s policies and 
programs at any level, such as the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming in 
national development.14 In addition, the enforcement of Law 23/2004 provided women 
with legal protection against domestic violence. Despite the many drawbacks and a 
persistent cultural belief which prevents victims from reporting their cases (Aisyah and 
Parker 2014), the law has criminalised a form of violence which was previously 
considered normal. It was viewed as a religiously justified means for men to discipline 
women. Certainly, these changes gradually diminished men’s normalised authority in 
public and domestic spheres. 
Apparently, such conditions were responded to by many pressure groups, 
especially conservative Muslims, who more intensively invoked the dominant gender-
biased interpretation of Islamic texts. In the most-cited literal interpretation of Islamic 
14 The President issued Presidential Instruction No. 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming in National 
Development. It instructs all government institutions at central and regional levels to implement gender 
mainstreaming into planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their development policies 
and programmes (Moffatt et al. 2013: 15). 
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text, Qur’an Surah 4 (An-Nisaa, literally translated in English, Women), verse 34, men 
are regarded as patron leaders for women. The official translation endorsed by the 
Department of Religious Affairs under the New Order translated the verse as follows: 
Men are leaders for women, because Allah has given the one (men) more than other 
(women), and because they (men) provide a living. Therefore, pious women are 
devoutly obedient to Allah and guard themselves in the absence of their husbands like 
Allah has protected them. As for those women whom you fear to be disloyal, admonish 
them and refuse to share their beds and beat them. But if they obey you, do not annoy 
them. For Allah is the Most High, great (above you all). (My translation of the 
Indonesian translation of the verse. Department of Religious Affairs of Republic of 
Indonesia, 1996).15 
This official literal interpretation has become hegemonic since the New Order 
and it has contributed to maintaining the official patterning of the gender relations of 
power, and thereby sustaining the hegemony of bapakism. Under the New Order, the 
literal interpretation of this verse supported the state’s gender politics to depoliticise 
women, relegating them to the domestic sphere, and subjecting them to the authority of 
their male patron leaders in the public and domestic spheres. In post-authoritarian 
Indonesia, this literal interpretation was deployed by conservative Islamists to question 
the legitimacy of women’s leadership at the level of the state in 1999, and ideas of 
gender equality in general. The rise of Megawati Soekarnoputri into top-level state 
power triggered a heated public debate on whether a woman was religiously justified to 
15 Laki-laki adalah pemimpin bagi wanita, oleh karena Allah telah melebihkan sebagian mereka (laki-
laki) atas sebagian yang lain (wanita), dan karena mereka (laki-laki) telah menafkahkan sebagian dari 
harta mereka. Sebab itu maka wanita yang shalihah ialah yang taat kepada Allah lagi memelihara diri 
mereka dibalik pembelakangan suaminya, oleh karena Allah telah memelihara (mereka). Wanita-wanita 
yang kalian khawatiri nusyuznya, maka nasihatilah mereka dan pisahkanlah diri dari tempat tidur 
mereka dan pukullah mereka. Kemudian jika mereka mentaati kalian, maka janganlah kalian mencari-
cari jalan untuk menyusahkannya. Sesungguhnya Allah Maha Tinggi lagi Maha Besar (Department of 
Religious Affairs of Republic of Indonesia, 1996). 
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lead a nation (see Chapter 2). The debate ceased within a couple of years and more and 
more women have risen to high-level pubic posts.  
As holding key posts in the public sphere has become culturally acceptable and 
normalised for women in twenty-first-century Indonesia, the above Qur’anic verse has 
been more intensively deployed by many religious leaders to save the last bastion of the 
male patron leadership norm—the domestic sphere. The literal interpretation of the 
verse continues to formalise men’s position as patron leaders of the household, under 
whose authority wives, children and other junior members of the family are subject. 
According to Musdah Mulia (2014: 10), such literal readings of the religious texts 
authorise women’s subordination to their husbands, in turn making men the religiously 
justified key decision makers in the family. The defence of men’s authority in the 
domestic sphere was vital for the sustainability of bapakism as the hegemonic 
masculine ideal. Bapakism, which valorises paternalistic power relations between men 
and women, will gradually disappear as liberal-minded people seek to realise more 
equal power relations. Furthermore, such a change will require the undoing of various 
forms of cultural practice, which have become part of the ‘common sense’ that has 
sustained hegemony. For instance, it will lead to the need to formally acknowledge 
women as heads of households, despite the presence of men. 
Consequently, the formal and institutional struggles to defend men’s authority in 
the domestic sphere have become more visible, even though they have never gone 
unchallenged. For instance, several local governments, enabled by the regional 
autonomy law (Law No. 22/1999), established night curfews for women; women are not 
allowed to travel on their own at night, unless accompanied by their male patrons. 
Implied in such a regulation, deemed to be based on Islamic sharia law, is the formal 
reinstatement of the male patron leadership norm by making men authoritative 
individuals, by virtue of their gender, who can determine women’s spatial movement 
183 
Evi Eliyanah 
and without whose consent and protection women cannot exercise their agency to travel 
at any particular time. Although such a formal way to restore male patron leadership 
norm has never gone uncontested (Noerdin 2002; K. Robinson 2009; White and Anshor 
2008), it implies that the formal and institutionalised struggles to restore the male patron 
leadership norm, thus also restores the hegemony of paternalistic bapakism masculinity. 
Street politics to preserve the male patron leadership norm in the domestic 
sphere has also been intensified. In a much later development, opposition against the 
drafting of Gender Equality and Equity Bill has often referred to male patron leadership 
in the domestic sphere as ‘natural’ and religiously endorsed. Conservative Islamists tend 
to perceive the struggle to subvert this established patterning of the gender relations of 
power, as well as feminism and gender equality, as a threat to Islam. Dhinar Dewi Kania 
(2014), a prominent figure in the now defunct conservative Islamist organisation Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia, states in her opinion piece published in the national press, that the bill 
and the ideal of gender equality are against Islam and threaten the fabric of Indonesian 
society. In her argument, men are divinely sanctioned as ‘imam’, leaders (Kania 2014). 
Thus, she called for the termination of the legislative process of the bill. In 2012, similar 
arguments were also advocated by various groups of conservative Muslims protesting in 
front of Indonesia’s legislative offices—both national and regional—to oppose the 
legislation of the bill. A branch organisation of Forum Umat Islam (Muslims Forum, 
FUI) in Jombang, East Java, through its representative, claimed that the bill was against 
Islam. In an article in Surabaya Pagi, entitled ‘FUI demo tolak RUU Gender’ (FUI 
mobilised protest against the Gender Equality and Equity Bill), he argued that it would 
put pressure on women to be involved in the public sphere, which in his opinion 
demeaned women’s roles as mothers, who already are important to the education of 
their children at home (9 June 2012). 
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Furthermore, the religious justification of male patron leadership in the domestic 
sphere has also strongly been advocated by women, especially in popular culture. For 
example, regardless of whether or not they get questions from journalists, Indonesian 
female celebrities often mention whether they will continue to pursue their careers after 
they get married. The most common answer is that with the husbands’ permission, they 
will continue to do so in the future. The reverse hardly ever happens: men have never 
been questioned about whether they would continue to pursue their careers after 
marriage. Shireen Sungkar, who gained popularity through her acting role in an award-
winning television soap Cinta Fitri (Fitri’s Love, 2007–2010, SCTV), and who married 
her co-star Teuku Wisnu in 2013, said that her husband allowed her to continue 
pursuing her acting career provided that: ‘Most importantly, I have to know my limit. 
Now I have kids and a husband, and I should not compromise my priority: family’ 
(Shireen Sungkar cited in Rochani 2015). Indeed, it has become culturally acceptable 
for women to pursue their careers in the public sphere, and it should not be an issue in a 
marital relationship. Yet, it is also explicitly stated that their husbands’ blessings are 
imperative and women’s roles as wives and mothers should be their priority. 
More broadly, Sungkar’s statement indicates that there is pressure for men to 
relinquish their patron leadership in the public sphere, but they should rest assured that 
their authority is preserved in the domestic space. Aafke Komter (1989) argues that 
major drawbacks to gender equality, in the relative absence of patriarchal laws and 
legally permitted gender discrimination, usually spring from norms about gender 
identity, concepts of masculinity and femininity, as well as tacit rules of interaction 
between men and women. In this case, as men’s institutional and formal power has 
decreased substantially in Indonesia, the struggle to sustain the male patron leadership 
norm has sprung from the hegemonic norms surrounding an ideal femininity. These 
norms involve submission to male patron leaders, especially in the domestic sphere. 
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Thus, men’s authority in the private sphere has largely been unchallenged, which makes 
the representation of an alternative masculine ideal in Perempuan Berkalung Sorban 
even more significant. 
It is interesting that the struggle to maintain the male patron leadership norm is 
not only fought for by men, as the major interest group, but also by women. I have 
already mentioned a few influential women who consciously or unconsciously declare 
their support of the norm, and in turn also of the hegemony of the cultural ideal of 
masculinity which valorises this norm. Such is inherent in the nature of hegemony—
including in gender—that a certain hegemonic notion shall gain support from groups 
which largely benefit from them and groups which are subjected to them (Gramsci 
2000). Women do not see their subordinate status as demeaning. Moreover, they see 
that men’s interest in defending the male patron leadership norm and the hegemony of 
bapakism is also in their own interest. This seeming contradiction is because the 
gendered interest is presented as a neutral religious issue, rather than a gender issue. 
Furthermore, R.W. Connell’s claim about the emergence of an ‘emphasised femininity’, 
which features a configuration of gender practices, personalities and culture fittingly 
supportive of the hegemonic masculinity is strengthened (1987: 183). Women are likely 
to take as so much pride in adopting this cultural ideal of femininity that they barely see 
the unequal social relations, including those of power, produced and reproduced within 
the official structure of gender relations. 
Situating the filmmakers’ struggle to subvert the hegemonic norm of men’s 
authoritative patron leadership both in the public and domestic spheres in Indonesia, 
such as shown in Bramantyo and his colleagues’ endeavour through Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban, was significant in the broader struggle to transform the structure of 
the gender relations of power. The struggle was waged against the inevitable decline of 
men’s authoritative patron leadership in the public sphere and the intensifying support 
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for men’s authority in the domestic sphere. Moreover, considering the intensive use of 
gender-biased Islamic injunctions to restore men’s authoritative patron leadership, the 
filmmakers’ offered visual alternatives of ideal masculinities projected to be equally 
pious but more compatible with the changing landscape of gender relations. The 
Muslim ‘new man’ in Perempuan Berkalung Sorban was a counter representation of 
masculinities which licensed men to be dominant in both public and domestic spheres 
on- and off-screen. 
This section has demonstrated that in undermining the existing hegemonic 
masculinity around gender relations of power, politically progressive Indonesian 
commercial filmmakers have had to negotiate their political intentions with both the 
normalised unequal gender relations of power and the intensive invocation of Islamic 
religious texts. In Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, the filmmakers had to challenge the 
representations of ideal masculinity that they themselves had produced in Ayat-ayat 
Cinta. This section has helped us understand that the filmmakers’ struggle in this 
respect matters in the context of their contemporary gender politics, in which the 
inevitable decline of men’s authority in the public sphere is often responded to, by 
supporters of the patriarchal gender order, with a strong reinforcement of men’s 
authority in the domestic sphere. The alternative ideal that the filmmakers of 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban introduced was then significant in unpacking the 
normalised and religiously justified unequal gender relations of power at the domestic 
level. 
An alternative ideal Muslim masculinity at the expense of lower-class 
Muslim men 
This section examines the middle-class biases of the filmmakers’ struggle to undermine 
the hegemony of bapakism through the movie, Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. Indeed, 
they advocated for an alternative ideal Muslim masculinity which subverted the 
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hegemony of bapakism by problematising normalised men’s authoritative patron 
leadership in both public and domestic spheres. Yet, as this section unfolds, the 
representation was distorted by a middle-class bias. The model of Muslim masculinity 
was cast in the figure of an urban educated middle-class Muslim man. He experienced 
religious enlightenment during his journey abroad, particularly to Egypt, for further 
study. On the contrary, Muslim men whose masculinities allow them to be conservative, 
authoritative, violent and discriminative against women are cast in male characters—
characters who have been educated in rural and traditionalist religious education 
institutions. Consequently, taking into account the immediate consumers of Indonesian 
commercial cinema, the filmmakers, regardless their intentions, offer a reassurance to 
Indonesian Muslim middle-class viewers that unequal gender relations of power are 
problems endemic in lower-class Muslim communities, rather than systemic in all 
conservative Muslim communities, transcending class boundaries. 
In Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, the idealisation of Khudori’s ‘new man’ 
masculinity relies heavily on his middle-classness. First of all, Khudori’s 
characterisation as the representation of an alternative ideal masculinity rests heavily on 
the higher education he received in Cairo and Yogyakarta, instead of the rural 
traditionalist pesantren, like the one led by Annisa’s father. Khudori leaves the rural 
pesantren for further study at Al-Azhar, Cairo. Al-Azhar itself is renowned among 
Islamic communities, including in Indonesia, for offering a reformist approach to 
education in Islamic studies (Jackson and Bahrissalim 2007: 43).16 By highlighting the 
ideal Muslim man’s educational background as an Al-Azhar graduate, Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban attempts to reinforce the reformist element and distance Khudori’s 
masculinity from traditionalist Islam. Moreover, upon his return to Indonesia, Khudori 
16 According to Greg Barton (2002: 83), it was in fact through graduates of Al-Azhar that Islamic 
modernism was introduced to Indonesia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to date, 
many of Indonesia’s stellar Islamic intellectuals were educated at Al-Azhar, instead of universities in 
Saudi Arabia or other Middle-East countries. 
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chooses to be based in Yogyakarta, where he pursues his doctoral degree. According to 
an article in Bernas entitled ‘Yogyakarta disebut kota pelajar? Apa alasannya?’ 
(Yogyakarta is called the students city? Why?), Yogyakarta, is an urban area in 
Indonesia renowned as Kota Pelajar, a student city and home to many universities 
which attract a substantial number of students from all over the country (23 January 
2018). Khudori’s disassociation from pesantren education and his membership of the 
urban-based Muslim reformist class, distance him from the rural pesantren graduates 
who are depicted in the film as mostly conservative and gender biased. Khudori is a 
man who is enlightened about the social construction of gender and the abuses of using 
Islamic religious texts to justify the unequal gender relations, including those of power. 
Annisa finds her relationship with Khudori is liberating, unlike her previous experience 
with her first husband and also with her father. With Khudori she can make decisions 
regarding her education and career, and her opinions as a wife are highly valued. 
As I indicated earlier, the idealisation of Khudori’s masculinity is contrasted to 
that of Annisa’s father and first husband, who are products of a rural pesantren. 
Annisa’s father is the representation of an authoritative husband and father who holds 
ultimate power in his relationship with his wife and children. He decides whether 
Annisa can continue her study in Yogyakarta or not; he also decides with whom, and 
when, Annisa must be married. His authority also makes his wife submissive—she 
never challenges him although she might disagree with him in several issues. Annisa 
cannot argue against her father, who tends to become emotional when his judgement 
and decisions are contested. Moreover, Annisa’s first husband, Samsudin is also the 
product of a rural traditionalist pesantren. He is the son of a notable kyai, a senior to 
Annisa’s father. He holds firmly to the gender-biased interpretation of Islamic texts 
because it provides him with patriarchal benefits. His literal reading of the texts allows 
him to maintain control over his gender relations with Annisa, forcing her to be 
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submissive and docile. The same texts afford him licence to physically and 
psychologically abuse her for his own sake. 
The class dimension of this contrast between the idealised Khudori who adopts 
the alternative ideal masculinity—the Muslim ‘new man’—and the pesantren graduates 
Samsudin and Kyai Hannan, is clearly visible. Khudori’s profile fits that of the typical 
modernist Muslim who, as suggested by Mun’im Sirry (2010: 66), are better educated, 
middle-class and urban-based. Greg Barton (2002: 37) and Ronald Lukens-Bull (2005: 
18) agree that generally pesantren have their roots in rural settings and many of their 
students are from lower socio-economic levels. Certainly, there are few pesantren 
which attract middle- and upper-class students which are located in urban areas 
(Lukens-Bull 2005: 18; Nilan 2009b: 221).17 The filmmakers reinforced these 
stereotypical images of pesantren and their graduates in the film adaptation of 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. Kyai Hannan and Samsudin who are discriminative and 
tend to be violent are the representations of this traditionalist religious education. 
Although they are depicted as economically better off than regular pesantren students 
and graduates, they do not hold university degrees, let alone an education from a 
reformist Islamic education institution abroad. Higher education, as I indicated earlier, 
is cinematically represented as vital in making a man aware of the gender biases in the 
interpretations of Islamic texts, which lead to discrimination and violence against 
women. In other words, the idealisation of Khudori and his Muslim ‘new man’ 
masculinity, forged by the filmmakers, relies heavily on the othering of less-educated, 
lower-class Muslim men. In the film, other violent Muslim men whose wives are 
17 According to Nilan (2009: 221), since the late 1990s, the constituency of Islamic education institutions, 
including pesantren, has broadened from teaching the children of conservative Muslim families, often 
rural and poor, to the children of middle-class and religiously moderate families, who believe that their 
children need to learn strong religious values to protect them from the negative excesses of the modern 
secular (westernised) world. Yet, this expansion of constituency does not necessarily erase the deeply 
rooted stereotype of pesantren as lower class and rural. 
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counselled by Annisa at her workplace are further negative representations of the urban 
poor. 
The film also deepens the rift between pesantren (stereotypically lower-class) 
and modernist Islamic education institutions (stereotypically middle- and upper-class), 
by representing the latter as the solution to the gender problem, and the former as the 
cause of rampant discrimination and violence against women. As I mentioned 
previously, the teaching of Islamic texts in pesantren is singularly depicted as sustaining 
men’s authoritative patron leadership in public and domestic spheres. It is the gender-
biased teaching of Islamic classical texts which is represented as underlying Kyai 
Hannan’s restrictive and discriminative treatment, as well as Samsudin’s abuses, 
towards Annisa. Furthermore, the film also reinforces the stereotype that the kyai, leader 
of the pesantren, is resistant to change. Off-screen, this stereotype is common. In the 
context of gender reform in Indonesian educational institutions, for example, 
pesantren’s curriculum and their charismatic leaders are often regarded as responding 
very slowly to modernisation and change (Srimulyani 2007: 93–94). The opposite 
applies to Annisa’s relationship with to Khudori, who is educated in modern religious 
institutions. His ‘new man’ masculinity is contrasted with men who are graduates of 
pesantren. Yet, as I argued earlier, this Muslim strand of the ‘new man’ reflects middle-
class Muslim aspirations, such as pursuing higher education in modern institutions 
either domestically or abroad, having modern occupations, as well as living in urban 
settings. On the contrary, the pesantren, which generally constitutes an important 
element of Islamic education in Indonesia, is represented as being the cause of most of 
the life problems experienced by Muslim women like Annisa. It is also the site of the 
reproduction of patriarchal hegemonic masculinity.  
Consequently, it is understandable that the monolithic representation of the 
pesantren and its charismatic leaders as anti-modern, especially in terms of gender 
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issues, sparked a heated public debate calling for a banning of the film. Muslims who 
identify themselves with pesantren education but consider themselves to be progressive 
in terms of gender were outraged by the film. A notable Muslim poet, Taufiq Ismail, 
condemned the film as a disgrace to Islam and kyai, traditional male Muslim religious 
leaders (KabarNet 2010). In addition, Ali Mustafa Yakub, the then Grand Imam of 
Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta, and the then Deputy Leader of the Fatwa Commission of 
Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI), demanded the film be revised for depicting Islam and 
kyai, as ultra-conservative, especially concerning gender. Drawing from hadiths, Ali, in 
an article entitled Perempuan Berkalung Sorban menuai kontroversi’ (Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban stirred controversy), states that Islam encourages women to pursue 
education and competitive sport, such as horse riding (Liputan 6, 27 March 2009). This 
demand for a revision of the film was also supported by Tifatul Sembiring, the then 
president of the Justice Welfare Party, a conservative Islamist political party (Dewi 
2009). 
However, the film earned support from (Muslim) feminists and critics because it 
bravely shows the extremely bitter reality of unequal gender relations, including those 
of power, within Indonesian Muslim communities. Amidst the intensifying demand for 
a boycott against Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, Musdah Mulia encouraged support for 
the film as it unveiled a certain social reality, albeit bitter, in which Islam had been 
abused to justify discrimination against women and superiority of men. 
I can claim that the film (Perempuan Berkalung Sorban) exposes a reality. In fact, we 
as Muslims should be aware that our religion has been abused by some people to justify 
oppression of women, which is an obsolete practice. That is a fact, which may not 
represent the whole complex reality. So, the film should not be boycotted (Mulia, cited 
in Yunita 2009). 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban also earned accolades from film critics and 
observers. Windu Jusuf, a notable Indonesian film critic and editor of one of the key 
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film criticism websites in Indonesia, Cinemapoetica, offers a commendation on the 
film. He emphasises that the film was daring in problematising the normalised gender 
inequalities and gender-based violence, often justified by gender-biased interpretations 
of religious texts, unlike contemporary Islamised melodrama (Jusuf 2013). 
The idealisation of the Muslim ‘new man’ as part of the solution to unequal power 
relations escaped opposition to the film. At a glance, it is easy to accuse the film of 
representing Islam as very conservative and restrictive of women. However, I agree 
with Ekky Imanjaya (2009) that the misrepresentation is caused by the monolithic 
negative representation of traditional religious authority. Perempuan Berkalung 
Sorban’s narrative is dominated by challenges staged by Annisa against the established 
authority of Islamic knowledge, a number of kyai and other men and women who share 
the ultraconservative gender perspective. In fact, not a single kyai is represented as 
opposing the gender-biased treatment of women. In a country, where kyai still hold very 
important roles in people’s religious life, the monolithic negative representations of 
these religious authority figures soon stirred controversy. The alternative solution 
offered in the film was hardly noticed.  
The idealisation of Khudori’s Muslim ‘new man’ masculinity in Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban is strengthened by the validation offered by Khudori’s network of 
urban-based, highly-educated middle classes. An important part of Khudori’s middle-
class network is his feminist activist friends who provide support for women victims of 
domestic violence. The film represents this network as comprising highly educated and 
mostly secular women feminist activists who deal with women victims of domestic 
violence. Being surrounded by colleagues who are enlightened about gender equality 
and the gender dimension of domestic violence, Khudori becomes aware of Annisa’s 
struggle to overcome the trauma caused by her toxic relationship with her first husband. 
His network of feminist activists provides Khudori with knowledge and skills that help 
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him navigate his marital relationship with the traumatised Annisa, herself a victim of 
domestic abuse. Unlike the people from the pesantren, the network of feminist activists 
around Khudori pushes for men to foster equal gender relations, including those of 
power with the female members of their family, including their wives. Consequently, by 
showing that Khudori is surrounded by feminist activists, the film implies that his 
masculinity has earned approval from a feminist point of view, while the masculinity of 
conservative Muslim men in pesantren is criticised. 
In contrast to the feminist network, pesantren represents a network of 
conservative patriarchal Muslim men and women. They turn a blind eye to the 
normalised gender discrimination and violence experienced by Muslim women, like 
Annisa. For example, Annisa’s teachers, men and women, sustain men’s absolute 
authority over women through their teaching of Islamic classical texts. Samsudin’s 
mother reprimands Annisa for seeking a divorce from her husband after finding out that 
he has had a child with another woman; she accuses Annisa of being an incapable wife 
that makes Samsudin seek happiness with another woman. Samsudin’s mother’s view 
on a woman seeking divorce provides evidence about how Muslim women in the circle 
of pesantren are depicted as internalising their subordination to men. Once again, the 
juxtaposition between stereotypically lower-class pesantren Muslim men and middle-
class highly educated Muslim men accentuates the idealisation of Khudori’s Muslim 
‘new man’ as an alternative ideal. 
The validation of Khudori’s Muslim ‘new man’ by his network of feminist 
activists also others urban poor men. The feminist activists are representations of urban-
based not-for-profit organisation workers who support women who are victims of 
violence, mainly by their intimate partners. In spite of the filmmakers’ intentions, the 
film highlights cases in which the perpetrators are urban poor men. Annisa, who also 
works for the organisation as a counsellor is, for example, shown providing counselling 
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to a housewife who was beaten by her husband but is financially too powerless to leave 
him. Such a scene eventually serves as a contrast to the idealised Muslim ‘new man’ 
masculinity adopted by Khudori. In fact, it is after this scene, that the film shows 
Khudori pampering Annisa by making her breakfast and taking her for a short holiday. 
While the urban poor man gets a divorce, Khudori gains Annisa’s trust and affection. 
Considering that urban poor men’s masculinity is singularly depicted in such violent 
character who does not deserve a family, the film clearly leads the audience to gravitate 
towards the masculinity displayed by the urban-based educated middle-class Khudori. 
To whom do the urban-educated, middle-class filmmakers communicate this 
cinematic representation of an alternative ideal masculinity? The immediate consumers 
are urban-based middle-class Indonesians. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the shifting 
cinema culture in Indonesia since the 1980s has made cinema going a middle-class 
lifestyle. Cinema theatres are mostly located in shopping centres in urban areas in 
Indonesia. Consequently, films aimed at the commercial film market must be able to 
appeal to urban-based middle-class segment of the Indonesian film audience. A further 
implication regarding cinema-going as part of the middle-class lifestyle is, as argued by 
James Hoesterey and Marshal Clark (2012), that film Islami tend to be informed by 
contemporary concerns, frustration, desire and aspirations of contemporary Indonesian 
middle-class Muslims. Perempuan Berkalung Sorban thus can be seen as a vehicle 
through which the filmmakers can communicate their political concerns, frustrations, 
and aspirations regarding contemporary Islamic gender ideals, including masculinity, to 
a middle-class audience, presumably mostly Muslims. Consequently, the alternative, 
‘legitimate’ ideal Muslim ‘new man’, is targeted at this segment of the audience. The 
narrative, in which the alternative ideal operates, tends to offer reassurance to middle-
class Muslims that gender-based discrimination and violence within conservative 
Muslim communities are likely to be problems of the lower classes. Therefore, middle-
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class Muslims who are more highly educated and socially as well as politically aware, 
are responsible for correcting the problem. 
In other words, the film, regardless of the filmmakers’ intentions, has reduced 
the issues of gender-based discrimination and violence, springing from unequal gender 
relations of power, to a problem of class, while realities show that these issues are 
systemic and transcend class boundaries. Indeed, the filmmakers have made a 
breakthrough in visually exposing gender-based discrimination and violence within 
conservative Muslim communities in Indonesia. Yet, associating the causes with 
problems linked to lower-class men and their masculinities and the solution with 
middle-class men and their ‘new man’ masculinity obscures the social realities that are 
inherent in the unequal gender relations of power. This association is responsible partly 
for the sustenance of bapakism and the normalising of gender-based discrimination and 
violence against women both in the public and domestic spheres. It is systemic as the 
gender-biased interpretations of Islamic texts dominate the ways of life of the majority 
of Indonesian Muslims, regardless of their social class. In a research conducted by Lily 
Munir (2005), the majority of Muslim men in her study tended to defend their dominant 
position in relation to women, especially their wives, by drawing on interpretations of 
Islamic texts which afford them privileges over women, despite these readings running 
counter to Islam’s basic principles of justice and equality. The fact that unequal gender 
relations of power and their grave repercussions on women, particularly in the form of 
gender-based violence, is also strengthened by the statement made by the Chairperson 
of the Monitoring Sub-commission of the National Commission on Elimination of 
Violence Against Women, Indraswari:  
When we talk about violence (against women), it is an issue that transcends economical, 
social and cultural boundaries. It does not mean that the higher the education 
background, or the socio-economic status, the less likely violence will take place (cited 
in Putra 2017). 
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In fact, a recent survey conducted by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS) 
shows that educated, urban Indonesian women are at higher risk of violence. As 
reported by Max Walden (2017), the survey finds that women living in urban areas and 
with relatively high educational attainments had experienced violence in the hands of 
their husbands. Thus, while the filmmakers have visually problematised the normalised 
unequal gender relations of power in conservative Muslim communities, their political 
move was riddled with middle-class biases. 
This section has highlighted the class biases overshadowing the filmmakers’ 
struggles in undermining the hegemony of bapakism around the gender relations of 
power. The idealisation of the Muslim ‘new man’, which the filmmakers promoted to 
replace the bapakism hegemonic ideal, heavily rested on middle-class frustrations and 
aspirations, while othering the lower-classes. I have elaborated on how the film’s 
narrative idealises the urban-based, highly educated middle-class Muslim man as the 
representation of ideal Muslim masculinity at the expense of the rural-based, less-
educated Muslim man. This strategy ultimately obscures the social reality that unequal 
gender relations of power—which tend to lead to discrimination and violence against 
women in public and domestic spheres—are systemic issues surpassing class 
boundaries. 
Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, I would like to offer a summary of my key points and 
establish linkages to the central argument of this thesis. In this chapter I have discussed 
Indonesian filmmakers’ struggles in undermining hegemonic bapakism around the 
gender relations of power in commercial cinema. As I maintained throughout this 
chapter, new hope had blossomed—commercial filmmakers took part in the resistance 
against the consistent idealisation of bapakism on- and off-screen. And amidst the 
heightened Islamisation in twenty-first-century Indonesia, the filmmakers offered a 
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religiously grounded alternative ideal, such as the Muslim ‘new man’ in Perempuan 
Berkalung Sorban, which they promoted to replace the deeply rooted cultural ideal of 
bapakism. The alternative ideal subverted the normalised men’s authoritative patron 
leadership in the family. In producing such an alternative ideal amidst an intensified 
period of Islamisation, the filmmakers had to wrestle with the heightened use of gender-
biased interpretations of Islamic religious texts deployed in defence of the norm. These 
conservative readings of Islamic texts are ultimately responsible for the sustenance of 
bapakism as the hegemonic ideal and more broadly of the patriarchal gender order. In 
such a way, the filmmakers’ struggle supported the movement pioneered by Muslim 
feminists, such as Musdah Mulia, who at that time were attempting to offer alternative 
interpretations of Islamic religious texts, which promote equal gender relations. 
Yet, this chapter also shows that the filmmakers’ endeavours were distorted by 
middle-class biases. For one, the idealisation of the alternative ideal they promoted 
relied heavily on the middle-classness of the representation. The idealisation clearly 
positioned lower-class Muslim men, uneducated in reformist education institutions, in 
Indonesia and abroad, and rural-based, as the ‘other’. As seen in the film adaptation of 
Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, to date one of the few progressive commercial film 
Islami in this regard, educational background and middle-class networks are vital in the 
making of an alternative ideal Muslim masculinity. They are crucial to the development 
of the character which the filmmakers used to represent an alternative ideal Muslim 
masculinity. His experience of being educated at a world’s leading reformist higher 
educational institution and his network of highly educated and socio-politically aware 
feminist activists shape his transformation into a Muslim ‘new man’, who fosters equal 
gender relations of power with his wife and other women. Such life experiences 
distinguish the ‘new man’ protagonist from his lower-class counterparts, who are rural 
based and have never experienced formal education in reformist religious educational 
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institutions. Unfortunately, as I reinforced at the end of the previous section, these class 
biases obscure the social reality that unequal gender relations of power are systemic and 
transcend class boundaries. 
This chapter has reinforced the central argument of my thesis that new hope for 
gender equity had emerged, albeit marred by middle-class biases. As the previous 
chapter also shows, the progressive political movements waged by filmmakers in 
commercial cinema in Indonesia during 2000–2014 were worth highlighting. In the 
previous chapter, I demonstrated that filmmakers struggled to undermine the hegemonic 
bapakism around gender relations of labour. As indicated in the central argument, the 
struggle was marred by class bias. In this chapter, I explored the filmmakers’ struggles 
to undermine the ‘ideal’ gender relations of power. Taking into account the heightened 
Islamisation in Indonesia, this chapter scrutinised how the filmmakers negotiated their 
political intentions with the intensified use of Islamic injunctions in defending the 
hegemonic masculinity ideal, especially through the restoration of men’s authoritative 
patron leadership in the domestic sphere. Yet, as with the filmmakers’ struggle 
discussed in the previous chapter, it was also marred by class bias. This chapter 
reinforces my thesis’s premises by showing filmmakers as political agents who actively 
engage with contemporary gender politics in their work in commercial cinema. The 
filmmakers behind Perempuan Berkalung Sorban negotiated the pressure for commerce 
and gender politics to create avenues for innovation and experimentation with 
alternative ideal masculinities, to better equip Indonesian men to navigate through the 
changing landscape of gender relations of power in a twenty-first-century Indonesia that 
is typified by Islamisation and democratisation. Eventually, this chapter reinforces that 
representations of (alternative) ideal masculinities in commercial cinema are irreducible 
to either purely market demand or politics. Commercial cinema is simultaneously an 
arena of politics and economy. The images of ideal masculinities circulating in 
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commercial cinema are products of negotiations between two forces. In the next 
chapter, I discuss the filmmakers’ struggle to undermine the hegemonic bapakism 
around the gender relations of emotion. 
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Chapter 6 
Filmmakers’ Reel Gay ‘New Man’  
and the Gender Relations of Emotion 
This chapter discusses the Indonesian filmmakers’ struggle in undermining the 
hegemony of bapakism in terms of the gender relations of emotion. Partly, the structure 
of the gender relations of emotion deals with the production of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality and the relationship between them (R.W. Connell 1987: 97). As I 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the structure of the gender relations of emotion supporting the 
Indonesian patriarchal gender order, strongly accentuates heteronormativity while 
subordinating and marginalising homosexuality. This structure paved the way for 
heteronormative bapakism to achieve hegemonic status. Yet, the hegemony has been 
substantially eroded due to the gender-order crisis. Attempts to challenge and sustain 
the hegemonic heteronormative ideal have been increasingly visible on various fronts. 
This chapter seeks to understand the tensions, negotiations and compromises behind the 
public gender politics mobilised by Indonesian filmmakers to challenge the most 
fundamental base of bapakism’s hegemony—heteronormativity. 
To do so, this chapter deploys Indonesian filmmakers’ struggles to legitimise a 
gay strand of ‘new man’ masculinity, using Arisan! (2003, Nia Dinata) and Arisan! 2 
(2011, Nia Dinata) as my analytical lenses. Arisan! was the first Indonesian film to 
celebrate and promote a gay masculinity as an alternative ideal to bapakism. While 
other films before it, such as Istana Kecantikan (Beauty Palace, 1988, Wahyu 
Sihombing), as well as its contemporary Kuldesak (Cul-de-sac, 1998, Mira Lesmana, 
Nan T. Achnas, Riri Riza, Rizal Mantovani) do show empathy towards the plight of gay 
men, they do not extend their representations to promoting gay masculinities as 
legitimate alternative ideals. Thus, the Arisan! franchise is important as it subverts the 
hegemony of bapakism even further by suggesting the embrace and idealisation of a gay 
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masculinity, instead of merely recognising and pitying its subordination and 
marginalisation. 
As I will show in more detail in the following section, the cinematic 
representation of the gay ‘new man’ is a critique of the hegemonic ideal. It criticises not 
only the gender relations of emotion, but also the gender relations of production and 
power that together (re)produce the idealised bapakism. The gay ‘new man’ 
protagonists in the franchise are juxtaposed with characters representing heterosexual 
men who are authoritative, self-centred, dishonest and irresponsible. One of the gay 
‘new man’ characters, Sakti, is also the representation of a caring father figure to a child 
in a non-conventional family arrangement. Staging such subversive challenges on 
commercial cinema screens to the deeply rooted hegemonic bapakism (which prescribes 
compulsory heterosexuality amidst the heightened moral panic against non-
heteronormative subjects) required careful strategies and aesthetics. This chapter 
investigates how the filmmakers engaged with contemporary gender politics and dealt 
with the political–economic pressures of commercial cinema. It also examines what the 
filmmakers’ struggles can inform us about the transformation of Indonesia’s gender 
order especially around the gender relations of emotion at this given time. 
I propose two arguments in this chapter. First, I argue that aesthetic, narrative 
and distribution compromises were inevitable in order for filmmakers to be able to stage 
subversive representations of heteronormativity—the most fundamental hegemonic base 
of bapakism. On one hand, the compromises made by filmmakers indicate that it was 
possible to stage such strong subversive figures openly in the public sphere amidst the 
escalating moral panic. I shall demonstrate that filmmakers could work around state 
censorship and evade public censorship by depicting the gay masculinity ideal as a 
private matter. On the other hand, the compromises indicate growing anxiety about the 
increasing visibility and support of marginalised groups; compromises which 
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overshadowed the production and distribution of certain masculine ideals on screen at 
that time. Due to the threats of public and state censorship as well as rejection by 
distribution channels, the filmmakers were unable to extend their struggle to advocate 
for a formal recognition that would allow gay men to freely express their gender and 
sexuality. Filmmakers could not just ignore the growing moral panic; they had to 
negotiate and compromise in order to still be able to stage their resistance publicly, 
albeit in a limited way. 
My second argument is that unfortunately, despite its progressive nature, the 
filmmakers’ struggle is clearly cast in middle-class professional gay men. In 
legitimising the gay ‘new man’ as an alternative ideal in the Arisan! franchise, the 
filmmakers’ risk being trapped within a class bias. To justify gay masculinity as a 
legitimate alternative ideal, the filmmakers rely on wealth, consumption and a middle-
class lifestyle in order to show that gay masculinity matters. Such a strategy tends to 
overlook the efforts of lower-class gay men to express their belonging in Indonesian 
society. Lower-class gay men off-screen may not have equal access to resources to be 
able to freely express their gender and sexuality, especially during a time of heightened 
moral panic. The filmmakers did not extend their struggle to imagine that a legitimate 
gay alternative ideal of masculinity would be class inclusive. 
This chapter is structured in the following way. The section which immediately 
follows this introduction examines the extent to which the Arisan! franchise subverts 
the bapakism hegemonic ideal. It also situates the films’ narratives in the deeply rooted 
tradition of representations of ideal masculinities in Indonesian cinema. This section 
shows that Arisan!, and its sequel, did heighten the political struggle to support the 
recognition of non-heteronormative subjects. It does so by celebrating and offering the 
gay strand of the ‘new man’ as a legitimate alternative ideal masculinity. The following 
section on the behind-the-scene politics around the production and distribution of the 
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franchise shows that the intensifying moral panic towards non-heteronormative genders 
and sexualities during the period imposed significant constraints in the filmmakers’ 
efforts. I will explain the aesthetics, narrative and distribution compromises made by the 
filmmakers in order to be able to stage their public gender politics without attracting too 
much negative attention, let alone controversy. I reinforce my argument that it is 
possible to stage subversive gender politics on screen, albeit to a limited extent. In the 
penultimate section, I discuss the class biases inherent in the filmmakers’ struggle. 
Reinforcing my second argument, I show that the filmmakers cast their efforts 
exclusively in middle-class professional gay men. The filmmakers used notions of 
wealth, consumption and an affluent lifestyle to justify the idealisation of gay 
masculinity on screen. As they did so, they overlooked the everyday struggles of lower-
class gay men who continue to be on the receiving end of discriminating treatment 
because of their non-heteronormative gender and sexuality and also their social class. 
The final part of this chapter offers a summary of my key points and establishes a 
linkage between these points and my thesis arguments. 
The Arisan! franchise and the ideal gay ‘new man’ 
This section discusses the extent to which Arisan! and Arisan! 2 subvert the hegemony 
of bapakism masculinity through their narrative devices, particularly plot and 
characters. It also explores the situatedness of such narrative devices in the tradition of 
cinematic representation of ideal masculinity in Indonesian cinema. I argue that the 
films have strategically escalated the struggle in undermining the hegemony of 
bapakism by offering a gay strand of ‘new man’ masculinity as an alternative ideal. In 
the film franchise, the ‘new man’ protagonists are presented as ideal partners and ideal 
fathers. However, especially for Arisan!, I second Ben Murtagh’s argument (2012, 
2013) that the idealisation runs the risk of creating a new ‘homonormativity’ by 
excluding certain effeminate homosexual men. 
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Arisan!, released in 2003, follows three close friends, Sakti, Meimei and 
Andien, who are part of an elite arisan, a rotating savings group. The film unpacks the 
secrets behind the lives of these upper–middle-class urbanites and their friends. 
Although the film aims to explore issues in the respective relationships of each 
protagonist, the exploration of Sakti’s masculinity and sexuality, and his coming-out 
arguably occupies most of the screen time. Other relationship issues tackled in this film 
include women’s infertility and marriage betrayal. The film concludes with each of the 
main characters finding a solution to their relationship issues. In particular, Sakti can 
finally come out to his mother and friends. In fact, the non-heterosexual relationship is 
represented as the only intimate relationship which works in this film. 
The sequel, Arisan! 2, released in 2011, follows the same urban elite clique but 
with a different set of issues. The focus slightly shifts to Meimei’s battle with cancer. 
Meimei’s quest to accept her health condition and to live her life to the fullest becomes 
the primary plot driver and the uniting factor for the elite clique. The group has 
expanded to include Lita, Sakti’s cousin, a single parent, successful lawyer and aspiring 
politician. Sakti’s homosexual love affairs still receive substantial screen time. The 
film’s exploration of his masculinity and sexuality is more complex and shows heavier 
political baggage than in the previous film. It is in this sequel that Sakti’s ‘new man’ 
masculinity is presented as ideal by supporting his role as a father to his cousin’s son. 
Sakti’s masculinity is portrayed as a caring, involved, and emotionally sensitive father 
figure. 
Indeed, Arisan! is not the first commercial film to depict gay masculinity in 
Indonesian cinema, but it is certainly the first commercial film which promotes it as an 
alternative ideal masculinity. In Indonesian cinema under the New Order (1966–1998), 
there were a few films that depicted gay masculinities. Yet, the depictions in these films 
were likely to perpetuate the marginalisation of masculinities which accommodate non-
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heteronormative sexual relations, and thus reinforce the regime’s official structure of the 
gender relations of emotion. Men adopting these marginalised masculinities were likely 
to be represented as psychologically deranged (Tinggal Bersama, Cohabitation, 1977, 
Bay Isbahi; and Istana Kecantikan, 1988, Wahyu Sihombing), a sexual predator 
(Remaja Lampu Merah, Teenagers of the Traffic Lights, 1979, Syamsul Fuad), or a sign 
of moral decadence (Titian Serambut dibelah Tujuh, A Hair Split into Seven Parts, 
1982, Chaerul Umam).1 The shared logic in these films is that eventually heterosexual 
order is restored and homosexual desire curbed (Murtagh 2011: 397). The recognition 
of Istana Kecantikan at the only national-level film festival in Indonesia, Festival Film 
Indonesia (FFI), in 1988 can be read as a further endorsement of the film’s 
representation of gay masculinity as destructive and dangerous. Arisan! and its sequel 
definitely overturn these negative portrayals of gay masculinities by representing one as 
an alternative ideal. 
Among films which were produced and released in post–New Order Indonesia, 
the Arisan! franchise is not the first film to offer a challenging portrayal of men 
adopting non-heteronormative genders and sexualities. Three years before the 
production of the first instalment of Arisan!, Kudesak was released in film theatres 
throughout Indonesia. This omnibus of four films with loosely related plotlines also 
presented gay protagonists who were frustrated by their marginalisation in society due 
to their non-heteronormative gender and sexuality. Kuldesak is a critique of the rampant 
discrimination against and marginalisation of homosexual men in Indonesia. Initially 
intended for an independent cinema release, unpredicted changes in the political 
situation enabled Kuldesak to be screened in commercial cinema theatres throughout 
1 The award-winning Istana Kecantikan was the first film under the New Order which specifically 
explored a gay man’s subjectivity (Murtagh 2006). However, the film supports the dominant narrative of 
the marginalisation of homosexuality. Towards the appearance of the credit title at the end of Istana 
Kecantikan, there was a written warning inserted to remind viewers to avoid homosexuality. The film 
won critical acclaim at the 1988 FFI. It was nominated for Best Film, Best Director, Best Lead Actress 
and Best Original Script. The film took the trophy for Best Lead Actor at the festival. 
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Indonesia in November 1998, albeit with the gay kissing scenes having been censored 
(van Heeren 2012: 54). Kuldesak continues to represent gayness as a source of 
frustration, which eventually leads to the demise of the characters. Their non-
heteronormative gender and sexuality is a lifestyle cul-de-sac. 
Around the time of the release of the first instalment of Arisan!, content about 
non-heteronormative genders and sexualities also proliferated in media and popular 
culture in Indonesia, albeit representing various perspectives. As stated by Tom 
Boellstorff, around 2002 non-heteronormative genders and sexualities began to be 
incorporated into programs and shown on several television stations with greater 
regularity (2005b: 75). At the same time media coverage of the lives of non-
heteronormative gender and sexuality subjects was also gaining interest. There was also 
a growing body of literary work written by Indonesians about the lives of LGBTIQ 
individuals. The proliferation of LGBTIQ content in Indonesia certainly carried diverse 
perspectives about these marginalised subjects. Such varied perspectives reflected the 
divided views in Indonesian society at that time regarding LGBTIQ people. Many 
holding divided views, in fact, maintained the deeply rooted idea that homosexuality 
was deviant and required correction. Be A Man, a reality show run weekly by Global 
TV between 2008 and 2009, for example, put 18 transwomen into a military camp in 
order to train them to be more macho and eliminate their effeminate mannerisms. This 
television program eventually sustained the hegemony of bapakism masculinity through 
its attempts to correct the mannerism of subjects who did not conform to 
heteronormative expressions of gender. In contrast to these popular representations of 
non-heteronormative subjects, the Arisan! franchise offered more positive 
representations of gay men and even promoted gay masculinity as an alternative ideal 
masculinity. 
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Situated in such a deeply rooted tradition of idealising heteronormative 
masculinity in Indonesian cinema, the Arisan! franchise is a subversion. First and 
foremost, the films undermine the hegemony of bapakism by offering a gay ‘new man’. 
In societies governed by a patriarchal gender order, heteronormativity is generally more 
than a world view which promotes heterosexuality as the normative relation of 
emotions. Heteronormativity is socially constructed as the only way of living. It is the 
‘only’ accepted intersection between biological anatomy, gender and sexuality. At the 
same time, homosexuality is culturally deemed to threaten the reproduction of life—in 
the form of future generations, as well as the reproduction of culture. Homosexuality is 
deemed to destabilise the specific arrangements for ‘normal’ living, in this case the 
‘family’ (Ahmed 2014: 144). 
Thus, as Stevi Jackson argues, in order to preserve heteronormativity, the de-
legitimation of homosexuality through differentiation and inequality is imperative 
(2011: 12), including through popular culture. Before the Arisan! franchise came along, 
the deeply entrenched tradition of the idealisation of heteronormative bapakism in 
Indonesian cinema was part of the mechanism to do so. Men who do not conform to 
heteronormative masculinities are depicted as not normal and deviant. Their 
masculinities were subordinated and/or marginalised in relation to heterosexual men. 
Thus, by promoting the gay ‘new man’ as a legitimate alternative ideal, the Arisan! 
franchise, could potentially be considered as a threat to the maintenance of 
heteronormativity. 
Furthermore, the cinematic representation of the gay ‘new man’ ideal 
undermines bapakism’s valorisation of emotional reservedness. By emphasising an 
alternative ideal, the filmmakers introduce men’s gentleness, empathy and emotional 
sensitivity. This configuration is depicted as being sought after by men and women in 
their search for life partners. The gay men who adopt the ‘new man’ masculinity in the 
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Arisan! franchise, Sakti and Nino, are the antithesis of representations of heterosexual 
men, who are authoritative, emotionally distant, unsympathetic and in some cases 
abusive. Sakti’s emotional sensitivity touches the heart of his best friend Meimei as well 
as the other members who attend the monthly arisan meetings—who all happen to be 
women. In Meimei’s eyes, Sakti is always sensitive to her feelings and her needs. 
Following is an excerpt from a conversation in Arisan! between Meimei and Sakti, in 
which the former appreciates Sakti’s emotional sensitivity.  
Meimei: No wonder all the ladies at the gathering were attracted when they saw you. 
But honestly, if it were my first time meeting you, I could imagine myself falling for 
you too. You are smart, handsome, able to play the piano and sensitive. 
Sakti: Sensitive? 
Meimei: Yep! You can feel what other people don’t, with empathy. There are not many 
men like that. You are just perfect (Arisan!: 00:28:00–00:28:39). 
Meimei is trying to understand why other members of the gathering, most of 
whom are married women, are instantly attracted to Sakti. Meimei’s remark indicates 
Sakti’s extraordinary masculinity, which women search for but hardly ever find in their 
heterosexual partners. Meimei represents heterosexual women’s voices on the kind of 
masculinity which makes a man an ideal partner in a heterosexual relationship. 
Eventually, Sakti’s gay ‘new man’ masculinity also earns him the title of a ‘Girls’ Best 
Friend’—also validated by his other close female friends towards the end of the film. 
Nino’s emotional sensitivity also makes Meimei fall for him. Nino provides 
emotional consolation to Meimei when she is facing divorce. Nino is the antithesis of 
Meimei’s husband, who is emotionally distant and all-too consumed by his career in the 
public sphere. Nino, like Sakti, is the queer eye for straight men when it comes to 
relationships with women. 
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Nino: You are working really hard to make him happy, but people call you ego-centric? 
While he left you without saying goodbye or anything. Isn’t he the one who is ego-
centric? 
Meimei: He may not want to hurt me. 
Nino: NO WAY! It clearly shows that he is a COWARD! He does not deserve to be 
your husband (Arisan!: 1.22.38–1.23.02). 
Ultimately, their gentle demeanour, as well as their ability to pick up subtle 
signs of emotions and to express feelings, characterising the ‘new man’ masculinity of 
these gay protagonists, are part of the cinematic strategies to subvert the emotional 
reservedness and toughness expected from the heteronormative bapak masculine man 
on and off screen. Bapakism masculinity valorises emotional reservedness because 
emotional sensitivity and expressiveness are associated with femininity, thus are 
believed to be more appropriate for women. Masculine men should be emotionally 
reserved in order to maintain their rationality. Off screen, it has been ‘common sense’ 
that women are more closely associated with tears, indecisiveness and anxiety, as well 
as being more suitable for emotional labour (see Jones 2004). When men display these 
qualities, they tend to be socially identified as weak and lacking in masculinity, which 
eventually makes them less fit to be leaders of the family or, in a much broader sense, 
the nation. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the president of Republic of Indonesia 
for the period from 2004 to 2014, was often criticised by his political rivals for 
expressing his emotional sensitivity in public and on social media. SBY was often 
referred as Jenderal Tak Tegas, a military general who is soft-hearted and lacks 
decisiveness (Gatra 2013). Consequently, by promoting gentleness, emotional 
sensitivity and expressiveness the Arisan! franchise sought to propose an alternative 
ideal which is more inclusive and sympathetic. 
Through Arisan! 2, the filmmakers took subversion against heteronormative 
bapakism to a new level by disrupting the image of the ideal happy nuclear family. 
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Through the family planning program, the New Order discursively constructed the 
image of an ideal family—a father, a mother and children, ideally two (Warwick 1986: 
457). Under the New Order, this image of a happy nuclear family headed by a 
heterosexual man was the hegemonic ideal, which partly justified men’s exercise of 
authority over the family collectivity. In the 1980s, this ideal discourse of ‘family’ was 
visually campaigned about on the roofs of houses and village gates. In addition, it was 
firmly embedded into massive family planning campaigns (Blackburn 1999; Dwyer 
2000; Hull and Adioetomo 2002). Arisan! 2 overturns this ideal image of the happy 
family partly by emphasising that the success of a man’s fatherhood lies in his 
masculinity, rather than his sexuality. At the same time, the film depicts that the 
reproduction of life does not depend on a heteronormative patterning of the gender 
relations of emotion. Instead, it partly relies on men’s masculinity which can ensure the 
reproduction of a happy and healthy future generation. 
Emotional sensitivity and nurturing strongly feature in the ‘new man’s gender 
practices and personality configuration for both gay and heterosexual subjects. Sakti, 
regardless of his homosexuality, becomes a father figure who replaces a child’s 
biological father. His ‘new man’ masculinity allows him to be an emotionally caring 
father figure to his cousin’s son. The absence of the biological father strengthens the 
film’s idealisation of this alternative father figure. It accentuates the low significance of 
heteronormativity and biological bonding in ensuring the growth of the future 
generation. The absence of a biological father also highlights that fatherhood is a social 
practice rather than simply a biological bond. It also foregrounds that the good practice 
of fatherhood requires men to adopt masculinities which allow them to be emotionally 
sensitive and directly involved in day-to-day caring duties. In short, masculinity matters 
more than sexuality in the making of a good father. 
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Arisan! 2 undermines the idealisation of the biological father and offers a 
different insight into fatherhood as a social practice. It emphasises the importance of 
masculinity in shaping a man’s fatherhood. In the film, the search for the biological 
father is largely absent. The film does provide a hint about the child’s biological father, 
but only in passing. The film even strengthens its position on this issue by allowing the 
single mother to choose to raise her son (by the missing biological father) on her own 
outside marriage. She receives help from her close friends and extended family 
members, including her gay ‘new man’ cousin. The gay protagonist is regarded by the 
child as an ideal father figure. Neither the mother nor the child feel the need for the 
presence of the biological father. Neither do they seek to form a heteronormative 
household, in which a bapak holds the utmost authority. However, the film does not go 
further to represent a gay household with children. Sakti’s fatherhood is still located 
within the domain of a heterosexual family, albeit one that is modified. 
Such an approach to fatherhood, as represented in Arisan! 2, contrasts with that 
displayed in most Indonesian films and other popular culture media before it. In films 
produced under the New Order, fatherhood is often represented as naturally biological. 
Indeed, most of the films produced and distributed during this period represent the ideal 
nuclear family a biological father, a biological mother and children. In some films, this 
idealisation of the biological nuclear family is used to force, tolerate and even justify the 
pressure for women to marry their rapists. In the film Dr. Karmila (1981, Nico 
Pelamonia), for example, an educated middle-class woman is forced to marry her rapist 
for the sake of saving her chastity and the reputation of her family, and also so the child 
will have a father. The fact that this film was adapted from a best-selling novel, written 
by a prominent female novelist Marga T. in 1971, and also adapted into a television 
series in 1998, indicates the prevalence of such an approach to fatherhood during the 
1970s to 1990s. Moreover, the book was a best-seller; the film earned two prestigious 
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awards at the 1982 FFI: Best Actress and Best Director; and the television series not 
only earned high ratings but it also won the Best Actress category at the 1998 Panasonic 
Gobel Award. The recognition received by the novel, film and television series, while 
not intended to legitimise biological primacy in fatherhood practice, reflects the 
common perspective of fatherhood at the time. 
The emphasis on masculinity as a vital element in shaping a man’s fatherhood 
can also be read as a challenge to the stricter legal mechanism preventing openly gay 
men from becoming legal guardians or foster parents. The state implemented 
Government Regulation No. 54/2007, which legally prevents same-sex couples from 
adopting children. The favouring of heterosexual couples and the legal exclusion of 
same-sex individuals from the right to adopt children was not a new approach designed 
to strengthen heteronormativity in Indonesia. In fact, the legal exclusion also took place 
under colonial ruling, especially in Staatsblad 1917 No. 19. However, amidst the 
escalating moral panic and widespread hostility towards non-heteronormative genders 
and sexualities, the new regulation emboldened the state’s position in regard to the 
rights, position and status of non-heteronormative genders and sexualities. Indeed, 
Arisan! 2 does not specifically tackle this discrimination. However, by highlighting 
fatherhood as defined more by masculinity, than sexuality, Arisan! 2 renders the legal 
regulation discriminatory against marginalised subjects of genders and sexualities. The 
film also exposes the state’s discriminatory treatment of these marginalised subjects. It 
exposes the fact, as documented by Boellstorff, that many gay men, like Sakti, take 
comfort in informally adopting their siblings’ children or the children of their extended 
family; they usually take care of the education expenses of these children in order to 
develop psychological bonds with them (Boellstorff 2005b: 123). 
However, the film’s struggle to legitimise a non-heteronormative masculinity 
ran the risk of creating a new ‘homonormativity’. In this case, I agree with Murtagh 
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(2012, 2013) who argues that the first film of the franchise, in addition to another film, 
Janji Joni (Joni’s Promise, 2005, Joko Anwar), tends to create a new homonormativity 
by disavowing a body of Indonesian citizens who were described by David Bell and Jon 
Binnie as the ‘queer unwanted’—queer people who are pushed out of certain spaces and 
practices of consumption (2004: 1810). Homonormativity is a concept developed by 
Lisa Duggan (2004) which refers to the privileging of a certain form of homosexuality 
and excluding others. In this case, the privileging of the gay ‘new man’ as the more 
acceptable form of male homosexuality is at the expense of the marginalisation of gay 
men who are camp, effeminate or limp wristed. These ‘othered’ gay men are cast as the 
‘queer unwanted’, the unwanted others whose exclusion is necessary so that the 
proposed normative gay masculinity can be legitimated. This othering is indeed clearly 
visible in the first instalment of the Arisan! franchise. In an interview with me, one of 
the key filmmakers claimed that the idealisation of gay ‘new man’ masculinity was 
primarily to counter the stereotypical depiction of gay men’s gender identity in 
Indonesian cinema. 
I personally don’t like the stereotypical gay depiction in Indonesian popular culture. 
Gay in popular culture tends to be represented as men whose everyday gesture is 
heavily camp and effeminate. They are too on your face in the way they express things 
… I don’t like that. Thus, I feel the need to create a representation of gay men which is 
not yet well represented in cinema (Garry, personal interview, 17 April 2014).2 
When I asked Garry to further clarify what he meant by ‘too on your face’, the 
filmmaker said that it referred to ‘heavily effeminate mannerism, cross-dressing and 
overly sexualised’ representations of homosexuality (ibid.). This statement indicates a 
justification for the filmmakers’ intention of the exclusion of effeminate gay men in the 
first film. Arguably after a series of criticisms, the second film presented a more 
2 A pseudonym. Garry is the only interviewee who requested pseudo-anonymity in this research. 
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welcoming attitude towards this unwanted gay gender identity, although it was 
subordinated to the masculinity of the ideal gay ‘new man’. 
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated the magnitude of subversion 
incorporated in the franchise Arisan!. These films through their idealisation of a gay 
strand of ‘new man’ masculinity undermine the heteronormative gender relations of 
emotion, which had originally paved the way for the ascendancy of bapakism 
masculinity in Indonesia. The films’ idealisation of gay ‘new man’ masculinity is part 
of the filmmakers’ struggle to reconfigure the relations among masculinities in 
Indonesia. The idealisation of the gay ‘new man’ renders the strongly heteronormative 
bapakism irrelevant and discriminating against other masculinities which accommodate 
non-heteronormative gender practices and sexualities. 
Behind the scenes of the Arisan! franchise: A low-key strategy of 
resistance 
This section reinforces the argument laid out in the previous section. Drawing from 
public statements and interviews with filmmakers, I examine the politics behind the 
production and distribution of images of the gay ‘new man’. I explore the tensions 
between off-screen and on-screen gender politics, as well as the unstable relations of 
hegemonic and marginalised masculinities. I also situate the screen politics within the 
discourse of larger public gender politics in Indonesia around the period when these 
films were produced and distributed in commercial cinema. 
I argue that the intensifying moral panic towards non-heteronormative genders 
and sexualities imposed significant constraints in the filmmakers’ struggle to promote a 
gay alternative ideal as a critique of hegemonic bapakism. The filmmakers behind the 
Arisan! franchise consequently had to make aesthetics, narrative and distribution 
compromises in order to be able to stage their public gender politics without attracting 
too much negative attention, let alone controversy. In terms of aesthetics and narrative, 
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the filmmakers made compromises in the title, setting and camera point of view 
specifically to create the sense that sexuality is a private matter, in order to evade both 
public and state censorships. In terms of distribution, compromises allowed the 
distribution to reach a limited number of film theatres in big cities across Java. 
Why were such compromises necessary? The answer lies in the political 
background against which the franchise was produced and circulated. The Arisan! 
franchise was produced against the background of escalating moral panic against non-
heteronormative genders and sexualities. In this case, ‘moral panic’ refers to sudden 
widespread and amplified anxiety, alarm or fear, often irrational, in response to a certain 
problem considered as threatening to the values, safety and interests of society in 
general (Cohen 2002: 1; Garland 2008: 10). The democratisation of the public sphere 
and the spirit of reform in the post-authoritarian era led to a euphoria of liberation as 
well as anxieties and uncertainties. The democratisation process partly triggered more 
confidence among subjects of non-heteronormative genders and sexualities and 
encouraged them to be present and open about their genders and sexualities in public; it 
also motivated more vocal public politics in defence of the rights of non-
heteronormative genders and sexualities (Khanis 2013). This process strongly 
undermined the hegemony of a strictly heteronormative masculinity, bapakism, and the 
legitimacy of the larger patriarchal gender patterning which supported 
heteronormativity as the only way of life. The struggle to reconfigure hegemonic 
masculinity around heteronormativity soon generated moral panic, resulting in pressure 
to police non-heteronormative genders and sexualities, be it through legal, ‘curative’, 
education, or in many cases violent ‘remedies’.3 Boellstorff (2004a) underscores the 
3 Since 2002, several local governments at the municipal/regency and provincial level, enabled partly by 
the decentralisation policy, legally criminalised non-heteronormative sexualities (see Ariyanto and 
Triawan 2008; Ichwan 2013; Muthmainnah,2016). For example, in Aceh, the punishment for committing 
homosexuality is up to 100 lashes, 1,000 grams of pure gold, or 100 months of imprisonment, based on 
the Qanun No. 7/2014 (Setyadi 2015). Yet, far prior to the implementation of this sharia bylaw, violence 
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emergence of the so called ‘political homophobia’ among Indonesian men who are 
involved in many hostile protests against public gender politics that support non-
heteronormative genders and sexualities; these men often declared that they were 
ashamed of these marginalised groups and could not accept their impending legitimacy. 
Based on the 2006 World Value Survey, more than 65 per cent of Indonesians indicated 
that they do not want to have homosexual neighbours (Hosen Faizah and Hosen 2006). 
In 2016, a survey conducted by the Wahid Foundation in collaboration with Lingkar 
Survey Indonesia (LSI) shows that non-heteronormative gender and sexuality subjects 
were top among groups disliked in Indonesia, even compared to ‘communists’ who had 
been discursively constructed as the common enemy of Indonesians since the 1965 
mass killing. This was reported in a Jakarta Post article entitled, ‘LGBT people have 
the right to live equally with others’ (2 August 2016). These surveys, despite their 
limitations, indicate increasingly negative sentiments among the general public in 
Indonesia. 
The escalated moral panic against non-heteronormative sexualities in 2000–
2014 emerged alongside increased public anxiety about and fear of a more assertive 
female sexuality. During the period, there was a series of heated debates on public 
expressions of female sexuality. These debates manifested more strongly in the arts and 
popular culture. Among the triggers were the rise of Inul Daratista with her ‘drill dance’ 
propelled into fame through her series of performances on national television since 
2003 (also see Chapter 3), the exhibition of Pink Swing Park, an art installation 
featuring nude photos of male and female models, in Jakarta’s Second CP Biennale 
2005, and the publication of the Indonesian version of Playboy magazine in 2006. These 
debates provided grounds for the legalisation of Law No 44/2008 on pornography. They 
against non-heteronormative individuals in Aceh had manifested more strongly, for instance in the widely 
documented case of the physical and psychological torture by state apparatus and the members of the 
general public against gay activist Hartoyo and his partner in 2005 (Ariyanto and Triawan 2008; Hartoyo 
2015). 
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also led to increasing state and public censorship on forms of art and entertainment as 
well as the persecution of artists deemed to be promoting more open female sexual 
expressions particularly in media and popular culture (Pausacker 2012, 2016). Yet, the 
level of violence involved in the moral panic around this ‘crisis’ was not as severe as 
the one triggered by the promotion of non-heteronormative genders and sexualities in 
the same period, in the sense that the latter led to many violent incidents victimising 
non-heteronormative subjects. 
The pressure to regulate non-heteronormative genders and sexualities also 
indicates the dialectical relation between the struggle to regulate non-heteronormative 
genders and sexualities and state power. State power has been used by and abused by 
interest groups. At the same time, the struggle has evidently bolstered the power of 
various individuals and interest groups in their contest for state power. Such was seen in 
the increasingly hostile statements made by many politicians and state ministers in 
condemning non-heteronormative genders and sexualities, and in the relative silence of 
the state in responding to the widespread moral panic. Furthermore, the decentralisation 
policy, implemented since 1999, partly enabled certain regions to legally regulate 
gender and sexualities through regional bylaws. Moreover, the political will to regulate, 
especially on the grounds of safeguarding the society’s moral values, is often deployed 
by regional leader candidates in regional elections during and after the period under 
study. 
This contrasts to the era under the New Order, in which President Soeharto 
appointed a gay minister. Although the late minister never publicly declared his 
sexuality, it was an open secret. Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla, also recalled this event in 
his public statement in response to the intensifying public debate and moral panic 
concerning non-heteronormative genders and sexualities (Tim Viva 2016). 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that all gay men had equal political rights with 
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heterosexual men under the New Order. I elaborated on the New Order’s attempt to 
offset the crisis tendency posed by non-heteronormative genders and sexualities in 
Chapter 2. Moreover, the strong state power wielded by Soeharto certainly contributed 
to securing and maintaining the political rights of selective non-heteronormative 
subjects, while discriminating against others. The appointment of a gay man to an 
important political position in the 1990s did not create substantial moral panic or lead to 
a lengthy and polarised public debate. It did not inspire the emergence of legal 
regulations policing homosexuality. These two facts show that the mechanism to offset 
the crisis tendency posed by non-heteronormative sexualities in the established 
patriarchal gender order was still functioning, unlike in the post-2000 era. Appointing a 
gay cabinet minister after the year 2000 would have been impossible without a harsh 
political battle, which might include violence. 
It was against this heightened moral panic that the Arisan! franchise and its gay 
‘new man’ alternative ideal were produced, circulated and consumed. The franchise was 
the filmmakers’ vehicle to foreground their public gender politics in support of non-
heteronormative Indonesians. Nia Dinata, a renowned feminist filmmaker was the 
director for the Arisan! franchise. Dinata herself has been consistent in supporting 
marginalised subjects through her creative works and activism. Arisan! is a politically 
loaded film projects. For Dinata and her colleagues, the intersections of gender, class 
and sexuality was central to their particular interests. Afi Shamara, Dinata’s co-producer 
in the first instalment of Arisan!, recollects: 
Nia (Dinata) and I tried to develop a story which was in trend in Jakarta. We also tried 
to bring up issues which were often kept closeted, such as husband-and-wife 
relationship issues or sexuality. For us, they are interesting because many people are 
bound by social norms; so the social taboos are often seen as big life problems by those 
facing them (2004: 12).  
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The necessity of bringing up issues on discrimination based on gender and sexuality in 
Arisan! and its sequel began as a personal concern, but the gravity of the issue was 
nationwide. Dinata mentions that the idea to incorporate gay characters came from her 
personal experience growing up with gay relatives and having gay friends. Dinata, in an 
interview with Tilman Baumgärtel, states: 
I just thought that these things need to be told through film. Why does this have to be a 
taboo? I do not really agree with that. I grew up in a family with a lot of gay uncles and 
a lesbian aunt, and it seemed to be fine (cited in Baumgärtel 2012: 207). 
Other principal filmmakers also shared the experience of either having gay 
relatives or friends or being gay themselves. Kalyana Shira Film, a film production 
company jointly managed by Dinata and Shamara, under which the Arisan! franchise 
was produced, employs individuals from these marginalised categories, and always 
supports films concerning gender issues (Ulung 2015). Dinata’s co–script writer for the 
first film in the franchise, Joko Anwar, in an interview with Suseno and Leila Chudori 
that was published in Majalah Tempo, ‘Saya dekat sekali dengan dunia gay’ (I am very 
close to the gay world), also claims: ‘I am very close to the gay world. So, if any of my 
films do not include this gay element, it means I have erased one thing which I see on a 
daily basis’ (8 May 2005). As this personal concern was reflected in larger identity 
politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia, Dinata soon felt the dissonance. 
I was and am concerned that our society is moving backwards … The first instalment of 
Arisan! was relatively well received … We were more open back then. But after the 
release of Berbagi Suami (2006), I often encountered backlash, including from the 
educated segment of society, which is surprising … I find it dangerous for Indonesia. 
Because, as a diverse nation, the country is supposed to be more tolerant about 
differences (Dinata, personal interview, 28 May 2014). 
Both Arisan! and Arisan! 2 were intended for mainstream commercial cinema 
despite the potentially controversial content. Scaling up the struggle to reconfigure 
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hegemonic masculinity around heteronormativity through commercial cinema was not 
an easy task for filmmakers during the gender-order crisis. I reiterate that commercial 
cinema is a political–economic institution which involves major financial investment, 
unlike any other form of popular culture. Consequently, the pressure of generating 
investment returns and profits is relatively stronger, and in many cases, it triumphs over 
idealism. Profit-driven producers generally avoid controversial subject matter; 
censorship is likely to succumb to the majority interests; distributors and exhibitors are 
often reluctant to take risks fearing hostile protests and financial losses (see Chapter 3). 
Therefore, independent film production and distribution are the strategies that 
filmmakers use for films that are intended to undermine the established patterning of 
gender relations (Hughes-Freeland 2011; Sen 2005). Teddy Soeriaatmadja’s more 
provocative take on a man who adopts non-heteronormative gender and sexuality 
through Lovely Man (2011), released in the same year as Arisan! 2, was independently 
produced and distributed through national and international film festivals and other 
alternative distribution channels (Irawan 2016). The Arisan! franchise was produced by 
a smaller scale production house, Kalyana Shira Films, run by Dinata and her business 
associate Shamara. Both were also executive producers of the franchise’s first film. 
Relatively a smaller-budget film, the funding to produce the Arisan! franchise was 
generated from personal funds and small investors who were in Dinata’s immediate 
network (Personal interview with Dinata, 28 May 2014). 
Furthermore, to be screened in commercial cinema theatres, films have to pass 
state censorship. Inability to pass censorship will result in films not being distributed in 
commercial film markets. The reputation of the Indonesian censorship board for being 
inconsistent and succumbing to the power of the dominant pressure groups is notorious. 
Thus, many commercial film producers and filmmakers tend to avoid sensitive subject 
matter so that they do not have to deal with the censorship board. The aforementioned 
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Kuldesak had to lose its important gay kiss scene set in a bus to the state’s censorship 
board. According to Katinka van Heeren, apparently such a depiction was still too 
revolutionary even amidst the growing spirit of liberation that emerged upon the demise 
of the authoritarian regime (2012: 54). Soeriaatmadja regretted his decision to distribute 
Lovely Man in commercial cinema theatres as it lost some important scenes during the 
censorship process. In an interview with Daniel Irawan of Kinescope Magazine, 
Soeriaatmadja explained: 
Lovely Man was never intended to be screened in commercial cinema theatres. Since the 
beginning, I was always insistent that my films must not be censored just for sake of 
screening. Before submitting Lovely Man to the censorship board, we did a trial 
censorship and it passed; yet, at the censorship board, the film was censored, and we did 
not get a satisfying answer as to why. However, we could no longer back down. So, 
during the theatrical release in Indonesia, there were some missing scenes in Lovely 
Man. Therefore, I then decided that Something in the Way and About a Woman would 
not be screened in commercial cinema theatres. So, not because they were more vulgar 
or not, but I didn’t want to lose the essence of the story (cited in Irawan 2016: n.p.). 
Arisan! took a different route by facing the censorship process and making 
compromises. I will discuss this later in the section. 
Moreover, around the production and release of the second instalment of the 
Arisan! franchise, there had been increasingly hostile protests against public gender 
politics that supported non-heteronormative genders and sexualities. I explained the 
heightened moral panic and its legal as well as social ramifications for the public gender 
politics earlier on. In cinema, there were several major protests against the screening of 
films about non-heteronormative genders and sexualities during the period from 2000 to 
2014. In 2010, the Indonesian Islamic Clerics Council (MUI) and the Islamic Defender 
Front (FPI), a vigilante group exploiting Islamic injunctions to justify their hostile 
attitudes and politics, protested against the ninth Q!Film Festival on the grounds that 
222 
Chapter 6. Reel Gay New Man and the Gender Relations of Emotion 
homosexuality is against religion and social norms (Child 2010; Gus/Ken 2010). In the 
following year, the screening of the aforementioned Lovely Man at the Q!Film Festival 
attracted another round of protests from FPI, resulting in the cancellation of the 
screening. However, hostile protests against films exploring such controversial themes 
were generally random, rather than systematic, and commonly targeted highly 
publicised films. The threat of hostile responses was enough to deter the censorship 
board from passing such films. It discouraged distribution channels from exhibiting the 
films and forced filmmakers to innovate in negotiating their political struggles, 
especially around the reconfiguration of hegemonic masculinity. 
Reflecting on its potentially controversial subject matter, the filmmakers behind 
the Arisan! franchise made aesthetic and narrative compromises to dodge state 
censorship, to ensure potential distribution channels, and most importantly to avoid too 
much negative attention and controversy around their introduction of non-
heteronormative masculinity. Aesthetically, they made compromises in the title and the 
depiction of gay intimacy to render sexuality a private matter. Distribution was limited 
to a number of film theatres in big cities across Java, instead of nationwide. These 
compromises indicate the filmmakers’ negotiations in their engagement with public 
gender politics at this particular moment in history. 
The first compromise was the choice of a more neutral, if not a more feminine, 
title. Titling has proven to be a tricky strategy in promoting a film. In Indonesia, there 
have been several cases in which a film’s title, more than its content, provoked 
controversies which eventually affected the sales and popularity of the films. Certain 
words may be deemed controversial or offensive at a certain moment in history. Under 
the New Order cinema, especially around the 1970s and 1980s, words associated with 
political Islam were likely to offend the state. In the film adaptation of Di Bawah 
Lindungan Ka’bah (Under the Protection of Ka’bah) in 1977, the censorship board 
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recommended a change of title due to the use of the word Ka’bah, which was also the 
symbol of the Islam-based political party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United 
Development Party) (Imanda 2012).4 In addition, words associated with communism 
have been considered highly offensive since 1965. The production of a film adaptation 
of Achdiat Kartamihardja’s novel Atheis in 1974, as explained in a Berita Yudha article, 
‘Syuman (Yang Kurang) Djaya dengan “Atheis” Nya’ (Syuman (who is not as) Djaya 
(Indonesian for Glorious) with his ‘Atheis’, almost did not get permission for 
production from the censorship board due to the title and content (04 May 1974). The 
filmmakers arguably wanted to evoke the nation’s dark history of the mass killing of 
communist party members and sympathisers in the 1960s. The film also stirred 
controversy among religious leaders, especially Muslims, who objected to the way it 
representated Islam (Said 1991: 239). The film was then retitled Kafir (The 
Unbelievers, 1974, Sjumandjaja). Amidst the intensifying Islamisation in twenty-first-
century Indonesia, Buruan Cium Gue! (Kiss me quick!, Findo Purwono, 2004) was 
heavily protested against because the title was thought to be too provocative. Islamic 
clerics called for a banning of the film, despite it passing censorship. The clerics 
suggested, despite not watching the film, that the title would likely encourage unlawful 
sexual relations. The film did not make it into the cinema before the title was changed to 
Satu Kecupan (a Kiss) and re-censored. Thus, the choice of a non-provocative title was 
important. 
The Arisan! franchise uses the customary practice of arisan among Jakarta 
urbanites as the setting where Jakarta elites, including the film characters, socialise. 
Indeed, while arisan may not be exclusively associated with women, it is particularly 
common among them (Papanek and Schwede 1988: WS81). Certainly, arisan as a 
4 The film was retitled Para Perintis Kemerdekaan (Pioneers of Indonesian Independence, 1977, Asrul 
Sani). 
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social practice has evolved from a mere economic association into a symbolic 
institution whose main purpose is to strengthen the solidarity of its members (Hudalah, 
Firman and Woltjer 2014: 2228). Among the elites, this type of gathering usually takes 
place at a fancy public venue, such as a restaurant or mall (Roesma and Mulya 2013: 
12). The term arisan, thus, while stereotypically gendered, does not in any way indicate 
any relation to homosexuality. Not only did the title not attract negative attention from 
radical Islamists, but it also helped the filmmakers in their negotiations with the 
censorship board, such as indicated through the following quote. 
So, my film was stuck there for a very long time. In such a case the chair has to make 
the final decision. After she watched Arisan! she called me to her office, and we had a 
long talk. She said: ‘I am new, and I am willing to take the risk.’ So, they censored a 
little bit. She even told me: ‘I am glad that the title is Arisan!’, because this type of 
meeting is very important in Indonesia … Everybody is doing it, even myself, in the 
office, with the neighbours, with the family. She felt it was safe, because with such a 
title, it would not attract the interest of the Islamist groups and the fanatics (cited in 
Bäumgartel 2012: 208). 
The film eventually passed censorship and was distributed in limited commercial 
cinema theatres, with its original title. 
In addition to the choice of a non-provocative title, the films also render men’s 
homosexuality as a private matter, instead of a public issue demanding recognition or 
legitimacy. Maimunah Munir has provided useful insights into this particular strategy 
that was used in the first instalment of the franchise. In her view, the confinement of 
homosexual intimacy and coming-out to the private sphere is a strategy deployed by the 
filmmakers in order to evade censorship (2011: 118). Apparently, the same strategy is 
maintained in the second instalment.  
The coming-out narrative, in the first film, is confined to a limited circle of 
family members and close friends. Moreover, the process of coming-out does not 
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involve individuals or organisations which represent political interests involved in 
advancing the rights and legitimating the status and position of non-heteronormative 
genders and sexualities. The coming-out story is kept to the confines of the private 
sphere: in the psychiatrist’s consultation room; at home; among family and close 
friends. In such a way, a man’s sexuality is represented as his private matter. Outside 
the family and the friendship circle, there is no pressure on the larger society or the state 
to recognise and legitimate these marginalised subjects. Adi Budiman, a journalist at 
Tempo, reported that Jusuf Kalla, the vice-president of Indonesia 2014–2019, is also a 
proponent of this private homosexuality strategy (cited in Budiman, 15 February 2016) 
Homophobic discourses that were circulating amidst the heightened moral panic in 
twenty-first-century gender politics in Indonesia included: homosexuality is contagious; 
and homosexual subjects are on the hunt to convert heterosexual individuals to 
homosexuality. 
Furthermore, in the Arisan! films, depictions of homosexual intimacy are 
aesthetically confined to private settings. None of the intimate scenes between the gay 
couples in either films takes place in the public sphere—a space in which heterosexual 
couples have relatively more freedom to express their emotions. The much-talked about 
gay kiss scenes in the first instalment of Arisan! take place in private home settings and 
are never intended to be displayed to a third party. The scenes are not intended to 
showcase the exploration of sexuality and, correspondingly, were very short (one-
second), long distance and off-focus shots. I second Murtagh who argues that such 
fleeting gay kiss scenes were intentionally crafted to evade censorship—censorship that 
is not tolerant towards sexually explicit scenes (2013: 116–17). Not only are the two 
scenes far from being provocative, but they also downplay the homosexual passion of 
the gay men involved. In the second instalment, there is a scene vaguely suggestive of 
sexual intercourse between one of the gay couples. The implied sex scene is not 
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included in the version that was distributed to theatres, but it was included as a gimmick 
in the DVD version. As such, this strategy implies that such a scene is inappropriate for 
release in a more public setting like a cinema theatre but is more acceptable for private 
consumption. In an article published in Kapan Lagi, ‘Nia Dinata siapkan banyak bonus 
dalam DVD “ARISAN 2”’ (Nia Dinata has prepared a lot of bonuses for ‘ARISAN 2’ 
DVD), Dinata explains: 
There are a lot of bonuses in the DVD … There is a scene involving Tora and Pong 
Harjatmo which we did not include in the movie. It was a bedroom scene, which we 
initially thought would be cut. But we felt bad disposing of it (14 June 2012).5 
Another form of compromise being made by the filmmakers behind the Arisan! 
franchise concerns the film’s distribution. Intended as a film to be distributed in the 
commercial film market in Indonesia, the filmmakers had to convince the biggest film 
exhibition company, Cinema 21. Mainly, the filmmakers had to convince them that the 
film would generate profit despite the sensitive subject matter provided that the 
screening was done strategically. This meant picking certain cinema locations where the 
subject matter would be appealing and attractive to audiences. Cinema 21, was 
extremely dominant from the late 1980s to 2006. Consequently, the decision makers in 
this company had a powerful influence in deciding which films could be screened in 
their cinemas and in Indonesia in general. The dominance of Cinema 21 continues, 
albeit with a slight decline of monopoly due to the increasing number of competitors.6 
In an interview with Baumgärtel, Dinata explained: 
Yes, we have learned how to deal with them (the 21 Cinema). I insisted on making a cut 
of my first film just for the owner of the Group21 [sic], because he controls everything 
… when he saw my film Arisan!, which is about gays and lesbians, he said, ‘You are 
5 Tora refers to Tora Sudiro who plays Sakti; Pong refers to Pong Harjatmo who plays Geri. 
6 Cinema 21 operated 76 per cent of the 1,088 cinema screens in Indonesia in 2016 (Katadata 2016). 
Moreover, the cinema theatres operated by Cinema 21 also spread wider in the archipelago, compared to 
its competitors, such as Blitz Megaplex. 
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crazy! Nobody will watch this film! You just make eight prints!’ And I said: ‘No, no, 
no, I want more prints, because I know the areas where there are gay communities.’ 
After a week he e-mailed me and ordered more prints! (2012: 206).7 
Implied in this statement is a calculated strategy of filmmaking and marketing. 
Dinata was certain of the segment of audience she wished to target—the urban middle-
class gay individuals and communities as well as their sympathisers. This is the primary 
segment that she imagined would have the disposable income and would be willing to 
spare a fraction of it for cinema-going. Moreover, in Indonesia, cinema-going is closely 
associated with a middle-class lifestyle, especially in the malls. Most of the cinema 
theatres are located within these shopping centres and hangout precincts. For gay men 
generally, malls have become ‘quasi civic spaces’ in contemporary Indonesia because of 
the private ownership of the businesses and their orientation towards the economically 
affluent class of society (Boellstorff 2005b: 134). Thus, malls have become less 
publicly diverse compared to parks or town squares, which are open to almost any 
segment of society. Affluent gay men who visit malls tend to be inconspicuous in their 
gender performativity and sexual expression. As Boellstorff reminded us, effeminacy, 
let alone cross-dressing are seen rarely in malls (2005b: 134). Thus, the filmmakers 
offered representations which were able to appeal to discreet non-effeminate gay men 
whose masculinity can also be idealised. Although this kind of representational politics 
and business calculations do not always work in Indonesian cinema because Indonesian 
film viewers are at best very unpredictable, it did well for the franchise. Arisan! and 
Arisan! 2 were screened in theatres in Java and Bali. Her prediction that the film would 
do well in fact came true, as mentioned by Dinata,  
It did well only in big cities, in Jakarta and in Bandung and in Surabaya. When I did a 
live radio interview to promote the film for a smaller city in Sumatra, the local people 
7 The lesbian character is featured in Arisan! 2. 
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were really angry at me, because they thought that film was promoting sacrilegious 
things (cited in Bäumgartel 2012: 207–208) . 
Both Arisan! and its sequel were warmly welcomed at the theatres as well as by 
critics and commentators. In the small but competitive market of commercial films in 
Indonesia in the early 2000s, Arisan! had attracted more than 100,000 moviegoers into 
its third week of screening in Jakarta alone (Soetjipto 2004). Although the number was 
unable to beat the sales of Ada Apa dengan Cinta? (2002) which attracted more than 
two million viewers during its theatrical release, the sales of Arisan! were still good 
considering the potentially controversial content. When the first instalment hit 
Indonesian theatres, many critics and commentators were surprised by the gay kiss 
scenes in the movie. However, there was no substantial negative attention received by 
the films and the filmmakers despite the heightened Islamisation and the escalated 
moral panic against LGBTIQ. Rachel Harvey (2004), writing on the first instalment for 
the BBC, states that the film was well received in Jakarta and the gay kissing scenes 
were subjects of discussion among audiences after screenings. Lely Djuhari (2004), 
writing for the Associated Press, offers an even more hopeful comment saying that the 
release of Arisan! in 2003 was an indication that Indonesia’s art scene was gradually 
liberated from the New Order’s authoritarian grip. The first film even received five 
Citra Awards out of twelve nominations at the 2004 Indonesian Film Festival (Hens 
2015). The second film, while not awarded any prizes at the Indonesian Film Festival, 
did relatively well in cinemas. In the absence of viewer statistics for the second film, I 
asked Dinata about it during my interview with her. She said that the second instalment 
was only mildly successful with fewer than five hundred thousand screening tickets 
being sold at that time (Personal interview, 28 May 2014). A film critic for Flick Review 
magazine, Amir Syarif Siregar (2011), applauds the film for daring to continue to 
explore the lives of gay men in Indonesia. In other words, the strategy deployed by the 
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filmmakers to evade state and public censorship as well as to secure a distribution 
channel was relatively successful. 
To conclude, as I have indicated earlier, the compromises made by the 
filmmakers behind the progressive Arisan! franchise were inevitable. It was only 
possible to stage such subversive political struggles on screen, with compromises being 
made on several aspects of the films. The Arisan! franchise has shown that the 
compromises have enabled them to reach a wider audience—especially those people 
who are less likely to access arthouse film theatres, cinema, or other alternative 
distribution channels. Yet, these compromises imply that filmmakers are limited in 
offering representations of an alternative ideal masculinity. Recognising the growing 
anxiety towards non-heteronormative individuals and causes, the filmmakers must 
compromise their vocal political statements in order to get around state censorship and 
prevent negative controversy which might potentially lead to the cancellation of their 
political film projects or their distribution. 
Beyond the dazzling scenes of Arisan!’s gay ‘new man’: Middle-class 
biases 
While the filmmakers’ struggles to promote gay masculinity as a legitimate alternative 
ideal are subversive in many ways, we cannot help but notice that the representation of 
the new ideal is biased towards middle-class gay men. The filmmakers tend to rely on 
showcasing wealth, consumption and affluent lifestyles to justify their idealisation of 
gay masculinity on screen. As they do so, they overlook the everyday struggles of 
lower-class gay men who continue to receive discriminating treatment not only because 
of their non-heteronormative gender and sexuality, but also because of their social class. 
This is true especially amidst the heightened moral panic that typified post–New Order 
politics. 
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Through the franchise, the filmmakers cast their struggle to legitimise a gay 
masculinity in affluent middle-class gay male protagonists. Sakti and Nino, the gay 
‘new man’ protagonists, are economically well off. They have secure white-collar jobs. 
Sakti is as a successful self-employed architect. He and his best friend, Meimei, co-own 
a construction firm. His firm’s clients are elite Jakarta urbanites.8 In the second film, 
Sakti and his firm are profiled in a glossy magazine which especially focuses on the 
lifestyle of Jakarta elites. As for Nino, he is a successful film director. He has a small 
but thriving film company, which produces films and advertisements. In the first film, it 
is already clear that Nino is an established name in cinema and advertising. He plans to 
contract Sakti to renovate his office. In the second film, Nino’s company is being 
considered by a major political party to produce a campaign film. As owners of thriving 
business, Sakti and Nino do not have to worry about their job security. 
Sakti’s business acumen is his ultimate ticket to a successful coming-out. The 
Arisan! franchise implies that the coming out process for non-heteronormative men will 
be a less daunting process when they have achieved a certain level of success in their 
respective public-sphere careers. Maimunah Munir criticises the first instalment of the 
franchise for suggesting that personal career achievement is a prerequisite for gay men’s 
survival in Indonesian society (2011: 122). In a serious conversation on coming out, 
Nino tries to influence Sakti that he should not be afraid of being open about his 
sexuality to his family and friends because he has a lot of achievements to be proud of. 
The achievement implicitly refers to his established career as an architect. In Nino’s 
imagining and experience, society is meritocratic, although not necessarily so off-
screen. Boellstorff (2004c) shows that such an emphasis on career-based self-
accomplishment to justify gay men’s belonging to family, society and the nation was 
8 In the second film, through the praises sung by a super-rich Jakarta socialite character, Sakti is an 
established architect to whom Jakarta elite circles have been trusting with their home renovations. The 
character says that she has been finding it difficult to secure an appointment with Sakti to discuss her 
house renovation plans. 
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prevalent in gay magazines published in 1990s and early 2000s.9 On screen, the same 
imagining is granted in the acceptance of Sakti’s sexuality by his family, friends and 
clients due to his career achievements. In the second instalment, the film shows that 
Sakti continues to enjoy career development, as shown in his being profiled in a glossy 
magazine as one of the best architects in town and Jakarta’s major socialites have to 
book way in advance for his service despite his sexual identity. 
With their jobs and income, these gay ‘new man’ protagonists are able to 
maintain an affluent lifestyle which protects them from potential harassment due to their 
homosexuality. For instance, they can afford to live in private homes in elite 
neighbourhoods which offer them privacy and security. Sakti lives in a large private 
home in an elite gated neighbourhood in Jakarta. It is of modern design and has a well-
maintained garden, in which Sakti hosts the arisan gathering. As for Nino, he converted 
the second floor of his office into a living space. Commenting on the affluent setting of 
the first instalment, Chris Berry states that the film is set in what could be Beverly Hills 
(2005: 304). The gay characters’ homosexual intimacy is contained within these private 
spaces. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the much-talked-about kissing scene 
between Nino and Sakti takes place in the comfortable and secure private space of 
Nino’s house, which keeps any onlookers at bay.10 Sakti’s intimate scene with his 
second lover, Geri, also takes place in his private and secure home setting. Furthermore, 
the gay protagonists navigate the geographical spaces of Jakarta in private cars with 
dark windows, instead of public transport. According to Murtagh, the cars which ferry 
them from one luxurious place to another keep the unpleasant reality of becoming gay at 
9 Boellstorff offers evidence that a Yogyakarta-based gay magazine in one of its 1997 editions mused that 
the idea of prestasi, or personal achievement, would be ‘a fortress strong enough to repel those minor 
tones’ (of social disapproval) (2004c: 391). 
10 In fact, the only public display of affection takes place in a tourist island in West Nusa Tenggara, which 
is frequented by both domestic and international tourists. The gesture is not even a kiss. Sakti and Nino 
hold each other’s hands and then embrace each other briefly. 
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bay (2012: 9). In short, these gay protagonists can afford to secure their privacy which 
protects them from forced eviction, public protests by angry mobs or violent public and 
state-based persecution. 
Ultimately, the gay protagonists’ wealth, consumption and lifestyle justify the 
idealisation of their ‘new man’ masculinity. To be good friends who are sensitive to 
their best friends’ feelings and emotional wellbeing, the gay ‘new man’ protagonists can 
negotiate their working schedules and afford luxury vacations. When Meimei is facing a 
problem with her marriage, Sakti and Nino are almost always there to console her, 
including during working hours and on weekdays. Sakti takes Meimei to the arisan 
gathering and finally joins it himself on a working day. Furthermore, in showing their 
attention to the terminally ill Meimei, Sakti and Nino are able to afford to go on 
vacation to a faraway island at short notice. These are privileges which may not be 
enjoyed by lower-class gay men. Sakti and Nino have these liberties because they are 
business owners, instead of general employees. With his income, Sakti is able to 
participate in the arisan. He is initially reluctant to join the rotating saving group as it is 
stereotypically associated with women and femininity. However, he does so to offer 
emotional support to his best friend. At the arisan, each member should contribute 
USD100 every month, an amount higher than the year’s minimum wage in Jakarta.11 
Sakti’s membership in the arisan gathering justifies the idealisation of his gay ‘new 
man’ masculinity. Meimei sees Sakti’s membership as a sign of his emotional nurturing 
of her. Not only is his emotional empathy with his female friends positively portrayed, 
but Sakti’s emotional sensitivity to his lovers is also shown. He is able to use his 
affluent artistic sense to pick out a painting which would appeal to his married lover’s 
rich wife. 
11 Based on data provided by the National Statistics Bureau (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2016), Jakarta’s 
minimum wage in 2003 was IDR 631,600/month. The amount was equal to roughly USD 75/month at 
that time with the exchange rate USD 1 = IDR 8,400. 
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In terms of Sakti’s ‘new man’ fatherhood, his affluence provides safety and 
protection for the single mother Lita and her son, Talu. Generally, in Indonesia, 
unplanned pregnancy outside marriage is undesirable. As stated by Linda Bennett, 
women in such a condition tend to face  
personal and familial shame, compromised marriage prospects, abandonment by their 
partners, single motherhood, a stigmatised child, early cessation of education, and an 
interrupted income and career (2001: 37). 
As for the children born outside of marriage, according to Habib Asnawi, they 
are likely to be socially stigmatised as anak haram—children resulting from a sinful 
sexual relationship, which may impose a psychological burden onto them (2013: 241). 
Sakti is a buffer for Lita and Talu against these negative possibilities. Instead of sending 
her back to her own family in Medan, he provides Lita and her son with a safe shelter at 
his luxurious house in a gated neighbourhood. According to Harald Leisch, residents in 
gated neighbourhoods mostly do not know and have no contact with each other (2002: 
347). Thus, Sakti can protect Lita and her son’s privacy by taking them into his house. 
Furthermore, he supports Lita as she completes her higher education and establishes her 
career as a lawyer. He also fills in as a father to the boy, so-much-so that the boy no 
longer longs for his biological father. He makes regular video calls to express his love 
when the boy is away. Assuming that the film is set in 2010 Indonesia, video calls were 
not yet as ubiquitous a mode of communication as they are in 2019. Indeed, video calls 
were a luxury during that period. Not to mention, Sakti can also ferry the boy around in 
his fancy SUV. In short, his ‘new man’ fatherhood is idealised through the showcase of 
wealth and consumption. 
The filmmakers’ struggle to undermine hegemonic masculinity and promote the 
gay ‘new man’ as an alternative ideal is staged in two films which exclude 
representations of lower-class gay men. Berry argues that the first film in the franchise 
is part of what he terms as ‘the wedding banquet effect’—the tendency in Asian films to 
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visually depict gay men as characters with affluent economic backgrounds (2004: 
306).12 Like Munir (2011) and Murtagh (2012, 2013), I agree with Berry’s assertion that 
the film lacks representations of poor gay men, working-class same sex culture, and 
local waria culture.13 The absences unfortunately remain true in the second instalment. 
Thus, it is no surprise that Arisan! was received in less welcoming manner by lower-
class gay men participating in the audience research conducted by Murtagh (2011) than 
its predecessor, Istana Kecantikan, although the latter provides a tragic end for its gay 
protagonist.14 
Responding to such criticism of her film, Dinata defended her decision to 
represent ideal gay men as a middle-class professional reflection of reality. With the 
same logic as that used by writers in several gay magazines studied in Boellstorff’s 
research (2004c), discussed above, Dinata, in an interview with Maimunah Munir, 
claims that gay men who are financially affluent would have more chance of being 
accepted in a heteronormative society, like Indonesia: ‘If you have enough money, a 
good career and are socially independent, being gay is easier’ (cited in M. Munir 2011: 
120). Dinata’s viewpoint is reflected in Nino’s imagining of Indonesia as a meritocratic 
12 After the success of Ang Lee’s The Wedding Banquet (1993), many Asian films are trapped in building 
the stereotype of gay men as members of the upper middle class (Berry 2005: 306). In the film, the 
Chinese American gay male protagonist is a successful entrepreneur who owns a property business in 
Manhattan. I should extend this argument of The Wedding Banquet effect to also criticise the absence of 
gay men. William Leung (2008) in commenting on the absence of cross-dressing as well as camp gay 
men in Lee’s The Wedding Banquet says that the absence makes the film often overlooked as if it is 
straight despite its revolutionarily queer content. Like The Wedding Banquet, the Arisan! franchise bears 
no representations of cross-dressing men, who are more visible in Indonesian public spaces, compared to 
straight-looking gay men; and the first film tends to subordinate camp gay men to the more straight 
looking ones, including Nino and Sakti. 
13 I maintain my use of the term waria to refer to Indonesian male-to-female cross dressers due to their 
unique subjectivity. I agree with Boellstorff (2004b) and Nurul Idrus and Takeo Hyman (2014) that waria 
is not easily translated as transgender, in the Western sense of the term, particularly because their goal in 
adopting feminine mannerisms and dress codes is not to pass as women, but to look like waria. Even 
based on his research, Boellstorff demonstrates that most waria do not desire sex-change surgery because 
they do not consider themselves to be women. 
14 As demonstrated by Murtagh (2011), the lower-class gay men and waria were more likely to have 
ignored the ending of Istana Kecantikan and focused more on the discrimination and the pressure needed 
to establish a heterosexual family, as experienced by the gay protagonist. These gay men and waria could 
relate to the familial and societal pressure in the film, while they felt that the representations offered in 
Arisan!, despite being more positive, were foreign. 
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society which cares more about one’s contribution to the family, society and the nation 
when it comes to social acceptance. This statement even more strongly substantiates my 
claim that the filmmakers are trapped in middle-class myopia by excluding lower-class 
gay men.  
The idealisation of a gay masculinity at the cost of lower-class gay men risks 
sustaining discrimination against them. Boellstorff claims that most Indonesian gay men 
are of the lower class, and they are likely to learn the concept of ‘becoming gay’ either 
from friends or the mass media, instead of from travelling abroad or meeting gay 
westerners (2005a: 577). The exclusion of gay lower-class men from films, that were 
created to politically support gay men, can imply that only a certain type of gay man can 
be socially accepted. As the strategy of exclusion is sustained in the second instalment 
of Arisan!, Murtagh’s phrase on the ‘queer unwanted’(2012, 2013) is confirmed. M. 
Munir (2011) also suggests that lower-class gay men are included in the unwanted 
category. Gay men who are economically affluent and socially independent provide the 
model, because their masculinity can be legitimated as an alternative ideal. Thus, gay 
men off-screen must aspire towards becoming like Sakti or Nino, in order to be socially 
recognised and accepted. 
The profile of lower-class gay men certainly is not like that of Sakti and Nino. 
Lower class gay men, based on a survey conducted by Indana Laazulva, Agus 
Herwindo Muatip and Pariawan Ghazali) for Arus Pelangi, a not-for-profit organisation 
supporting the Indonesian LGBTIQ community, are mostly employees earning between 
IDR1,000,000 to 3,000,000 each month, or roughly USD 87–261 (2013: 33–34). 
Consequently, they are less likely to be able to afford the services of a psychiatrist who 
will help them manage their mental wellbeing or pay USD 100/month as an arisan 
contribution—as Sakti does. Furthermore, they are less likely to be able to negotiate 
their working arrangements and have disposable income to spare for a holiday on a 
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private island in order to be with a terminally ill friend—as Nino and Sakti do for 
Meimei. In fact, lower class gay men with relatively insecure jobs, especially those who 
are effeminate, have to stay closeted at their workplace so that they will not be 
discriminated against by their employers and colleagues. According to Dede Oetomo et 
al., in their report for USAID and UNDP, state that although Indonesian Labour Law 
No. 13/2003 clearly rules out discrimination at the workplace, discrimination against 
gay men and other non-heteronormative individuals is still rampant (2012: 34–35). 
Although, in many cases, those who unfairly dismiss or reject openly gay employees do 
not cite gender or sexuality as the main reasons (Oetomo et al. 2012: 35). 
Moreover, many working-class gay men cannot enjoy the privilege of owning a 
secure private dwelling place. As indicated by Boellstorff (1999), many gay men who 
were his research participants in the 1990s lived in rented share houses in lower-class 
neighbourhoods. In their random sampling survey in Jakarta, Makassar and Yogyakarta 
in 2011, Indana Laazulva, Agus Herwindo Muatip and Pariawan Ghazali also shows 
that most Indonesian gay men lived in rented rooms or houses, unlike Sakti and Nino 
(2013: 36–37). By living in rented accommodation, these gay men are prone to forced 
eviction at any time if their landlords do not like them.15 I mentioned the persecution of 
Hartoyo, a gay activist, in Aceh, in Chapter 2. Hartoyo and his male lover were 
violently persecuted by an angry mob who claimed to have been offended by their 
homosexual intimacy, despite it taking place in a private rented house. Certainly, 
Hartoyo and other lower-class gay men, such as those who took part in Boellstorff’s 
research, did not have the same security and privacy afforded to affluent middle-class 
gay men, such as Sakti and Nino. As Berry (2005) commented, none of the gay 
15 In one of the fieldwork vignettes presented by Boellstorff several gay men who lived in a share house 
were evicted because the landlady did not like their behaviour (1999: 483). 
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characters in Arisan! ends up being violently bashed by an angry mob who are offended 
by their homosexual relations and displays of affection. 
In this section I have demonstrated the middle-class biases exhibited by the 
filmmakers as they struggled to undermine the gender relations of emotion that bolster 
hegemonic masculinity. I do not wish to discount the progressiveness of the 
representation of the ideal that they did promote through the franchise. Nevertheless, it 
is important for me to highlight the exclusions implied in such screen politics. In short, 
by not extending their struggle to incorporate the experiences of lower-class gay men, 
the filmmakers have risked sustaining the exclusion of this particular category of gay 
men from social acceptance and belonging. The filmmakers did not extend their 
struggle to contest the rampant discrimination experienced by less affluent gay men in 
Indonesia. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown the complex processes and the biases involved in 
Indonesian progressive filmmakers’ struggles to subvert the fundamental hegemonic 
base of bapakism—heteronormativity. I have shown that on one hand, the filmmakers’ 
struggles can be seen as progressive despite the compromises they had to make. On the 
other, we cannot help but notice the exclusion of a certain segment of Indonesian gay 
men in the films intended to challenge the rampant discrimination against them. The 
compromises and exclusion in turn lead me to question the limited representations of 
alternative ideal masculinities on the silver screen in Indonesia during the period of the 
gender-order crisis. 
In the first part of this chapter I demonstrated that in terms of cinematic 
representations of the gay ‘new man’, the franchise did offer an alternative ideal which 
subverted the most fundamental base of bapakism’s hegemony—heteronormativity. 
Promoting a gay masculinity as a legitimate alternative ideal to the heteronormative 
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bapakism through Arisan! and Arisan! 2, the progressive filmmakers escalated the 
struggle to support non-heteronormative subjects in Indonesia. Celebrating gay 
masculinity as a legitimate alternative ideal on screen was a political move which had 
previously been unthinkable. Other films before them and their contemporaries might 
have reflected sympathy towards the marginalised subjects, but they did not extend their 
support to depicting gay masculinities as legitimate alternative ideals, let alone as ‘the 
queer eyes for straight guys’ ideal. This is what the franchise did by presenting the gay 
‘new man’. Moreover, considering that this progressive move took place during the 
time of an intensified moral panic against heteronormative subjects in Indonesia, this 
progressive political move through cinema was particularly daring. 
However, the fact that the filmmakers were forced to compromise several 
aspects of their representations during the production and distribution of the film makes 
it clear that anxiety was heightened and always lurking behind any experimentation of 
alternative ideals on the silver screen, and popular culture in general. The political 
movement to offer an alternative ideal through cinematic representation in commercial 
cinema, as in the case of the Arisan! franchise, proves to be equally as fierce as the 
public politics pursued in other political arenas. It is important to recognise the 
importance of the experimentation with alternative masculinities that the filmmakers 
planned to introduce in their films at a time of heightened moral panic and rampant 
discrimination against non-heteronormative subjects. The filmmakers were left with few 
options in terms of aesthetics, narrative and distribution. I have shown that eventually, 
the filmmakers were able to work around the state censorship and eliminate the 
potential of public censorship generally by representing gayness as the private matter of 
the individual. 
Unfortunately, as happened in the filmmakers’ struggles to undermine 
hegemonic bapakism in terms of the gender relations of production (see Chapter 4), the 
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progressive struggle waged by the filmmakers behind the Arisan! franchise also shows a 
tendency towards privileging middle-class professionals at the exclusion of lower-class 
men. The filmmakers cast their subversion in affluent middle-class gay male 
protagonists. The filmmakers also justified the legitimacy of the gay ‘new man’ as an 
alternative ideal through wealth, consumption and lifestyle. They did so to demonstrate 
that gay men are an important and inseparable part of the Indonesian community and 
that their masculinity matters. Yet, in doing so, they kept both films sterile by 
neglecting to include representations of lower-class gay men. They did not extend their 
struggle to provide a class-inclusive alternative ideal. As a result, they risked sustaining 
the marginalisation of lower-class gay men. 
This chapter has supported my thesis argument by showing that new hope for 
more inclusive representations of ideal masculinity bloomed in Indonesian cinema 
during the 2000–2014 period. Yet, it also emphasises that public anxiety and moral 
panic overshadowed the innovation and experimentation of alternative ideal 
masculinities. These new masculinities were projected to replace bapakism and better 
equip Indonesian men to navigate the changing landscape of gender relations in the 
twenty-first century. This chapter has shown that it was possible to provide subversive 
challenges to the established official cultural ideal of masculinity and the overall 
patterning of gender relations of emotion in the public political arena. Yet, this chapter 
has also demonstrated that there were difficult negotiations and compromises that had to 
be made in order to so. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the struggle of progressive Indonesian filmmakers to 
undermine the hegemonic ideal, bapakism, through commercial cinema during 2000–
2014, a period marked by a gender-order crisis. Cinema was, and still is, one of the 
most crucial arenas in popular culture, in which political agents, primarily filmmakers, 
have sought to legitimise alternative ideals or to reinforce the hegemony of the 
culturally most exalted form of masculinity. The ‘new man’, that challenges bapakism’s 
valorisation of breadwinning, authoritative patron leadership and heteronormativity, 
emerged as one of the strongest alternative ideal masculinities on the silver screen. I 
decided to use it as a magnifying lens, in order to understand the filmmakers’ choices, 
negotiations and compromises in shaping what could and could not be represented, and 
what could and could not be idealised in commercial cinema at this given period in 
time. Combining textual analysis, field research and interface ethnography, I maintain 
that new hope emerged in terms of the representation of alternative models of ideal 
masculinity in commercial cinema. Filmmakers struggled to innovate and experiment 
with alternative ideals which promoted equal and fluid gender relations on the big 
screen. Yet, at the same time, I also highlight that the filmmakers’ struggle was marred 
by moral panic and middle-class preconceptions. Clearly shown in my discussion, the 
representations of alternative ideals promoted by the filmmakers in their commercial 
films were in the interest of the Indonesian middle-classes. 
This chapter concludes my thesis. Here, I first provide a summary of the key 
points and establish linkages to the central argument of my thesis. I follow up the 
summary with a reinforcement of my contribution to the existing literature on 
Indonesian gender politics. In the final part, by taking cues from my research, I offer 
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suggestions on the direction of future research on the politics required to secure 
hegemonic masculinity through Indonesian cinema. 
Summary 
To sum up, my thesis consists of four parts: introduction, discussion on the socio-
political background and its ramifications for the structure of Indonesian cinema, 
discussion of the filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the hegemonic ideal around the 
three structures of gender relations (production, power and emotion), and a conclusion. I 
will follow up the summary in this section with a reflection on my contribution to the 
scholarly discussion of Indonesian gender politics. 
In Chapter 1, I explained my theoretical and analytical frameworks, situated my 
research among the existing scholarly works on Indonesian gender politics and also 
elaborated my research methods. In this summary section, I highlight my framework. In 
Chapter 1, I explained that I drew my theoretical and analytical frameworks from R.W. 
Connell’s work on hegemonic masculinity and the three structures of gender relations 
respectively. Connell’s theorisation of hegemonic masculinity has helped situate the 
filmmakers’ struggles to secure a new hegemonic masculinity within the broader field 
of gender politics taking place in Indonesia. Although Connell’s theory does not directly 
deal with cinema, it helped me shed light on the competing interests and power plays 
which shaped what could and could not be idealised at a particular moment of history. 
Ultimately, the struggle to alter Indonesia’s hegemonic masculinity is to be won, and 
the contestation for hegemonic masculinity is the crux for gender politics. Cinema is 
one of the crucial arenas in which a certain masculinity can be legitimised as the 
culturally most exalted one. The processes involved in the production, circulation and 
consumption of cinematic images of ideal masculinities are imbued with politics. As 
shown in the filmmakers’ struggles to legitimise variants of the ‘new man’ as an 
alternative ideal through commercial cinema, they tapped into contemporary gender 
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politics as they innovated and experimented with alternative ideals that represented 
critiques of the existing hegemonic masculinity. It is the processes by which the 
filmmakers negotiated with contemporary gender politics—both within and outside 
cinema—in order to offer an alternative ideal masculinity that interested me. I was also 
concerned with the products: the films as texts, which became my main interests in this 
research. I mapped my discussion on the filmmakers’ political struggle using R. W. 
Connell’s three structural framework to explain in more detail how they engaged with 
each of the structures of gender relations (production, power and emotion) which 
facilitated the ascendancy and sustained the hegemony of bapakism as culturally the 
most exalted ideal. Ultimately, as suggested by R.W. Connell, gender politics follow the 
broad outlines of social divisions and interests defined in the relations of production, 
power and emotion (2009: 138). 
Chapter 2 mapped the socio-political and economic backgrounds against which 
the filmmakers waged their political struggles to offer different forms of hegemonic 
masculinity through commercial cinema. Deploying R.W. Connell’s three structure 
framework, I traced the development of the crisis tendencies born within the structures 
of gender relations of production, power and emotion during 2000–2014. Despite 
advancing at different stages, the crisis tendencies within the three structures erupted 
into an actual gender-order crisis during the period. I demonstrated that profound 
changes in the economy and politics at the turn of the second millennium sped up the 
maturation of the crisis tendencies within the three structures. It was during this period, 
like never before, that the culturally most exalted masculinity, bapakism, faced 
challenges from the emerging alternatives. Thus, my second argument in this chapter 
shows that the gender-order crisis triggered, on one hand, more fervent opposition to 
hegemonic masculinity. On the other hand, the gender-order crisis also motivated 
various interest groups to defend the same hegemonic masculinity. I drew substantially 
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from this chapter, as well as from Chapter 3, as I proceeded to analyse the situatedness 
of the filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the hegemony of bapakism and to offer 
alternative ideal masculinities. 
Chapter 3 explored the broad implications of the gender-order crisis in 
Indonesian cinema. As I constantly reiterate, the gender-order crisis reinvigorated the 
struggle for hegemonic masculinity during the period under study. One of the poignant 
political arenas, in which the struggle to defend and subvert hegemonic masculinity was 
waged, was the cinema. In this chapter I provided a broad overview of how the gender-
order crisis crept into the structure of Indonesian cinema and forced changes in the 
cinematic representations of gender and sexualities. I argued that Indonesian cinema 
turned into a contested terrain in which various interest groups waged their struggles in 
support or in challenge of the official gender ideals. I identified two key forces which 
significantly shaped the directions of the gender politics pursued in Indonesian cinema 
during the period—Islamisation and women’s cinema. I showed that both forces 
developed into strong agencies for change, which motivated more intensive challenges 
against the hegemonic ideal and more rigorous searches for new alternative ideal 
masculinities in Indonesian cinema. However, they also deepened public anxiety and 
moral panic concerning gender and sexualities, which ultimately led to censorship. As 
the discussion in the remaining three chapters unfolds, both forces (Islamisation and 
women’s cinema) substantially shaped what could and could not be idealised in terms of 
masculinities in Indonesian cinema. 
Chapter 4 specifically discussed the filmmakers’ struggles in undermining the 
hegemonic masculinity around the gender relations of production. I demonstrated that 
there were attempts by progressive filmmakers to offer alternative ideals which departed 
from the rigid gender relations of production, which compelled men to provide income 
for the family—a gender practice strongly featuring in hegemonic bapakism. Yet, the 
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filmmakers’ struggle was distorted by middle-class biases. As seen in the filmmakers’ 
struggles to legitimise the ‘new man’ in 7/24 and Hijab, the alternative ideal they 
promoted did encourage men to foster fluid and equal gender relations of production at 
the household level. However, we cannot help but notice that the idealisation of this 
alternative was cast exclusively in middle-class professionals. Consequently, the screen 
representations of alternative ideals projected by the filmmakers to replace bapakism 
tended to exclude the constant struggle of lower-class men. Furthermore, the screen 
representations offered by commercial filmmakers were biased towards middle-class 
men’s interests in maintaining paid work, albeit negotiated, as a marker of their gender 
and class.  
Chapter 5 examined the filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the hegemonic ideal 
surrounding the gender relations of power. Taking into account the heightened 
Islamisation, this chapter showed how the filmmakers negotiated with contemporary 
gender politics in order to promote an alternative ideal which fostered equal gender 
relations of power amidst the intensive invocation of gender-biased interpretations of 
Islamic texts in defence of the bapakism cultural ideal. Focusing more particularly in 
the burgeoning film Islami, I examined the gender politics engaged by the filmmakers 
who were behind the controversial Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. This film promotes 
the Muslim ‘new man’ as an alternative ideal. In this chapter, I maintained that new 
hope was fostered as they cinematically presented a religiously grounded ideal 
masculinity which fostered equal gender relations of power. The alternative ideal 
promoted by the filmmakers did challenge men’s normalised authoritative patron 
leadership in the public and domestic spheres, central to the definition of bapakism. It 
also undermined the intensive invocation of literal and gender-biased interpretations of 
Islamic texts in defence of the norm, thus also the hegemony of bapakism. Yet, the 
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alternative ideal was cast in middle-class Muslim men—a strategy that consigned 
lower-class Muslim men to the position of ‘others’. 
Chapter 6 dealt with the filmmakers’ struggles to undermine the hegemonic 
ideal around the gender relations of emotion. As I have explained so far, 
heteronormativity is vital not only to the sustenance of bapakism’s hegemony, but also 
in maintaining the patriarchal gender order. The impending legitimacy of homosexuality 
is thus a threat not only to the cultural ideal but also to the overall patterning of gender 
relations. This penultimate chapter is interested in the filmmakers’ struggle to promote 
an alternative ideal masculinity which accommodates men’s homosexuality. I focused 
my investigation on the filmmakers’ struggle to legitimise the gay ‘new man’ as an 
alternative ideal through the commercial film franchise Arisan!. Arisan! and Arisan! 2 
were released amidst a growing moral panic against non-heteronormative individuals. I 
proposed two arguments. First, I showed that filmmakers had to make substantial 
compromises, especially in terms of the narrative and distribution of images of the gay 
‘new man’. The compromises indicate that it was still possible to stage subversive 
challenges to the most fundamental gender practice sustaining the hegemony of 
bapakism in an arena where politics and commercial pressures were intricately 
interwoven. Nevertheless, the compromises indicate the growing anxiety and moral 
panic which imposed limitations on the extent to which filmmakers could tailor their 
progressive political views on gender and gender relations, particularly concerning 
masculinity. The second argument that I proposed in this chapter was that in spite of the 
progressive take on heteronormativity, the filmmakers’ relied on characters that 
represented middle-class gay men to voice their progressive political views, while 
indirectly othering lower-class gay men. 
Together these chapters reinforced my central argument that some commercial 
filmmakers who are actively engaged with contemporary gender politics offer 
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alternative ideals which undermined hegemonic bapakism. As exemplified in their 
struggle to legitimise the ‘new man’ as an alternative ideal through cinematic 
representations, there were filmmakers who attempted to offer alternative ideals which 
departed from bapakism. Drawing from feminist discourses of gender equality, these 
progressive filmmakers attempted to replace the existing hegemonic ideal, sanctioned 
by the state and major cultural institutions in Indonesia, with an alternative which is 
relatively liberated from the pressures of breadwinning, authoritative patron leadership 
and heteronormativity. Furthermore, taking into account the intensified Islamisation on- 
and off-screen, these progressive filmmakers also sought for alternative interpretations 
of Islamic texts which justified their resistance to bapakism and reinforced the religious 
foundation of the alternative ideals they promoted. The filmmakers’ struggles in this 
sense indicate that new hope had emerged in Indonesian cinema. The struggles waged 
by Indonesian filmmakers in commercial cinema in its opposition to bapakism can be 
seen as attempts to influence the direction of the gender order towards accommodating 
fluid and equal gender relations. Furthermore, through the filmmakers’ struggles to 
legitimise the ‘new man’, we can discern that in certain aspects, filmmakers had to deal 
with intensified anxiety and moral panic which ultimately imposed limitations on what 
could be represented, let alone idealised on screen. The filmmakers’ struggle to subvert 
hegemonic bapakism around the gender relations of emotion showed that compromise 
was inevitable, yet worth the work to promote a subversive alternative in such a 
contested terrain without attracting negative attention. The filmmakers proved that 
substantial challenges to bapakism were possible to be staged the arena of gender 
politics, in which pressures of politics and commerce are tightly interwoven. 
The findings also reinforce my second argument. Despite the progressive nature 
of the political engagement waged by filmmakers in commercial cinema, we cannot 
help but notice their middle-class prejudices. Through the filmmakers’ struggles to 
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legitimise variants of the ‘new man’ as alternative ideals, we can discern that despite 
their intentions, the representations of ideals they proposed projected the frustrations, 
concerns and aspirations of a certain segment of the Indonesian middle class. The 
alternative ideal promoted to challenge hegemonic bapakism around the gender 
relations of production excluded lower-class men who constantly struggle to make the 
ends meet and barely have the capacity to negotiate their breadwinning practices. The 
alternative ideal that challenges bapakism around the gender relations of power, tends to 
‘other’ lower-class men who are rural based and less educated. Last but not least, the 
alternative ideal promoted to challenge bapakism around the gender relations of 
emotion excluded lower-class men. Indeed, the ‘new man’ alternative ideal may not 
represent the whole gamut of the burgeoning cinematic representations of alternative 
ideal masculinities in Indonesian commercial cinema. Yet, as I stated in Chapter 1, the 
‘new man’ was and still is one of the strongest alternative ideals sought to be 
legitimised on- and off-screen. Thus, their silver-screen representations can be said to 
represent the concerns, aspirations as well as frustrations of a certain segment of 
Indonesian society.  
How do these findings contribute to the existing literature on gender politics in 
Indonesia? In Chapter 1, I situated my research in the academic field of gender politics 
in Indonesia. Specifically, joining the existing literature discussing the contestations of 
gender issues involving various social interests in twenty-first-century Indonesia, my 
research offers a view from a non-conventional yet poignant political arena: commercial 
cinema. I filled the gap left by scholars working on this specific field, such as Tom 
Boellstorff (2004a), Rebecca Elmhirst (2007), Kathryn Robinson (2015), Sonja van 
Wichelen (2009), Pam Nilan (2009), Nilan and Argyo Demartoto (2012) and Nilan, 
Demartoto and Alex Broom (2013), by showing that gender politics, especially for the 
securing of hegemonic masculinity, were intensively pursued in this arena in the first 15 
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years of the twenty-first century. While the profit-driven nature of commercial cinema 
is indisputable, I showed that the filmmakers were active political agents who carved 
their way into gender politics by making negotiations and at times compromises in the 
processes of production and the circulation of images of alternative ideal masculinities 
in commercial cinema. Gender politics did permeate the production and circulation of 
cinematic representations of ideal masculinities, ultimately shaping what could be 
represented and idealised on screen at that time. My findings also show that the political 
battle to challenge and defend the existing hegemonic ideal was equally fierce and 
arguably more visible in commercial cinema during the period. Battles relating to the 
representations of ideals were seen through comparisons between films produced and 
circulated at that time, as well as through public debates and censorship that attempted 
to curb or cut certain representations. 
Furthermore, I also contribute to the field of study by examining the class 
dimension of the political struggle for securing hegemonic masculinity. Among the 
abovementioned scholars working on the gender politics of masculinity in twenty-first-
century Indonesia, even fewer take into account that political expressions, including 
gender, vary across social classes. Elmhirst (2007) specifically discusses violence as a 
common political expression of lower-class men in a rural area in Sumatera—men who 
felt besieged by the increased internal mobility of their female counterparts for the 
purpose of employment, while fewer opportunities were available for them. Van 
Wichelen (2009) discusses the shifting ideas of ideal masculinity among many Muslim 
middle-class men in early twenty-first-century in Indonesia. Burgeoning Islamisation 
paved the way for the proponents of polygamy to raise the issue and advocate for the 
custom. My research contributes to this conversation by exploring the political 
expressions of a certain segment of the Indonesian middle classes. Indeed, Indonesian 
middle classes are plural, and my research cannot capture the complexity and 
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contradictions of political expressions of all the members of this category. The 
progressive filmmakers with whom I engaged in this research are characterised as urban 
based, highly educated and generally critical of gender inequalities. Some of them have 
a background in gender activism and their work is known to be loaded with gender 
politics. The immediate audience, consumers of their films in commercial cinema, are 
also from the urban middle class. Indeed, their secondary audience is broader, especially 
when their films are screened on television, sold as pirated DVDs, or hijacked through 
video-sharing networks. Commercial films are made with a middle-class audience in 
mind. Consequently, Indonesian commercial cinema is a rich site for the investigation 
of middle-class political expressions, including ideal masculinity. I have proven that 
regardless of the filmmakers’ intentions, middle-class biases are visible. 
My research contributes to offering nuances of their complex political 
engagement. The middle classes were also besieged by the economic crisis, yet, as I 
showed in Chapter 4, the urban-based highly educated middle class represented by the 
commercial filmmakers were least likely to resort to public violence to express their 
economic frustrations. Instead, they promoted the refashioning of ideal masculinity by 
drawing from alternative discourses of masculinity which allowed non-breadwinning 
men to be figures of ideal masculinity. Nevertheless, these filmmakers did not extend 
their imagining to include jobless lower-class men. In Chapter 5, I showed that the 
filmmakers criticised (the representations of) polygamous middle-class men by 
promoting a Muslim ‘new man’ as an alternative ideal, thus fostering equal gender 
relations of power between husband and wife. Among the urban-based educated middle 
classes, represented by the progressive filmmakers engaged in this research, there was a 
strong pressure to embrace and advocate for the rights of non-heteronormative 
individuals. In Chapter 6, I demonstrated that progressive feminist filmmakers 
negotiated with the growing anxiety and moral panic against non-heteronormative 
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individuals in order to offer the gay ‘new man’ as a legitimate alternative ideal of 
masculinity on screen. They did have to make compromises to several aspects of their 
representations—compromises that were inevitable at that time. Yet, they proved that 
bold moves against the existing hegemonic ideal during a time of moral panic were 
possible in commercial films in Indonesia. 
Through their political struggle to offer alternative ideal masculinities in 
commercial cinemas, the filmmakers attempted to influence the trajectory of the gender 
order, albeit in a direction that served their class interests. Borrowing the concept used 
by van Klinken, I argue that these filmmakers are part of the ‘national bourgeoisie’ who 
have the cultural capital to impose discipline on the gender order (2014: 5). In the case 
of my research, they attempted to do so by challenging the configuration of the existing 
hegemonic ideal of masculinity through cinematic representations. The distinctive role 
of the national bourgeoisie in Indonesian gender politics has been indisputable ever 
since the colonial period (see Chapter 2). Their aspirations to become ‘modern’ led 
them to adopt the industrialised European gender division of labour, which also 
resonated with that of the Javanese aristocracy. In turn, this gradual change towards 
modernity facilitated the ascendancy of bapakism into the ideal masculine position. The 
social change at the time drove a great many middle-class women in the Netherlands’ 
East Indies colony to the confines of the domestic sphere. Men’s breadwinning role was 
championed as more employment opportunities opened up for them in the colonial 
bureaucracy. Such chances afforded men power over their family collectivity. During 
the New Order period, bapakism became even stronger and ascended to the hegemonic 
position, enjoying endorsement from the state and major cultural institutions in 
Indonesia. A series of profound changes in politics and economy, however, forced 
changes in the structure of the gender relations that support bapakism’s hegemony. In 
the twenty-first century, these descendants of the colonial national bourgeoisie 
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intensively challenged the cultural ideal that their ancestors had previously helped to 
create and maintain. 
They criticised the existing hegemonic ideal because being the sole family 
breadwinner able to guarantee a middle-class lifestyle for the whole family became 
increasingly difficult, especially in the aftermath of 1997–1998 economic crisis. At this 
time, deep economic, social and political trauma were felt by the middle classes. The 
dual-income household has become the new norm among this social category. 
Moreover, the increasingly vocal feminist women’s movement in the post-authoritarian 
moment has made gender ‘equality’ a new buzzword for development and political 
correctness. Such changes have gradually eroded the hegemonic base of bapakism, 
eventually making it obsolete. Indeed, fervent defence of bapakism has become 
politically incorrect especially among highly educated members of the social category. 
In this social milieu, the filmmakers discussed in this thesis attempted to transform 
Indonesia’s gender order to accommodate the changing landscape of gender relations. 
Certainly, the voices of the filmmakers do not represent the whole gamut of the 
Indonesian middle-class. They did face challenges from their fellow middle-class 
filmmakers as well as other groups and individuals interested in steering the direction of 
gender relations in different directions. I would like to underscore that the progressive 
filmmakers discussed in this thesis were able to stage their public gender politics to 
undermine the existing hegemonic masculinity on screen despite such challenges. They 
imagined that a reconfiguration of ideal masculinity would lead to a transformation of 
the gender order. Yet, in doing so, as I have maintained throughout this thesis, they 
excluded the lower classes. It is in their interest that the alternative ideal projected to 
replace bapakism remains exclusive. 
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Way forward 
The sense of ‘direction’ is always central to any discussion of politics, including gender 
politics. As suggested by R.W. Connell, basically gender politics is about steering the 
gender order at a particular moment of history (2009: 144). So far, I have discussed the 
way that progressive filmmakers working in Indonesian commercial cinema directed 
their gender politics onto the silver screen. In the final part of my thesis I would like to 
suggest ‘directions’ of further research on gender politics in Indonesian cinema that 
future researchers could undertake. Taking cues from my research, I would like to 
suggest to two areas: audience and independent cinema. 
It is the audience that consumes the images of ideal masculinities circulated 
through film. I constantly maintain that images of ideal masculinities constitute an 
important component to the ways that individuals perceive and internalise what it is to 
become an ideal masculine man. My research investigated how such crucial images 
were produced and circulated. Further investigation into how images are consumed by 
an audience is yet to be carried out. Scholarly investigations into how gender politics 
off-screen shape the ways in which audiences perceive images of ideal masculinities 
offered in the cinema will provide invaluable insights on the personal level of gender 
politics. As audiences consume cinematic representations of ideal masculinities, they 
negotiate their individual ideas of gender with the texts as well as with off-screen 
gender politics. In this way, personal gender politics can morph into public gender 
politics when the audience’s interpretations are published in their social media accounts 
or on media outlets. The process of mediatisation is also the crux of politics in itself. In 
this case, researchers will be able to explore the nexus between the personal and public 
gender politics. 
Audiences are made up of autonomous individuals but the ways they perceive 
images do not take place in a social and political vacuum. What they perceive of films’ 
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images of ideal masculinity do not necessarily follow what the filmmakers intended to 
project. As I discussed, the filmmakers’ struggles to offer an alternative ideal Muslim 
masculinity through Perempuan Berkalung Sorban, was intended as a correction to the 
previously popular representation of ideal Muslim masculinity depicted in Ayat-ayat 
Cinta. To high-level state bureaucrats such President Yudhoyono, Fahri, the protagonist 
of Ayat-ayat Cinta represented not only an image of ideal Muslim masculinity but also 
the true teaching of Islam which countered the growing association of Muslims with 
acts of violence. A great many audience members found Fahri to be a contemporary 
answer to the growing stereotype that linked violence with Muslim men in the period 
post-9/11 and the heightened Islamisation in Indonesian politics at that time. Yet, for the 
filmmakers, the representation of ideal masculinity through Fahri was still too 
authoritative especially in relation to women. Thus, they were compelled to ‘correct’ it 
in their next film, Perempuan Berkalung Sorban. However, their correction did not 
equally appeal to the audiences. Instead, the film drew controversy over its 
representations of Kyai and pesantren. This calls into question, the ways that the 
audience perceive the representations of ideal masculinity in each of the films. We need 
to ask why the audience tended to find Fahri appealing as an alternative ideal, while 
Khudori, intended as the ‘correction’ to Fahri, easily escaped their attention. Instead, the 
audience was more concerned about the negative portrayals of Kyai and pesantren in 
the latter film. Such questions beg an investigation on how gender politics during the 
heightened Islamisation contribute to shaping the ways in which audiences consume 
cinematic representations of ideal masculinities. 
My second suggestion is a scholarly investigation of the gender politics of 
hegemonic masculinity in independent cinema. Unlike commercial cinema, independent 
cinema has a different set of practices. For one, the pressure to make a profit is less 
intense compared to commercial cinema. Generally, independent films do not seek to be 
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shown in commercial markets. Instead, they tend to aim for private, art house or festival 
competitions and exhibitions. A direct consequence of this is the relative freedom 
filmmakers have to explore topics socially considered to be taboo or sensitive. 
Independent films, not intended to compete in the commercial film markets, do not have 
to go through state censorship. Moreover, with generally low-key publicity, they hardly 
ever attract negative attention or stir up public controversy. Thus, investigations into 
gender politics waged by filmmakers in this arena can potentially uncover different sets 
of political expressions. Moreover, with more plural individuals involved in the 
production in terms of social class status, such investigations will yield rich insights into 
the competing ideologies underlying the production and circulation of images of ideal 
masculinities in this particular arena.  
Taking cues from my investigation into the filmmakers’ struggles to promote 
gay masculinity as a legitimate alternative ideal through the Arisan! franchise, we can 
imagine that a whole different set of challenges would be faced by independent 
filmmakers as they attempt to stage their public gender politics through films intended 
primarily for film festivals and niche exhibitions. As I mentioned, filmmakers such as 
Teddy Soeriaatmadja, after his disappointment with the state censorship process which 
cut several metres from his Lovely Man reel, decided not to opt for the commercial 
market with his film, Something in the Way. During my fieldwork in 2014, I had the 
opportunity to watch Something in the Way at a private screening in a small arthouse 
cinema in Jakarta. Graphic sex scenes and a radical critique of ideal Muslim masculinity 
were the staple visuals in the film—two elements which would potentially face state and 
public censorships in the commercial arena. The same thing went with Djenar Maesa 
Ayu’s SAIA, which challenges the normalisation of domestic violence in Indonesia. An 
investigation into how independent filmmakers, such as Soeriaatmadja and Ayu, 
negotiated the contemporary gender politics on- and off-screen amidst heightened 
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Islamisation in order to make their critique accessible for an Indonesian audience will 
yield rich insights into the nexus between gender politics and film subculture. 
These areas of further investigation will become ever more important as cinema 
becomes an increasingly heated and contested terrain for the securing of hegemonic 
masculinity in Indonesia. Moreover, amidst the more heightened Islamisation and the 
growing anxieties and moral panic against non-heteronormative individuals, Indonesian 
cinema has become an even more crucial arena in which to contest and defend 
hegemonic masculinity. 
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Plot Summary of 7/24 
Director: Fajar Nugros 
Scriptwriter: Natatya Bagya 
Release date: 27 November 2014 
The film revolves around the life of a young couple that tries to find a balance between 
work and family. The conflicts spring from the disrupted gender relations of labour and 
power as the couple’s respective careers take off and force them to renegotiate their gender 
relations. The man, Tyo, is a film director whose career in the domestic film industry 
begins to shine. He often has to spend long hours on set filming. The woman, Tania, is a 
successful banker who is eyeing a career promotion to become a Senior Corporate 
Relations Manager (CRM) at her office. They have a five-year-old daughter. They live in a 
gated neighbourhood in greater Jakarta. They used to share the domestic and caring 
responsibilities between themselves without the help of a domestic assistant, with 
occasional help from Tania’s mother and female cousin. With both of them striving for 
career promotion, the renegotiation of the gender relations of production and power 
becomes the main sources of conflict between them. 
The film opens with an introduction to the characters. Tyo, who is on a tight 
schedule of filming, passes out on the film set. The film crew is in a panic and take him to 
the hospital for treatment. The introductory segment also presents Tania as a successful and 
extremely busy career woman and a mother. Tania tries to juggle between domestic and 
caring responsibilities on the one side and work responsibilities on the other. The couple 
used to share the domestic and caring responsibilities. Yet, as Tyo must put more hours at 
work to finish his film project, Tania has to take care of them herself while pursuing a full-
time career. She gets help from her mother to care for her daughter this time. When Tyo is 
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taken to the hospital, it means she has to also care for her sick husband at the hospital on 
top of her existing responsibilities at home and in the office. 
The film then flashes back to the previous twenty-four hours before the incident. 
The film shows that in the beginning, the couple tries to make things work between them 
when their respective careers take off. Tyo is under pressure to finish an overdue filming 
process for his new film. He has to work overtime. He has not been home for two days. He 
has not had enough rest. Neither has he consumed a healthy diet in the few days leading up 
to the incident. As for Tania, it is clearly depicted in the film that she is overwhelmed by 
the piling responsibilities at home and her office, especially when she has to demonstrate 
her exceptional qualities to get a promotion. Although they maintain effective 
communication every day through phone and video conversations, they can no longer care 
as much to each other or their daughter as before. Tyo can no longer take care of his share 
of domestic and caring duties, and Tania has to take up all the extra burden created by his 
absence while she herself is eyeing promotion. 
The condition becomes worse when Tania’s health deteriorates due to exhaustion. 
Tania is even busier when Tyo is hospitalised. While receiving help from her mother, Tania 
is still trying her best to meet her parenthood responsibilities. Returning from work, she 
prepares dinner for her daughter and puts her to bed. She is also trying her best to be a 
caring wife. After she puts her daughter to bed, she rushes to the hospital to tend to her sick 
husband. She leaves her daughter in the care of her mother while she sleeps at the hospital 
with her husband. This arrangement eventually takes a toll on her own health. She collapses 
at work. She is infected by the typhoid virus and is taken to the same hospital, where her 
husband is being treated. As they are treated in the same room, they have to bear with each 
other for the whole 24 hours over the course of seven days. It is during this period that the 
conflicts stemming from unequal relations of power and labour become heightened. 
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Both Tania and Tyo take their work to the hospital to each other’s dismay. They are 
under pressure to make accomplishments in their careers. Thus, they cannot let days pass 
without doing any work. They think that their careers are at stake if they do not continue 
working, despite their being treated in the hospital for serious illnesses. Yet, they do not 
seem to think the same way for their partner. Tania is upset when Tyo is working on his 
film with his crew while in a hospital bed. Tyo is also upset with Tania not withdrawing 
from work and even continuing to handle a multimillion-dollar financing bid while she is 
very sick. 
The conflict reaches a climax when Tyo regresses and he becomes a conventional 
masculine man, a typical bapak. Tyo and Tania both argue that their own career is 
important. It becomes clear that the possibility for Tania to achieve promotion as a senior 
CRM intimidates Tyo. It threatens his sense of masculinity. He is afraid that Tania will be 
more successful than him. He is afraid of not being an important person for her anymore. 
Tania blames Tyo for not being home to help with the day-to-day domestic and caring 
duties, which makes her so overwhelmed that she finds it difficult to juggle homemaking 
with her career. Frustrated by the argument, Tyo emphasises that he works long hours for 
their family. Hearing this, Tania is insulted and becomes even more furious. For her, Tyo’s 
statement implies her career iss secondary to his and it is her designated role as a woman to 
care for their child and do the domestic work. They become cold towards each other. Tania 
checks out early from the hospital and leaves Tyo on his own. 
The conflict is finally resolved when Tyo realises that he has approached the 
relationship problems with Tania in the wrong way. Tania is a progressive woman, not a 
typical ibu who is domestically bound and prioritises her reproductive duties. As stated by 
Tania, even her main reason to marry Tyo was because she believed that Tyo was a 
progressive thinking man. She believed that Tyo would never ask her to choose between 
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work and family, and that he would always support her in her career endeavours, including 
sharing the domestic and caring duties with her. Finally, Tyo is symbolically shown to 
leave his film set and head straight home to meet Tania and his daughter. 
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Plot Summary of Hijab 
Director: Hanung Bramantyo 
Scriptwriter: Rahabi Mandra 
Release Date: 15 January 2015 
The comedy revolves around the lives of four young urban middle-class Muslim couples. 
The first couple is Sari and Gamal. Gamal is of Arab descent and he is the representation of 
a conservative Islamist masculine man in the film. His wife, Sari, was an aspiring business 
woman before she got married. But she quit because Gamal will not allow her to work. He 
believes that a woman’s rightful place is at home and her rightful duties are to be a 
submissive wife and mother. It is his masculine duty to provide a livelihood for Sari and 
their family. The second couple is Bia and Matnur. Matnur is a budding actor who recently 
found fame through his part in a successful Islamic-themed television series. Bia was an 
aspiring designer. She gave up her passion once she got married to Matnur in order to be 
able to accompany her husband on set, so she could have more quality time with him. The 
third couple is Tata and Ujul. Tata was an activist before getting married to Ujul, but she 
gave up her career once they had a baby. Ujul himself is a successful photo journalist. The 
last couple, Anin and Chucky, is not married yet. Anin, the daughter of a mega-rich 
businessman, is a French enthusiast. Chucky is an internationally recognised film director 
whose works are notable for their strong social criticism. Conflicts primarily spring from 
the changing gender relations of production and power as the women’s careers take off, 
while the men’s careers stagnate or decline. The women collaborate to establish a fashion 
business behind their men’s backs. As their business thrives, unfortunately the men’s 
careers either remain stagnant or declines. Conflicts reach a climax when it becomes 
obvious that the married women contribute more to the family’s income than do their men. 
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The film opens with the women making their first video blog (vlog) to promote 
their fashion business. The taping is supposed to involve the four women, but Anin is late. 
So, the other three women start telling their stories without her. The man behind the camera 
asks why they wear hijab, headscarf. It is in this segment filmed in flash back mode that the 
viewers are introduced to the characters, especially the women and why the three of them 
wear hijab. Bia confesses that she first adopted hijab as her fashion style accidentally. She 
once came to a personal-development seminar, which was apparently religiously based and 
she was the only female participant who did not wear hijab. Realising she had worn the 
wrong costume, she came the next day wearing hijab to the surprise and delight of the 
instructor and her peers. Her changing appearance was mistakenly taken as improvement in 
her piety due to the seminar; her story was then promoted on the organiser’s website. Since 
then, she has become known as ‘gadis hidayah’ (the girl who received God’s guidance). 
She had been invited as a speaker in various events to share her spiritual journey which led 
her to changing into a more Islamic fashion style. The story is different for Sari, who adopts 
hijab because her authoritative husband told her to do so in order to comply with Islamic 
injunctions. Sari did not have any choice but to adopt hijab as part of her devotion to her 
husband and to Islam. Another different story is from Tata. She began to wear hijab 
because she had been having hair-loss problema. She would like to cover her almost-bald 
scalp. Wearing hijab seems to give her solution and makes her look more pious.  
The introductory segment is then followed by an introduction to the conflict: 
unequal relations of production and power. Once Bia, Sari and Tata got married, they gave 
up their career endeavours as indicated above. They depend on their husbands for financial 
support. Anin herself has not had the inclination to pursue any specific career and still 
relied on her parents for financial support. Basically, none of them is economically 
independent. The married women are full-time housewives who take care of the domestic 
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and caring duties in their family, while their husbands pursue their careers in the public 
sphere full time.  
During an arisan meeting, where all the group members gather, there is a casual 
discussion about what constitutes ideal gender relations of production between a husband 
and a wife. When the men are grilling the meat, Gamal also makes a comment about what 
constitutes a proper masculine man and a feminine woman. One of the aspects he highlights 
in his comment is the masculine practice of breadwinning and the feminine homemaking. 
Chucky, who represents progress, disagrees with this strict division in the gender relations 
of production. Yet, Gamal dismisses Chucky by saying that this division is religiously 
justified. When everyone has gathered, Gamal makes a statement which eventually 
motivates the women to change the situation. Gamal says that even though the married 
women take part in the arisan, they actually use the men’s money. So, it is actually an 
arisan for men, not for women. For the women, this statement highlights the power held by 
their men accorded by their financial contribution to the family. It also implies women’s 
disempowered position in relation to men.  
After the arisan meeting, the women meet among themselves to discuss a potential 
business collaboration. As they discuss different business options which do not require a 
large amount of financial investment and can be managed from home, they finally settle on 
a fashion business. They benefit from Bia’s chick designs, Sari’s skills at bargaining for 
materials, Tata’s skills of marketing, and Anin’s networks for extra investment. They 
decide to use an online platforms to sell their products so that the married members can still 
be full-time housewives.  
Yet, as their business develops rapidly, it takes a toll especially on the married 
members of the venture. It becomes even more difficult to hide the business from their 
husbands. At first, the business takes only a little of their time. They do business 
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transactions in between household chores and caring for their children. When their 
husbands are home, they do it discreetly behind their backs. It is becoming trickier when 
they receive more orders from their customers. They spend more time on their phones 
every day to manage their business. Consequently, they find it even more difficult to 
straddle the business and their roles as mothers and wives. It is also more difficult to hide it 
from their husbands. 
Conflict becomes more focused when the husbands’ careers either stall or decline as 
the wives’ career takes off. Matnur, the actor, loses his leading role in a television soap. He 
struggles to sustain his acting career and finds it very difficult to land on a substantial 
acting role. Unable to provide as much financial support as he previously did, he feels he 
has turned into an incapable head of the household. Ujul’s career as a freelance 
photographer is also on the decline. He is a quite renowned photo journalist. Yet, he wants 
to expand his career to involve fashion and beauty. He has made a great deal of financial 
investment setting up a photo studio. Yet, it has been extremely difficult to compete in this 
segment of the market. He has not been able to generate income, and his family savings 
gradually diminish. Gamal, the public servant, has a stagnant career in his office. He has 
not been able to secure a career promotion for several years, and all the while his family 
expands. In short, the dwindling or stagnancy in the men’s careers has left them feeling 
inferior; they cannot perform their ideal masculine gender practice—providing for their 
families. The career decline or stagnancy has emasculated them. They feel even more so 
when they know that their wives earn more money and contribute more significantly to the 
family expenses. Their masculinity is shattered. 
Matnur, Gamal and Ujul generally react aggressively towards the shifting gender 
relations. Knowing that Bia has paid all the bills, Matnur becomes angry with his wife and 
ashamed of himself. He evades his wife. Gamal, who finally reveals that Sari has been 
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involved in a fashion business without his consent, is extremely irritated and leaves home. 
He thinks that Sari has challenged his authority as head of the household and has slowly 
taken over his role as the family’s sole breadwinner. Ujul gets even angrier at Tata because 
their child has to be taken to the hospital due to malnourishment. The shifting gender 
relations of the married couple apparently has deterred Anin from establishing a committed 
relationship with men, including with Chucky. Although Chucky has been the voice of 
wisdom in the group, Anin has not been convinced about taking it further with him. She 
fears that she will be trapped by strict gender relations which may lead to her to be 
domestic bound and unable to pursue the career of her dreams. 
The conflict is resolved when Matnur and Ujul realise that they have been over-
reacting towards their partners’ career development. They realise that they have been 
intimidated, fearing that they would be meaningless when their wives take over the 
‘masculine’ gender role as the family breadwinners. Both eventually apologise to their 
wives. This leaves Gamal, the representation of conservative Muslim, who chooses to stick 
to his belief that a wife’s womanly duty is to be a homemaker—to do the household works 
and care for children, and a man’s masculine role is to provide for his family. While the 
other three women continue to work on their fashion business, Sari voluntarily withdraws 
from the collective business to focus on her family. But she and Gamal continue to be good 
friends with the rest of the characters. Gamal apparently is awarded a career promotion by 
the end of the film, which shows that he is committed to his gender role and highly 
dedicated to his career. Anin is eventually convinced that Chucky is the right guy for her—
he will support her career and help her to achieve her dreams. 
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Plot Summary of Perempuan Berkalung Sorban 
Director: Hanung Bramantyo 
Scriptwriter: Gina S. Noer 
Release Date: 15 January 2009 
The film revolves around the struggle of a Muslim woman, named Annisa, against unequal 
gender relations and the gender-biased religious interpretation of her Muslim community. A 
daughter of a notable religious leader, Annisa is expected to be the model of Muslim 
femininity by her family and her community. She is expected to be docile, domestic-bound 
and submissive to men’s authority. Unlike her older brothers, she is not expected to pursue 
higher education, let alone a career in the public sphere. Instead, she is expected to marry a 
pious man as soon as she finishes high school. Annisa’s father, brothers and teachers justify 
these discriminatory treatments with literal gender-biased interpretations of certain Islamic 
texts. So deeply entrenched is the gender-biased interpretation of Islamic religious texts in 
her community that most people see the discriminatory treatment as the norm. On the 
contrary, Annisa sees this treatment as discriminatory and has been battling for equal rights. 
Consequently, she is seen as a rebel by her family and the Muslim community.  
The story opens with an introduction to the young Annisa and her Muslim 
community. The setting is in a pesantren, a traditional Islamic boarding school, in East Java 
in 1985. The pesantren is managed by Annisa’s family. Annisa is a free-spirited young girl 
who has passion for reading and horse riding. Yet, her conservative Muslim family, which 
represents the conservative Muslim community, does not approve of her passion because 
she is a woman who is supposed to be docile and submissive. When her father finds out 
that Annisa secretly goes horse riding to the beach, he scolds Annisa in front of other 
family members. He thinks that she has violated the Islamic gender norms. Annisa fights 
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back by arguing that there were ample examples of renowned Muslim women who also 
rode horses. She also questions why her brothers are allowed and even encouraged to be 
involved in such an activity while she is not. Annisa does not get a convincing answer, 
other than ‘she has to guard her chastity because she is a woman’. The opening scene also 
shows Annisa arguing against her male teacher at the pesantren when he decides to appoint 
a male class captain despite Annisa winning the vote. These are events which form the 
foundation of Annisa’s struggle against the conservative gender construction in her Muslim 
community. 
Annisa has almost no one to defend her stand. She is challenging the mainstream. 
Moreover, she is challenging her father, a prominent religious leader among conservative 
Muslim community. Only one person who quietly supports her is Khudhori, her step 
uncle.1 Khudhori teaches her to ride horses and supplies her with books. He shares 
Annisa’s progressive views of gender and her critique against the gender-biased 
interpretation of religious texts. Khudhori is Annisa’s first love. Yet, Khudhori has to leave 
for Cairo to pursue higher education at Al-Azhar, leaving Annisa to struggle on her own. 
Annisa continues to face gender discrimination and conservative gender 
indoctrination as she grows up. At school, she and other female students are taught to be 
submissive and docile. Aggression in not a desired feminine quality. Transgression of 
gender norms is socially shunned. Furthermore, Annisa is barred from pursuing a higher 
education, let alone moving out of town. While her father is willing go into considerable 
debt to send Annisa’s brothers to the Middle East to get higher degrees in Islamic studies, 
he is unwilling to approve Annisa’s wish to pursue a university education in Yogyakarta, in 
1 Annisa’s grandfather from her mother side remarried to a widow with a son. The son is Khudhori, who then 
stays at the pesantren managed by Annisa’s family. So, technically, Annisa is not related biologically to 
Khudhori. 
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central Java, regardless of the full-board scholarship earned by Annisa. Her gender is the 
main reason for that. Instead, her father arranges her marriage to Samsudin, the son of a 
notable pesantren leader in a neighbouring town. Samsudin’s father was senior to Annisa’s 
father when they went to the same pesantren during their younger years. Although Annisa 
protests the decision, the marriage arrangement continues. 
Annisa faces a different level of challenge when she is forced to marry Samsudin—
a man she barely knows. Following the patrilocal tradition, Annisa moves to her husband’s 
family home, also a pesantren compound. In the new area, she has nobody supporting her. 
Her husband turns out to be an alcoholic and abusive towards her. He verbally, sexually 
and physically abuses her. He justifies his abusive behaviour by using a literal reading of 
some Islamic holy texts, which permits him to beat his wife and be authoritative over her. 
Annisa suffers physically and psychologically in the relationship. Her suffering is made 
worst when Samsudin has an affair with a woman who becomes pregnant with his child. 
The woman asks him to marry her. Annisa could do nothing about it because her in-laws 
support Samsudin’s second marriage in order to save the family’s name. Annisa has then to 
share the house with a cowife. Things only get worse from there. Samsuddin becomes even 
more abusive towards Annisa. She also has to witness him abusing the new wife. 
Annisa meets Khudhori again after almost a decade of separation and their love 
rekindles. One day, Annisa asks permission from her husband and in -aws to attend a 
special occasion at her family’s pesantren. There she meets Khudhori. She confronts him 
about why he stopped sending her letters while he was in Cairo, to which Khudhori says 
that he never stopped sending her letters. They then realise that Annisa’s father confiscated 
his letters. Annisa finds comfort in Khudhori who has developed more progressive views of 
gender relations.  
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The climax is reached when Samsudin finds out that Annisa secretly meets 
Khudhori at the barn. There, Annisa tells Khudhori about she still loves him and hopes that 
he will take her away from her husband. She is even willing to sleep with him so that 
Samsudin will divorce her. Khudhori rejects the idea at the onset. Yet, suddenly Samsudin 
barges into the barn to find Khudhori and Annisa, who has discarded some of her 
headcover. Samsudin is furious and accuses them of adultery. He then calls for people to 
throw rocks at them as a religiously sanctioned punishment. Annisa’s mother comes to 
defend Annisa and Khudhori by saying that only people who never sin are eligible to 
punish them. Then, the violent crowd is subdued. Shocked, Annisa’s father has a heart 
attack, which leads to his death. After that, Samsudin divorces Annisa. 
Upon her divorce, Annisa decides to move to Yogyakarta to live as an independent 
woman. She is enrolled at a university to get a degree in psychology. She is also involved 
in activism to support women victims of domestic violence. Around the same period, 
Khudhori also leaves the pesantren and works as a university lecturer while completing his 
doctoral degree in Yogyakarta. When they meet, they do not quickly rekindle their old 
flame. Annisa is badly traumatised by her previous marriage to such an abusive man. 
Khudhori is very persistent in convincing her that he will treat Annisa better. Annisa finally 
accepts his marriage proposal after dreaming of her father giving her his blessing to marry 
Khudhori. 
Annisa’s experience of becoming Khudhori’s wife starkly contrasts with her 
previous experience with Samsudin. Khudhori is a man who is hands-on with domestic 
work. He is sensitive to her feelings. He patiently waits for Annisa to be ready for sexual 
relations with him, instead of forcing his way on her. In addition, he is intelligent and 
supports Annisa’s career pursuits in the public sphere. Annisa finds this experience 
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reassuring and healing. She can finally be more open to Khudhori about her psychological 
wounds. When she is finally healed, she is ready to establish a fresh start with Khudhori. 
Annisa returns to her family home. She is pregnant with her first child. Her 
pregnancy has been difficult, and her doctor advises her to take a rest from her activities. 
Khudhori suggests that she should be near her mother who has had more experience of 
pregnancies. Returning home is not that easy since her brothers have not exactly accepted 
her life choices and her progressive views. Yet, she does it anyway. At home she teaches 
the female students about becoming independent and intelligent women. She brings 
literature, including books that are banned by the state. Khudhori secretly also teaches the 
female students to criticise the gender-biased interpretations of religious texts. Teaching 
aside, Annisa also learns that her family has a large debt to Samsudin’s family. Samsudin 
handles the matter with aggression and intimidation. Annisa cannot stand it anymore and 
demands Khudhori take her back to Yogyakarta. Unfortunately, on his way to get the train 
ticket, Khudhori is involved in an accident and his life cannot be saved.  
Upon her husband’s death, Annisa is back on her own struggling for her own cause. 
She has to raise her son on her own. She continues to struggle with  Samsudin who is 
highly authoritative over her family. She also struggles to change the conservative views of 
gender and education deeply rooted in her conservative Muslim community, represented by 
her brothers. She continues to smuggle in books for the female students. She also 
encourages these students to be more open-minded and to seek experiences beyond the 
confines of the pesantren. Realising the abuses committed by Samsudin and Annisa’s 
struggle to modernise the pesantren education, her brothers finally are convinced of the 
positive influence she has brought to the female students. They then support each other to 
fight Samsuddin and modernise the pesantren. 
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Plot Summary of Arisan! 
Director: Nia Dinata 
Scriptwriter: Nia Dinata and Joko Anwar 
Release Date: 10 December 2003 
The film generally revolves around a group of young Jakarta socialites who are trying to 
maintain their social standing among the city’s elite community. The members of the elite 
community around which the narrative revolves are Meimei, Sakti and Andien. They are 
young professionals who have been best friends since high school. The conflicts stem from 
the group members’ attempts to conceal certain social identities which threaten their 
position in the community. Meimei is a successful young interior designer. She has been 
trying to conceive but has had no success, and she begins to lose confidence in herself and 
her marriage. Her work partner, Sakti is a successful architect. He is gay. He has not been 
able to come out as he fears that his family will reject him. The other member of interest is 
Andien, the wife of a very successful businessman and mother of twin daughters. She 
previously worked as a secretary to her now husband before they got married. She is trying 
hard to fit in her new class cliques. Yet, although the film tries to foreground friendship and 
explore the individual problems of each character, Sakti’s coming out dominates the plot. 
The film’s climax is centred on Sakti’s coming out story. 
The film opens with an introduction to Sakti, the gay protagonist, and Meimei. The 
camera zooms into his morning routines, comprising morning physical exercise, body 
grooming and eating a healthy breakfast. After the routine, he leaves for work, where he 
meets Meimei. On that day, he listens to her complaining about her dull marriage. She feels 
that her husband is not so interested in her anymore. She blames herself for being unable to 
conceive. Sakti confronts Meimei and says that the situation is not necessarily due to her 
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childlessness. He emphasises that not all men are obsessed with having children. Cutting 
through the conversation, Meimei asks Sakti to accompany her to an arisan gathering, but 
he declines because he has to attend a meeting. 
Apparently, Sakti has been plagued by anxiety due to his sexuality. He is aware that 
he is more sexually attracted to other men. The film also shows Sakti’s more feminine 
mannerism, for instance his meticulous attention to Meimei’s makeup, his fondness for 
body grooming (i.e. body scrub, spa and massage) and his soft hand gestures. Sakti has 
been seeking help from a psychiatrist. He has also been taking some drugs online, that are 
proclaimed to ‘cure’ homosexuality. His psychiatrist has been trying to convince him that 
homosexuality is not an illness which needs to be cured, and to be gay is becoming 
increasingly acceptable. Yet, Sakti still insists that he wants to be ‘normal’ as he fears 
rejection from his family and society. He comes from an affluent Batak family. As the only 
son, he is expected to carry on his family lineage. His widowed mother places high 
expectations on him that one day, he will marry well into another Batak family and give her 
many grandchildren. Sakti is afraid of shattering her dreams. He has been covering his 
gayness by developing his muscles and having tattoos done in order to look more macho.  
The scene continues with Sakti dropping by the arisan gathering which Meimei is 
attending. There, he meets Andien and other elite young women, members of the arisan 
gathering. Sakti soon becomes the darling boy of these women. He is very affectionate, 
sensitive to women’s feelings, attentive and romantic. He plays a tune on the piano at first 
to himself but soon to an audience of women. He is even invited to take part in the arisan 
group. On their way back to the office, Meimei mentions to Sakti that his emotional 
sensitivity has won him the women’s attention. 
Sakti then meets Nino, a potential client. Nino is a gay film director who is seeking 
help to renovate his film studio. Apparently, he once met Sakti at the gym. Nino likes Sakti 
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and suspects that he has a chance at a romantic liaison because, based on his observation, 
Sakti is possibly a gay too. Nino searches Sakti’s contact details and arranges a meeting 
with him. In their first meeting, Nino confidently tells Sakti that he is gay. Sakti is surprised 
at how Nino is very comfortable and confident with his nonheteronormative sexuality. Nino 
encourages Sakti to be honest at least to himself about his own sexuality. The two then date 
secretly because Sakti is still not ready to tell people about his sexuality, let alone his 
relationship with Nino. 
Nino also begins to be friends with Meimei. After her divorce, Meimei is still heart 
broken. Although she finds out that her ex-husband had been unfaithful to her, she can’t 
help blaming herself for her situation. When Sakti is on a business trip overseas, Nino steps 
in to console her. Meimei finds comfort in Nino’s companionship. She is unaware of 
Nino’s sexuality, or his relationship with Sakti. 
The conflict escalates when Meimei finds out that Nino is gay and in a relationship 
with Sakti. On Nino’s birthday, Andien prepares a surprise. She sneaks into Nino’s 
apartment and brings cake, hoping that Nino would be surprised by her presence. 
Unfortunately, she has to witness Nino arriving at the apartment arm-in-arm with Sakti. She 
also sees their romantic kiss. She is very disappointed. In the situation, Sakti is plagued 
with guilt and shame. Meimei eventually tries to understand Sakti and Nino and accept 
their togetherness. 
The conflict reaches a climax when Sakti has to open up to his mother about his 
sexuality. His mother has just come from Medan. She brings with her one of Sakti’s distant 
cousins, Lita, who she expects to be wedded to Sakti. Sakti cannot hide his sexuality from 
Lita for long as she finds some gay magazines in Sakti’s room. Instead of rejecting Sakti, 
Lita supports him to come out of the closet and tell his mother. Sakti is still not confident 
until the arisan, hosted by Sakti at his house. At that time, his mother accidentally hears 
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him arguing with Nino about their relationship. His mother confronts him with the question 
and says that she does not mind his gayness. She highlights that she wants Sakti to be 
honest with himself and his family. The reaction is beyond Sakti’s expectation. He is 
relieved that everyone that matters for him accepts him as he is. 
The abovementioned climax makes the conflict faced by Andien—her husband’s 
adultery and her revenge less significant. Andien finally finds that her husband has been 
cheating on her. As a revenge, she engages in a series of sexual relations with young male 
escorts. She also falls in love with an art curator, who happens to be a drug addict. One day, 
while she and her boyfriend are driving home from an art gallery, police randomly stop 
their vehicle for weapon possession check. Unfortunately, the police find a package of 
heroin belonging to Andien’s boyfriend. They then are taken into police custody. Andien 
calls Meimei for help. She finally realises that the revenge only hurts herself and her 
family. She returns to her family. 
The resolution offered by the film was ‘honesty’. When each character is honest 
about who they are, life is much simpler and happier. The film closes with Meimei, Sakti 
and Andien able to accept themselves and each other. 
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Plot Summary of Arisan! 2 
Director: Nia Dinata 
Scriptwriter: Nia Dinata 
Release Date: 1 December 2011 
The story revolves around the same main characters, Meimei, Sakti and Andien. In this 
film, they are almost 40 years old and face different sets of problems. The story carries 
heavier baggage in relation to challenging homophobia, raising awareness of cancer and 
different types of family, as well as encouraging women’s agency and their participation in 
politics. The film is narrated by Meimei, the primary driver of the story. We view other 
characters from her perspective. 
The introduction part of the plot is lengthy as the film tries to reintroduce the 
protagonists, their networks and their problems. The film opens with Meimei reflecting on 
her recent journey to value time. She mentions about how things have changed around her 
in the past eight years. She tells the viewers that Sakti and Nino have broken up and each 
has been dating another man. Andien survives being a single mother and business woman 
in the wake of her husband’s death. Lita was brave enough to raise a son and chooses to 
stay unmarried. As for herself, Meimei says that she is back being single and learning to 
value her remaining time in this world. 
The introduction then moves forward to introducing the problem faced by Nino and 
his queer film activism. As we learned in the previous instalment, Nino is a renowned film 
director. He has been engaged in activism promoting films made by and about LGBTIQ. In 
this second instalment, we see that the Rainbow Film Festival he organises is heavily 
protested against by an unknown group of people despite it having been held seven times 
already. There is a scene showing a demonstration outside the theatre where the film 
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screenings are held. Although the protesters are not wearing religious attributes, they draw 
from religious discourses in their oration. Attendees and organisers are condemned by the 
hostile homophobic protesters as being immoral and supporting pornography. Nino and 
other protagonists of the film tend to see the public protest as backward and conservative. 
The festival continues despite the protest and lack of protection from the state. Nino, in 
particular, sees that the protest might indicate that the country is heading in a different 
direction considering that it is the seventh queer festival he has held, and the protest has 
only happened now, instead of years ago. 
The story then shifts to Sakti who continues to see his psychiatrist because life as a 
gay man in a heteronormative society has not been easy for him. Sakti has been keeping his 
meetings with the psychiatrist from his friends and family. During the sessions, he usually 
shares his psychological burden with the psychiatrist. This time, he tells his psychiatrist that 
actually he has not moved on from Nino. He still feels jealous every time he sees Nino and 
his new partner together, despite himself dating another man. Sakti is also jealous of 
Gerry’s wife although from the very beginning of their relationship he knows that Gerry is 
not a single guy. Gerry has been keeping the identity of his wife a secret from Sakti. The 
psychiatrist probes why Sakti seems to be afraid of being a single. The question is 
unanswered, and the scene moves on to Meimei in Lombok. 
Meimei, who is battling Hodgkin’s lymphoma, struggles to accept her mortality. 
She hides her medical condition from friends and family. Having exhausted medical 
treatment, she chooses to undertake palliative care. She escapes Jakarta to enjoy a quieter 
life in Lombok, an island east of Bali known for its pristine beaches and mountains. She is 
being treated by a doctor who is an expert in meditation and herbs. She has been staying on 
the island for the past two months. She does not tell her friends about her illness and choice 
of treatment. She lied to her friends that she was taking an extended vacation there. She is 
278 
Appendix 5. Plot Summary of Arisan! 2 
accompanied by Lita’s son, Talu, whom she coparents. Overtime, she develops a close 
relationship with her young healer, Tom, an Buddhist Indonesian of Chinese descent. 
The plot then moves on Andien and her network. Andien has maintained her 
position among the Jakarta elites. She has established a successful event-organiser company 
after the death of her husband. Her clients are mostly Jakarta socialites. Romance-wise, she 
has been seen with a string of men, to the dismay of her twin daughters. She seems to be 
having fun with her current status and her flourishing business. Her elite cliques gossip 
about her being robbed of her fortune by her recent boy-toy. Yet, Andien seems to care 
nothing about what people think about her. According to her, there are too many imperfect 
things in her life, and she wants to take control of her appearance. She has had a series of 
liposuction operations and quite recently she had an eye-lift procedure. In this scene set in a 
Moroccan restaurant, in addition to meeting Lita, Nino and Octa, she also meets her arisan 
ladies and her new elite network, consisting of Dr Joy, a famous plastic surgeon, Ara, an art 
collector and Yayuk Asmara, a successful writer. At a separate table from the arisan ladies, 
Andien is listening to Lita, now a successful young lawyer who is eyeing a seat in 
parliament. Lita tells Andien and Nino that she has been struggling with the personal 
profiling campaigns against her. She has been accused of being gay because of her 
involvement in LGBT activism. Furthermore, Andien also congratulates Nino for the 
success of the film festival. Once Lita, Nino and Octa leave, Andien joins the arisan ladies 
at another table.  
Nino is trying hard to fit into his new boyfriend’s world. His friends do not 
particularly approve of his relationship with Octa because to them, Octa is dependent, 
clingy, possessive and too obsessed with social media presence. But they respect Nino’s 
decision. Octa suspects that Nino and Sakti actually have not moved on from each other. 
279 
Evi Eliyanah 
Thus, Octa still feels insecure when they meet Sakti. Moreover, the circle of friends expects 
that Sakti and Nino will get back together. 
After keeping her medical condition a secret for quite a while, Meimei does not 
realise that her secret has accidentally been revealed. Sakti, who is also Meimei’s business 
partner, accidentally finds out that she is terminally ill with cancer. Unintentionally, he 
receives a report about Meimei’s hospital bills from Singapore International Hospital from 
his employee at the office. Sakti is shocked to learn about Meimei’s condition. He calls his 
circle of friends for a meeting to discuss Meimei’s condition. Then, Lita makes a call to 
Meimei checking on how she is doing, while the others are listening. To their surprise, 
Meimei’s voice sounds very vibrant and healthy. They seem to be confused of what is 
actually happening to her.  
Meimei herself has been enjoying her treatment and vacation in Lombok. The 
palliative care she has been receiving from Tom has helped to stabilise her condition. But, 
there are still episodes where her cancer wreaks havoc with her immune system and makes 
her weak. Meimei meets Molly, a wise bartender also suffering from cancer. Molly 
comforts Meimei and says that cancer is actually a blessing—they are among the few 
people who know that their time in this world is going to end soon, so they have to enjoy 
the remaining time well. Apparently, Molly was previously Tom’s patient. 
Meimei finally gives in to the pressure of her friends and work. She returns to 
Jakarta for a brief period. Tom goes with Meimei and Talu her to the airport. While they 
are catching a flight to Jakarta, Tom is heading to Yogyakarta to attend the Vesak service at 
Borobudur temple. Meimei and Talu are picked up by Sakti. On their way to Meimei’s 
house, Talu tells Sakti—a father figure—that he has adopted another father, Tom. This 
conversation gives Sakti a cue that Meimei has a special relationship with her healer. At 
home, Meimei and Talu are welcomed by Andien, Lita and Nino. No one confronts Meimei 
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about her illness. They are just happy to see Meimei looking happy and fresh. While Lita is 
spending the night with Talu, the rest are going to their nostalgic Chinese restaurant. 
Meimei is no longer on a diet. She wants to eat everything she has missed for the past nine 
years. Accidentally, they meet Gerry and his daughter. Andien suddenly realises that Sakti 
is dating Dr Joy’s husband. Sakti himself is a patient of Dr Joy. Andien does not tell Sakti 
about Gerry’s wife’s identity immediately. 
The next scene is a book launching and fund raising party for flood victims in 
Jakarta, hosted by Dr Joy and Ara. Andien is the organiser of the event. Despite Andien’s 
persistence, Meimei skips the party and chooses to go to Borobudur to attend the Vesak 
service with Tom. There she listens to a moving sermon about life and death, which 
reminds her of her own mortality. At the party, the elite clique meets with other elite 
networks, including celebrities. By the end of the party, Andien reveals to Sakti that Gerry 
is Dr Joy’s husband. When the party is almost over, Gerry arrives. He meets Sakti who 
confronts him about the fact he just discovered. Gerry assures Sakti that his wife already 
knows of their affair and does not mind it. 
The next day, Sakti is invited to have breakfast with Gerry and Dr Joy at their 
mansion. During breakfast, Sakti is offered an arrangement, which is not revealed to the 
audience. Dr Joy also clearly states that she does not mind their relationship as long as they 
are discreet. Guessing from Sakti’s rejection and decision to break up his relationship with 
Gerry, the arrangement does not suit him and sounds absurd. Suddenly, Ara joins them for 
breakfast. Dr Joy exhibits a romantic public display of affection with Ara, who has been her 
long-time business partner. 
Meanwhile, Meimei is back in Lombok. She does not say goodbye to her friends 
this time. She really wants to enjoy her remaining time without being burdened by the 
pretentious networks of Jakarta elites. She loves her friends, but she cannot be the person 
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she used to be because she has limited time. She wants to spend the limited time in a 
quieter place and find peace. She starts making recordings of her activities. She meets again 
with Molly at the reggae bar. She asks Tom to join her at the bar one night to dance. There 
Tom meets Molly, his former patient. Molly asks him to help Meimei deal with her 
unstable condition. The three of them then spend the night together at Molly’s place. 
Knowing about Meimei’s severe condition, the elite clique decides to visit her in 
Lombok. They want to comfort her and be part of her healing process. They want to give 
Meimei a surprise visit. The trip to the island is not as easy as expected for Andien and 
Octa. They have to take a small boat to reach the island where Meimei is being treated. 
Once they are there, they have difficulty in locating Meimei’s villa. They meet her the day 
after their arrival. When they meet, Meimei can hardly face them. She just plays a video 
she has prepared for them. They cry and then offer comfort to her. It is during this trip that 
Nino eventually breaks up with Octa. Octa is aware that Nino has not moved on from Sakti 
and the same goes for Sakti. Octa leaves the island after breaking up with Nino. Sakti and 
Nino rekindle their romance to the delight of their friends. The film ends with the 
protagonists are enjoying their time together at the beach where they are joined by Tom and 
Molly. 
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List of Research Participants 
The following list is made in order of appearance. The date in the brackets is when I 
conducted interview(s) with the respective participants. 
Filmmakers 
Chairun Nisa (08 March 2014) 
Putut Widjanarko (10 March 2014) 
Prima Rusdi (12 March 2014) 
Anggun Priambodo (17 March 2014) 
Ucu Agustin (20 March 2014) 
Tumpal Tampubolon (1 April 2014) 
Jujur Prananto (2 April 2014) 
Riri Riza (10 April 2014) 
Gina S. Noer (11 April 2014) 
Salman Aristo (11 April 2014) 
Imam Tantowi (14 April 2014) 
Garry (pseudonym, 17 April 2014) 
Hanung Bramantyo (21 April 2014, 18 and 19 August 2014) 
Didi Petet (17 April 2014)1 
Titien Wattimena (23 April 2014) 
Beta Inggrid Ayuningtyas (23 April 2014) 
Ilya Sigma (27 April 2014) 
Putrama Tuta (27 April 2014) 
Manoj Punjabi (2 May 2014) 
Anirudya Mitra (6 May 2014) 
Priesnanda Dwisatria (9 May 2014) 
Mandy Marahimin (16 May 2014) 
Amelia Hapsari (20 May 2014) 
Faozan Rizal (22 May 2014) 
Nia Dinata (28 May 2014) 
Lucky Kuswandi (28 May 2014) 
DS Nugraheni (22 January 2016) 
Shanty Harmayn (04 April 2016) 
Oki Setianadewi (08 March 2017) 
1 Didi Petet passed away on 15 May 2015. 
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Feminist activists 
Syaldi Sahude (07 March 2014) 
BJD Gayatri (22 September 2014) 
Mariana Amiruddin (29 September 2014) 
Sabar Riyadi (11 September 2014) 
Saeroni (11 September 2014) 
Myra Diarsi (1 October 2014) 
Sri Kusyuniati (11 October 2014) 
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